

EWS-84

THE WORLD'S HISTORY

THE WORLD'S HISTORY

A SURVEY OF MAN'S RECORD

EDITED BY

DR. H. F. HELMOLT

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY THE

RIGHT HON. JAMES BRYCE, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S.

VOLUME VIII

WESTERN EUROPE. THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

WITH PLATES AND MAPS



WILLIAM HEINEMANN

1907

E 12584

PREFACE

THE scope and method of the great undertaking of which this volume is the last instalment are carefully explained in the introductory chapter to the first volume, contributed by Dr. Hans F. Helmolt, the German general editor. His scheme may be summarised in the words of Herodotus, the Father of History: "I will discourse of the cities of men, both great and small. For those which in the past were great are now, for the most part small; and those which are great in my time were small in days of old. Seeing, therefore, the instability of human fortunes, I will speak of great and small alike." The object of "The World's History" is to supply a trustworthy account not merely of the nations which are regarded as most important in human history, but of the smallest peoples and of the lands which are most remote from the central hearths of civilisation. That there should be lacunæ in so gigantic an undertaking is only to be expected. Nor has it been possible to observe fixed standards in apportioning the space which was at the disposal of the editor. No doubt critics will object that some of the great empires and nations are treated more summarily than others of less note. But, with a view to the convenience of the general reader, it has seemed advisable to give more latitude to those contributors who deal with unhackneyed subjects and who provide information that cannot be obtained from any of the older books of reference.

The plan of the History is a compromise between two methods. On the one hand, special sections are devoted to each geographical unit of the world's surface; and in this connection we may point out that the history of the seas and oceans has been treated with as much care as that of the continents. But, again, since there are broad movements and forces in history which cut across the lines of geographical boundaries, another set of sections has been devoted to the history of groups or communities of nations which have from time to time been formed by the operation of economic forces, racial ties, and intellectual sympathies. Had either of these methods—that of culture-history or that of historical geography—been adopted to the exclusion of the other, our History might have gained in logical symmetry; but it would certainly have been less catholic and less satisfactory as a work of reference.

The great difficulty has been that of arrangement; and it has been all the greater because certain changes of scheme were necessitated when the work was

already far advanced and in part published. We feel that it is only due to the reader that the whole scheme should be laid before him in an orderly conspectus.

The following table gives a list of the chief sections which are written from the geographical standpoint, with the names of the authors and the number of the volume in which each section occurs :

THE PACIFIC OCEAN. By Count Edward Wilczek and Professor Karl Weule. Vol. I.

THE INDIAN OCEAN. By Professor Karl Weule. Vol. II.

THE MEDITERRANEAN. By Count Edward Wilczek and Dr. Hans Helmolt. Vol. IV.

THE BALTIC. By Professor Karl Weule and Dr. Joseph Girgensohn. Vol. VI.

THE ATLANTIC. By Professor Karl Weule. Vol. VIII.

THE AMERICAN CONTINENT. By Professor Konrad Haebler. Vol. I.

ASIA. (a) *Eastern Asia*. By Max von Brandt. Vol. II.

(β) *Central Asia*. By Dr. Heinrich Schurtz. Vol. II.

(γ) *Western Asia*. By Dr. Hugo Winckler and Dr. Heinrich Schurtz. Vol. II.

(δ) *India*. By Professor Emil Schmidt. Vol. II.

AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA. By Professor Karl Weule. Vol. II.

INDONESIA. By Dr. Heinrich Schurtz. Vol. II.

AFRICA (South and Central). By Dr. Heinrich Schurtz. Vol. III.

EGYPT. By Carl Niebuhr. Vol. III.

NORTH AFRICA. By Dr. Heinrich Schurtz. Vol. IV.

EUROPE. (A) *Mediterranean Peoples*.

(a) Black Sea and E. Mediterranean. By Dr. Karl Brandis. Vol. IV.

(β) Turkey in Europe. By Professor Heinrich Zimmerer. Vol. V.

(γ) Greece. By Professor Rudolf von Scala. Vols. IV. and V.

(δ) Ancient Italy. By Professor Karl Pauli and Professor Julius Jung. Vol. IV.

Mediaeval and Modern Italy. By Dr. Hans Helmolt. Vol. VI.

The Unification of Italy. By Dr. Heinrich Friedjung. Vol. III.

(ε) Spain. By Dr. Heinrich Schurtz. Vol. IV.

(B) *Eastern and South-Eastern Europe*.

(a) The Danube Peoples. By Dr. Heinrich Wlislöcki and Dr. Hans Helmolt. Vol. V.

(β) Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. By Dr. Berthold Bretholz. Vol. V.

(γ) Russia and Poland. By Professor Vladimir Milkowicz. Vol. V.

(δ) The Slovenian and Croatian Race. By Professor Vladimir Milkowicz. Vol. V.

(C) *Northern Europe.*

- (a) Scandinavia. By Dr. Hans Schjöth. Vol. VI.
- (β) Great Britain. Re-written for the English edition by H. W. C. Davis, M.A. Vol. VI.

(D) *Central and Western Europe. Early and Medieval Period.*

- (a) Germany. By Professor Eduard Heyck. Vol. VI.
- (β) The Celts. By Professor Eduard Heyck. Vol. VI.
- (γ) The Franks and Early France. By Dr. Hans Helmolt. Vol. VI.
- (δ) The Eastward Expansion of Germany. By Professor Richard Mayr. Vol. VI.

(E) *Central and Western Europe. Modern Period.*

- (a) The Rise of the Great Powers. By Professor Hans von Zwiédineck Südenhorst. Vol. VII.
- (β) The Unification of Germany. By Dr. Heinrich Friedjung. Vol. VIII.
- (γ) Western Europe, 1866-1902. By Professor Richard Mayr. Vol. VIII.

It will be observed that as we approach the modern period and enter upon the history of Western Europe the difficulty of a precise geographical method becomes greater and greater. It is in the seventh and eighth volumes, which are more particularly concerned with Western Europe, that the methods of culture-history have been most freely used. Some of the most important articles in this section treat the whole of Western Europe as forming in certain aspects one community with a homogeneous civilisation. The sections on the culture-history of earlier ages, which are scattered up and down the earlier volumes, should be read as an introduction to Vols. VII. and VIII.—that is, as describing certain phases in the evolution of culture which have more or less deeply influenced the Europe of our own day. The following is a list of the sections which relate to culture-history :

- (1) The Relation of Man to Nature. By Friedrich Ratzel. Vol. I.
- (2) The Prehistoric Age. By Professor Johannes Ranke. Vol. I.
- (3) Hellenism. By Professor Rudolf von Scala. Vol. V.
- (4) The Rise of Christianity. By Professor Wilhelm Walther. Vol. IV.
- (5) The Formation of the Romance Peoples. By Professor Karl Pauli and Dr. Hans Helmolt. Vol. VI.
- (6) The Diffusion of Christianity. By Professor Wilhelm Walther. Vol. VI.
- (7) Economic Development of Western Europe. By Professor Richard Mayr. Vol. VII.
- (8) Renaissance, Reformation, and Counter-Reformation. By Dr. Armin Tille. Vol. VII.
- (9) Western Christianity since the Reformation. By Professor Wilhelm Walther. Vol. VII.
- (10) The Social Question. By Professor Georg Adler. Vol. VII.

It should, however, be remembered that all the writers on national and geographical history have been careful to emphasise in their articles the special contributions of the several races and countries with which they deal to the general growth of civilisation. In fact, their rule has been to give only so much of dynastic and military history as will suffice to explain and illustrate the growth of ideas, principles and tendencies. Some of them are pupils of Professor Lamprecht, the most eminent of modern culture-historians; and all of them have come under the influence of the ideas which he has done so much to impress upon the rising generation of historical students.

In conclusion, we have only to emphasise the fact that the scheme of the present work is more comprehensive than that of any previous universal history. In an undertaking of such magnitude it is too much to hope that criticism will detect no serious shortcomings. The writer who ventures, in the present state of our knowledge, to narrate the history of Africa, or South America, or Oceania, is in the position of a pioneer, and as a pioneer is entitled to special indulgence. Again, it would have been easy to produce the effect of closer interconnection between the several articles if the scope of the work had been artificially narrowed. But such a limitation of the field of history implies a dogmatic view of human progress which is out of place among historical students. Our contributors look rather to the future than to the past. They are convinced that the growth of *Weltpolitik* must have the effect of bringing all the seas and continents into the story of human development; and they have parted company with their predecessors so far as to insist that the outlook of the historian must be widened to the same degree as the outlook of the statesman. This is perhaps a simple truth. But, like many of an even simpler nature, it has hitherto failed to obtain the recognition which it deserves; and, indeed, it is only in the course of the last fifty years that the material which such a conception requires has been made available. It is the hope of the Editors and the Publishers that these eight volumes of the "World's History" will not only be found useful as a *résumé* of the great additions which recent studies have made to our knowledge, but will also do something to promote further research along the catholic and broad-minded lines which Dr. Helmolt and Mr. Bryce have indicated in their introductory essays.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

WESTERN EUROPE AT THE AGE OF THE REVOLUTION; NAPOLEON AND THE REACTION.

1. The Condition of France before 1789 *Pages 1-7*
2. The Revolution: (A) The Constituent Assembly; (B) The Legislative Assembly; (C) The Convention *Pages 7-24*
3. The Age of Napoleon I.: (A) Bonaparte; (B) Napoleon I. *Pages 24-85*
4. The Reaction: (A) The Beginnings of the Second Restoration; (B) The Powers; (C) European Convulsions (from 1823 to the July Revolution, 1830) *Pages 85-132*

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN EUROPE BETWEEN 1830 AND 1859

1. Conservative Aberrations *Pages 133-136*
2. The Fall of the Bourbons in France *Pages 136-143*
3. National Risings between 1830 and 1840: (A) Belgium; (B) Poland; (C) The Revolts in Modena and the Church States; (D) The Effects of the July Revolution upon Germany; (E) The New Kingdom of Greece under Otto I. *Pages 143-155*
4. Religious and Social Movements from 1830-1850: (A) The Religious Ferment; (B) The First Attempts at a Solution of the Social Question *Pages 155-161*
5. The German Federation and the German Customs Union: (A) Germany as represented by the Diet; (B) The Customs Union; (C) The Beginnings of Frederick William IV. *Pages 161-166*
6. The Collapse of Metternich's System: (A) Conservative Statesmanship in Austria; (B) The Party Struggles in Spain and Portugal; (C) The

- Struggles for Unity in Italy; (*D*) The Downfall of Jesuit Predominance in Switzerland; (*E*) The Romantic and Constitutional Movements in Prussia *Pages* 166-175
7. The February Revolution and its Effects: (*A*) The Foundation of the Second French Republic; (*B*) Revolutionary Movements in Central Europe; (*C*) The Convocation of the German Parliament
Pages 176-190
8. The Struggles for the Right of national Autonomy: (*A*) Italy; (*B*) The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1848-1849; (*C*) Schleswig-Holstein; (*D*) Pan-Slavism and the Poles *Pages* 190-213
9. The Red and the Democratic Republic in France: (*A*) The Radicals in May and June, 1848; (*B*) The Presidency of Louis Napoleon; (*C*) The Restoration of the temporal Supremacy of the Pope; (*D*) The *Coup d'Etat* *Pages* 213-220
10. Liberalism, Radicalism, and the Reaction in Germany: (*A*) The Frankfort Parliament; (*B*) Prussia's Attempt at federal Reform *Pages* 220-235
11. Political and ecclesiastical Retrogression, 1850-1853: (*A*) The reactionary Movement in Western Policy after 1850; (*B*) Ecclesiastical reactionary Movements in Relation to the State *Pages* 236-242
12. The Fluctuations of Power under the Influence of the second French Empire to the year 1859: (*A*) The Crimean War; (*B*) The Downfall of Austria in Italy *Pages* 242-254

CHAPTER III

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY AND GERMANY (1859-1866)

1. Preliminary Remarks *Pages* 255-257
2. The Union of Italy: (*A*) Retrospect of the first Half of the Nineteenth Century; (*B*) The Ministry of Rattazzi; (*C*) The Second Ministry of Cavour; (*D*) Garibaldi; (*E*) Cavour's End; (*F*) The Roman Question. The Fall of Ricasoli and Garibaldi *Pages* 257-271
3. The Failures of the Emperor Napoleon III. *Pages* 271-273
4. Military Reform and the Constitutional Struggle in Prussia; (*A*) The Ministry of Hohenzollern-Schwerin; (*B*) The Army Reform; (*C*) The Attitude of the Landtag; (*D*) The Summons of Bismarck
Pages 273-281
5. Bismarck's first Fights: (*A*) His Antagonism to the Chamber of Representatives and to the Crown Prince; (*B*) The German Question; (*C*) Austria as a Constitutional State; (*D*) The Diet of Princes at Frankfort
Pages 281-286
6. The Struggle for Schleswig-Holstein: (*A*) The Hereditary Right to the Duchies; (*B*) The War with Denmark; (*C*) The Treaty of Gastein;

(*D*) The Rupture between Austria and Prussia ; (*E*) War Preparations of the two Nations ; (*F*) Final Negotiations and the Outbreak of War

Pages 286-295

7. The Decisive Struggle : (*A*) Hanover ; (*B*) The War in Bohemia ; (*C*) The Battle of Custoza *Pages* 296-302

8. The Last Struggles and the Conclusion of Peace : (*A*) The Advance of the Prussians to the Danube ; the Struggles in Western and Southern Germany ; (*B*) Nicholsburg ; Lissa ; (*C*) Bismarck's Diplomacy

Pages 302-305

CHAPTER IV

WESTERN EUROPE IN THE YEARS 1806-1902

1. Western Europe, 1806-1871 : (*A*) The Amalgamation of the new Provinces with the Kingdom of Prussia, (*B*) The Establishment of the North German Confederation ; (*C*) The Difficulties and Expedients of Napoleon ; (*D*) The Consolidation of Germany ; (*E*) Austro-Hungary after 1866 ; (*F*) Great Britain ; Parliamentary Reform ; Ireland ; Abyssinia ; (*G*) The Roman Question ; The Consequences of the Treaty of September, 1864 ; (*H*) New Complications ; (*J*) The Outbreak of the Franco-German War ; (*K*) The War of Germany against the French Empire ; (*L*) The War of Germany against the French Republic

Pages 306-354

2. Western Europe, 1871-1902 : (*A*) The German Empire ; (*B*) Austria-Hungary ; (*C*) Great Britain ; (*D*) France ; (*E*) Spain ; (*F*) Italy ; (*G*) Switzerland ; (*H*) Belgium ; (*J*) The Netherlands . *Pages* 354-387

CHAPTER V

THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ATLANTIC

1. Configuration and Position *Pages* 388-391

2. The Age before Columbus : (*A*) Until the Retirement of the Romans from the North Sea ; (*B*) From the Sixth to the Fifteenth Century

Pages 391-399

3. The Age after Columbus : (*A*) The Atlantic Ocean as an Educational Force ; (*B*) The Part played by the Atlantic Ocean in the Struggle for Supremacy in the World's Commerce ; (*C*) The Atlantic Ocean after the Napoleonic War *Pages* 399-412

4. Retrospect *Pages* 412-413

ILLUSTRATIONS

PLATES

The Chief Actors in the French Revolution	<i>Facing page</i>	2
The Three Notifications of the "Moniteur" which refer to the Execution of Louis XVI.	,	16
Napoleon Bonaparte at Four Stages of his Career	„	24
The Representatives of Russia, France, Austria, and the Curia about 1800	„	34
Chief Actors in the Liberation of Germany	„	62
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 (<i>Coloured</i>)	„	74
Introduction and Conclusion of the Holy Alliance of Sep- tember 26, 1815	„	88
Caricatures of Members of the National Conference at Frank- fort and of the Prussian Kreuzzeitung Party in 1849	„	186
The Danish Line-of-Battle Ship "Christian VIII." blown up at Eckernförde	„	210
Introduction, Middle, and Conclusion of the Constitution of the German Empire of March 28, 1849	„	228
The Congress of Paris in the year 1856 (<i>Coloured</i>)	„	246
Otto von Bismarck at Four Stages of his Career	„	330
Important Extracts from the preliminary Peace of Versailles and the Peace of Frankfort of February 26 and May 10, 1871	„	354

MAPS

France from 1774 to the Peace of Lunéville, 1801	<i>Facing page</i>	10
Central Europe in the year 1813	„	58
Prussia in the Nineteenth Century	„	304
The War of 1870-71	„	340
The Atlantic Ocean	„	388
Chart of Trade Routes	„	410

I

WESTERN EUROPE AT THE AGE OF THE REVOLUTION, NAPOLEON AND THE REACTION

By PROF. DR. ARTHUR KLEINSCHMIDT

1. THE CONDITION OF FRANCE BEFORE 1789

NO revolution of ancient or modern times has obtained such a unique popularity as the Revolution of 1789, that terrible picture of sin and retribution, full of light and shade, beauty and blood, of fair ideals and foul crimes, and original in the widest sense of the word. Michelet actually called it "The accession of law, the resurrection of right, the reaction of justice." That was merely a phrase; the "days of innocence" soon flew past, and the massacres followed. Every other revolution was restricted by geographical limits, that of 1789 destroyed all boundaries, and had no country of its own; but it aspired to sweep away all frontiers, and unite all nations in a single spiritual commonwealth. Like a creed aiming to become a world religion, it had its preachers and its propaganda; it was as intolerant as a world religion, but it admitted no divine worship, recognised no future existence, and restricted itself to the material and the earthly. It wished to bring to all the freedom which it believed it had won for itself; it offered the kiss of brotherly affection to its arch-enemy, England; it cared for no nationality, but was international. And this impulse toward universality opened the doors to it wherever it knocked. It is little wonder that such a religion, seething and fermenting with the strength of youth, was antagonistic to Christianity. It rejected a church that was based on predestination and the favour of God to the wealthy,—it called that an immeasurable injustice, and demanded equality of rights for all, equality before God and man.

And yet this international revolution was also a local one; it could not occur anywhere except in the France of the eighteenth century. There, above all, the *ancien régime* had lost its vitality, and had no nerve, no backbone. Nowhere was the old political wisdom so exhausted, so sapless, as there; nowhere glowed a more fiery hatred of despotism and feudalism; nowhere had the specious promises of modern philosophy so undermined the ground on which the throne stood. And seated on that throne was no enlightened despot like Frederick the Great, no Maria Theresa, commanding respect from all Europe. The "first-born" kingdom

of the Church was represented by the Regent and Louis XV, who undermined morality by their licentious pleasures, and forfeited respect by mean trading in the hunger of their people. They allowed themselves every excess, and trampled the nation under their feet. The nation became restive under the burden of royal tyranny, and of that caste system which was arrogant in spite of political impotence, and doubly detested for that very reason. Callousness and indifference gnawed the vitals of the people. The land bled from a thousand wounds, and the army, so long the pride of France, was dishonoured by the stain of Rossbach. According to Quinet's view, a thunderbolt ought to have descended on the monarchy at the time of the Spanish War of Succession, and only the patience of the nation allowed another century of sin to be added to the list. Peter the Great, as far back as 1717, after his visit to Versailles, thought that the senseless luxury of the court must ruin fair France; Montesquieu did not shrink from admitting that things could not go on longer as they were, the *ancien régime* was untenable; and Rousseau dinned into his countrymen's ears, "Awake, your will is the law, is God; be no longer slaves, but kings!" Louis XV, on the contrary, sunk in corruption, said with laboured wit, "I am an old man: it will see my time out; my grandson can take care of himself."

It was unfortunate for France and the world that this grandson and successor was Louis XVI, who "could love, forgive, suffer, and die, but was incapable of ruling," — a prince of romance, ill suited to the tragedy in which he was fated to play a part. And at his side was Marie Antoinette, a woman never weary of pleasure, a true Viennese, the easy prey of calumny, the impolitic daughter of a politic mother, who was a more royal and manly character than Louis, but yet unstable and inexperienced. Then, if ever, France needed a Henry IV, who would have been able to watch over the demands of an age eager for reform, and to grant favours with prudent moderation; it needed an energetic and liberal sovereign, fertile in plans, bold and renowned, who would have commanded reverence and warm affection. Such a sovereign must have carried out the inevitable revolution by a *coup d'état* from above without bloodshed, and would not have ventured to entrust its conduct to his people. A slave to the influence and the innuendoes of others, the puppet of his relations, of parties, ministers, and courtiers, possessing no knowledge of persons or events, Louis XVI was wearied by any intellectual exertion, avoided the bulk of his duties, and frittered away his time in hunting or in the workshops of locksmiths and watchmakers. He remained absolutely moral in the midst of the most profligate court in the world, but he was devoid of self-reliance, firmness, or royal dignity. Weak monarchies stake their existence at the precise moment when they wish to lighten the burden that rests on their people; for the people shakes itself entirely free from the detested yoke that now is easily slipped off. Louis made experiments with a series of reforms, and revealed the weakness of the *ancien régime*, when he promised to amend it. He may have shown in his proclamation to the attentive nation how disgracefully it had hitherto been treated, and under what shameful circumstances it had suffered and bled; but he soon revived these conditions and renewed the now doubly hated abuses. Though more disposed in favour of the union of all classes than any other Bourbon, he nevertheless followed the principle, "Divide et impera." While he was the most unfortunate representative of absolute monarchy, he still looked down with Bourbon pride on the position of a British sovereign.



THE CHIEF ACTORS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

EXPLANATION OF PORTRAITS ON THE OTHER SIDE

1. Jacques Necker (1732-1804); painted by J. S. Duplessis-Bertaux, engraved by A. de Saint Aubin.
2. Honoré Gabriel Victor Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau (1749-1791); painted by Ch. Boze, engraved by E. Beisson.
3. Queen Marie Antoinette (1755-1793); painted by François Janinet.
4. King Louis XVI (1754-1793); painted in 1785 by J. Boze, engraved by B. L. Henrquez.
5. Maximilien Marie Isidore Robespierre (1758-1794); drawn by J. Guérin, engraved by F. G. Fiessinger.
6. Georges Jacques Danton (1759-1791).

(1, 2, 4, and 5 are after the "Allgemeines Historisches Porträtwerk" of Woldemar von Siedlitz; 3, from a coloured portrait in the Royal Collection of Engravings at Dresden, 6, after an old anonymous lithograph.)

Louis made terrible mistakes in the choice of his first ministers. The premier Count Maurepas was nothing better than a place-hunter of ordinary calibre, who wished to make the fullest profit out of his office, and put every obstacle in the path of all who, like Turgot and Malesherbes, wished to act honourably toward their king and country. The able minister of finance, Turgot, aspired to make the nation and government one; he wished to free the labour on the land and the ownership of land from all feudal burdens, to abolish all compulsory labour service and privileges, to do away with customs and local tolls within the kingdom, and to join all Frenchmen together by the ties of commercial intercourse. They were to be accustomed to public life by provincial assemblies, and prepared for the fresh summoning of the states-general; he wished to see a land tax levied upon all, — in short, he tried to build up political reforms on the basis of social reforms, just as Stein did in Prussia later, and to effect the necessary alterations by means of enactments. His friend Malesherbes, the secretary of state and treasurer of the royal household, demanded equal rights and equal security for all, a renewal of the Edict of Nantes, and the abolition of torture and of *lettres de cachet* (arbitrary arrests).

But Malesherbes and Turgot fell in May, 1776, for Louis did not wish to reconstruct France, and the privileged classes were opposed to any universal land tax. The nation lost its confidence in the crown, and this latter sacrificed its future, since it gave the clergy and the nobility the preference over the people. The clergy, as great landed proprietors, possessed a third of the soil, with a revenue of 130,000,000 francs (£5,000,000 sterling) and a million and a half of serfs (*main-mortables*), but yet were free from most taxes, and confined themselves to *dons gratuits* (voluntary gifts) to the crown. They lived secular lives, indulged in worldly pleasures, and were as far removed from genuine piety as Talleyrand and Rohan showed them to be. With all this they asserted toward Rome a certain independence, which rested on the four articles of the Gallican Church of 1682. The new philosophy concentrated all its fury against the Church, preached atheism, wished to depose God, and overthrow all authority; and the Church missed the statesmanlike prelates which it had formerly possessed, men like Richelieu, Mazarin, and Fleury, thinkers like Fénelon, Bossuet, and Malebranche, orators like Fléchier, Massillon, and Bourdaloue. Effete and sterile, it could not withstand the growing storm of the Revolution. It was split up into a nobility consisting of the prelates, which was recruited mainly from among the noblest families, and a people, the inferior clergy. Both sections hated each other; the one feared, the other desired, the Revolution as the first step toward equalisation of rights. The nobles were never so detested as now, when they had sunk from the position of local rulers to that of supple courtiers, and never appeared on their estates except to collect the rents, which they squandered in Versailles. It was only in La Vendée and Brittany that the nobles lived a patriarchal life and continued to be the friends and respected counsellors of the people. Everywhere else they represented a rigid caste; they made themselves hated from their ridiculous pride, and they owned some third of the soil, in addition to many valuable privileges. They too were divided into the higher and the lower nobility; the two sections were disunited, and powerless against the coming revolution. Besides the *noblesse d'épée* (or knightly nobility) there was also the *noblesse de robe* (nobility of office). The crown could rely neither on clergy nor on nobility; the future

belonged to the Third Estate, which official France contemptuously ignored; it comprised twenty-five million souls, while the two privileged classes together did not amount to half a million. There was no middle class of proprietors. In France, as Arthur Young noticed in 1791, there were only *latifundia* and small holdings, and the small holdings, which made up a third of the soil, were in the hands of peasants. The Revolution first created the middle class of landowners. No one spoke so loudly of the abuses of the *ancien régime* as the Third Estate, to which it was nevertheless indebted for many privileges. It hated the nobility, whose property it had partially obtained, despised the voluptuous clergy, which it rivalled in religious indifference, and scoffed at the poor man, who, as *misera contribuens plebs*, did not appear its equal. All classes were thus disunited and divided among themselves.

Turgot's entire work was ruined under incompetent successors. Even when Jacques Necker, the Genevese, was placed at the head of the finances in June, 1777, there was still scope for Maurepas' machinations; for Necker, as a Protestant, could not become a member of the council of state, and come into close contact with the king. Necker was intolerably proud; he plumed himself upon his strict morality, but could never rise to any lofty ideal. He considered himself a genius, and yet hated all genius in others, as he had shown by his behaviour to Turgot and Mirabeau. He was no statesman, and had no talent for administration; he was merely a banker, but disinterested and incorruptible. Without thinking of the future, he tried to alleviate the distress of the moment; but he was incapable of organising the shattered finances, and contented himself with specious appearances. While his name was a power on the money market, and the bourses at home and abroad were open to him, he incurred new debts to cover the old, anticipated the coming years by loans, borrowed in five years 530,000,000 francs (£21,000,000), and worked with a permanent deficit.

Public opinion compelled him to take part in the war of Great Britain and her American colonies and to incur fresh debts. The oldest kingdom allied itself with the youngest republic. The young nobles were enthusiastic for the pioneers of political freedom in the New World. Lafayette, Custine, Lameth, Rochambeau, and others shed their blue blood there, and by so doing won the approval even of the Third Estate, who formerly had been their bitter foes. The appearance of Benjamin Franklin at the court of Versailles (cf. Vol. I, p. 468) and his affected simplicity procured for America the alliance of the *Roi Très-Chrétien*; and when Rochambeau's troops, having become familiar with the freedom of the New World, returned to their despotically governed home after the peace of Versailles in 1783, they brought back with them republican ideas and the germs of revolution.

Necker's operations failed; he himself followed the path of Turgot, whom he had previously opposed, and ventured on what was an unprecedented step, considering the mystery in which the *ancien régime* had loved to shroud itself. Remembering the British budgets, he published in 1781 a "*Compte-rendu présenté au roi*," or statement of accounts to the king. The work shows traces of deliberate embellishment; it lays stress upon all improvements in the incomings, and skilfully conceals the deductions; presents a quite false picture, denies the deficit, which amounted to over two hundred and eighteen millions, and speaks of ten millions surplus. The *compte-rendu* hurried on the Revolution, for now the nation was supplied with statistics of the senseless and ruinous extravagance which prevailed

at court; but it was fatal to Necker, for Maurepas overthrew him on May 19, 1781. This gave the opposition, which was headed by the Duke of Orleans and the Prince of Condé, the opportunity to flatter Necker's pride by ovations and to magnify his dismissal into a national disaster.

After the death of Maurepas, in November of the year 1781, the king did not appoint another premier, and became more dependent on the queen, who had just given birth to the dauphin. Necker's immediate successors, Joly de Fleury and d'Ormesson, held office for a brief period, and on October 3, 1783, the Marquis de Calonne, a profligate and spendthrift roué, became "controller general," or director of finance. His system of the most mad extravagance with an empty treasury at once satisfied the courtiers; he called an unbounded expenditure of money the true principle of credit, and scoffed at economy. The parasites sang the praises of the *ministre par excellence*, for whom millions were but as counters, while the people received "*panem et circenses*" (food and amusement) through his great public works in Paris, Cherbourg, etc. Calonne reduced Necker's system of borrowing to a fine art. All money melted in his hands, and in order to obtain loans he was forced at once to give up large sums to the bankers; as unconscientious as John Law in the second decade of the eighteenth century, he courted bankruptcy. The scandalous affair of the Diamond Necklace, into which the queen's name was dragged by vile calumniators, was a fitting product of Calonne's age of gross corruption. When he was at an end of his resources he brewed a compound of the reforming schemes of Vauban, Colbert, Turgot, and Necker, put it before Louis in August, 1786, and requested him to go back to the system of 1774, and to employ the abuses to the benefit of the monarchy. At the same time he induced him to act as Charlemagne and Richelieu had acted in their day, and summon an assembly of notables, by which order could easily be established. He extolled his administration before it, and attacked Necker. This led to a paper war between them, resulting in the triumph of Necker. When Calonne demanded a universal land tax, he was met by shouts of "no" from every side, and the notables insisted on learning the extent of the deficit. He admitted at last that it amounted to one hundred and fifteen millions. The archbishop of Toulouse then brought up the clergy to the attack, and reckoned out a deficit of one hundred and forty millions. The court effected the fall of Calonne in April 9, 1787, and the quack left France, while the popular voice clamoured for the return of Necker. The courtiers, however, persuaded Louis to summon the Archbishop de Brienne, who had overthrown Calonne, and actually to nominate him "principal minister."

Archbishop Loménie de Brienne was an actor of exceptional versatility, a philosophising self-indulgent place-seeker, who wished to carry measures by the employment of force, and yet was discouraged at the least resistance. When the notables refused him the land tax, he dismissed them; they now took back home with them full knowledge of the abuses prevailing at Versailles, and paved the way for the Revolution. The archbishop had a very simple plan by which to meet the financial problem, but he soon was involved in strife with the parliament. The people sided with the latter, clubs sprang into existence, pamphlets were aimed at the court, especially at "Madame Deficit," the queen, and her friend the duchess of Polignac, whose picture the mob burnt together with that of Calonne. The parliament, exiled to Troyes, concluded after a month a compromise with the government, but insisted on the abandonment of the stamp duty and land tax.

Louis, who posed as an absolute monarch, played a sorry figure in the *séance royale* of November 19, in which the duke of Orleans won for himself a cheap popularity, and in the *lit de justice* (solemn meeting of parliament) of May 18, 1788. On this latter date the parliaments were reduced to the level of simple provincial magistrates, and a supreme court (*cour plénière*) constituted over them. This was the most comprehensive judicial reform of the *ancien régime*; but the crown did not possess the power to carry it out. The courts as a body suspended their work; parliaments, clergy, nobility, and the Third Estate leagued together against the centralising policy of the crown; Breton nobles laid in Paris the foundation stone of what was afterward to be known as the Jacobin Club; the provinces, especially Dauphiné, were in a ferment; and revolutionary pamphlets were sold in the gardens of the Palais Royal, the residence of the duke of Orleans. Louis, however, lived for the day only. The loyal Malesherbes vainly conjured him not to underestimate the disorders, and pointed out the case of Belgium under Joseph II, and of the American colonies of Great Britain. Louis was too engrossed in hunting to read the memorial.

The winter of 1788-1789 brought France face to face with famine. Brienne was without credit, and a suspension of payments was imminent. It was high time to find an ally against the privileged classes, which granted him no money, and Brienne looked for one in the nation. He invited every one to communicate with him on the subject of the states-general, offered complete liberty of the press on this national question, and let loose a veritable deluge; two thousand seven hundred pamphlets appeared. Their utterances were striking. First and foremost there was the pamphlet of the Abbé Siéyès, vicar-general at Chartres, entitled "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État;" a scathing attack on clergy and nobility, and a glorification of the Third Estate, which Siéyès emphatically declared was the nation, and as such ought to send to the national assembly twice as many representatives as the two other estates. Thirty thousand copies of this pamphlet were in circulation in three weeks. Count d'Antraigues in his pamphlet recalled the proud words with which the justiciar of Aragon did fealty to the king: "We, each of whom is as great as thou, and who combined are far more powerful than thou, promise obedience to thee, if thou wilt observe our rights and privileges; if not, not." The count attacked, with Rousseau, the distinction of classes, explained that no sort of disorder is so terrible as not to be preferable to the ruinous quiet of despotic power, and called the hereditary nobility the heaviest scourge with which an angry heaven could afflict a free nation. Jean Louis Carra called the word "subject" an insult as applied to the members of the assembled estates, and termed the king the agent of the sovereign, that is, of the nation. Even Count Mirabeau, who more than any other had suffered in the fetters of absolute monarchy, took up his pen, called upon the king to abolish all feudalism and all privileges, and counselled him to become the Marcus Aurelius of France by granting a constitution and just laws. His solution was "war on the privileged and their privileges," but his sympathies were thoroughly monarchical. Louis then promised that the states-general, which the popular voice demanded, should meet on May 1, 1789, and dissolved the *cour plénière*. The archbishop, on the other hand, suspended the repayment of the national debt for a year, and adopted such desperate financial measures that every one considered him mad. On August 25 he was dismissed from office; the mob burnt him in effigy and called for Necker, on whom the

country pinned its last hopes. Louis reluctantly summoned him, and this time conceded to him a seat and vote in the council of state.

Necker had hardly become director-general of finance before credit improved. The public funds rose thirty per cent in a day, the capitalists brought back their money, and Necker's name was a power on the bourse. With his boundless self-complacency he hoped to make the ship of state once more seaworthy, although there were barely 500,000 francs (£20,000) in the treasury. He took with one hand what he gave with the other; he borrowed in eight months sixty millions from the discount office, monopolised more than ever the corn trade of the kingdom, and treated the question of the states-general as a jest, while Mirabeau, his most formidable opponent, estimated their value by the words: "The nation has made a century of progress in twenty-four hours. You will see what it can do on the day which gives it a constitution, on the day when intellect also will be a force." Necker did not come down from his curule chair; he made no reforms from above, but stared vacantly into the distance. In vain Malouet, Mounier, and others urged him to overcome his indecision. He preferred to shift the responsibility of answering the question how the states-general, which had not met since 1614, should sit, to a new assembly of notables, which met in November, 1788, but did nothing and was dissolved on December 12. Then on December 27 he pronounced, contrary to it, in favour of doubling the number of representatives of the Third Estate, and published his view in a pamphlet in order to increase his popularity. He did not, however, decide the question whether the voting in the states-general was to be by orders or by heads, while the whole nation was already hurrying to the voting urns. He did not form any combinations in order to be able to guide matters, but sat at his desk and composed the tedious oration in his own praise which he intended to pronounce at the opening of the states-general. The deputies of the clergy were divided, as we have already mentioned (p. 3), into a nobility and a people. The prelates piteously protested, "A complete revolution seems to threaten every political, civil, and religious institution. The people will make an uproar, and will rise against the nobles." The inferior clergy, however, looked forward to that day. The nobility, which had most to lose by this revolution, was equally disunited; and the new age found its representatives neither in the clergy nor the nobility, but in the Third Estate. The electoral law was to a large degree democratic. Among the deputies of the Third Estate the lawyers greatly predominated; there were hardly six country gentlemen. On the other hand, the Third Estate elected a number of nobles and clerics, for instance, Mirabeau and Siéyès. It felt itself the representative of the entire nation.

2. THE REVOLUTION

A. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

WHEN Louis XVI on May 5 appeared at the opening of the states-general, Mirabeau said to his neighbour, "There is the victim;" and the greatest Frenchman of the century listened with undisguised distrust to the three hours' speech of Necker, which was an interminable series of statistics and repetitions, and totally misrepresented the financial position. Since Mirabeau also violently attacked Necker in his journal, the government tried to silence him by force; but he held

his ground, and spoke just as before against the man who proudly wrapt himself in his threadbare cloak of virtue. On the 17th of June the deputies of the Third Estate, having been often foolishly challenged and insulted by the court, constituted themselves the National Assembly. Siéyès' question, What is the Third Estate? was thus answered. The Third Estate jostled aside the two superior classes and proceeded to the order of the day. Necessity compelled the nobles and clergy to unite with it on June 27. One victory after another fell to it; even the voting by heads and not by orders was conceded. On June 20 the deputies administered the "first oath" in the tennis court at Versailles. Louis, it is true, had declared it null and void; but at the close of the royal sitting (June 23), in which Necker meanly deserted the king in order to heighten his own popularity, Mirabeau emphasised the lasting efficacy of the oath, challenged the bayonets, and thus succeeded in affirming the inviolability of the national assembly. These were heavy reverses to the crown, since the army now began to show disloyalty. Where was there any tangible power, if Mirabeau dared to use such language? The court, led by the queen, took fresh courage. The Duke of Broglie received the command over the foreign regiments, which mustered in and round Versailles, Louis refused to withdraw them, and Necker was summarily dismissed on the 11th of July.

Necker hurried so rapidly to Coppet in Switzerland that his arrest was impossible. To the deluded people he appeared a martyr, and riots broke out. Desmoulins termed Necker's dismissal the tocsin for a St. Bartholomew's night of the patriots, and the new ministry of the reaction was completely powerless. Its weakness was proclaimed by the surrender, which is even yet mendaciously glorified as the storming, of the Bastille on that 14th of July when the mob so basely broke the promise which it gave to the few defenders of the old fortress. The revolt had become a revolution, as the Duke of Laroche-foucauld-Liancourt first announced to the astonished monarch on the following night. How bewildered everyone was by the reality! What power the phrase possessed! The trade in stones, in models, in pieces of iron and wood from the Bastille, was world-wide. Lafayette received a sword of honour made out of a bar from the Bastille, and the theatres earned immense sums by "*La Prise de la Bastille*." Schlözer thought that a *Te Deum* must have been sung in heaven for the wonderful event; Klopstock lamented that he had not a hundred tongues to extol the day of freedom; Stolberg, Johannes von Müller, Forster, Eulogius Schneider, and Steffens vied with each other in enthusiasm. In St. Petersburg the passers-by embraced one another in the streets and rejoiced over the foul massacre of the 14th of July.

Louis was compelled to recall Necker on July 16. The latter, with blind self-confidence, accepted office unhesitatingly for the third time, and was conducted in a triumphal procession to Versailles as "father of the people." Louis, on the contrary, had already taken the first step on the road to the scaffold; for his appearance in the national assembly and his offer of reconciliation and confidence on reciprocal terms could only accentuate the ambiguity of his position. While the Count of Artois, his youngest brother, led the great retreat of the first emigration and the fortune-hunting courtiers fled for their lives like cowards, the visit of Louis on July 17 to mutinous Paris degraded his crown. He represented the caricature of a citizen-king by the side of the mayor, Bailly, and Lafayette, the commander-in-chief of the National Guard. When he returned to the queen at Versailles with

the national cockade, "the distinctive badge of the French," she could not suppress the cry, "I did not think to have married a citizen!" Everything bowed before the national assembly, which lay under the hand of the mob. The dictatorship of blood was in sight, and Barnave enquired in the assembly, after the murder of a number of "national enemies," "Is, then, this blood so pure?" Necker revelled in the consciousness that he was the guardian angel of the nation, and was tactless enough to allow a general amnesty, which could only emanate from the monarch, to be granted by the municipal authorities of Paris. Mirabeau, who strained every nerve to obtain Necker's position, attacked him remorselessly, and tried to gain access to the threatened court through Count August von der Mark (Prince Arenberg); the queen, however, allowed herself to be mastered by her feelings, and, calamitously for her, rejected the helper, the "plebeian count" who was notorious for his profligacy. He avenged himself by inciting the populace of Paris, and aimed at the mayoralty, which Bailly, a weak character, was incompetent to administer; but he had to fight for power against the court and Necker on one side, and Jacobins and other claimants on the other. Meanwhile the peasant war raged in the provinces. Law and magistrates were silent before the bandits. Châteaux and monasteries were burnt daily; nobody any longer would pay the taxes; Murat and other despicable creatures commanded the press; and the masses listened to the senseless "*Ça ira*," the favorite song of the Jacobins.

In the midst of this excitement came the night of the 4th of August, the night of deluded infatuation for the nobility and clergy, whose voluntary sacrifice, offered in an excess of self-abnegation, was soon regarded as unworthy of thanks. Mirabeau had before this declared it to be ridiculous that the rights of man should be proclaimed before the country possessed a constitution; but the constituent national assembly was too much in love with abstract principles to hear him. After the reckless proceedings of the night which sounded the knell of feudal France, he wrote to his uncle: "Here you see your Frenchmen. For a month they were wrangling over syllables, and in a night they demolished the entire ancient structure of the monarchy." Yet scarcely anyone in the assembly ventured to suggest that the resolutions of the 4th of August encroached upon the feudal rights of many German states of the empire in Alsace, Lorraine, and Burgundy and prejudiced them without authority. The French rejoiced like children at the victory over tradition and history, and at the public justification of the peasant war of the last few weeks. Not a single voice was conservative, all thoughts and actions were revolutionary, and men tried to spread this movement outside the limits of the country. Disorders, therefore, broke out in the neighbouring secular and spiritual domains; trees of liberty were planted, seditious songs and speeches were heard, all the protests of the States of the Holy Roman Empire were futile. France cared nothing for the right of other people to be free agents, but insisted upon forcing on all her own "freedom."

The debates on the proposed new constitution bore the stamp of excited passions, immaturity and utopianism. A heated dispute as to the veto soon began. The democrats declared it madness to cripple the will of twenty-five millions by the veto of one individual; the constitutionalists supported the royal right of veto, in order to prevent the introduction of mob rule. Men in the streets shouted curses on the veto, many took Veto for the name of a hated aristocrat, and wished to hang him on a lamp-post, the new method of showing public disapproval. On

the 30th of August the Marquis de Saint-Huruge, who had sunk from one depth to another, started for Versailles with a large mob, but was prevented by Lafayette from reaching his destination. Mirabeau in a marvellous speech defended the absolute veto of the king; Necker, on the contrary, who had been since August 6 "first minister of finance," in order to ingratiate himself with the people behaved so pitifully that Louis, unsupported as he was, contented himself on September 11 with the *veto suspensif* (or suspensory veto), and thus became powerless in the sphere of legislature.

The national assembly declared itself permanent. The new constitution required no royal assent; the "king of France and Navarre" became a simple "king of the French;" and in the constitution were included the possible contingencies under which he could lose his crown. The court committed folly upon folly, needlessly provoking the already exasperated people by fêtes of the Gardes du Corps, and so forth. On the 5th of October Paris marched to Versailles in order to bring the royal family under the yoke of the mob. Lafayette's suspicious attitude facilitated the undertaking, and, amid scenes of the most revolting character, the monarch, the royal family, and the national assembly, in accordance with the popular wish, were brought to Paris. Necker had counselled this step; Mirabeau offered useless warnings against it. Paris now was queen of France. A number of moderates left the national assembly, where consequently the radicals gained in power; no part can be played with weakening forces. Lafayette, the strongest man in the country, sent the Duke of Orleans out of his path to England. Mirabeau broke with this latter and exclaimed: "He is as cowardly as a lacquey; he is a scoundrel, and would not be good enough to black my boots."

Gabriel Honoré Riqueti, Count Mirabeau, who knew France better than anyone, wished to become prime minister in the kingdom created on August 4 and to build up a constitutional monarchy. His ideal was *la monarchie sur la surface égale*, and he thought that one class of citizens would have met with Richelieu's approval. Mirabeau saw in Lafayette the flighty and emotional usurper, a Grandison-Cromwell, and he conjured Louis to leave Paris at once. But nobody listened to his advice, no one wished to have this genius in the ministry. In order to remedy the financial distress the ecclesiastical property was made available and was declared to be the "dowry of the Revolution." Specie disappeared from circulation, foreign countries no longer gave any credit, assignats flooded the country, and national bankruptcy was approaching. All the efforts of Mirabeau to become minister failed. The resolution of the national assembly of November 7, by which no member might become minister during the session, was aimed at him; and he said to Chateaubriand that his superiority would never be forgiven. The dream of a parliamentary monarchy was past.

The process of transformation lasted in France until the summer of 1790. America served in many cases as the prototype, and then the French constitution became itself the model of all the constitutions of Europe and America. Mirabeau opposed incessantly the levelling mania, and wished to preserve in the new State the good points of the old. But every historical tradition was destroyed. France was divided into eighty-three departments, as nearly as possible of the same size, which were called after mountains and rivers, to avoid any recollection of the old provinces and to destroy any feeling of union; Siéyès even proposed numbers instead of names. All executive power was sacrificed; the monarchy

and the influence of the crown were ruined in the overthrow of all organisation. The king was obeyed henceforward only if his will happened to be that of 4,400,000 participatory citizens. The whole body of officials depended on these latter, who were their electors, and a most disastrous state of anarchy gained ground where none would obey and all wished to command. The whole judicial system was practically independent of the king, and the parliaments were abolished. Many of the new laws were excellent, for the constituent assembly contained brilliant jurists; but law and judges soon became dependent on the sovereign people. Louis, as supreme head of the army, was condemned to equal impotence; since he confirmed all the resolutions of the national assembly, he gradually sank into a puppet king (*roi fainéant*). When the position of the Church was being settled, Mirabeau, referring to the St. Bartholomew's night, vainly warned men against religious fanaticism. Passion broke through all bounds, and the enemies of the old Church gained the day. The clerics of new France became "officials of the people," and were bound to it on oath.

Meanwhile the press became more and more obscene; it flattered the lower impulses of the masses and worked on the animal nature of the readers. To men like Desmoulins, Carra, Loustalot, and Marat nothing was sacred, and they were supported by patrons as powerful as a Danton, before whom everyone trembled. The idle loafers in the streets composed the ever ready army of the Jacobin Club, which ruled the entire left of the national assembly, and Mirabeau's "Patriotic Club of 1789," like other moderate combinations, was powerless against the serried ranks of the Jacobin Club, which comprised all France. The club of the *Cordeliers*, under the advocates Danton and Desmoulins, vied with this in excesses. The judicial murder to which the Marquis de Favras fell a victim showed to true royalists what they had to expect. Louis, by his appearance in the constituent assembly (February 4, 1790) and by taking the citizen oath, sanctioned this monstrous deed. Mirabeau and Monsieur (the future Louis XVIII) came to an understanding with each other, and the former, in return for a pension, became an extraordinary councillor of the king. But the latter, to his ruin, did not often follow Mirabeau's advice, and plotted with the emigrants and the foreigner or with foolish courtiers. Mirabeau, nevertheless, had done splendid service for the worn-out monarchy in the debates on the right to declare war and peace. Undismayed by the furious outcries of the mob, he had obtained for the king his share in such declarations, and in a secret audience at St. Cloud (July 3, 1790) he had frankly declared his views to Marie Antoinette, though he was unable to convince the daughter of the *ancien régime*. The abolition of all titles of nobility by the national assembly, the farcical sitting of the 19th of June, in which Anacharsis Clootz by his folly provoked thunderous applause, sickened Mirabeau. The new measures were foolish and impracticable; France could never become a country of citizens and citizens only. Mirabeau was right when he said to Mauvillon: "Nothing is more impossible than to tear the power of recollection from the hearts of men. In this sense the true nobility is a possession as indestructible as it is sacred. Forms change, but reverence remains. Let everyone be equal in the eyes of the law, let every monopoly, especially every moral monopoly, perish! All else is a mere shifting of unrealities."

How miserably Louis, overshadowed by Lafayette, played the popular king at the federation fête on July 14! How theatrical the so-called Holy League! The

attitude of the king in his semi-imprisonment seemed to be more and more lifeless. He did not escape, and yet remained most reluctantly. Necker resigned in September without the world noticing it, being cast aside by the Revolution as worthless, dead while still living. Louis would have begged for the new ministry from the national assembly had not he been hindered in this by Mirabeau. The latter now sided with the Jacobins, and counselled him, therefore, to form a Jacobin ministry, becoming himself president of the Jacobin Club and playing a thoroughly dishonourable rôle. Louis consented to everything; the pious prince only wished not to support the Revolution against the Catholic Church, and asked advice from the pope. But the Revolution forced him, in spite of the warnings of Pius VI, to sign the *Constitution civile du clergé* on the 26th of December, 1790. Though by so doing he was on the side of those who emancipated his Church from the pope and made it subject to the national laws, he still in heart supported the *réfractaires*, — that is to say, the clergy who refused to swear to the new constitution, — and wished rather to be “king of Metz than remain king of France in such a position.” Mirabeau, on the other hand, thought it possible to “deatholicise France.” Most of the clergy in many departments refused the oath; on the whole, fifty thousand out of sixty thousand priests. Of one hundred and thirty-five bishops, only five took the oath. Among these latter was Talleyrand, who resigned his bishopric of Autun and became a layman; his keen sagacity detected the imminent end of the Church.

The king and queen were more desirous than ever to leave France. The latter thought of an appeal to Europe, but the former feared a civil war, and condemned any reference to Charles Stuart. There was much secret scheming and correspondence, but they did not come to any conclusion. And which of the European sovereigns thought of helping them? Gustavus III of Sweden alone wished to overthrow the Revolution in a crusade, and to raise once more the banner of the fleur-de-lis. Prussia and Great Britain rejoiced in the Revolution against the royal house. Catherine II, indeed, wrote in a sympathetic style, but did not sacrifice a single soldier or rouble; though the Revolution seemed to her to be very dangerous to Russia, she only urged Sweden, the emperor, and Prussia to withstand it, and hoped, while they were thus engaged, to expand her power in Poland and Turkey behind their backs. The emperor Leopold II, Louis’ brother-in-law, was a cool, sensible man, and, considering the reconciliation of the crown with the new constitution to be possible, he counselled patience and avoidance of the emigrants; but he never encouraged Louis and Marie Antoinette to flee.

On April 2, 1791, Mirabeau died, prematurely worn-out by work and self-indulgence. He was the first to enter into the pantheon of the magnates of France, and the mystery of an uncompleted work shrouded the tomb of the Titan, who had bitterly paid by disappointments for the sins of his youth. Only small men with small capacities now trod the stage. Rousseau’s pupil, Robespierre, the sentimental monster of mediocrity, acquired considerable influence, while Lafayette’s power diminished. Under the leadership of Robespierre the Jacobins, in possession of the tribunes, intimidated the constituent assembly. Louis entangled himself in a mass of contradictions, prevaricated from desperation, and finally on June 20 started on his lamentable flight, accompanied by his family. The plan was one foredoomed to failure even if it had not been bungled in the execution. Louis was recognised, detained at Varennes, and on June 25 brought back

to Paris, which was roused to intense excitement. It is true that the republic was not proclaimed, but the monarchy was tottering. Louis' deposition was already clamoured for. He lived with his family in the Tuileries under close arrest; guards were stationed even in the bedroom of the queen. The circular of the emperor from Padua (July 6, 1791) to the cabinets of Europe, the treaty of Vienna (July 25) with Frederick William II of Prussia, who now chivalrously interested himself on behalf of the unfortunate royal pair, the joint declaration of the sovereigns at Pillnitz (Saxony) on August 27, 1791, did not ameliorate the position of the Bourbons; for no army was put in the field to carry out their threats against France, and a concerted intervention of the European powers was not arranged. The constituent assembly, as a preliminary step, suspended the executive power of the king, without however deposing him, and did not restore it to him until he had accepted the new (or second) constitution on September 13 and had sworn to it on September 14. At his request the national assembly granted an amnesty for all political offences; but he wrote very ambiguous letters to his brothers, who had taken refuge abroad, in which he represented himself as a prisoner and under compulsion in his actions. The constitution was completed finally on September 30, 1791. Devised in an extraordinarily short time by the leading brains in France, it contained many dubious experiments, and displayed an anxious fear of monarchy and a considerable bias toward democracy.

B. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

THE constituent assembly was replaced on October 1 by the legislative assembly, from which the democrats, at Robespierre's proposal, excluded all deputies of 1789, so that the twelve hundred best trained politicians in France were at once deprived of seats. Among the members, principally unknown, of the new national assembly the Girondists, deputies from the department of Gironde and their partisans, formed the most interesting group. They were democratic doctrinaires, imaginative and eloquent, but inexperienced in politics and too prone to phrases; they dreamt of a philosophic republic with philosophers as kings, and desired democracy in place of monarchy, but rejected bloodshed as a means of establishing it. Unfitted themselves to legislate, they endeavoured to destroy the recently granted legislature. Their chief leader was Brissot, a fervent advocate of war, and near him stood the superficial Madame Roland, who was always hovering on the border line between woman and virago, while Siéyès secretly furnished the Girondists with the plan of campaign. No unanimity of opinion existed among them, but they were all determined to declare war with the foreign powers. The supporters of Louis were consumed with hatred of the constitution, while the Jacobins seized the power. Lafayette and Bailly were forced to resign their offices, the brutal Pétion became mayor of Paris on November 14, and the other leading posts in the municipal council fell to radicals like Manuel, Danton, or Rôderer. Louis refused to sanction the harsh measures against the emigrants and the clerical non-jurors, as well as the threatening proclamation aimed at his brother. By putting his veto on them he increased the hatred of himself and Marie Antoinette, "Madame Veto;" and the carmagnole rang in their ears,—

"Madame Vêto avait promis
De faire égorger tout Paris."

Leopold II, like Louis, wished to see war avoided, but the Girondists were resolved to fight; mad with passion, they menaced Leopold and overthrew the ministry of Louis. But more than this, in March, 1792, the murderous hand of Anckarström had laid low Gustavus III of Sweden, who had honourably and earnestly planned the restoration of Louis. Leopold had just concluded a defensive alliance, from purely conservative motives, with Frederick William II on February 7 when he died, on March 1. He was followed by his son Francis II, who, unlike the old emperor, was a sworn foe to the principles of the Revolution and all ideas tending to a constitution. Louis was compelled to propose war against him on the 20th of April, and the assembly thoughtlessly applauded a resolution, which brought with it two and twenty years of war.

The Gironde had forced upon Louis, in March, 1792, the "ministry of Madame Roland," in which he only saw his gaolers; the leader, General Dumouriez, talked foolishly of the Alps and the Rhine as the "natural frontiers of France," and attempted secret negotiations with Prussia against Austria. The campaign was a costly one for France. The plan of Dumouriez to conquer Belgium at once failed completely; generals and soldiers fled before the imperialists, and the intended blow on Savoy was never struck. The king communicated with the enemies of the ministry of the *sans-culottes*, and sent his confidant Mallet du Pan on May 21 with secret instructions to the princes allied against France. He interposed his veto on the deportation of the non-juring priests, after which his body-guard of six thousand men was taken from him (May 29). And when, without asking him a camp of twenty thousand "federals" was established outside Paris, he once more interposed his veto in June. He knew indeed that the Gironde wished to create in this way a standing army against the throne. Numerous ministerial changes did not improve his position. No confidence could be reposed on the *Fruillants*; Lafayette seemed to the Jacobins an unmasked monk. Broadsheets threatened "the monster Louis" with death; but he wrote to his father-confessor on June 19, 1792, that he had done with men, and that his eyes were now fixed on heaven. The next day the Girondists, Jacobins, and Cordeliers arranged the armed visit of the mob to "Monsieur and Madame Veto." The mayor, Pétion, played an ambiguous part; the king, the queen, and Madame Elizabeth, the sister of Louis, exhibited splendid courage and dignity. The Revolution missed its aim; the 20th of June ended in folly; and the young captain of artillery, Bonaparte, declared that with a whiff of grapeshot he could sweep away all the *canaille*. A sort of feeling of shame was roused in thousands of Frenchmen; and the price which the Duke of Orleans, henceforward "Philippe Égalité," had laid on the head of Louis was not yet earned.

A camp was erected near Paris, which Louis now sanctioned. The legislative assembly, in consequence of a fiery speech by Vergniaud, obtained on July 4 the right to declare the nation in peril even without the royal permission; immediate use was made of this privilege on July 11.

Louis, whose life was constantly threatened, was compelled to sustain, as ever, his double rôle. While he played the part of a patriot against the allied sovereigns, he hoped for salvation from the troops of the allies which were advancing under Duke Charles William Ferdinand of Brunswick, and saw, with malicious joy, how miserably the review of the volunteers on the 14th of July had turned out. When he refused a new Girondist ministry, the Gironde united again with

the Jacobins and declared war to the knife against him. In consequence of the agreement between Francis II and Frederick William II at Mayence the army advanced under Brunswick, who personally was a friend of the new constitution in France, and yet lent his name to the foolish manifesto of Coblenz on July 25. Unrestrained fury answered his threats. Woe to him who did not join in the cry! Maximilien de Robespierre, an advocate of Arras, demanded a national convention in place of the king; the Gironde wished for the king's deposition; the "federated" bandits from Marseilles cemented brotherhood with the Jacobins and the Cordeliers; street demagogues sprang up like mushrooms, and Danton came rapidly to the front.

The mayor, Pétion, paved the way for the attack of the mobs on the Tuileries. Louis saw himself deserted by almost all troops when the 10th of August dawned. The rebels pressed on to the Tuileries, and Louis ordered the loyal Swiss, his last defenders, to evacuate the palace. Instead of fighting there and dying an honourable death, as befitted a soldier and a king, he abandoned the monarchy and followed the advice of the Girondists, to fly with his family to the bosom of the legislative assembly. There he listened to the interminable discussion over his fate, and learnt that, upon the proposal of Vergniaud, he was provisionally removed from his office, and that a national convention was created. On the 13th of August the Temple received the royal family. The Girondist ministers, recalled to office, were unimportant in comparison with Georges Danton, the minister of justice, tribune of the republican democracy, who himself did not shrink from wholesale murders. All personal safety was at an end. On the 18th of August, on Robespierre's motion, a revolutionary tribunal was constituted against all who were suspected of loyalty, and spies were everywhere looking for *suspects*. The legislative assembly blindly obeyed the commune of Paris, in whose name the unprincipled Danton governed. Everything was drifting toward a republic. The property of the emigrants was squandered, and all feudal rights were abolished without compensation, which signified a loss of at least six thousand million francs. During the terrible September massacres in Paris and the provinces, in which hired executioners butchered thousands, among the chief of whom was the friend of the queen, the princess of Lamballe, whole crowds of clerical non-jurors were got rid of, for the guillotine worked too slowly. By a hideous deed in monumental style Danton wished to preclude the nation from returning to the old order of things, and by a sea of blood to separate monarchical France from the new France.

C. THE CONVENTION

ON the 21st of September, 1792, the national convention dissolved the legislative assembly and immediately adopted the unanimous resolution that the monarchy was abolished. But then the Girondists and the party of the Mountain separated; the former declared against the September butchery, the latter glorified it as the confession of faith of the lovers of freedom. Victory smiled on the swords of the young republic. Her armies, which gradually became accustomed to discipline, astonished the whole world. The cannonade of Valmy effected nothing, and the Prussians under the incompetent Duke of Brunswick were compelled to abandon the advance on Paris. Custine and Houchard occupied Mayence; it capitulated with disgraceful celerity, as did Frankfurt, Worms, Speier, and other less important

towns. Dumouriez conquered the imperialists at Jemappes and took the whole of Belgium; Montesquiou and Anselme made themselves masters of Savoy and Nice, which were soon incorporated into France; while monarchical Europe tottered and fell, the revolutionists adopted the plan of spreading their ideas by force of arms, and pursued it even into the empire. They threw off the mask of national emancipation and unsheathed the sword of conquest. The deposed royal family languished in the Temple, cut off from all communication with the outside world and exposed to the brutality of their keepers. The cabinets of Europe did nothing for them, after the vain threats from Padua, Pillnitz, and Coblenz had died away in the empty air.

Legally, the king could not be put on his trial. But the Girondists, playing with the fire, wilfully hurried on his death; they did not wish to see him killed, but only condemned; he was to live under the axe, a hostage, hovering between the throne and the scaffold. While Robespierre's inexorable disciple, St. Just, demanded with brutal words the death of Louis for the crime of being king, and while Robespierre exclaimed that Louis must die in order that the republic might live, the convention adopted the pretence of legal proceedings. On December 10 the bill of indictment against "Louis Capet" was drawn up. Louis strangely omitted to enter a protest against his judges, answered each interrogation, and convincingly refuted most of the charges. The veteran Malesherbes offered his services to defend him; Tronchet and De Sèze took his side. But they were, from the first, helpless against the malice of the convention. Robespierre, in spite of the brilliant speech of Vergniaud on the 31st of December, defeated the Girondists; he wanted the head of the king, in order to commit the nation to his policy by making them his accomplices in murder. Marat and Hébert dragged the monarchy through the mire of their journals, domiciliary visits and prosecutions were endless, the terrorism could no longer be checked, and at the close of the year fourteen thousand men fled from Paris.

On January 15, 1793, the voting began in the convention on three of the questions raised by the Gironde. The first, whether Louis was guilty of conspiracy against France, was negatived by no one. The second, whether the judgment should be submitted to the approval of the nation, was negatived by a large majority, and the Girondists thus suffered a distinct defeat. The execution of Louis, the third question, was decreed on the 17th by a majority of one vote. The proposal to delay proceedings was rejected the next day, and on the subject of the protest of the Spanish ambassador the members proceeded to the order of the day. After a heart-rending farewell to his family, Louis XVI went calmly and with resignation to his death. On the 21st of January, 1793, he was guillotined; the weakling became a martyr and a hero (cf. the inserted extracts from the "Moniteur"). The meanest of judicial murders had been committed. The execution of a king could not fail to put a new stamp on France. Bandits and murderers spread terrorism through the land. The Revolution itself had cut away the path of propaganda from under its feet, and had hurled the king's head in the face of monarchical Europe. The only answer would be a universal war. How did Europe and the world treat the murder of the king? George III, at once dismissed the French ambassador from his realms. The convention replied to that on February 1, 1793, with a declaration of war against Great Britain and the States-General which were influenced by her, and threatened to change all France into "one vast camp." Through

THE THREE NOTIFICATIONS OF THE "MONITEUR" WHICH REFER TO THE EXECUTION OF LOUIS XVI

GAZETTE NATIONALE, OU LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL.

No. 21. Lundi 21 Janvier 1793. L'an deuxième de la République Française

Extrait des procès-verbaux de la Convention nationale, des 15, 17, 19 et 20 janvier 1793, l'an 2 de la République Française.

ART. I^{er}. La Convention nationale déclare Louis Capet, dernier roi des Français, coupable de conspiration contre la liberté de la Nation, et d'attentat contre la sûreté générale de l'Etat.

II. La Convention nationale décrète que Louis Capet subira la peine de mort.

III. La Convention nationale déclare nul l'acte de Louis Capet apporté à la barre par ses conseils, qualifié d'appel à la Nation du jugement contre lui rendu par la Convention, défend à qui que ce soit d'y donner aucune suite, à peine d'être poursuivi et puni comme coupable d'attentat contre la sûreté générale de l'Etat.

IV. Le conseil exécutif provisoire notifiera le présent dans le jour à Louis Capet, et prendra les mesures de police et de sûreté nécessaires pour en assurer l'exécution dans les 24 heures, à compter de la notification, et rendra compte à la Convention nationale immédiatement après qu'il aura été exécuté.

PROCLAMATION DU CONSEIL EXÉCUTIF PROVISOIRE, DU 20 JANVIER

Le conseil exécutif provisoire, délibérant sur les mesures à prendre pour l'exécution des décrets de la Convention nationale, des 15, 17, 19 et 20 janvier 1793, arrête les dispositions suivantes :

1. L'exécution du jugement de Louis Capet se fera demain lundi 21 ;

2. Le lieu de l'exécution sera la place de la Révolution, ci-devant Louis XV, entre le piédestal et les Champs-Elysées ;

3. Louis Capet partira du Temple à huit heures du matin, de manière que l'exécution puisse être faite à midi ;

4. Des commissaires du département de Paris, des commissaires de la municipalité,

Extract from the Protocols of the National Convention of the 15th, 17th, 19th, and 20th January, 1793, in the year 2 of the French Republic

ART. I. The National Convention declares Louis Capet, last king of the French, guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the Nation and of an attempt on the general security of the State.

ART. II. The National Convention decrees that Louis Capet suffer the penalty of death.

ART. III. The National Convention declares the act of Louis Capet brought forward by his counsel, entitled an appeal to the Nation from the judgment pronounced on him by the Convention, to be null and void ; and forbids any one to follow it, on penalty of being prosecuted and punished as guilty of an attempt on the general security of the State.

ART. IV. The Provisional Executive Council will notify this present to Louis Capet in course of the day and will take the necessary police measures and precautions, in order to secure its execution within 24 hours, reckoning from the notification, and will give a report to the Convention immediately after its execution.

PROCLAMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE 20TH JANUARY

The Provisional Executive Council, after deliberating on the requisite measures for the execution of the decrees of the National Convention of the 15th, 17th, 19th, and 20th January, 1793, agrees on the following resolutions :

1. The sentence on Louis Capet shall be carried out to-morrow, Monday, the 21st.

2. The place of execution shall be the Place de la Révolution, formerly Place de Louis XV, between the pedestal and the Champs-Elysées.

3. Louis Capet will leave the Temple at 8 A. M., so that the execution can be over by noon.

4. Commissaries of the Department of Paris, Commissaries of the Municipality, and two

deux membres du tribunal criminel assisteront à l'exécution. Le secrétaire-greffier de ce tribunal en dressera procès-verbal; et lesdits commissaires et membres du tribunal, aussitôt après l'exécution consommée, viendront en rendre compte au conseil, lequel restera en séance permanente pendant toute cette journée.

The conseil exécutif provisoire.

members of the Criminal Court will be present at the execution. The Secrétaire-Greffier of the Criminal Court will draw up the protocol; and the aforesaid Commissaries and members of the Court, immediately after the execution will report to the Council, which will remain sitting the whole day.

The Provisional Executive Council.

GAZETTE NATIONALE, OU LE MONITEUR UNIVERSEL

No. 23. Mercredi 23 Janvier 1793. L'an deuxième de la République Française

DE PARIS

Lundi, 21 janvier, était le jour fixé pour l'exécution du décret de mort prononcé contre Louis Capet. A peine lui avait-on signifié la proclamation du conseil exécutif provisoire, relative à son supplice, qu'il a demandé à parler à sa famille; les commissaires lui ayant montré leur embarras, lui proposèrent de faire venir sa famille dans son appartement, ce qu'il accepta. Sa femme, ses enfans et sa sœur vinrent le voir; ils conférèrent ensemble dans la chambre où il avait coutume de manger; l'entrevue a été de deux heures et demie; la conversation fut très-chaude. . . . Après que sa famille se fût retirée, il dit aux commissaires qu'il avait fait une bonne mercuriale à sa femme

Sa famille l'avait prié de lui permettre de le voir le matin; il se débarrassa de cette question en ne répondant ni oui ni non. Madame ne l'a pas vu davantage. Louis criait dans sa chambre; les bourreaux! les bourreaux! . . . En adressant la parole à son fils Marie-Antoinette lui dit: Apprenez par les malheurs de votre père à ne pas vous venger de sa mort. . . .

Le matin de sa mort, Louis avait demandé des ciseaux pour se couper les cheveux; ils lui furent refusés. . . .

Lorsqu'on lui ôta son couteau, il dit: Me croirait-on assez lâche pour me détruire.

Le commandant général et les commissaires de la Commune sont montés à huit heures et demie du matin dans l'appartement où était Louis Capet. Le commandant lui a signifié l'ordre qu'il venait de recevoir pour le conduire au supplice; Louis lui a demandé trois minutes pour parler à son confesseur, ce qui lui a été accordé. Un instant après, Louis a présenté un paquet à un des commissaires, avec prière de le remettre au conseil général de la Commune. Le citoyen Jacques Roux a répondu à Louis qu'il ne pouvait s'en charger, parce que sa mission était de l'accompagner au sup-

FROM PARIS

Monday, the 21st of January, was the day fixed for carrying out the sentence of death pronounced on Louis Capet. The decree of the Provisional Executive Council had hardly been communicated to him, when he asked to speak to his family; the Commissaries, being in a difficulty, proposed to him that his family should be brought to him, an offer which he accepted. His wife, his children, and his sister visited him; they talked together in the room where he usually took his meals. The interview lasted two and a half hours; the conversation was very animated. . . . After his family had withdrawn, he said to the Commissaries that he had severely reprimanded his wife.

His family begged to be allowed to see him the next day; he evaded this question without answering yes or no. Madame did not see him again. Louis shouted out in his room "The executioners! the executioners!" . . . Marie Antoinette said to her son, "Learn from the misfortunes of your father not to avenge his death."

The morning of the day on which he was to die Louis had asked for a pair of scissors to cut his hair, but they were not given him.

When they took away his knife, he said, "Would you suppose me to be coward enough to kill myself?"

The Commandant-General and the Commissaries of the Commune went up to the room of Louis Capet at 8.30 A. M. The Commandant communicated to him the instructions which he had received to lead him to the scaffold. Louis asked for three minutes in order to speak to his confessor, and his request was granted. A moment after Louis handed a packet to one of the Commissaries with the request that he would take it to the General Council of the Commune. Citizen Jacques Roux answered Louis that he could not undertake to do so, because his duty was to accom-

plice: il a répondu: *C'est juste.* Le paquet a été remis à un autre membre de la Commune, qui s'est chargé de le rendre au conseil général.

Louis a dit alors à Santerre: *Marchons, je suis prêt.* En sortant de son appartement, il a prié les officiers municipaux de recommander à la Commune les personnes qui avaient été à son service, et de la prier de vouloir bien placer auprès de la reine Cléry, son valet-de-chambre; il s'est repris et a dit: *Auprès de ma femme;* il a été répondu à Louis que l'on rendrait compte au conseil de ce qu'il demandait.

Louis a traversé à pied la première cour; dans la seconde il est monté dans une voiture où étaient son confesseur et deux officiers de gendarmerie. (L'exécuteur l'attendait à la place de la Révolution.) Le cortège a suivi les boulevards jusqu'au lieu du supplice; le plus grand silence régnait le long du chemin. Louis lisait les prières des agonisants; il est arrivé à dix heures dix minutes à la place de la Révolution. Il s'est déshabillé, est monté d'un pas assuré, et se portant vers l'extrémité gauche de l'échafaud, il a dit d'une voix assez ferme: *Français je meurs innocent. Je pardonne à tous mes ennemis et souhaite que ma mort soit utile au peuple.* Il paraissait vouloir parler encore, le commandant général ordonne à l'exécuteur de faire son devoir.

La tête de Louis est tombée à dix heures 20 minutes du matin. Elle a été montrée au peuple. Aussitôt mille cris: *Vive la Nation, vive la République Française* se sont fait entendre. Le cadavre a été transporté sur le champ et déposé dans l'église de la Madeleine, où il a été inhumé entre les personnes qui périrent le jour de son mariage, et les Suisses qui furent massacrés le 10 août. Sa fosse avait douze pieds de profondeur et six de largeur; elle a été remplie de chaux.

Deux heures après, rien n'annonçait dans Paris que celui qui naguère était le chef de la Nation, venait de subir le supplice des criminels. La tranquillité publique n'a pas été troublée un instant. Si la fin tragique de Louis n'a pas inspiré tout l'intérêt sur lequel certaines gens avaient compté, son testament n'est pas propre à l'accroître: on y verra qu'après avoir répété tant de fois qu'il avait sincèrement adopté la constitution, le roi constitutionnel n'était, à ses yeux, qu'un roi dépourvu de son autorité légitime, et qu'il repousse jusqu'au titre de *roi des Français*, que la constitution lui avait donné, pour se décorer, au moins dans le dernier acte de sa vie, de celui de *roi des France*. Les témoignages irrécusables de mauvaise foi contenus dans ce testament pourront tarir quelques-uns des sen-

pany him to the scaffold; he replied, "*C'est juste.*" The packet was intrusted to another member of the Commune, who undertook to convey it to the General Council.

Louis then said to Santerre, "*Marchons, je suis prêt.*" As he left his room he begged the municipal officers to recommend to the commune the persons who had been in his service, and to request it to let Cléry, his valet, wait on the Queen; he corrected himself and said, my wife. The reply was that his wishes should be conveyed to the Council.

Louis crossed the first court on foot; in the second he got into a carriage, in which were seated his father confessor and two officers of the gendarmerie. (The executioner was waiting for him in the Place de la Révolution.) The procession moved along the Boulevard to the place of execution. The deepest silence prevailed along the route. Louis read the prayers for the dying; he reached the Place de la Révolution at ten minutes past ten. He undressed himself, mounted the scaffold with a firm step, and turning toward the left side said in a fairly steady voice, "Frenchmen, I die innocent. I forgive my enemies, and wish that my death may benefit the people." He seemed as if he wanted to say more; but the Commandant ordered the executioner to do his duty.

The head of Louis fell at 10.20 A. M. It was shown to the people. Immediately a thousand cries were heard, "*Vive la Nation, vive la République Française.*" The corpse was immediately taken away and placed in the church of the Madeleine, where it was buried between the persons who perished the day of his marriage and the Swiss guards who had been massacred on the 10th of August. His grave was twelve feet deep and six feet broad; it was filled up with lime.

Two hours afterwards, nothing in Paris betrayed that he, who lately had been the Head of the Nation, had just died the death of a felon. The public peace had not been disturbed for a moment. If the tragic end of Louis did not inspire all the interest on which some persons had counted, his will was not calculated to increase it. One can see there that, after having repeated so often that he had sincerely adopted the constitution, a constitutional king in his eyes was merely a king stripped of his legitimate authority, with which, as with the title King of the French, which the Constitution gave him, he would have nothing to do; he still adorned himself, at least in the last act of his life, with the title of King of France. The irrefutable proofs of bad faith contained in this will might well

timens de pitié que les âmes compatissantes aiment à ressentir. Il est difficile de penser qu'il ait pu être assez content des puissances belligérantes, de ses frères, et de cette noblesse aussi plate qu'impuissamment rebelle, pour n'avoir cherché qu'à mériter leurs suffrages. En effet, qu'ont-ils fait pour lui depuis que la mort planait sur sa tête ? Y a-t-il un seul témoignage d'intérêt, l'offre du moindre sacrifice ? Ils n'ont pas même eu l'hypocrisie de la sensibilité, et ils n'agissaient que pour ses intérêts ! . . . Mais laissons Louis sous le crêpe ; il appartient désormais à l'histoire. Une victime de la loi a quelque chose de sacré pour l'homme moral et sensible. c'est vers l'avenir que tous les bons citoyens doivent tourner leurs vœux, leurs talens et leurs forces. Les divisions ont fait ou laissé faire assez du mal à la France. Tout ce qui est honnête doit sentir le besoin de l'union, et ceux qui n'en aimeraient pas le charme ont encore la raison d'intérêt pour desirer qu'elle existe. Un peu de principes, un peu d'efforts, et la coalition fatale aux méchans sera consommée.

blunt some of those sentiments of compassion which pitying souls are accustomed to feel. It is difficult to think that he was so satisfied with the belligerent powers, with his brothers, and with that nobility, as stupid as impotently rebellious, that he only sought to deserve their votes. As a matter of fact, what did they do for him after his head was threatened ? Was there one single proof of interest, or offer of the least sacrifice ? They had not even the semblance of sensibility, their only aim was their own interest. . . . But let us leave Louis under the crape ; henceforth he belongs to history. A victim of the law is something sacred to the moral and sensible man ; it is towards the future that all good citizens must direct their wishes, their talents, and their powers. The divisions have caused directly, or indirectly, sufficient evil to France. All that is honourable must feel the need of union, and those who would not love its charm have still interested reasons for wishing it to exist. A few principles, a few efforts, and the coalition fatal to evil-doers will be accomplished

British representations Spain — where, under the unworthy Charles IV and his licentious consort Maria Louise, the latter's favourite, the despicable Godoy, was governing — broke off all relations with France. The whole Spanish nation shouted for war, which was destined to prove a heavy burden to it. William Pitt, the great son of a great father, concluded within six months thirteen treaties of alliance and subsidies, and was the soul of the coalition against France. The German Empire, Pope Pius VI, and King Ferdinand IV of Naples and Sicily began the war. The only powers that remained neutral at first were Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus IV, Denmark under Christian VII, Russia, Tuscany (which, however, joined the coalition in October, 1793), Venice, Switzerland, and Turkey. The coalition put two hundred and twenty thousand men into the field. The Prince of Saxe-Coburg defeated General Dumouriez on March 18, 1793, at Neerwinden. Dumouriez's soldiers fled in masses, and he himself, fearing for his head, took refuge with the imperialists on April 4.

While loyal La Vendée, with British help, took up arms against the new sovereignty of the people and was frequently victorious in the war, the convention sent eighty-two commissaries into the departments, in order to crush any opposition to the Parisian terrorism, and nominated a committee of public safety, in which the Gironde and Danton were predominant. The revolutionary tribunal of March 10, 1793, signified a victory of both over Robespierre and a delay of the undisguised reign of terror; but their league was not lasting. The Gironde accused Danton of being a partner in the guilt of Dumouriez; but he foamed like a wounded boar and the Jacobins cheered him. The Gironde was certain to succumb before Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, if their leaders accomplished nothing, but only made fine speeches. The eighty-two commissaries of the convention incited the proletariat against the propertied class, armed it, and in many departments threw three or four thousand persons into prison. All lawful authorities were deprived of their power. Robespierre with his *sans-culottes* and his *tricoteuses* was master of the position. When the Gironde on May 18, 1793, displayed in the convention a wish to aim a blow at the terrorists, Barère, "the Anacreon of the guillotine," averted it; and on May 22 Danton declared open war against the Girondists, when they had threatened that the province would march on Paris. Convinced that the Girondists, so soon as they possessed the power, would bring the Mountain under the guillotine, he planned with this party under Robespierre and Marat the rising which raged in Paris from May 31 to June 2. The Gironde fell. Danton left the members their lives, an act which the Jacobins soon considered a crime on his part. Many Girondists escaped from arrest; and instigated by them Charlotte Corday murdered Marat on July 13, in order to avenge the Gironde, but forfeited her life by so doing. The country rose against the capital. Brittany and La Vendée blazed with the civil war of "whites" against "blues." Marseilles, Lyons, Toulon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, and other towns threw down the gauntlet to Paris. Toulon opened its gates to the British and proclaimed the dauphin, now a prisoner in the Temple, king as Louis XVII; the convention was besieged with addresses of the towns against the "handful of unscrupulous villains." The allies once more took Belgium and the Rhine country; the road to Paris, where complete anarchy prevailed, lay open. But the disunion of the cabinets and their wish for peace saved France. Prussia was intent on booty in Poland, Austria in Bavaria and, instead of advancing straight on Paris. Great Britain was blockading Dunkirk.

France gained time for new preparations, which were the more necessary since the soldiers of her eastern army were deserting by tens of thousands.

Danton's prestige in the convention diminished, and only full-blooded Jacobins now sat on the Committee of Public Safety. Robespierre was pushing more and more into the foreground. Danton was the avowed enemy of all hypocrisy, and merely regarded the Revolution as a source of power and enjoyment, without any belief in ideals. In spite of his marvellous natural endowments he had not a spark of the higher intellectual life; an athlete in his pleasures and his crimes, knowing no limits to his daring, and filled with glowing patriotism, he was an honourable robber and candid murderer. François Joseph Maximilien Isidor de Robespierre, on the contrary, played a carefully studied part; with his companions, St. Just and Couthon, he wished to lead the social democracy to victory. He never changed his views, or allowed himself to be deterred by any scoffs, but remained loyal to himself. His personal appearance was not in his favour, for he was insignificant and ugly; but his house was filled with his picture in every possible pose, and he idolised himself. He forced his way up by his slavish adoration of Rousseau's "social contract;" his phrase, "The nation is pure and noble, but the rulers are evil," proved his fortune. He never wearied of lauding himself as the incorruptible and the steadfast. He was the only hitherto unemployed power among the demagogues, devoid, indeed, of any creative talent and of genius, but an accurate logician, whose policy was strictly negative. Without the courage of Danton, he was like a cat creeping up to pounce on its prey. He waited, concealed, to see if his secret blows had struck home. He was consumed with hate and envy of every one who in rank, talent, or influence was an "aristocrat," as opposed to him; and while he courted power only for its own sake, he was eager to remove all who stood in the way of his quest for equality. With honey on his lips and venom in his heart, he was planning the moment when all other powers should be disorganised, in order to put his rule in their place. The senseless constitution (III) which at his proposal was promulgated at the end of June, 1793, remained with its rights of man a "piece of paper." The government of the Revolution was all powerful, and the guillotine worked unceasingly. The Girondists were outlawed on July 18, 1793, and one noble general after another was executed. Barère called all nobles "budding traitors," and demanded on September 5 that the terror should be entered upon the orders of the day.

The revolutionary tribunals were packed with Robespierre's creatures. On September 17, 1793, a savage law was passed against the "suspects," who were divided into six categories; and on October 3 the shameful trial of the queen, who was removed to the Conciergerie, was begun. Robespierre's gang did not even allow the proceedings to be decently conducted; the obscenities of Hébert brought a blush to the cheeks of the fishwives in the galleries. In the three days' hearing of the case no positive acts of treason could be proved against Marie Antoinette; nevertheless, she was condemned, and bravely met her death on October 16. Forty Girondists followed her to the scaffold during the next weeks, while others escaped. The scenes of horror continued in the departments; Lyons was almost destroyed. There was only one crime, that of not being radical enough. Every town possessed a revolutionary committee and a revolutionary army; that is to say, the unfettered rabble. In Toulon, Barras and Fréron wreaked their fury; in Nantes, Carrier organised the brutal drownings in the Loire (*noyades*, or republi-

can marriages); while twelve *colonnes infernales* ravaged La Vendée. Everywhere a fanatic fury was vented on Christianity; the churches fell a prey to plunder and desecration. Hand in hand with all this went the spoliation of all respectable people; at Bourges two million francs were extorted in a single day. The entire booty of the robbers amounted to four hundred million francs (£16,000,000), and the number of arrests exceeded two hundred thousand. Even Danton and Camille Desmoulins thought that the massacres had gone far enough, or France would bleed to death. They wished to restore law and order, to restrict the committees and the Paris commune; they set about their purpose, and the terrorist party began to break up.

The prevalent hatred of Christianity produced the senseless "Republican Calendar," which began with September 21, 1792. It was followed by the abolition of Christianity and the adoption of heathen in place of Christian names. Many would have liked to decree by law the cancelling of the whole period since Christ. They did not suspect how difficult it is to take away the belief of a people which had been baptised in the blood of St. Bartholomew's night. The whole nation was judged from infatuated proletarians or blinded atheists like Anacharsis Clootz, who called himself "the personal enemy of Jesus;" from standard-bearers of religious and moral anarchy like Chaumette ("Anaxagoras"), who termed divorce the patron goddess of marriage; from a Dupont, who shouted out in the convention, "Nature and reason are my gods; I confess on my honour that I deny God;" or from Bishop Gobel of Paris, who, "led by reason, in company with other clerics, divested himself of that character which superstition had imposed on him;" while execrations were poured upon the Jansenist Grégoire, who fearlessly acknowledged his Christianity and would not abjure that which he held sacred.

But when loafers and prostitutes paraded in priestly vestments, and the sacred vessels were defiled, many timid thinkers asked themselves whether such people would bring them a true religion, or whether it would not be more expedient to resist them and hold fast to the religion of their fathers, which had brought them two thousand years of prosperity. Men of the stamp of Hébert, who published "*Le Père Duchêne*," and Cloots seemed even to the terrorists to be digging the grave of the reign of terror; and Robespierre resolved to proceed against such *enragés*, as they were called.

Though he was still a rationalist of Rousseau's school, he thought that a religion, however faint and floating, was indispensable to a government. He thundered in the Jacobin Club against those fanatics who crushed the sacred impulse of the people, and expressed his admiration for the great thought which safeguarded the order of society and the virtue of the individual, while he chastised the underlings who wished to play a part superior to his. Hébert humbled himself. Danton, too, raised a warning voice against the action of the partisans of Hébert. Nothing touched Robespierre more acutely than the appeal for clemency and humanity which the originator of the September massacres raised. Danton, from his popularity with the masses, was the most dangerous rival, and in dealing with him it was necessary to exercise the greatest cunning. Desmoulins, who had helped to fan the flame of the Revolution, and had plucked the first national cockade from a tree in the garden of the Palais Royal, now that his ideal lay bemired on the ground, attacked the tyranny of the authorities in his clever and satiric paper, "*Le vieux Cordelier*," and demanded that their despotism should be

ended. The paper formed the topic of the day, and Barère taunted Desmoulins with wishing to rekindle the ashes of the monarchy; but Desmoulins compared the committee of public safety to Tiberius.

The management of the war by the republic had meanwhile improved; in La Vendée alone no progress was made. Everywhere else was felt the powerful influence of Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot, who since August had sat on the committee of public safety, and was at the head of military affairs. He drew up the plan of operations, raised the national armies, created fourteen army corps, and with masterly discernment discovered military genius like that of Bonaparte. He despised Robespierre and St. Just, hated the rule of bloodshed, but served it in order, at the given moment, to be able to rescue his country by arms. He was "the organiser of victory." Many a distinguished general came to the fore, chiefly young men, the chief of whom were Lazare Hoche, the commander of the army of the Moselle and the Rhine, and Bonaparte. Hoche drove back the imperialists under Wurmser over the Rhine, Houchard and Jourdan were victorious at Hondscoote and Wattignies over the allies, Bonaparte began his European career with the capture of Toulon. Everywhere outside their own country victory rested with the French.

But in their own land they were slaughtering each other. Robespierre dug the common grave for Excess and Moderation, as he termed Hébert and Danton. Intimate friends warned Danton of the danger; but he did not believe that Robespierre would venture to proceed against him. He was advised to fly; he refused, since "a man cannot take his country with him on the soles of his shoes." He was advised to appeal to the masses, his old allies; but "mankind wearied him," and he "preferred to be guillotined than to guillotine." On March 15, 1794, the Hébertists, and on March 31, Danton, Desmoulins, and other Dantonists, were arrested. Robespierre declared to the muttering convention that the presumptuous and exceptional rôle of Danton was over, and all submitted to the dictatorship of the glib dissembler. In contrast to the pitiable behaviour of the Hébertists at the trial and on the scaffold (March 24), the Dantonists faced with unblushing assurance their judges, now accustomed to such scenes, and demanded to be personally confronted with Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon. But in vain. The triumvirate extorted the verdict of "guilty" from the jury, and mustered numerous troops for the execution, since they feared a riot when Danton appeared on the scaffold. Like a jaded voluptuary the "Mirabeau of the alley" went to meet his death, and said to the executioner with a sneer, "One cord is enough, put aside the other for Robespierre." In Danton there fell (April 5, 1794) a candid brigand; the last, though belated, voice against the dictatorship of the terror was hushed. A hyena lacerated France, "revelling in blood and tears." The "holy" guillotine found ever fresh food; one scoundrel, to use Goethe's phrase, had been despatched by another.

"The terror and all virtues" were now the order of the day. Robespierre, "the virtuous and the incorruptible," governed with "the healthy centre;" on the shoulders of the armed proletariat was to be raised the national edifice of "virtue and righteousness," adorned by those strange caryatids, Robespierre, St. Just, Couthon, Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varennes, and Fouquier-Tinville. They were all prepared for new bloodshed and horrors, waded through streams of gore, wished to bring to life Rousseau's "Social Contract," and displayed their wit by saying

that the more the body social sweated the healthier it would become. Death became the only principle of ruling. The republic was given over to executions; in the town and in the country bled hecatombs of the enemies of the democratic dictatorship.

Robespierre then spoke of morality and divine worship, dethroned the goddess of reason, a prostitute, who had been worshipped for a short time, and introduced the cult of the "Supreme Being," as whose high priest, arrayed in a gorgeous uniform, he received homage on June 8 (20th Prairial). Many, indeed, of his companions in crime, like Fouché, laughed their fill at "the great man of the republic" with his enormous nose; the masses remained mute. He altered the revolutionary tribunal to suit his purpose, and ordered trials *en masse*, since separate condemnations wasted too much time. The administration of the Supreme Being began with the institution of the "great batches" (*grandes fournées*). For seven weeks some seventy persons were daily executed; in Paris alone fifteen hundred victims fell. Every informer was sure of his reward, and anyone put those he wished to get rid of on one of the many categories of public enemies. "We grind vermilion," cried David, the great painter of the Revolution; and the executioners chuckled, "The basket is soon full." From the daily spectacle death by the guillotine lost its sting; it became "demoralised," so Billaud-Varennes thought. Madame Elizabeth, sister of Louis XVI, met her fate on May 10, 1794; the scaffold seemed promoted to be the deathbed of the House of Bourbon. Many mounted the scaffold with a jest; only a sponsor of the Revolution, the Comtesse Dubarry, mistress of Louis XV, implored the executioner to spare her life; and "Égalité" died as meanly as he lived, on November 6, 1793. Every man except his most intimate friends (St. Just, Couthon, and Lebas) avoided Robespierre. A half-uttered thought might rouse his ever-watchful suspicion; even in the convention no one was safe from him. The whole guidance of the State lay in the hands of the "*gens de la haute main*,"—Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon. Under them stood a second triumvirate, the "*gens révolutionnaires*," Barère, Collot d'Herbois, and Billaud-Varennes, whose duty it was to keep the political movement from subsiding. A third triumvirate, Carnot, Prieur de la Marne, and Lindet, *les travailleurs*, superintended the entire administration. There was, in addition to these, Jean Bon Saint-André; so that there was a decemvirate to rule the country.

But all others were full of jealousy and hatred against the highest triumvirate and strove to overthrow it. They termed the introduction of the cult of the Supreme Being and the visions of Catherine Théot, the mother of God, preliminaries to the despotism of the "Pisistratus," Robespierre. The latter kept noticeably aloof from public life. He feared the military dictatorship of a victorious general, wished therefore to conclude peace with the emperor, and meditated a marriage with Madame Royale, the sister of the prisoner in the Temple, who was proclaimed as Louis XVII by the royalists. His enemies gained ground. His reappearance in the Convention on the 26th of July, 1794, was intended to overthrow them, but it completely failed in this purpose. The next day, the 9th Thermidor, the Convention overwhelmed him with accusations; he was not allowed to speak, and together with his loyal adherents was arrested. They were, it is true, liberated by the commune and taken to the Hôtel de Ville under the safeguard of Henriot, the drunken commander-in-chief of the National Guard; but when the Convention outlawed the commune and Henriot, the troops of the Convention

marched under General Barras to the Hôtel de Ville. Robespierre made a futile attempt to commit suicide. And on July 28, 1794, amid the sincere rejoicings of the populace, Maximilien Robespierre, his brother Augustin Bon Joseph, St. Just, Couthon, and Henriot (Lebas had died by his own hand) were guillotined, and on the following days and later nearly a hundred of the most bloodthirsty villains shared the same fate. The long-crippled bourgeoisie was aroused and had overthrown the reign of blood; it desired order, law, and peace, the reorganisation of a country fallen into chaos.

To what had the ideas of 1789 degenerated? Instead of freedom for all, they had all found the same slavery; the whole intellectual work of the National Assembly, all the rights of man and citizen, were destroyed. The *ancien régime* was dead and buried; but what mighty labour was needed to rear a new structure, whether monarchy or republic?

The future rested with the armies of the young republic, and their unbroken strength was eager to hurl itself on Europe. The civil war in La Vendée gradually died out. Jourdan's victory at Fleurus over the Prince of Coburg cost the allies Belgium; the Rhine countries and Savoy were occupied, and not a foreign soldier was left on French soil. This strengthened the confidence of the French soldiers, who looked with pride on their generals, the best that had led them for a century. The coalition, on the other hand, showed that its members were disunited. Austria still schemed for Bavaria and the removal of the House of Wittelsbach to Brussels; Prussia was haggling with Russia for Poland. Bavaria finally threw itself into the arms of France, in order to find protection against the emperor; and Russia concluded with Prussia the second partition of Poland, since she was not allowed to annex it entirely. The new foreign minister at Vienna, Baron Thugut, a practical politician of calm temperament, and no more scrupulous about means than the ministers at Berlin and Paris, being a declared enemy of Prussia, was incensed at the partition, and stirred up ill-will against Prussia. He approached Catherine II, who gladly met him, for she hated Frederick William II, and required Austria as a bulwark against the warlike schemes of the sultan Selim III. The Duke of Brunswick, who, in November, 1793, had defeated Hoche at Kaiserslautern, resigned his position as commander-in-chief of the allied forces in January, 1794; and Frederick William was already desirous of leaving the coalition, when the cabinet of St. James, in the treaty of the Hague of April 19, forced him, as a mercenary of Great Britain and of the States-General, to equip an army for the war. The king's heart was not in the cause; and since the payment of the subsidies from London was in arrears, he regarded the treaty as lapsed, especially since the insurrection in Poland under the noble Thaddeus Kosciuszko sufficiently occupied his hands. The Prussians and the imperialists withdrew to the right bank of the Rhine. The former turned against Poland; but it was the genius of Suvaroff, the Russian general, that first succeeded in checking and subjugating the Poles (November, 1794). The secret understanding of January 3, 1795, between Russia and Austria was aimed at Prussia.

Frederick William II, indeed, knew nothing of it; he suspected however, the hostile attitude of both cabinets, and resolved to come to an agreement with France, whatever other States of the empire might intend. The conquest of Holland by Pichegru opened to the French a door for an attack on Lower

Germany. Frederick William then began negotiations with the Committee of Public Safety, and the result of them was the peace of Basle on April 5, 1795. In it Prussia not only renounced its position as a great power, but abandoned to France the left bank of the Rhine; it secured from France the promise of compensation on the right bank, and sought a neutral position behind a line of demarcation. The regicide republic celebrated its splendid victory over the superannuated monarchy of "Old Fritz." Numerous lampoons were published in Vienna against the Judas in the empire, the speculator in an imperial crown of Lower Germany; and yet it was only the stupidity of Haugwitz and Lucchesini that caused Prussia's unworthy conduct. France also concluded peace with Spain at Basle (July 22, 1795), and received the latter's share of San Domingo. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, a near relative of the emperor, had, as first of the Italian princes, come to a friendly agreement with France.

The body of citizens in France demanded protection against the recurrence of anarchy. The Committee of Public Safety and the other committees in Paris were placed on a new footing; the fifty-two thousand revolutionary committees in the departments, which cost six hundred millions of francs yearly, were greatly reduced in number. The uninterrupted payment of daily wages to the idlers in the sections of Paris was discontinued. The dissolute hordes of proletarians, priding themselves on their rags and dirt, disappeared from the streets. A cheerful crowd, emerging from their concealment, scared them thence, and hailed the overthrow of the tyranny. The natural gaiety of the French, coupled with their love of pleasure, reappeared; the places of amusement were always thronged, men's minds were occupied with dress and show. It was a sickly effort to obtain ample compensation for all the dangers they had undergone; and instead of the bloodthirsty songs of the Reign of Terror, there resounded from a thousand lips the song of vengeance against the terrorists, *le réveil du peuple*. The irregular militia of *muscadins* and *petits maîtres*, the *jeunesse Fréronnière*, formed by the converted terrorist Fréron, defeated with their life-preservers the Jacobins, the *tricoteuses*, and "*veures de Robespierre*." The Committee of Public Safety closed the Jacobin club. The last Girondists were brought back in triumph to Paris, and now entered the camp of the reaction and were reconciled, as if transformed, to the monarchical idea. Mutinies and insurrections did not indeed cease. The constitution of 1793 was willingly employed as a pretext; scenes like those of May 20, 1795 (1 Prairial of the year III), in the Convention recalled precisely their prototypes in the Reign of Terror, but led to beneficial results,—to the disarmament of the suburbs, the abolition of the revolutionary committees and the revolutionary tribunal, to the fall of the constitution of 1793, and to the consolidation of the middle classes.

Royalism once more was revived, but only for Louis XVII. It was a terrible blow for the royalists and a triumph for the Convention that the unfortunate boy died at that very moment, on the 8th of June, 1795, in the Temple. The reaction, suppressed in Paris by the convention, raged furiously in the south of France; the horrors of the White Terror of the *Compagnies de Jésus* or *du soleil* in Lyons, Marseilles, Aix, Tarascon, were as atrocious as those of the Red Terror. Attempts at a general rising of the Vendéans and Chouans, who were supported by British ships and British gold, were defeated, and General Hoche meted out stern justice to the insurgents.

The change both in sentiment and in the position of affairs since the constitution of 1793 was immense. The wish now was no longer to weaken the government, but to give it strength to ensure peace and security. It was no longer a question of unattainable social equality, but equality in the eye of the law. Every one who wished to share in the management of the commonwealth must have a certain amount of property. Boissy d'Anglas was right when he said, "A country ruled by the propertied classes is in the right social condition; government by those who have no property is barbarism." The Convention had required the experiences of five long years of terror to comprehend this obvious truth. France might have been spared such experience had Mirabeau's emphatic warnings been followed out, and had he not been left to pine away in an unsatisfied longing for the guidance of the nation.

3. THE AGE OF NAPOLEON I

IF the constitution (IV) of the year III in the republican chronology (August 22, 1795) created no monarchy in France, it laid the foundation for one. All who for the future exercised rights undertook duties also; and the franchise was limited by means of a property qualification. The legislative power went to two councils,—the council of the Five Hundred and the council of the Ancients; the executive was assigned to a directory of five members selected from the latter council. The chief mistake of the constituent assembly was unintentionally avoided by taking in despair two-thirds of both councils from the Convention. The royalists and the bourgeoisie could not tolerate the constitution; in order to repress them, the Convention required the suburbs and the armies. Bonaparte's hour was come. Who could have possessed more ambition or more talent in order to be the coming man?

A. BONAPARTE

BORN shortly after the conquest of Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769, at Ajaccio, Napoleon, the second son of the advocate Carlo Maria B(u)onaparte, a man of noble ancestry, had suffered bitter privations from his earliest years, and through poverty was compelled to lead a life of careful management and strict economy. Sent, by royal favour, to a military school first at Brienne (1779), and afterward at Paris (1784), the enthusiastic worshipper of the Corsican national hero, Pasquale Paoli, was in every fibre of his being a Corsican, and detested the French as the executioners of Corsican freedom. Unpopular with his comrades, since he was shy, reserved, and awkward, he buried himself in the library and scoffed at the luxury of the others; a soldier, he said, required discipline and simplicity. He found pleasure in learning artillery duties and fortification, and his masters thought he would one day become a good artillery officer, whereas he would by preference have joined the navy. He devoured eagerly all books which he found, whatever their contents, and his extraordinary memory enabled him to remember all that was useful.

Since his father, an improvident man, left hardly any fortune behind him on his death in 1785, his mother, Maria Letitia, found the education of her large family an anxious and difficult task, though her son, a boy of sixteen, would not consent to put her to much expense. He became second lieutenant in September, 1785,



NAPOLION BONAPARTE AT FOUR STAGES OF HIS CAREER

EXPLANATION OF THE PORTRAITS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE ON THE OTHER SIDE

1. Bonaparte as Brigadier-General when arrested and deprived of his command (1795); drawn by J. Guérin, engraved by G. Fiesinger.
2. Bonaparte as the victorious commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy on the Bridge of Arcola (1796); painted by Antoine Jean Gros.
3. Bonaparte as First Consul in Malmaison (1802); painted by Jean Baptiste Isabey.
4. Napoleon I as Emperor (1810); drawn by Stefano Tofanelli, engraved by Raffaello Morghen.

(1, after an engraving in the Dresden Gallery; 2, after a photograph by Girardon of the picture in the Louvre at Paris; 3, from Girardon's photograph of the picture in the Museum at Versailles; 4, from W. v. Seydlitz's "Historisches Porträtwerk.")

was quartered in Valence, then in Auxonne (after 1788), and, dissatisfied with garrison duty, occupied himself with literary work, but could not turn his labours to account. Though he met with constant reverses and disappointments, he did not give way to useless regret, but always hoped to ameliorate his position. The Revolution of 1789 roused him to political speculations. He hated all privileges, all aristocracy, and hoped that the Revolution, to whose flag he swore allegiance, would lead to his rapid advance. He spoke passionately in the clubs when he visited Corsica; he organised the National Guard there, and wrote wild political pamphlets. He worked also in the cause of revolution after 1791, while a first lieutenant in Valence. But since he had stayed in Corsica without leave in order to prepare an insurrection and capture Ajaccio, the war minister erased his name from the army list on February 6, 1792. After the 10th of August, the day on which the throne had fallen, able men were needed, and Bonaparte was once more enrolled in the army as captain. He could no longer play any part in Corsica. Paoli was negotiating with the British, and the whole family of Bonaparte was banished from Corsica in July, 1793. The exiled Corsican now became a Frenchman; the bridge to his native country was broken behind him.

In the south of France the adherents of the Gironde were fighting against the national Convention. Bonaparte, the friend of the younger Robespierre, fought at Avignon, Beaucaire, and Toulon for the Convention. Toulon was attacked according to his plan of siege; it fell on the 19th of December, and Bonaparte became brigadier-general of artillery on the 22d. The overthrow of Robespierre threatened to bring him also to the scaffold. He was arrested in August, 1794, and deprived of his post. He was successful, indeed, in justifying himself and proving his patriotism. He was placed at the head of the artillery in an expedition against Corsica, which the British had conquered, but was transferred suddenly to the army of the west against the Vendéans; his name was struck out from the artillery and transferred to the infantry. Bonaparte was not disposed to assent quietly to this change. He went to Paris, tried to get into touch with Tallien, Barras, Fréron, Boissy d'Anglas, and Cambacérès, and evolved the plan of the Italian campaign for 1796. As a member of the topographical bureau in the Committee of Public Safety he had the best prospects in his favour, but his refusal to go to La Vendée led, on September 15, 1795, to his being, for the second time, struck off the army list. His friend Louis Stanislas Fréron saved him from fresh misery, recommended him to Paul Jean François Nicolas Barras; and on the 13th of Vendémiaire (October 5) Bonaparte, as second in command to Barras, routed the opponents of the convention in sanguinary street fighting as completely as in a pitched battle. For his services he was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the interior on October 26. His fortune was made, and he held up his head in pride. The directors of the republic were Barras, Carnot, Laréveillère-Lepeaux, Letourneur, and Rewbell; and on October 26, 1795, the Convention ended its revolutionary career by granting a general amnesty.

(a) *The Campaign in Italy.*—The centre of interest now lay in the foreign policy and in the armies of the republic. Politics split up the German Empire into two parts. Prussia, and with it Hesse-Cassel, lay hidden behind the line of demarcation; but South Germany separated itself from Prussia and reckoned on the emperor or on France. The imperial foreign minister, Baron von Thugut,

prevented any good understanding between Austria and Prussia. The Rhenish princes fled when Jourdan and Pichegru marched across the Rhine. The cowardly surrender of Düsseldorf and Mannheim revealed the weakness of the empire,—the demoralisation consequent on a system of secondary and petty States. Bonaparte was given by Carnot the supreme command of the army of Italy. Moreau and Jourdan once more crossed the Rhine in order to seize the road through South Germany to Tyrol. If their attack on Vienna failed, Bonaparte hoped to press on thither from Italy. Wurtemberg and Baden, which had prospects of acquiring fresh territory, concluded separate terms of peace with the victorious Jean Victor Moreau, and detached themselves from the coalition and the war of the empire. Swabia and Franconia and Electoral Saxony came to terms with Moreau. The efforts of the republicans to establish communications caused no little anxiety to the States. Many princes fled, and strange plans of compensation whizzed through the air. The Paris government seduced the rulers of the southwest of Germany to prove disloyal to emperor and empire for the sake of their own enrichment, held out to them as a bait the possessions of the Church in the empire, and won them all over. Bonaparte quickly separated the Austrian and Sardinian armies from each other, detached Sardinia from the coalition, occupied Milan and the whole of Lombardy, and on the 18th of May, in a treaty of peace with Sardinia, obtained Savoy and Nice for France. He appeared in Italy not as a liberator but as a conqueror. All the States of the peninsula trembled before the unscrupulous man, who was bound by no commands of the Directory, but waged war and ravaged countries for his own glory and at his own discretion. Parma, Modena, Naples, Tuscany, and the States of the Church concluded humiliating treaties with him. He detached them from the coalition, seized the British factories in Leghorn, created the Cispadane and the Transpadane republics, and thus began to surround the sun of the French Republic with a ring of satellites. His victories which followed, blow upon blow, culminated in the fall of Mantua on February 2, 1797. Italy was conquered, and Austria terribly weakened.

After Bonaparte had devastated the States of the Church, and had obtained, on February 19, at Tolentino, the cession of Avignon, Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna, and Ancona, he sought out the emperor in his German dominions. While he was in Styria, Barthélemy Catherine Joubert was favoured by fortune in Tyrol. On the other hand, the Archduke Charles had succeeded in driving back Jourdan and Moreau over the Rhine in the autumn of 1796, an incident that gave Bonaparte a welcome ray of hope, since he saw in Moreau his most formidable rival next to Hoche. When he had reached Leoben, the Hofburg was so alarmed that it opened negotiations. The result was a preliminary peace on April 18, 1797, which gave to France Belgium, the Rhine frontier, and all the Italian possessions of Austria to the west of the Oglio, but procured Austria large portions of the republic of Venice, which was at peace with France. The republic of Venice was abolished in the summer, and Genoa became a "Ligurian" satellite-republic. The Cisalpine republic was now created.

Thugut avoided a final conclusion of peace because he expected a revolution in Paris. Without interfering in the matter, Bonaparte also awaited that moment. He did not fight for "cowardly advocates and miserable babblers." But by means of the rough Pierre François Charles Augereau, he forced the despised Directory into the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor (September 4), by which the royalists and

the conservatives, with Carnot, Barthélemy, and Pichegru at their head, were overthrown. The victory of the Directory thus turned out to his advantage. Lazare Hoche, the fiery republican who alone could have disputed the dictatorship with him, died suddenly in the camp at Wetzlar (September 18, 1797), after he had pacified Vendée and Brittany. The communistic rising of the "tribune of the people" Babeuf (cf. Vol. VII, p. 398) had terminated in May, 1796, with his arrest (a year afterward he was executed); other movements proved failures. The place of the guillotine was now taken by deportation to Cayenne, the "dry guillotine." Bonaparte, in whose favour all this was, admitted to his friends: "The nation needs a supreme head, crowned with bays of victory; Frenchmen do not understand the phraseology and fancies of ideologists."

Bonaparte, acting without any scruples, obtained from Francis II, on October 17, 1797, at Campo Formio, the peace abroad which he now required in order to strengthen his position. This treaty was one of the keystones of his world empire. Belgium and the Ionian Islands came to France; Lombardy to the Cisalpine republic; a prospect of the Rhine frontier was held out to France; Austria received the greater portion of the ancient Venice; peace was to be concluded with the empire at Rastadt, and a congress should meet for the purpose. Bonaparte appeared there in order to "give a supplement to Campo Formio" to obtain the cession of Mayence, and to effect the evacuation of the empire by the imperial troops. Paris then received him in the "Rue de la Victoire" with acclamations, and in order to increase his popularity, he modestly withdrew from the demonstrations, apparently happy only as a member of the institute.

(b) *Foreign Affairs in the Year 1797.*—At Campo Formio the emperor had reconciled himself with the political ethics of the Revolution, had enriched himself at the cost of the empire, and had incurred new suspicion on the part of Prussia. The latter did not understand the miserable rôle of hiding behind the line of demarcation. It awaited its salvation from France, and yet only served it as a tool against Austria. The large accession of Slavic territory which it had received on the partition of Poland destroyed its German character. Prussia became a mixed kingdom, and the government, as well as the military system, was unprogressive.

Everything was rusty when Frederick William II, the voluptuary and mystic, under whom the nation grew immoral and decadent, was replaced by his virtuous, but perverse and irresolute, son, Frederick William III (November 16, 1797). The new sovereign was not competent for his heavy task. The revival of State and society was delayed. Great natures, among them, first and foremost, Baron Karl vom Stein, the only real political reformer in Prussia, were repulsive to the king. It was only as a soldier that Frederick William had any real importance, but he was excessively pacific. He was as averse to, and as suspicious of, any innovation as the emperor Francis II, who resembled him in narrowness of views and limitations of intellect. George III of Great Britain was also of boorish intellect, capricious, and filled with a jealous hatred of great men, such as the two Pitts. He had preferred to lose the New World rather than give up a foolish policy (cf. Vols. I and VI). Wherever we look, there was not a sovereign of real power who was able to check Bonaparte's career. Catherine II of Russia avoided war with France, and was already on the verge of the grave when his career began before Toulon. This explains to some extent the absolutely unprecedented success of the

Corsican *condottiere*, the ancient foe of France, who had now long behaved as an ardent Frenchman, and won the hearts of his countrymen by victory, conquest, and booty.

At the imperial peace congress at Rastadt the official non-French world played a miserable part. Many of the States of the empire, large and small, grovelled in the dust before the representatives of France, whose pockets they filled; but they treated the envoys of the ecclesiastical princes so contemptuously, that these felt it would go badly with them. A shameless scramble for new possessions was initiated by the catchword "secularisation." In vain did the ecclesiastical princes emphasise the theocratic nature of the empire. The secular lords already picked out the lots on which they had set their hopes in the great auction of the empire, estimated their losses on the left bank of the Rhine or elsewhere at an exorbitant figure, and put a low valuation on the territory given in compensation in order to do a good stroke of business. There was no talk of patriotism or public spirit, and France fostered their base inclinations in order to make them more subservient.

(c) *Egypt and Syria*. — The dream of the East and of Egypt filled Bonaparte's soul, together with the thought of the conquest of Great Britain, which formed part of the same plan. He wished to wrest Egypt from the sultan and then to march to India, in order to strike Great Britain in her most vulnerable spot. He dreamed of expelling the Turk from Europe and of establishing once more a Byzantine empire. "Europe is only a molehill; great empires, great revolutions, are found only in the East, where six hundred million men live. Our path must lie eastward; for the East is the source of all power and might." To carry out the Egyptian expedition, which was shrouded in the profoundest mystery, the Directory had need of money. Since it had none, but was desirous of sending Bonaparte away from France, the generals Berthier and Brune were ordered to empty the treasuries of the States of the Church and of Switzerland in the midst of peace. Pierre Alexandre Berthier overthrew the papal rule, and led Pius VI a prisoner to France, where he died (August 29, 1799); and on March 20, 1798, the Roman Republic was created. A part of Switzerland was united to the Cisalpine Republic, Geneva was joined to France, and on the 11th of April the "one and indivisible Helvetic republic" was proclaimed, where, according to Lavater's phrase, only the "freedom of Satan flourished." These steps not merely enlarged the power of France, but also brought the treasures of Rome and Berne to the relief of the depleted exchequer. It was high time; the assignats, of which more than forty-five milliards were in circulation, had sunk to one two-hundredth of their nominal value. Bonaparte, as commander-in-chief of the army of the Orient and the army of England, well equipped with all necessities, left Toulon on May 19, 1798. He had no difficulty in crushing the State of Malta, which had sunk very low, and obtained as booty the treasury of the Order and large stores. He eluded Nelson's fleet, which was intended to catch him, captured Alexandria on July 2, and moored his fleet in the Bay of Aboukir.

Hastening through the burning desert, he made his entry into Cairo after the battle of the Pyramids, or Embabeh (July 21), the crushing defeat of the Mamelukes (cf. Vol. III, p. 713). But in vain he flattered the sheikhs; all his coquetting with Islam was useless. The "sultan Kebir" did not reciprocate his love, and the attempts to bless the Egyptians with departments and arrondissements met with universal opposition. Then the great admiral Horatio Nelson annihilated the

whole of Napoleon's fleet on August 1 at Aboukir Bay, and cut off the return of the French. Selim III, one of the most important of the reforming sultans, availed himself of the chance, declared war in September with France, and concluded alliances with Great Britain and Russia. Napoleon was forced to suppress an insurrection in Cairo with grapeshot (October 21-22).

Since all that was romantic attracted him, he now regarded Syria as the base of his advance on India, and entered into negotiations with Tippu Sahib, sultan of Mysore, and with Persia. The thought of an expedition like Alexander's march flashed through his brain. El Aryschee indeed capitulated, and Jaffa was stormed by him on March 7, 1799, but Bonaparte's assaults on St. Jean d'Acre, where the plague broke out in his army, were failures; and the victory won by his subordinate, Jean Baptiste Kléber, over the Turks on Mount Tabor (April 16) did not compensate for the losses before Acre. Bonaparte was forced to abandon his Oriental dreams and to withdraw on May 20; "but for Acre he was emperor of the East." Nelson now wrote triumphantly that the "vagabond" was cut off; nevertheless he reached Cairo, cleared Upper Egypt, and defeated the Turks on July 25 at Aboukir. But little news from France had reached him. His antagonist before Acre, the British commodore William Sidney Smith, derisively sent him newspapers which revealed to him the misfortunes of France.

(d) *The Second Coalition War.* — What had happened? The Directory had to face stubborn struggles with the obstinate republicans, and, in order to crush them, usurped in May, 1798, an illegal power; but after Carnot's retirement it forfeited all respect. Barras, its best-known member, seemed an incarnation of every vice. Russia, since November, 1796, had an eccentric ruler, the emperor Paul, who regarded himself as a divine tool for the restoration of ancient France and ancient Europe, wished to reinstate the pope, and contrary to tradition acted quite disinterestedly, being prepared to supply money and men, and enthusiastic for the cause of the divine monarchy against the worthless republic. Paul vainly tried to draw Prussia out of her neutrality. His favourite thought was an alliance of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain against France. The new (second) coalition, the soul of which was Paul, was most formidable to France even if Prussia kept aloof from it. It comprised Russia, Great Britain, the new pope Pius VII, the princes of Italy, a number of German States (not Bavaria, however, which strangely favoured France), Portugal, Turkey, and the Barbary States. The second coalition emphatically defended the law of nations as established by past history, and Paul gave it a commander of the highest rank in Marshal Suvaroff. At sea, indeed, the British were undisputed masters since Aboukir. The French under Joubert conquered Sardinia, whose king, Charles Emmanuel IV, knelt before the sacred veil of Veronica instead of fighting, and forced him in December, 1798, to abdicate and leave the country. Under Jean Etienne Championnet they conquered Naples on January 23, 1799, and, while the court fled to Palermo, created the Parthenopean Republic. France in this way possessed Italy as far as the straits of Sicily.

André Masséna, when the coalition war began, drove the imperialists from the Grisons to Vorarlberg, and then received the supreme command of all troops on the Rhine and in Switzerland. Jean Baptiste Jourdan advanced at the beginning of March, 1799, to Swabia, was defeated by the archduke Charles on the 21st and 25th of March at Osterach and Stockach and repulsed to the left bank of the

Rhine. Marshal Paul Kray, Baron von Krajowa, defeated the French on April 5 at Magnano, and Suvaroff drove them behind the Adda. He then, after the victory over Moreau at Cassano on April 28, entered Milan and dissolved the Cisalpine Republic, while Masséna was driven by the imperialists into the heart of Switzerland. The French envoys were still sitting at the congress of Rastadt. The imperial headquarters finally declared that their safety could no longer be guaranteed. When they started back on the night of the 28th of April they were attacked, in gross violation of international law, and two of them were killed. Fortune smiled on Suvaroff in Italy. He defeated Macdonald on June 17–19 on the Trebbia. Mantua was taken on July 27, and on August 15 Joubert fell in the defeat inflicted at Novi by Kray and field-marshal Baron Melas, and France was doomed to forfeit her last positions in Upper Italy if the coalition remained united.

Suvaroff was, however, incensed at Thugut's intrigues and the interference of the military council of Vienna. He and his emperor wished to reinstate the king of Sardinia; the emperor Francis would not hear of it, and was himself intent on booty. The British cabinet organised a Russo-British expedition to Holland, which captured, it is true, the Dutch fleet, but was defeated in the autumn of 1799 by General Brune; thus the plans for a restoration of the banished House of Orange to the throne of Holland and for an invasion of Belgium were thwarted. No battles were fought on the Rhine; Archduke Charles only captured Mannheim, and the militia caused the French much trouble. While Count Haugwitz, the foremost statesman of Prussia, feared the encroachment of France on Prussia, and advised an entrance into the triple alliance of Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, the king, who saw in France his natural ally, remained an idle spectator of the great war. The foolish plan was formed in Vienna of cutting short Suvaroff's triumphal march into Italy and of removing him over the Alps into Switzerland. By unparalleled exertions the general crossed over in September, 1799, and when he heard of the victory of Masséna, at Zurich (September 26), over the Russians and imperialists, he descended with the fragments of his army in October into the valley of the Upper Rhine. Paul, furious with Francis, concluded the alliance of Gatschina with Bavaria, whose independence he guaranteed, announced to Francis in blunt words his withdrawal from the coalition, and in December the Russians marched back. The coalition was broken up, and France saved from the most dangerous onset. The weak government of the Directory would not have been adequate; it could hardly keep its head above the water. The Director, Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès, himself aimed at its overthrow, and looked for an energetic general to help him. Since Joubert was fallen, he thought of Bonaparte. His colleague Barras, on the contrary, planned a restoration of the Bourbons, and entered into negotiations with the banished head of the house, Louis XVIII, whose attempts at reconciliation Bonaparte had always rejected.

(c) *The Consulate.*—As soon as Bonaparte in Egypt learnt how things were going in Europe, he resolved to return home; he had nothing more to do in the East or with his army, which he handed over to Kléber. His star was now in the ascendant at Paris. He sailed secretly from Alexandria on August 23, 1799, taking only a few followers with him. Marmont confesses in his memoirs, "We felt we were bound to an irresistible destiny." A glamour of romance already

surrounded the victor of the Pyramids and of Mount Tabor; when he landed at Fréjus, on the 9th of October, people said before his face, "We will make you king, if you wish." On the 16th of October he appeared in front of the astonished Directors; they certainly had not summoned him. But the nation saw in him the embodiment of its honour, the glory of France; the nation belonged to him, not to the despised Directory.

(a) *The Founding of the Consulate.*—Bonaparte quietly enlisted allies and adopted useful agents from every party. His brothers Joseph and Lucien, now president of the Council of the Five Hundred, did him yeoman service; Josephine helped him with Barras and Louis Jérôme Gohier, who was then president of the directory. Charles Maurice Talleyrand joined his side, as did many generals, ministers, and other influential men, with Siéyès at their head. He did not, however, trust any one of them, being himself guided by ambition and cool reason, wholly occupied from childhood with the plain actualities of life, with struggles and victories, and as hardened an egoist as Machiavelli's "Prince." The soldiers worshipped him, the generals yielded to his persuasions, and some bankers advanced money. Then the *coup d'état* of the 18th and 19th Brumaire (9th and 10th November, 1799) took place. For a time everything pointed to failure, but Lucien's presence of mind saved the situation. The council of the Five Hundred at St. Cloud was broken up by troops, the Directory forced to abdicate, and a provisional Consulate (Siéyès, Roger-Ducos, and Bonaparte) entrusted with executive power. The nation abdicated in the orangery of St. Cloud; the military despotism which Robespierre had already foreseen had come, and after the first sitting of the Consulate the duped Siéyès acknowledged, "We have a master. Bonaparte wills everything, knows everything, and does everything. The laws, the citizens, and all France lie in his hand." Siéyès was forced to content himself with sketching a constitution; but when he wished to limit Bonaparte's power, and subordinate it to himself, Bonaparte called the plan a metaphysical absurdity, and the constitution (V) of the year VIII (24th of December, 1799) placed all power into the hand of the First Consul.

Bonaparte, chosen by the senate to be First Consul for ten years, had all sovereign powers, and chose for the Second and Third Consuls, who were only given advisory powers, Jean Jacques Régis de Cambacérès and Charles François Lebrun, occupied the Tuileries with them, and surrounded himself and them with guards. In order that the legislative power might be as weak as possible relatively to the executive, it was divided between a tribunate, a legislative body, and a senate, which Bonaparte managed as lord and master. Siéyès as president of the voiceless senate was buried alive. Into the council of state, which showed some resemblance to the *conseil du roi* of Louis XIV, Bonaparte summoned the best experts; the council of state became, as Louis Marie Cermenin says, "the torch of legislature," also, indeed, the vanguard of the upstart. The other two Consuls were shadows. In place of the many-headed government of the advocates, a single ruler governed, who was at once the child and the destroyer of the Revolution. A manifesto of December 15 stated that the Revolution was ended.

Bonaparte had attained a high position; but nevertheless he was dependent on the sovereignty of the people, and might after ten years be removed into the background. He was compelled, therefore, to keep his laurels from fading and to add

to them by fresh campaigns, even though he now apparently was an advocate of peace. He offered peace to the haughty George III in the tone of an equal, knowing well that the king would keep his hold on Malta and on Egypt; and when George sent a curt refusal to Talleyrand by his secretary of state, William Wyndham, Lord Grenville, in January, 1800, that gave the desired pretext for stigmatising the policy of William Pitt as the grand obstacle to international peace. A similar refusal was returned by Francis II, for Thugut did not wish to lose the victories of 1799. Frederick William III wished to reconcile the Czar with the consular government, but Bonaparte saw that Prussia was a too subordinate power. He established quiet in the country, and finally subdued La Vendée. The heads of the Chouans continued, however, to be his deadly foes.

(B) *Marengo*. — Moreau led the army of the Rhine against the emperor, and drove back General Kray, in May, 1800, into a fortified camp before Ulm; Masséna was operating in the Appenines against Marshal Melas. The First Consul, however, crossed the Alps with the reserves of Berthier, in order, after most careful preparation, to imitate Hannibal and Suvaroff. A success at Montebello was followed by the glorious victory of Marengo on the 14th of June. Never perhaps was Bonaparte so favoured by fortune, never was he less in a position to show his genius as a commander. Melas lost his head, and the disgraceful capitulation of Alessandria not only cancelled Austria's victories of 1799, but cleared North Italy of the enemy as far as the Mincio and the lower Po. The thought of a western empire, though still vague, already arose in Napoleon's breast. At the same time Moreau defeated Kray on June 19 at Hochstädt, occupied Munich, and inflicted terrible losses on South Germany. Conquered Austria soon concluded a new treaty of subsidies with Great Britain, which also entered into a similar treaty with Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Electoral Mayence. The emperor rejected the preliminary peace of the 28th of July, but on the other hand not only concluded the armistice of Parsdorf but prolonged it on the 20th of September; thus the "augmenter of the empire" abandoned South Germany to its fate. Thugut fell on October 8, 1800, and Count Ludwig Cobenzl succeeded him.

Bonaparte curtly rejected any overtures of the Bourbons, who wished to employ him to reinstate them, and directed affairs into the path of monarchy, in order to aid his own advancement to the throne. He closed the list of emigrants, willingly admitted emigrants to his own circle, and wished to "make the people of 1792 and the people of the 18th Brumaire one united people." The Jacobins considered him a renegade, the royalists an usurper, who had escaped their attempts in October and December, 1800. The dispute with the United States of America was terminated by the peace of Mortefontaine, in which the principle "free ship, free cargo" was recognised, and France obtained an influential ally against the British naval power. Bonaparte wished to put against Great Britain an alliance of the neutrals under the headship of the Czar, and made overtures to him. Paul fell an easy victim to his flattery and cheap homage; he saw in Bonaparte the conqueror of the Revolution and the future emperor of Western Europe, and, in concert with Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, concluded a convention of armed neutrality against the naval supremacy of Great Britain (December, 1800) and drove the Bourbons, who had been received at Mitau, out of Russia in midwinter.

(γ) *Luneville and Amiens.*—The war with Francis II broke out afresh, and Thugut returned for a short time to the head of affairs. But Moreau defeated Archduke John on December 3 at Hohenlinden, and Bonaparte became master of the situation in Germany and Italy. He pushed Moreau into the background, met with support for his anti-Austrian policy from Russia and the South German princes, and by his insistence achieved the peace of Lunéville on the 9th of February, 1801. Central Italy and the left bank of the Rhine became French; the German Empire, politically and territorially revolutionised, was forced to give compensation to the princes, whose rights on the left bank of the Rhine had been prejudiced, and the ecclesiastical States, which were destined to serve this purpose, saw that their hour had come. An imperial peace commission, which was mainly in favour of secularisation, was intended to carry out the affairs of the imperial peace; but everything, as a matter of fact, was settled in Paris, — princes and ministers fawned loathesomely for the favour of France.

Bonaparte ruled the unworthy royal pair of Spain by means of Godoy, the "prince of peace" (cf. Vol. IV, p. 552). In the alliance of Madrid on March 21, 1801, Parma and Elba as well as Louisiana came to France. Tuscany was given as the "kingdom of Etruria" to Prince Louis of Parma, the son-in-law of Charles IV; this, the first kingdom created by Bonaparte, was naturally only a French province, and Louis a puppet king. In spite of all the promises given to Spain, Bonaparte sold Louisiana in 1803 for eighty million francs to the United States of America, whose extent of territory was thus doubled. Lucien Bonaparte, ambassador in Madrid, goaded Spain to war against Portugal, the ally of Great Britain. After a disastrous campaign, the prince regent John in Badajoz was forced to close the harbours of Portugal against the British, pay twenty-five million francs to France, and make concessions in Guiana. Ferdinand IV of Naples also saw himself compelled, as Murat approached, to close his harbours to England and to allow the French to occupy the Gulf of Taranto.

The British sovereignty in India stood firmer than ever. Lord Wellesley and his successors, Cornwallis and Minto, continued the victorious career of Clive and Warren Hastings, and enlarged the British possessions far and wide (cf. Vol. II). Kléber had been murdered in Egypt; his foolish successor Menou capitulated in September, 1801, to the British, who were coming to the help of the Turks. Egypt was lost for France (cf. Vol. III, p. 715). Bonaparte meditated vengeance and the annihilation of England.

The emperor Paul became stranger than ever in his conduct. His own family felt themselves threatened, and, with the cognisance of his successor to the crown, a number of nobles wished to compel him to abdicate. He resisted, and was murdered on March 24, 1801, — a blow for Bonaparte, but a triumph for Great Britain. Alexander I, Paul's successor, concluded in June a peace and a commercial treaty with Great Britain, waived all claim to Malta and to the grand mastership of the Maltese Order. Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson had attacked the Danish fleet on April 2 and compelled King Christian VII to abandon the alliance of the neutrals; this defection was soon followed by that of Gustavus IV of Sweden. The northern confederation for the neutrality of the seas thus was broken up.

Bonaparte now set aside the respect he had entertained for Paul and annexed Piedmont to France in 1802. He concluded a secret treaty in August, 1801, with Bavaria, whose destinies were guided by the talented Max. von Montgelas, "the

Pombal of Bavaria," and thus obtained an important base in Southern Germany. He also effected a peace with Great Britain. The pacific cabinet of Addington met him, and concluded peace preliminaries at London on October 1, 1801, and a definite peace at Amiens on March 27, 1802. It was soon apparent that it was at best an armistice. Great Britain never contemplated resigning Malta to the Knights of St. John, nor did France intend to evacuate the Helvetian and Batavian republics. Bonaparte immediately entered into closer relations with Alexander I. When they had concluded a peace, they formed a secret agreement in Paris on October 11, 1801, in order to settle, to their mutual satisfaction, the affairs of Italy and the question of compensation to the secular States of the empire for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine. The policy of Tilsit and Erfurt had already long existed in the germ. Both rulers set up to be dictators in Europe and arbitrators in the empire, and Alexander did not seem to notice that Bonaparte was only making use of him for his own ends. The First Consul concluded peace also with Turkey and the Barbary States, and the world hailed him as the bringer of universal peace.

(δ) *The First Consul.* — How little did Bonaparte's nature correspond to this idea! It was a matter of indifference to the Spartan-like adventurer whether the nations found peace and happiness; they were to be merely the footstool under his feet. Fame alone meant anything to him; but not the fame of spreading civilization and morality, but the fame which is won by force and sanguinary wars. Washington was not his ideal. He called the devastation of the Palatinate by Louvois the latter's noblest title to fame. Filled with an intense contempt for men, which was due to his great knowledge of mankind, he attached no value to the lives of his fellow creatures; he had seen in the East how the life of man was not esteemed more highly than that of a dog. As if an evil spirit urged him on, he loved to destroy what others held dear, to rend in pieces all that history had built up. He wished to change the varied form of Europe into the desolate uniformity of a military world empire. He was devoid of patriotism. At first he was an enthusiastic Corsican, then apparently a Frenchman, soon a thorough citizen of the world; the French realised that fact, and never offered the man who remained half a foreigner, while he was raising them to be masters of the world, that love which Louis XII and Henry IV had enjoyed.

Although he had no religious feeling, he recognised the necessity of Christianity for social order. He required for the world sovereignty, to which he aspired, an alliance with the papacy. The Catholic religion was invaluable, in order to invest him with the character of the heaven-sent ruler. "Philosophers will laugh, but the nation will bless me. . . . Men will say I am a papist: I am nothing. In Egypt I was a Mussulman; here I shall be Catholic for the welfare of the people. . . . My policy is to govern as the majority wish. . . . If I ruled a nation of Jews, I would restore the temple of Solomon." Bonaparte was doomed to disappointment if he thought that the papacy would give itself up as a tool to the will of another, and that the hierarchy could be ordered about like a regiment. Pius VII showed him his error. Pius and his secretary of state, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, a man of splendid ability, gladly opened negotiations with the First Consul, full of admiration "for the man of studied spontaneity," and the Concordat, one of the most brilliant measures of Bonaparte, was signed on July 15, 1801.



EXPLANATION OF PORTRAITS ON THE OTHER SIDE

1. Catherine II, Empress of Russia (1729-1796) ; engraved, 1762, by Count Peter Rotari from a picture in the possession of E. Tschetsoff in St. Petersburg.
2. Alexander I, Emperor of Russia (1777-1825) ; drawn by Seb. Bourdon, engraved by P. Audouin.
3. Charles Maurice, Duke of Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince of Benevento (1754-1838) ; painted by F. Gérard, engraved by A. Boucher-Desnoyers.
4. Clémens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince of Metternich-Winneburg, Duke of Portella (1775-1859) ; painted by Th. Lawrence.
5. Pope Pius VII, formerly Barnaba Luigi Chiaramonti (1740-1823) ; painted by Joseph Bazzoli, engraved by Ang. E. Lapi and Raph. Morghen.
6. Francis II, Emperor of Germany, as Emperor of Austria Francis I (1768-1835) ; painted by Nat. Schiavoni, engraved after 1806 by Joseph Longhi.

(From W. v. Seydlitz's "Historisches Portratwerk.")

France and the Church were reconciled. The latter accepted the dictatorship of Bonaparte, the States of the Church were restored to the pope, who became the supreme head of the French Church. The ecclesiastical laws of the Revolution were repealed, and the Curia assented to the confiscation of the property of the Church in France. All the clergy in France became State servants, the schools were taken away from them, and the Church, in its democratic form, was far more compliant and ecclesiastical than it was before the Revolution. Bonaparte obtained indirect power over the religious belief of the French.

Bonaparte introduced military discipline into the national life, which had become demoralised, and the idea of authority once more gained ground. The law of February 17, 1800, became the foundation of the government. In contrast to the revolutionary age with its elected bodies, the State was now governed by single officials. It was a hierarchy of a number of "First Consuls in miniature;" all were nominated by Bonaparte, and were removable at his pleasure. The government of France was strictly centralised from top to bottom. The councillors who stood by the side of the prefects played the part of the chorus in ancient tragedy. The entire executive and legislative power was united in the First Consul. All regular authorities obeyed him; public opinion had to keep silent, and a marvelously trained police suppressed inconvenient views. The readjustment of the finances was carried out by help of the capable finance minister, Gaudin. The chief burden of the direct taxes fell on the landowners; the indirect taxes were accurately adapted to social conditions. The national expenditure and national debt were entirely reorganised. Industry and trade were supported by the Bank of France, founded in 1800. The respectable business men strongly supported the national financial undertakings. Even in finance centralisation prevailed; the money market became subservient to Bonaparte's despotism.

By a wide extension of the system of substitutes a large proportion of the wealthier classes obtained freedom from military service, and the army raised by conscription served Bonaparte's ambition better than a recruited army. It was only from 1807 onward that the harshness of the military law was unduly prominent. The corps of officers was divided into two sections, since the staff officers required to be educated men; there could be no promotion in ordinary cases beyond the rank of captain. The "field-marshal's baton in every knapsack" was only a phrase, a concession to the "equality" delusion. Bonaparte's rule was the best-organised despotism of modern history; but there was no place in it for public spirit or an independent attitude.

Even before the Revolution a reform of the French judicial system was thought imperative, and Bonaparte, who possessed an exceptionally legal mind, nominated in 1800 a committee, consisting of the four most capable jurists in France, to draw up a civil code. In the council of state, which contained legal magnates, the proposals of Cambacérès were discussed, and Bonaparte's opinion often determined the correct decision. As the thought of Rome and world empire influenced him greatly, Roman law was prominent in the new system, though combined with the *droits de coutume*. The portions of the revolutionary legislation which abolished all feudalism were also taken into account. In the *Cinq Codes* the practical legislation of the Bonapartist despotism was effected (1801-1810). Usually known as the *Code Napoléon*, it is still in force in France, Belgium, Holland, and many other countries, where it had been introduced during the Consulate and the first

Empire,—a splendid conquest in the field of civilization. Extraordinary courts and military commissions, however, frequently served the government when it wanted to place itself above the law.

The educational system was in a sorry plight. Bonaparte intended teachers to be apostles of his authority and superintendents of the political and moral views of the people; he organised the educational system from a rigidly bureaucratic standpoint, and created a scholastic hierarchy. All teachers formed a corporation, a civil militia available for the power of the government, and had at their head, after 1808, the grand master of the Imperial University. Since all independent thought and work in science and art seemed to Bonaparte shallow pedantry, the press, literature, and the theatres were kept under strict supervision. They were constantly threatened with police interference. The intellectual life requisite for freedom thus languished; everything succumbed to an uniformity which crushed the spirit and allowed no genius to break through.

(e) *The Consulate for Life.*—The senate and the legislative body were entirely submissive to the will of the First Consul. In the tribunate alone many still opposed his wishes, which were directed toward despotism. He removed, however, all opponents except Carnot, who alone recalled past days of freedom of thought, and filled their places with creatures of his own. It seemed dangerous to make France suddenly into a monarchy once more. On the other hand, it was possible, by prolonging the term of the Consulate, to lead the nation insensibly in the desired direction. Bonaparte discussed the whole matter carefully with Cambacérès, the Second Consul, and was indignant when the exasperated Siéyès induced the senate to propose a renewal only for ten years. He was afraid that the proposal might be accepted, and declared to the senate he would only remain in office if the nation demanded it. But the question was simply put to the nation in the form, Shall Bonaparte be Consul for life? Lists were opened everywhere in the country, and there was vast room for influence and intrigues. The people pronounced for their hero, and by a decree of the senate of August 3, 1802, "Napoleon Bonaparte" became Consul for life. He followed "the will of the people," resolved soon to replace it by his own will. The rights were conceded him of nominating his successor, of concluding truces and alliances on his own responsibility, of granting pardons, etc.; he ranked among the sovereigns. The constitution of the year VIII was immediately altered to suit his purposes. The tribunate was reduced in numbers, the senate, his dumb servant, was increased and its powers enlarged; not a trace was left of constitutional guarantees. The Bonaparte family grouped themselves round him. On the 15th of August, 1802, his birthday was celebrated for the first time as a national festival. He had already founded in May the order of the Legion of Honour, a sign of the approaching dissolution of the republic.

The First Consul felt himself the master and the mediator of the destinies of Europe. He had imposed on the greatly weakened "Batavian republic," in October, 1801, a constitution which made it quite dependent on France. He changed the "Cisalpine" into an "Italian" republic, of which he graciously accepted the presidency on January 26, 1802. The republic of Lucca received a Bonapartist constitution, the "Ligurian republic" saw incorporation imminent, Parma and Piacenza came under French administration; thus Upper Italy, except Austrian Venetia, was directly or indirectly in Bonaparte's power. He interfered

in the party conflict of Switzerland; and on February 19, 1803, by the Act of Mediation, the best constitution of Switzerland before 1848, gave a fresh proof of his marvellous power of administration. He became "Protector of Switzerland," whose neutrality ceased, and stood above the Landamman; Geneva remained to France; Valais became a French protectorate. The alliance of France with Switzerland was followed in 1803 by a military capitulation, according to which Switzerland was pledged to keep sixteen thousand soldiers always ready for France. Europe, as Bonaparte said, had recognised that Holland, Italy, and Switzerland were at the disposition of France.

(5) *The Diet of Ratisbon.*—Apparently in concert with the emperor Alexander, but, as a matter of fact, independently, the First Consul decided matters of life and death in the German Empire. The States overwhelmed him with petitions and demonstrations of respect; thoughts of a confederation of the Rhine, the plan of a third alliance besides the chief powers, haunted his ever restless brain. He concluded secret treaties with Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Cassel, and then with Austria also, and promised himself great advantages from them. The partition of the German Empire had been planned by Bonaparte and Alexander on June 8, 1802. In spite of all protests of the ecclesiastical States, the resolution of the imperial diet was passed with unprecedented rapidity, in consequence, indeed, of orders given from Paris and St. Petersburg. On the 25th of February, 1803, the chief resolution of the diet at Ratisbon was promulgated,—a monstrous act of injustice which confiscated by a law of the empire the whole possessions of the Catholic Church. The ecclesiastical States in the empire, which had indeed long been decaying, fell victims, not to the requirements of modern progress, but to the greed of the secular *protégés* of Napoleon. Only two, and those rapidly disappearing, princes survived. Out of one hundred and fifteen ecclesiastical princes, there were only three who kept their status; two of these, the grand master of the Teutonic Order in Mergentheim, and the grand prior of the Knights of St. John in Heitersheim, were soon to disappear. The third was a loyal friend of Napoleon, the elector and arch-chancellor Karl Theodor von Dalberg. His archiepiscopal see was removed from Mayence to Ratisbon. More than two thousand square (German) miles, with more than three million souls, fell to the secular lords, and only six States of the empire escaped destruction.

There was, in fact, no longer a Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, and the theocracy was past and gone. The proportion of votes in the new imperial diet was largely in favour of Protestantism. The change within the Catholic Church was more thorough and more comprehensive than even at the Reformation. The Catholic clergy were deprived of their immunity from taxation, as well as the greater part of their property, and became servants of the State; but they also lost interest in the empire, in which they no longer appointed any princes or cathedral chapters. A democratic spirit hostile to the plundering State took the place of the independence of the princes of the empire; subserviency to the pope and ultramontane doctrines celebrated their birth. The Curia itself gave up the Roman Empire for lost, since it henceforth spoke of *imperium germanicum*; Talleyrand actually termed it *fédération germanique*. When the new era dawned with violation of all rights, the German people hardly felt the disgrace. Amongst the medley of nationalities, the ephemeral States of 1803, a Bonapartist bureaucracy

promoted an unnatural particularism. In South Germany especially the governments, supplied with rich spoils, proceeded with precipitation and recklessness, following out an identical and stereotyped policy. Their conceptions of justice resembled in many respects those of their protector, and only a few men possessed the courage of Baron Karl vom Stein, who openly blamed and condemned all outrages.

(η) *San Domingo, Boulogne, Hanover, Pichegru, Cadoudal, and Enghien.* — The First Consul knew perfectly well that the peace with Great Britain could not be permanently maintained. Pitt, whom Grenville called the only saviour, challenged the too pacific cabinet of Addington, and advised new preparations for war. Bonaparte on his side thought of organising a great colonial policy. The revolt of the negro Toussaint l'Ouverture in San Domingo (cf. Vol. I, p. 488) presented, at the beginning of 1801, the pretext for sending out an army under Charles Emmanuel Leclerc d'Ostin, husband of Pauline Bonaparte. The island, indeed, was subjugated, and Toussaint, by a stroke of treachery, was brought to the icy dungeon of Joux in the Jura, where Mirabeau had once languished. But a new negro insurrection after Leclerc's death ended in November, 1802, with the loss of the island, and Bonaparte for the future thought no more about San Domingo. The United States of America immediately opposed the expansion of France from Louisiana, a further reason for sale. Bonaparte was thus forced at an early date to renounce the hope of colonial successes.

Smarting at the caricatures which appeared in the British comic journals, at the permanent occupation of Malta and various other occurrences, the First Consul made preparations for renewed war with the queen of the seas; he publicly insulted the British envoy, and the cabinet of St. James replied on May 18, 1803, with a declaration of war. The British privateers unscrupulously plundered French and Batavian ships; British fleets watched the coasts of France. The greatest sacrifices were willingly made by the people, who all looked to Pitt as the natural director of their destinies. Even his opponent Charles James Fox admired him. Large military forces were raised. Bonaparte fanned the old racial hatred into flames, revived the fête of the Maid of Orleans, and savagely denounced England in the press, which was entirely at his service, as the eternal disturber of the peace of Europe. The whole of France resembled a gigantic dockyard. England, that second Carthage, must be attacked, chastised, and overthrown. It was a duel; but Bonaparte showed the same obstinacy and embarrassment as later when facing Russia. France was fated to make futile sacrifices; Spain and Portugal too were pressed into the service. Laurent de Gouvion St. Cyr held the ports in the Neapolitan district; the Batavian and Helvetian republics were required to lend aid, and a large army was collected in the camp at Boulogne.

Prussia had felt secure behind the line of demarcation, and at Russian instigation ventured temporarily to occupy Hanover in 1801, a policy which Bonaparte never forgave; it now received the tidings that the First Consul himself would occupy Hanover. Before the king summoned courage to anticipate him, Bonaparte, disregarding Hanover's neutrality, ordered Mortier to advance into the country in May, 1803, and by the blockade of the Elbe and the Weser to close North Germany to British trade. The gallant Hanoverian army was disarmed and disbanded, and twenty-six months of French occupation cost the country more than sixty mil-

lion francs. The occupation damaged Prussia's trade and its prestige in North Germany. But Frederick William did not shake off his inactivity; in fact, his government played the part of a mediator, in order to induce the pretender "Louis XVIII," who was living on Prussian soil, to abandon his claims. The attempt met with a proud refusal. Bonaparte's will was sovereign from Hamburg to Messina, and, filled with arrogance, he exclaimed, "I find no opponent in Europe!"

The French royalists living under British protection, being supported by the cabinet of St. James, thought of a *coup de main*; but the First Consul, who was haunted by a fear of the restoration of the Bourbons, was informed of all their preparations by his spies, and his splendid police enticed the conspirators into the net. Moreau, Charles Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal, Armand, and Jules de Polignac were allowed to land without hindrance and were then arrested in the spring of 1804. In spite of the pressure which Bonaparte exercised on the courts, he did not succeed in procuring the execution of Moreau, who escaped with a sentence of perpetual exile. Pichegru was found strangled in the Temple on April 5, and public opinion called Bonaparte the murderer of the "suicide." Cadoudal and eleven others were executed on June 25; the two Polignacs escaped the penalty of death. Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, "the flower of the Condé," was arrested by the First Consul, in flagrant defiance of the law of nations, on Baden territory in Ettenheim for no crime whatsoever, and was shot on the 21st of March at Vincennes. The German imperial diet, Austria, and Prussia accepted the outrage in silence: Hanover and Sweden protested; and actual war with Russia seemed imminent.

B. NAPOLEON I

(a) *The Empire of the West.* — The general alarm which had seized France was utilised by Bonaparte for his further elevation. The senate was compelled to ask him humbly to strengthen his position, and a tribune proposed that Napoleon Bonaparte should be given the title of "hereditary emperor;" Carnot alone in the tribunate raised a voice of protest. Even the legislative body was in favour of the proposal. Napoleon adroitly excluded the limitations which the senate wished to propose, and by a decree of the senate of May 18, 1804, he was given the imperial crown for himself and his descendants. The new constitution of the year XII enlarged the senate, but restricted it to the discussion of proposals introduced by the crown, limited the legislative body, and the tribunate still more closely and completely fettered freedom; in Mignet's phrase, France was now ruled for ten years with closed doors. The clergy compared Napoleon I with Moses and Cyrus. Napoleon did not, however, wait for the result of the pretended popular voting, which promised an enormous majority in his favour, and revived the old pomp of the Bourbons at his imperial court. How many of these new and fickle courtiers had raved during the Revolution against nobility, titles, privileges, and church! how many had dipped their hands in royal blood, and stained themselves with theft! It is only necessary to recall the high chamberlain the Duke of Talleyrand.

What a strange imperial house! Besides the venerable mother Letitia, who was now styled Madame Mère, there were the other "imperial highnesses," — the whilom commissaries Joseph and Lucien; Louis, the emperor's comrade in poverty at Auxonne and Valence; the frivolous Benjamin Jérôme and the three gay sisters;

finally, the uncle, Cardinal Grand-Almoner Joseph Fesch, the prosperous army contractor and picture collector. The etiquette and ceremonial of the court of Louis XIV were diligently studied in order that everything might assume an effective and "legitimate" form. The old nobility flocked to court and entered the service of the "successor of Charlemagne," unconcerned about the solemn protests of the banished king against the unlawful usurpation of his throne. Since his "system," as Napoleon styled it, depended on military successes, he created by the side of the civil posts great military offices, the marshals of France, amongst whom there was no friend of Moreau. The new nobility, which owed its existence to him, formed a counterpoise to the old, both bowed beneath his iron fist and the principle of authority. The "empire" was the Caesarism of old Rome, as Napoleon showed by carrying the Roman eagles on his coat-of-arms and his standards; that is to say, a State controlled by one man's will and administered by military officials and policemen. The idea of universal sovereignty was more prominent in the empire than in the monarchy. Napoleon saw in himself an emperor of the West. The Roman Empire passed from the Hapsburgs to the Bonapartes; the world indeed was accustomed only to one Western emperor, and saw in the Czar the heir of the Greek emperors.

Most of the courts hastened to recognise the crowned revolution as a legitimate power. Prussia set the example to the rest. Austria hesitated, as Friedrich von Gentz advised caution; but Cobenzl, the diplomatist of Campo Formio and Lunéville, thought that the monarchs of Europe ought not to be ashamed of this colleague. The German and Italian princes congratulated Napoleon with the most servile flattery; only Russia, Great Britain, and Sweden refused to acknowledge the imperial title. The emperor Francis foresaw that the Roman elective empire could no longer exist in his empire; he retained therefore his existing title, but assumed at the same time, on August 11, the title of "Hereditary Emperor of Austria" for his hereditary dominions, — they had, as a fact, constituted an independent realm since Leopold I. After Napoleon, in spite of much ridicule, had acknowledged this third empire, Francis in return acknowledged him as emperor of the French. On Napoleon's imperial progress along the Rhine in September, 1804, the German princes prostrated themselves in the dust before him at "golden Mayence," and did homage to him as the natural successor of Charlemagne, while he dropped hints of a confederation of the Rhine. They all realised that they had an absolute master, who showed the iron hand more and demanded more than a Hapsburg emperor, but rewarded them far more amply. Napoleon suggested to Frederick William his willingness to recognise Prussia as an empire, but the king did not rise to the bait.

Napoleon now invited the compliant German princes, a remarkable following, to attend his coronation at Paris by Pius VII, and Fesch had the difficult task of persuading Pius and Consalvi, with threats and inducements, to take the journey. Ought he to consecrate the murderer of Enghien on the throne of the "most Christian kings"? Ought he to legitimatise an illegitimate accession and to proclaim Napoleon to the faithful Catholics as a successor of Charlemagne? Faced by this difficulty, Pius finally set aside his scruples, especially since he cherished the hope that his compliance would be rewarded by large secular and spiritual advantages. Napoleon treated him with studied neglect, and was very indignant when Josephine persuaded Pius to give the blessing of the Church to their mar-

riage, which had only been concluded according to the civil law. The coronation of Napoleon and Josephine took place on December 2 in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, a stately but chilling ceremony. Pius, in spite of his long stay, obtained none of the expected advantages. The Gregorian Calendar alone was reinstated on January 1, 1806, and the constitutional, that is to say, heretic, French bishops became subject once more to the Roman primacy. Pius left France, deeply mortified.

Napoleon was more arrogant than ever; he termed it incredible that Francis II, alone or in concert with Alexander, should raise the flag of "rebellion" against him, and extended his power on every side by conquests and threats. Where his rule extended, all intercourse with Great Britain had to cease; but the dream of landing in England was never realised. The army which had been assembled on the coasts of France was employed in the campaign of Austerlitz. Napoleon in his obstinacy hardly noticed that Pitt was welding a new, the third, coalition against him, and was pouring out a liberal stream of subsidies everywhere. Pitt, who had been premier since May, 1804, devoted all his energy to the defence of his country; he failed in his efforts to detach Prussia, but attacked Spain, which sided with Napoleon. Among Napoleon's declared opponents was reckoned Gustavus IV of Sweden, the honourable but impolitic "Don Quixote of legitimacy," whom the Napoleonic press overwhelmed with abuse and contempt. He drove the French ambassador from the country, saw in "Monsieur Bonaparte" the beast of the Revelation of St. John, allied himself with Great Britain and Russia against him, and furnished twenty thousand men to the coalition (April, 1805). Alexander I became more and more friendly to Pitt, and concluded at the same time an alliance with Great Britain, in the interest of the European balance of power, according to which France was to give up all conquests made since 1789. The prospective entrance of Austria into the coalition did not, however, yet take place, notwithstanding the defensive alliance with Russia in November, 1804, and Prussia remained neutral, in spite of the persuasion of Pitt and Alexander. It was in vain that Queen Louise, Prince Louis Ferdinand, General Ernst von Ruchel, and others were eager for war. Austria, where since 1801 Count Ludwig Cobenzl was permanently at the head of affairs, was for peace, especially in view of the increasing financial distress. Archduke Charles spoke also for the maintenance of peace; and the army, in spite of all improvements, was still defective.

(b) *The War of 1805.* — Napoleon went to Italy in order to make a monarchy out of the republic. The people were forced to ask for his brother Joseph and then Louis, and since both declined the crown, Napoleon crowned himself on May 26, 1805, at Milan, with the iron crown of the Lombard kings. His step-son, Eugène de Beauharnais, became viceroy of Italy, and this kingdom was administered in the French fashion; in the talk about the greatness of Italy the Italians forgot the chains of Napoleon. The Ligurian Republic was united to France in June, Parma and Piacenza to Italy in July; and with the grant of Piombino and Lucca as an hereditary principality to his sister Eliza Bacchiochi began the narrow-minded policy of providing for his family adopted by the "emperor and king," who, in so doing, became the harshest oppressor and most unsparing judge of his own relations.

These events in Italy induced the Viennese cabinet to take up arms. The arch-

duke Charles drew up the plan of campaign, which the incapable general Karl von Mack was to follow; and in August Austria joined the alliance of Great Britain and Russia. The princes of South Germany took the side of Napoleon, who had promised them a share in the spoliation of Austria; at their head was Bavaria, which vied with him in reviling the emperor Francis, "the skeleton, whom the services of his forefathers has raised to the throne." In Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt Napoleon had the "bases of his German league," which furnished him large bodies of troops. Mack entered Bavaria in September, 1805, and occupied Munich. Prussia remained neutral; even the march of the army corps of Bernadotte through the district of Ansbach, although a flagrant breach of the laws of neutrality, did not induce the king to rise against France and make common cause with Austria; he only allowed the Russians to pass through Silesia and occupied Hanover. Napoleon struck crushing blows at Francis II. On October 17 Mack made a shameful capitulation at Ulm, and other Austrian divisions were defeated before the Russians under Michael Gole-nishchef-Kutusoff could come up.

On the other hand, Napoleon seemed to meet with no good luck at sea; the fleet, which had been rebuilt after Aboukir at an enormous cost, was annihilated, along with the Spanish fleet, off Cape Trafalgar by Admiral Nelson (October 21, 1805). Nelson fell; but he had secured for his country the charter of the absolute rule of the seas. Napoleon's maritime dreams were over, and no one ventured to mention the name of Trafalgar before him.

The emperor Alexander had broken away from the anti-Prussian counsels of his friend, Prince Adam Czartoryski, and, at the king's invitation, had gone to Berlin, where the archduke Anton also appeared. The treaty of Potsdam of November 3 pledged Frederick William to attempt an armed mediation between the coalition and Napoleon on the basis of the terms of the treaty of Lunéville, and to join the coalition on December 15, should the mediation prove unsuccessful. Alexander and the king and queen of Prussia clasped hands over the grave of Frederick the Great in confirmation of the agreement, and Haugwitz set out on November 14 for the headquarters of Napoleon, in order to offer the promised mediation. Napoleon, however, was so confident of ultimate victory, that he already spoke of the end of the Hapsburg dynasty, and was looking out principalities in the empire for his marshals.

The French advanced into Austria and Italy, the court fled from Vienna, Upper Italy was lost to Francis, and Murat captured Vienna on November 13 by a stratagem. Napoleon occupied Schönbrunn and tried in vain, by posing as a national liberator, to detach the loyal people from Francis. The Russians under Prince Peter Bagration were defeated by Lannes and Murat on November 16 at Hollabrunn, and Brünn fell. Nevertheless Napoleon's position in Moravia might have become very precarious if the allies had acted prudently, and if Prussia had entered the alliance after Napoleon had rejected her offer of mediation. But Alexander let himself be hurried into premature action, and the "battle of the three emperors" at Austerlitz, on December 2, 1805, was Napoleon's most brilliant victory; he certainly never showed greater skill as a general than on that day. The Austro-Russian army fell back on Hungary. Francis abandoned the Russians. Alexander was completely discouraged, and carefully followed out the plan which had been drawn up for the retreat; he also recalled his troops from Italy and

Hanover. Francis, gnashing with fury, humbled himself before Napoleon, who gave him an interview at a bivouac and conceded an armistice. A third of the Austrian dominions remained in the power of the French, while the South German courts already sent their diplomatic representatives to Napoleon's headquarters in order to beg for territory and subjects out of the losses of the "augments of the empire." After Austerlitz no other course was left to Haugwitz, the mediator, than to conclude with Napoleon at Schönbrunn, on December 15, a humiliating defensive and offensive alliance, by which Prussia received Hanover.

Napoleon, having obtained the treaty with Prussia, did not ingratiate Austria by the moderation of his claims, as Talleyrand advised, but extorted from Francis II a characteristic peace. Francis was forced, in the treaty concluded on December 26 at Pressburg, to recognise all changes in Italy, and to sacrifice a fifth of his fairest dominions, of which Italy, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden received their share. Salzburg was a miserably small compensation for this. Austria was excluded from Germany and Italy, cut off from Italy and Switzerland, forced to pay an enormous war tax, and placed in an untenable and unendurable position. The terms of peace spoke of the "German Confederation," not of the German Empire. Bavaria and Wurtemberg became sovereign kingdoms, Baden a sovereign electorate; the airy phantom of the Roman Empire vanished. Hereditary sovereignties accorded ill with the elective empire. The despotic king Frederick of Wurtemberg wrote to his imperial patron that the diet of the empire at Ratisbon was a collection of fools, as ridiculous and mischievous as apes! The conqueror of Austerlitz and Pressburg had made many matches between the new French nobility and that of the *ancien régime*. His burning ambition now was to ally his family, which he termed the fourth on the French throne, with the ancient ruling dynasties of Europe. His wish was easily obtained. Bavaria and Wurtemberg offered their princesses, and Baden its heir apparent, in marriage to the Bonapartes. Prussia, bound hand and foot by the harsh treaty of Paris of February 15, 1806, was obliged to abandon the policy it had marked out for itself, and to commence hostilities with Great Britain and Sweden. Napoleon all the time was playing a double game, for while Frederick William thought himself secure in the possession of Hanover, his patron was secretly making offers of it to England. Napoleon always had two strings to his bow; he wished to transform the European system completely. The position of an emperor of the French did not satisfy him; he thirsted to become emperor of Europe, emperor of the West, and to collect round his throne a suite of kings who, while nominally independent, would be forced to submit to be the puppets of his caprice. He ruled, indeed, as he himself said to the senator Chaptal, "both at home and abroad only by the fear which he inspired." He never asked after the peoples of those kings, and his ambition for a world empire estranged him more and more from the French nation. An army order of December 26, 1805, announced that the House of Bourbon had ceased to reign in Naples; and on March 30, 1806, Napoleon's eldest brother, Joseph, became king of Naples and Sicily, without, of course, any will of his own. His beautiful sister, Princess Pauline Borghese, received temporarily the duchy of Guastalla. His brother Louis was forced to become king of Holland on June 5, 1806, and lived a life of martyrdom, since he became attached to his subjects and did not wish to sacrifice them to Napoleon. The brothers and sisters of Napoleon all took the name of Napoleon in addition to their Christian names; and the Church, in spite of the

shameful treatment of her supreme head, discovered a Saint Napoleon. The marshals and ministers, newly fledged nobles for the most part, were provided with large hereditary fiefs in the conquered or "protected" States, and were merely the princely satellites of the one and only sun.

(c) *The Confederation of the Rhine.*—Ulm and Austerlitz had killed Pitt on January 23, 1806, and Fox became the soul of Grenville's "Ministry of all the Talents." The negotiations for peace, which he soon commenced, were answered by Napoleon with the attempt to separate Russia and Great Britain from each other; but Russia now drew closer to Prussia. Disappointed in his hopes of peace, Fox died on September 13, 1806, and Lord Grenville adhered to the policy of war with Napoleon.

Gustavus IV seceded from the German Empire in January, 1806, "since only usurpation and egoism influenced the resolutions of the Reichstag and no one dared any more to speak the language of honour." The fragments of the empire were no longer able to face the storm, and the imperial chancellor, Karl von Dalberg, dinned into Napoleon's ears, "You are Charlemagne, prove yourself the reformer, the saviour of Germany, the restorer of her constitution. Let the western empire, the realm of Charlemagne, formed of Italy, France, and Spain, again arise in the Emperor Napoleon!" In this way Napoleon's wishes were met by the princes of the empire. He thought of forming out of the secondary German States which were dependent on him "*la troisième Allemagne*," in opposition to Austria and Prussia, and to divide the petty States among them. They were intended to furnish troops for his battles, and were never allowed to act on their own initiative. The decree of the Confederation of the Rhine, which Talleyrand read out to the various ambassadors of the vassal princes, was drawn up under his eyes on the 12th of July, 1806. They all signed it, since rich spoils were held out to them, while in any other case complete destruction was certain. Under the leadership of the prince-primate Dalberg sixteen German princes were separated from the emperor and empire, broke their oath, and in the most servile manner joined Napoleon, "whose ideas were in complete accord with the true interests of Germany." They openly announced their treachery, and annexed the territories of all their peers on the Rhine, in Franconia and Swabia, who refused to join them; the laws of the empire had lost all force for them. More than seventy princes and counts were robbed of their sovereign rights in favour of the sixteen, who received the fullest sovereignty in their own territory, but, on the contrary, in European politics had to submit unconditionally to the "protector of the Confederation of the Rhine." All the continental wars of the Confederation of the Rhine and its protector were for the future waged in common. The Confederation could put into the field sixty-three thousand men, whom Napoleon only considered food for powder. Gentz called the constitution, which was never completed or expressed in legal forms, "a shameful and contemptible constitution of nations of slaves under despots, who, again, are under a head despot." As a fact, the new alliance of States brought more than three thousand square (German) miles with fully eight millions of subjects under the rule of Napoleon.

The official representative of Napoleon at Ratisbon proclaimed on August 1 that his master no longer recognised a German Empire. Francis II considered this a suitable moment for getting rid of the German crown, which had been

degraded to a useless ornament. A cold note of Count Stadion gave the *coup de grâce* to the institution founded a thousand years before by Charlemagne, and Francis threw the imperial crown into the still open grave of the "permanent" diet. The step was indeed unconstitutional, since an emperor can do nothing without the co-operation of the imperial diet, but every one, except the German knights, agreed to the burial. The nation went away from the grave without a tear, and the "Mayence Journal" said scoffingly, "There is no Germany left!" The protectorate over the Confederation of the Rhine was inaugurated on the 26th of August, 1806, by the execution of the brave bookseller Johann Philipp Palm, the first who testified by his blood to the German love of freedom.

(d) *The War of 1806 and 1807.*—The Confederation of the Rhine was fraught with great danger to Prussia, but Haugwitz adhered to Napoleon. He, just as his sovereign, contemplated a North German confederation under Prussian headship as a counterpoise. The king was deaf to the appeal of the patriots, however loudly Arndt, Fichte, and Schleiermacher spoke to the hearts of the Prussians. It was only when he learnt that Napoleon had again offered Hanover to the English that his eyes were opened and he ordered the army to be mobilised. The commanding officers rejoiced, in spite of the bad condition of the army. They had learnt nothing from the mistakes of the Austrians in 1805, and in their presumption still saw in the French the *sans-culottes* of 1792. Frederick William would gladly have avoided war. But Napoleon thirsted for vengeance on Prussia, in which he saw the last hope of Germany. He received the homage of the princes of the Rhenish Confederation at Mayence, and considered it "a proof of the weakness of the human intellect to think that he could be opposed." In order that Russia might not hasten to the assistance of Prussia, he roused the Porte to attack it, and stirred up the Poles against Prussia and Russia. When Prussia finally declared war against him on October 9 he called it madness. It was, indeed, the most unfavourable moment for Prussia to strike a blow. Saalfeld (10th October), Auerstädt, and Jena (14th October) stripped the badly led army of the charm of invincibility which it had inherited from Frederick the Great. The Prussians everywhere were defeated or capitulated, as did most of the fortresses. Frederick William had no army left. Saxony went over from him to Napoleon; the elector of Hesse was deposed by Napoleon on October 23, and his territory placed under French administration; the dynasties of Orange and Brunswick lost their dominions. Napoleon imposed an exorbitant war tax on the Prussian monarchy; wished to detach it from Germany; meanly rejected Frederick William's proffered negotiations, and incorporated provisionally his territory left of the Elbe into the empire. His soldiers flooded Central and North Germany. On October 24 he entered Potsdam, whence he sent the cane and sword of "Old Fritz," his ideal of a commander, to Paris. Three days later he was in Berlin. The officials humbly obeyed him, seven ministers took the oath of fidelity to him, and he wrote to the sultan, "Prussia has disappeared." In this opinion he had eminent supporters. Gentz found the notion of Prussia's revival ridiculous.

A disgraceful alliance which the grand marshal Michel Duroc forced upon the Prussian ministers in Charlottenburg only served to accentuate Prussia's plight; while the Continental System, introduced by the Berlin decree of November 21, not only closed the Continent to British commerce, but crippled for a long time

the prosperity of every nation,—a misguided measure which put all Europe in sympathy with Great Britain. Frederick William finally plucked up courage, and on November 21, at Osterode in East Prussia, repudiated the treaty of Charlottenburg. That act marked the hour when a new Prussia was born. The king allied himself closely with Alexander, and dismissed Haugwitz. He did not, however, summon Stein, as the patriots hoped, but broke completely with that “disrespectful and indecorous man.” Napoleon in his fury drew up a declaration for the deposition of the Hohenzollern dynasty, dangled from Posen phantoms of a new Polish kingdom before the eyes of the Poles, in order to rouse them against Prussia and Russia, and made futile efforts to incite Austria against Prussia. The Rhenish Confederation was increased by the kingdom of Saxony and a series of sovereign petty States,—a stroke of policy which filled once more the pockets of Napoleon's diplomatists. Napoleon thought himself nearer than ever to his goal. He wished to play off Europe against Great Britain, to make one single State out of Europe, to conquer India and Egypt, his never-forgotten land of sunshine; while for the first time a vague foreboding filled the French people that this sovereignty, whose aim was cosmopolitanism, was only a passing natural phenomenon.

Prussia served as the base for the operations against Russia. In the French army the feeling of pride and self-confidence had increased enormously since the victories over Prussia; but this army, since one-third of it was composed of non-French soldiers, lost its national character and became a mixed society, which was animated by the spirit of mercenaries instead of enthusiasm for France. Dissensions soon broke out between the Russian and the Prussian generals. The commander-in-chief, Count Kamenski, showed signs of madness and abandoned the Vistula, and Napoleon entered Warsaw. After the indecisive battle of Pultusk, the new commander-in-chief, Th. von Bennigsen, advanced to Eylau, where the Prussians were the chief factors in preventing Napoleon, on February 7 and 8, 1807, from winning a complete victory. Contrary to his custom, he retired into winter quarters, and hypocritically offered, through H. G. Bertrand, peace and friendship to Frederick William, designating that moment as the most splendid of his life; but the king saw through the tempter, and, at the advice of Hardenberg, stood by the Czar. Fortune smiled on the French in Silesia and in Pomerania. Several fortresses capitulated; and after the fall of Dantsic (May 25), only Glatz and Kosel, Kolberg and Graudenz, held out. The bold raids of the volunteer bands of Ferdinand von Schill and Friedrich von der Marwitz were certainly a great embarrassment to the enemy. Prussia had concluded peace with Great Britain in January, 1807, and had renounced all claims on Hanover; Austria, in spite of all the efforts of Russia, persistently remained neutral. On the other hand, Alexander, at Kydullen, on April 4, said to Frederick William, who honourably confided in him: “Is it not true that neither of us will fall alone?—both together or neither!” The alliance of Prussia with Sweden was followed by an alliance on April 26 at Bartenstein with Russia, which it was hoped that Great Britain, Austria, and Sweden would soon join. In spite of all the exertions of Gentz and others, Francis did not join, and Great Britain did very little.

Napoleon displayed an almost fabulous versatility and persistency. From Osterode and Finkensteen he directed the affairs of the world, despite the attractions of the beautiful countess Walewska, who had become enamoured of the supposed saviour of Poland. He waged war with Russia and Prussia, defended

Constantinople against the British, and was continuously absent from France. The battle of Heilsberg (June 10, 1807) was indecisive; but at Friedland Napoleon, once more on the 14th of June, annihilated the army of Bennigsen, and the latter urged Alexander to ask for an armistice, while the Prussians were forced to evacuate Königsberg. The effect of Austerlitz was revived in Alexander's memory. He seemed crushed, and trembled before the possibility that Napoleon might set foot on Russian territory and stir up the Poles. Throwing his promises to Prussia to the wind, he struck out a new path after the armistice of June 21. Napoleon exerted his extraordinary powers of persuasion, and won the Czar over at a secret interview held on the Memel (June 25). The two emperors became friends. Their friendship was naturally the offspring of self-interest and cold calculation; they were at one in their hatred of Great Britain and in their ambition. Napoleon held out to the Czar the prospect of a free hand on the Balkan peninsula and in Finland, and entrapped the easily persuaded monarch, whom he intended to keep in leading-strings like a prince of the Rhenish Confederation.

Alexander relinquished the thankless rôle of a champion of international rights and international freedom, abandoned Frederick William, and acquiesced in the mutilation of Prussia. He met Napoleon at Tilsit, discussed with him the transformation of the world, and hoped to rule it with him. Prussia was forced to conclude a truce; Napoleon heaped reproaches on the king, and the tears of Queen Louise "slipped off him as off oilskin." On July 7 Russia and France, on July 9 France and Prussia, concluded peace at Tilsit. Only "out of consideration for the emperor Alexander" did Napoleon give back to the king the smaller half of Prussia (2,856 square German miles, with 4,594,000 inhabitants), and Alexander enriched himself with the Prussian frontier province of Bialystok. South Prussia and New East Prussia fell to the new duchy of Warsaw, which the king of Saxony received, together with the district of Cottbus; Dantsic became a free city. Prussia was forced to break off all trade relations with Great Britain. The king and the Czar recognised the royal crowns of Joseph and Louis Napoleon and Napoleon's title of Protector of the Rhenish Confederation; Jérôme Napoleon was to receive a kingdom of Westphalia. The Czar allowed the king of Sardinia to fall, ceded Jever to Holland, the Ionian Islands and the Bocche di Cattaro to France. Both emperors concluded at the same time a secret offensive and defensive treaty for all wars, negotiating like robbers. They wished to partition Turkey in Europe, except Roumelia and Constantinople; to fight the British, and to enforce strictly the continental system, which plan brought Russia's trade to the verge of ruin. The creation of "Old Fritz" seemed destroyed at Tilsit; Prussia was driven back over the Elbe, and Westphalia was interposed as a barrier State between Prussia and France,—a daughter of France on German soil. Hardenberg, who left on July 10, still guarded against the entry of Prussia into the Rhenish Confederation. But the thoughtlessly arranged Convention of Königsberg (July 12) was responsible for the great misery of the next years. Napoleon wished to crush the rest of Prussia, while maintaining peace, by war taxes of an exorbitant height. It was with Prussian money that he waged his wars on the Iberian Peninsula. The Russian councillor of state, Pozzo di Borgo, his Corsican hereditary enemy, termed the treaties wrung from Prussia a masterpiece of destruction.

(e) *Napoleon's Struggle for World Empire.* — The third transformation in Napoleon had been completed for some years. He had become a world conqueror, the despot of Europe, and France was only a province of his system. He denied this at St. Helena and called France his only love, and yet the case was otherwise; the French themselves felt it. No sovereign in modern times was ever so supreme as Napoleon after Tilsit; only Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar furnish any kind of parallel. But his insatiable appetite was far from satisfied: he wished to be worshipped as the "image of God upon earth;" his will was to become and remain the only law for the world.

Weak or neutral States only provoked his laughter; they could look for neither clemency nor protection from him, so soon as they attracted his greed. Portugal, in order to be allowed to remain neutral in the war between France and Great Britain, had paid sixteen million francs to France, for it lived on British trade; but Napoleon thirsted for the treasures of Portugal, and insisted that it should close its ports to the British. Since the kingdom of Etruria carried on business with the British from Leghorn, he incorporated it with France in November, 1807. His quarrel with the pope, whose secular and spiritual power he continually curtailed, became more acute when Jérôme's divorce was refused. Three provinces of the States of the Church were occupied by the French. Napoleon intended to turn the Danish fleet to account against the English; but they anticipated him, bombarded Copenhagen, and carried away the fleet in September, 1807, — a blow from which Denmark never recovered. It was a technical breach of the law of nations; but necessity knows no law, and the struggle was one of life or death for England. The attempt of Russia to mediate between France and Great Britain was frustrated by the energetic foreign secretary, George Canning, who saw in the Czar the masked underling of Napoleon. Canning answered the "continental system" by the orders in council declaring the blockade of the French coast, and began war with Russia. How little intention Napoleon had of fulfilling the promises which he made at Tilsit and of strengthening Russia at the cost of Turkey was shown in August, 1807, by the truce of Slobosia, due to his intervention, according to which the Russians were forced to evacuate the Danubian principalities. The friendship already began to flag. The ambassadors in St. Petersburg — Savary Duke of Rovigo and De Coulaincourt Duke of Vicenza — had been concerned in the execution of the Duke of Enghien, and in consequence were treated coldly by the Russian court; and the Russian ambassador in Paris, Count Peter Tolstoy, showed an exclusive preference for the society of the royalist Faubourg St. Germain. Alexander gave vent elsewhere to his indignation at the deception by attacking Finland. Gustavus IV was supported indeed by the British; but in Finland the Count of Buxhöwden advanced victoriously, and in the peace of Fredrikshamn Finland came to Russia in September, 1809. The French occupied Swedish Pomerania in 1807; but the British fleet, however, carried off the Russian fleet in the Tagus (September, 1808).

(f) *Spain.* — The "emperor and king" now laid his insatiate hand on the Iberian Peninsula, for "there were to be no longer any Pyrenees." The downfall of Spain after the enlightened despotism of Charles III and Aranda was primarily his doing, and the directing minister, Godoy, was his tool (cf. Vol. IV, p. 552). Talleyrand counselled Napoleon not to interfere with Spain, since he disapproved

generally of his master's boundless greed for territory, but Napoleon would not take advice; he wished to tear Spain from the Bourbons and transfer it to his house, of which he said that it would shortly be the oldest in Europe. While Andoche Junot led an army to Portugal, Napoleon concluded with infatuated Spain at Fontainebleau, in October, 1807, a treaty aiming at the destruction of Portugal, which allowed Napoleon to enter on Spanish territory and to advance through Spain to Portugal. The royal family fled to Brazil, their American kingdom (cf. Vol. I, p. 490); Junot occupied Portugal; and Napoleon announced in December, "The house of Braganza has ceased to reign." Portugal was terribly plundered by Junot, now Duke of Abrantès, and lost both its colonies and its maritime trade.

The ministers at Madrid saw these violent measures with alarm. But Napoleon was not content with these; in February, 1808, he ordered Rome and the fortress of St. Angelo to be occupied, and showed to Pius VII the successor of Charlemagne. Charles IV of Spain and his heir apparent Ferdinand, prince of the Asturias, hated each other, and the queen Maria Louise (of Parma), whose infatuation for Godoy was notorious, loathed her son. Napoleon incited the three, one against the other. Ferdinand begged for the hand of a Bonaparte; Charles, too, proffered this request, and he thought of Lucien's daughter Charlotte. Playing the part of providence in Spain, Napoleon posed in Italy as the genial father of a family, adopted his step-son Eugène as son, and nominated him heir to the throne of Italy, which caused a good impression there. He blockaded the island of Sardinia as being an ally of England, tried to wrest Sicily from the British in order to restore it to Naples, and threatened Algiers. Spain was defenceless. When Charles IV discovered a conspiracy organised by Ferdinand against him, he complained of his son to Napoleon; since Ferdinand also summoned Napoleon to his side, the latter became the willing mediator and arbitrator. After fine speeches the country was enslaved. Joachim Murat appeared as lieutenant-general of the emperor in Madrid; he cast longing eyes on the crown of Spain, and the emperor cajoled him also; Murat then served him doubly well. The French invested Madrid on every side. Napoleon hoodwinked the entire court of Spain, where all parties regarded him as their helper, and prepared for the friendly nation an unparalleled comedy of errors. When the royal couple wished to fly, the son betrayed them. The people lost all patience; an insurrection against Godoy led to the abdication of the king, and on March 19, 1808, the son proclaimed himself king as Ferdinand VII. But Murat enticed the king to give him a paper on which the latter called his abdication involuntary. Napoleon invited both kings and the queen to the castle of Marrac near Bayonne, goaded them on, one against the other, like wild beasts, and effected with mean cunning the abdication of both kings. The Bourbon dynasty collapsed amid mutual execrations. Murat suppressed a riot in Madrid on May 2, and Spain with all her colonies was now French; but her haughty people still remained Spaniards at heart. In order that Talleyrand might appear to be responsible for the settlement of the Spanish question, Napoleon shut up the ephemeral king Ferdinand VII with him in the château of Valençay. By this means and by the dole of pensions to the old royal couple, he thought, shortsightedly enough, that the matter was settled. In Naples he replaced his brother Joseph by Joachim Murat; the former was transferred to Spain as king, on June 6, 1808. Joseph obeyed his brother as his destiny, and set foot in Spain on the 9th of July. But hardly had the people heard of the occurrences in Marrac when an insurrec-

tion broke out, in order to shake off the foreign yoke. Napoleon did not understand this struggle for independence; he thought that the Spaniards ought to have thanked him on their knees for having given them his approved system of government instead of the former maladministration. He regarded unchained national passions, such as the French Revolution had so often shown him, with supreme contempt; yet Spain and the Tyrol, Prussia and Russia, were fated to teach him a stern lesson as to the primitive force that lies in freedom-loving peoples. The Spaniard knew only *one* king, Ferdinand VII. The British supplied them with money and arms; the juntas of the towns assumed the defensive. National armies grouped themselves round popular leaders. The peasants attacked the French soldiers from ambushes and stabbed them, while muttering a prayer; even priests handled the poignard, for Napoleon was the persecutor of the Holy Father, the despoiler of the Church of Christ.

Joseph saw how things stood. He wrote to his brother from Burgos that he had not a single adherent. Napoleon, however, relied blindly on his fortune, and, consumed by a disastrous over-confidence, hoped for an unqualified success. Joseph did indeed enter Madrid; but the Spaniards captured the French fleet off Cadiz, and the cautious Sir Arthur Wellesley, who brought troops to them, took care that the "wound on the body of the empire" remained open. Pierre Count Dupont de l'Etang capitulated on July 22 at Baylen. Joseph warned his brother that his fame would be wrecked in Spain, and evacuated Madrid, as he longed to be back in Naples; but Napoleon asserted haughtily that he found in Spain the pillars of Hercules, but not the limits of his power. While the insurrection extended, Portugal concluded an alliance with Spain. Wellesley was victorious at Roliça and Vimiero (17th and 21st August); on August 30 Junot and Kellermann surrendered in Cintra.

The moral effect of Baylen and Cintra on the world was immense. Germany and Austria were in a ferment, and Baron Stein hoped for a simultaneous rising. Secret leagues were formed among the German people, so little disposed to conspiracy, and the Prussian war party entered into communications with Austrian diplomatists. But Frederick William was anxious not to fight the master of the world without trustworthy allies. He had, during the time of distress, started on the road to great exploits. Stein and Hardenberg, although remote from the throne, had co-operated in the reform of Prussia. The abolition of hereditary serfdom was followed quickly by the reorganisation of the government and of the military system, as well as by social reforms, municipal regulations, etc. In Austria, Count Philip Stadion, "the Stein of Austria," wished to remedy all ancient abuses; from the moment when he entered the ministry he tried to kindle the flame of patriotism in the motley group of nationalities in Austria, and thought of an universal "war of the nations" against Napoleon. Friedrich Gentz wrote in favour of national liberty and the emancipation of Europe, and Stein advised the court of Vienna, which certainly cared little for his opinion, to take the opportunity of commencing the war before Spain was conquered. But Archduke Charles was in favour of the postponement of the war, and contented himself with the reorganisation of the army and the formation of a militia for the whole monarchy except Hungary. The Czar, too, warned Francis to maintain peace, since he wished to settle accounts with the Porte without the interference of Austria. The latter, therefore, took no action.

Napoleon suspected that the war against Austria could not long be delayed, and wished to settle first with Spain. Nobody rejoiced more heartily at the French reverses on the Iberian Peninsula than the imprisoned pope, from whom one piece of territory after another was snatched, in spite of the most energetic protests that he could make in the presence of Europe. If Napoleon could only succeed in binding more closely to himself Alexander, who was busied in distrustful introspection, he could withdraw the grand army from Germany and crush Spain with it, in which case all the vassal States would fall to him. The further existence of Prussia was doubtful, since an intercepted letter of Stein of August 15 had roused the blind fury of Napoleon. Prince William of Prussia was forced, at the sword's point, to sign the crippling agreement of Paris of September 8, 1808, which reduced the Prussians to the impotence of a State of the Rhenish Confederation, allowed it only an army of forty-two thousand men, and prohibited the raising of militia or the arming of the people.

Napoleon once more promised Alexander a free hand in the East, humoured his greed by a thousand fanciful pictures, and invited him to Erfurt, in order to settle with him the destiny of the world. As a set-off to the Spanish reverses it was important to renew, under the eyes of Europe, the Franco-Russian alliance, and, in order to produce the best scenic effects, the princes of the Rhenish Confederation, so insignificant in themselves, were summoned to Erfurt to serve as a background. Talma played every evening before a "parterre of kings," and the two emperors discussed matters together. Their lips were overflowing with friendship, but their hearts beat only for self-interest. Napoleon's wish for the hand of a Grand Princess met with no response, and Constantinople, the "key to the house-door," did not fall to Alexander. The treaty of Erfurt on October 12, 1808, renewed the alliance of Tilsit, and guaranteed to Turkey its territory with the exception of the Danubian principalities; in the event of an Austrian war the two emperors wished to help each other. Prussia was once more reduced in size, and was forced to bow before the dictatorship of the two. On November 6 a new arrangement with respect to the war tax and evacuation of territory was made. Stein, the soul of the anti-Napoleon party, fell on November 24; on December 16 he was outlawed by a decree of Napoleon from Madrid, and his property confiscated. Napoleon fought against "*le nommé Stein*" as against a rival power. In Austria, where he found an asylum, Stein exercised no influence. Francis considered him a Jacobin and member of the *Tugendbund*, and was submissive enough to accept resignedly Napoleon's phrase, "Your Majesty is what he is by my will." On December 4 Madrid surrendered to Napoleon. He treated Spain as a conquered country, ruling it over the head of Joseph, who re-entered Madrid on January 22, 1809, in order to form a liberal administration; Napoleon thought that ridiculous, advised him to rule with axe and halberd, and allowed his soldiers to plunder the country. Meantime, great discontent was caused in France at the interruption to its prosperity.

(g) *The War of 1809.* — Austria, deeply wronged, at last armed herself. The same cry for revenge echoed from palace and hovel; the militia hastened to the colours, and the nation was prepared for any emergency. The cabinet waited in vain for Russia and Prussia to join, while Napoleon said scoffingly that Austria had drunk of the waters of Lethe, and that Francis wished to forfeit his throne.

From Spain came the tidings of the surrender of Saragossa to Lannes; from the States of the Rhenish Confederation, which was now twice as strong as Prussia, more than one hundred thousand men poured out under French generals. Austria had far fewer men than Napoleon, and was still in the middle of the preparations, as Archduke Charles had vainly emphasised in answer to Stadion's importunity. Among the peoples in opposition to the governments of the Rhenish confederation patriotic feelings were roused; they recalled the union of the empire for so many centuries under the Hapsburgs, and read with enthusiasm the proclamation of Archduke Charles, in which he said that the cause of Austria and Germany was one and the same.

Tyrol, loyal to the emperor, began the war. The "landsturm" freed it in five days from the Bavarians and French; at Wilten Count Bissen laid down his arms. Napoleon once more experienced the power of national indignation, and in North Germany Andreas Hofer, Joseph Speckbacher, and their companions were worshipped as national German heroes. Archduke Charles crossed the Inn on April 9, but split up his army. Napoleon concentrated his forces and drove him back to Bohemia in five days. Austria's hopes were destroyed, and Stadion's dream of a universal national rising was shattered; the archduke hesitated what to do. The French re-entered Vienna on May 13. All independent attempts at liberation in Germany made against Napoleon and King Jérôme of Westphalia had failed; only in the Iberian Peninsula did the Iron Duke conquer, and Tyrol freed itself a second time, toward the end of May.

The imperial upstart hurled his thunderbolts from Schönbrunn against the "House of Lorraine;" called on the Hungarians to make themselves independent and elect a king for themselves; put before the "bishops of Rome" their list of sins; united, in virtue of being "the successor of Charlemagne," the rest of the States of the Church with France on May 17; and ordered the pope to be taken as a prisoner to Savona, when the latter on June 10 had excommunicated him as the all-devouring tyrant. The world followed with strained attention the duel between France and Austria. Suddenly the "invincible" was prevented by Archduke Charles on May 21 and 22 from crossing the Danube at Aspern-Essling. Unfortunately Charles did not take full advantage of the victory. Nevertheless all Germany followed the example of Theodor Körner and Heinrich von Kleist in praising him as a national hero, and Napoleon, clearly perceiving the impression, was furious at the *canaille* of Austrians; it was the first time a single State had defeated him. But on July 6 Charles sustained the defeat of Wagram, and an armistice was concluded at Znaim. The peace party in Vienna gained the day. Stadion fell, and with Count Metternich, the new foreign minister, the Opportunists came to the helm. Napoleon rejoiced at the want of spirit shown by the *chétif François*, who abandoned any effort to carry on the war and was eager to conclude peace, for the victor's hands were quite full with Spain and Portugal. Here Wellesley, with less than twenty thousand British troops, foiled all the efforts of Soult and Victor to entrap him, and took the adventurous course of marching on Madrid. Want of men compelled him to abandon this design and fall back upon the coast of Portugal; but not before he had won the glorious victory of Talavera (July 28) over an army nearly double the numbers of his own. Even in Portugal he was a constant source of anxiety. He built the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras to defend Lisbon and the position of his army, and waited

calmly for the favourable moment to emerge and drive the imperial forces out of Spain. On the other hand, the British expedition to the island of Walcheren, situated between the mouths of the Scheldt and the North Sea, was a disastrous failure.

Napoleon gladly commenced peace negotiations with Austria. He saw Russia ready to interfere, and knew that the friendship of Russia was more than dubious. In the leading circles the only partisan of France was really the imperial chancellor, Count Rumjanzoff, a mere cipher, while the empress mother, Maria Fedorovna, was as pronounced an enemy of Napoleon as the empress Maria Ludovica in Vienna and Queen Louise in Berlin. The attempt of Staps, a priest's son, on his life (October 12) made a very deep impression on him. He feared other plots, had peace concluded in Vienna on October 14, and left the next day. This treaty of Schönbrunn imposed very hard terms on Austria. It was forced to cede to France, Italy, Russia, Warsaw, Bavaria, and Saxony more than 50,000 square miles, with 3,500,000 souls, pay a war indemnity of 85,000,000 francs, and to reduce its army to 150,000 men; it forfeited its position at sea, was henceforth surrounded on every side by Napoleon's world empire, and suffered much from the continental system forced upon it. Francis was obliged to acknowledge all present as well as all future changes on the Iberian Peninsula and in Italy, and to pledge himself to a rupture with Great Britain. In addition to this, a financial crisis prevailed which yielded to no remedial measures. Austria sacrificed the heroic Tyrol and Vorarlberg, patiently looked on at the execution of Hofer (February 20, 1810), and became a second-class power under French superintendence. Metternich, it is true, never believed in any long duration of the Napoleonic world empire, but now he saw salvation in close alliance with Napoleon. Alexander, too, was dissatisfied that the enlargement of the State of Warsaw placed a new kingdom of Poland before the door of Russia, but consented to receive Tarnopol out of the ceded territory of Austria, and thus proclaimed himself a hireling of France.

Napoleon completed the long-planned divorce from Josephine in order to rivet his dynasty by the links of legitimacy, and, since no Russian princess was given him, married by proxy, on March 11, 1810, the archduchess Marie Louise, daughter of Francis. The ceremonial was precisely the same as in the case of his "predecessor," Louis XVI. The princes of the Rhenish Confederation flocked to the nuptial ceremony, which Fesch performed in the Louvre, and five queens bore the train of the chosen bride. The fact that one-half of the College of Cardinals (the "black" cardinals), which had been removed to Paris, was absent from this ceremony roused the spoiled tyrant to fury. The "restorer of the altars" expected implicit obedience from the Curia, and yet it condemned his second marriage as bigamous. By a decree of the senate of February 17, 1810, the States of the Church were incorporated into the empire; Rome became the second city in it; and to flatter old remembrances, the expected son of Marie Louise was to be called king of Rome. Even Napoleon, who unhesitatingly destroyed so many kingdoms in this world, did not venture to abolish the papacy. Paris was intended to become the capital of Christendom, the pope the spiritual arch-chancellor of the empire and merely president of the French council. The Gallican Church was to be separated from Rome; Napoleon then would be Cæsar and pope. Once more Napoleon had mistaken the spirit of the age. The faith of the subjects could not be outraged in the way that the States of the Church, the pope, and the cardinals

were. Pius himself quietly endured the hard imprisonment in Savona, and his patient resistance was an invincible power.

The quarrel between the pope and the "*commediante*" largely influenced the feeling of the Spaniards and embittered them more and more against the foreign yoke. The veterans of Napoleon found their graves in Spain and Portugal. An orthodox campaign against the guerilla forces of the two nations was quite impracticable. Joseph was pushed by his brother entirely into the background, and the marshals of the emperor effected little against Wellington. One of the chief follies of Napoleon was his perverse insistence on the continental system (cf. Vol. VII, p. 122). He wished to annihilate the British in a passionately waged commercial war, and to close the Continent to them entirely. The trade of the neutral States was also greatly injured by it. The tariff of Trianon and the edict of Fontainebleau (1810) forbade any State lying within the dominions of Napoleon to trade with Great Britain, and ordered the capture and burning of all British goods. The imperial soldiers carried out this command from Spain and Switzerland to Sweden and the Hansa towns with the utmost barbarity,—a course which did not prevent the most daring smuggling. The trade of every State, including France, was destroyed in favour of the imperial monopoly.

(h) *The World Empire; its Zenith and its Fall.*—The situation of Prussia became more and more desperate. Napoleon remorselessly demanded the arrears of the war indemnity and scoffed at the king's pecuniary distress. When Frederick William once more resided in Berlin in the midst of the imperial soldiers (December, 1809), he was called upon to cede territory, and the Altenstein-Johna ministry advised the cession of Silesian soil. Spurred on by the brave queen, Frederick William dismissed the faint-hearted ministers, and in June, 1810, Baron von Hardenberg became chancellor of state. The second work of reform began, but the queen was not fated to see the regeneration of Prussia. Louise died on July 19, 1810.

The fulness of power granted to Hardenberg was contrary to all traditions of the Prussian official system. He undertook, in combination with Stein, many improvements, and tried to develop the country's resources, disregarding the obstinate resistance of the privileged classes. The agrarian reform found its completion in the edicts of September, 1811. In 1810 freedom of trade was conceded, the first case in a German State, following the example set in the kingdom of Westphalia. But the promise given by Frederick William in the finance edict of October 27, 1810, of granting an appropriately constituted representation of the people, was quite premature. The assembly of the national deputies of 1811, as well as the "interim national representation" of 1812, by no means realised the high expectations which had been excited.

Among the States which were peculiarly injured by the continental system Holland was first. Its prosperity rested on the trade with the British. King Louis, therefore, conjured his brother to desist from his disastrous measure, but no representations availed. Napoleon merely became so incensed with the king, who favoured Holland against Napoleon, that, in March, 1810, he united part of his country with the empire. When he sent Oudinot with an army to Holland, Louis, weary of his dreary rôle, abdicated and escaped to Austria. Napoleon thereupon, on July 9, declared Holland as "an alluvial deposit of the French

ivers" to be united with the empire, strictly enforced the continental system, and reduced the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Full of distrust of the kings of his house, he curtailed their power. From King Jérôme of Westphalia, to whom he had given Hanover in January, 1810, he snatched a large part away, in order to join it to the empire, and King Joseph of Spain received similar treatment. On account of the continental system, he incorporated into the empire the entire coast from the Ems to the Elbe, the Hanseatic towns, Lauenberg and Oldenburg (whose duke, as well as the princes of Salm and Arenberg, he deposed), and also Valais, in December, 1810. A canal was intended to connect Paris with the Baltic. Dalberg, the prince-primate, became grand duke of Frankfurt, and nominated Napoleon's step-son Eugène as his future successor. The Rhenish Confederation, which in its widest development embraced about 145,000 square miles, with 15,000,000 inhabitants, was a powerful weapon in the emperor's hands.

Napoleon's direct dominion now extended from Rome to the Baltic; in addition there were thirty-nine vassal States; in all, seventy-two and a half million souls obeyed him. He thus could exclaim, "I have the strength of an elephant; what I touch I crush." He thought of a new expansion of his realm, of the incorporation of the Iberian Peninsula and of Italy. "The trident will be united with the sword; Neptune will ally himself with Mars for the erection of the Roman Empire of our days; from the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean, from the Scheldt to the Adriatic Sea, there shall be one people, one will, one language." He only complained that the world would not believe him when he declared himself to be, like Alexander the Great, god-born. The Danish government obediently followed his commands. In Sweden Gustavus IV was overthrown in spring, 1809, by a palace revolution, at whose head stood the treacherous uncle of the king, and the power of the crown was curtailed by the States. Charles XIII, the new king, whom Napoleon treated as a subject, saw himself compelled, by the treaty of Paris in 1810, to join the continental system and declare war on the British. In the hope, which was not realised, of propitiating Napoleon, the childless Charles and the Reichstag chose, in the August of that year, Marshal Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte as successor to the Swedish throne. Victory after victory crowned Napoleon's undertakings. In his arrogance he said to Count Wrede: "In three years I shall be lord of the universe." The birth of his son, the king of Rome, on March 20, 1811, seemed to secure his fortune for ever. The fourth dynasty had now not only a present, but also a future. A wave of rapture swept over France, and all the satrap States, princes, and diplomatists outdid each other in grovelling salutations to the "new Messiah." That generation seemed born to servility. Within eight days two thousand poets commemorated the birth of a son to the generous father. The Cassandra-like utterance of a Viennese, "In a few years we may have this king of Rome as a beggar-student in Vienna," found no echo.

The boundaries of the world empire approached more and more nearly those of Russia. While Alexander recognised that he had been outwitted at Tilsit and at Erfurt, that the Porte was under the protection of France, and that a new kingdom of Poland was growing up in the Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon dreamt that he saw his custom-house officers, who watched Great Britain, at work on the Neva and the Volga; that he was commencing an Alexander-like march from the Volga to the Ganges, attacking the British with squadron after squadron on every sea, and setting the befooled Poles at the Russians. Alexander, being, as head of the house

of Holstein-Gottorp, insulted by the deposition of the Duke of Oldenburg, his cousin, lodged a protest, which Napoleon returned sealed to the Russian ambassador. The Czar, by a ukase of December 31, 1810, abandoned entirely Napoleon's system of trade, and announced a customs-tariff, which quickly revived Russia's trade and menaced France. While protesting their love of peace the two rulers armed for the campaign which Talleyrand called "the beginning of the end." Alexander anxiously faced the situation, and was resolved to await the attack of his Erfurt friend in Russia itself, where his people would fight the most valiantly; he obtained by bribery information from the French war office as to the plan of campaign.

Napoleon felt sure of the princes of the Rhenish Confederation; for he abandoned them, as he wrote to the King of Wurtemberg, the most self-reliant among them, at the slightest suspicion. Two hundred thousand men were assembled on the Lower Elbe, and Prussia feared to be obliterated from the map of Europe even before the outbreak of the war; it was gagged, found no protection from Russia, and the king styled a national war on a large scale, such as Gneisenau and Scharnhorst recommended, mere romance. Scharnhorst's mission to St. Petersburg and Vienna met with little success; Metternich took no interest in the permanence of Prussia, and refused all help; and Great Britain finally refused to send money. There was no other course left to Prussia than to conclude an alliance with Napoleon (February 24, 1812) and to supply him with twenty thousand men; almost the whole of Prussia lay open to the passage of the French; the fortresses and Berlin were in their hands, and the king lived, with a body-guard of a few hundred men, at Potsdam. Austria allied itself with Napoleon on March 14, 1812, under far more favourable circumstances, promising him thirty thousand men; it confidentially assured the authorities at St. Petersburg that it would only pretend to take part in the war.

Sweden also suffered terribly under the continental system, and secretly kept up commercial relations with Great Britain, with which it ought to have been at war. The Crown Prince, Charles John (Bernadotte), who conducted affairs almost irresponsibly, wished to have Norway, and since Napoleon did not acquiesce in that, he came to an understanding with Russia; the Russo-Swedish alliance was completed in April, 1812, and was followed by further agreements with Great Britain. Alexander informed Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839; cf. Vol. V) of Napoleon's offer to divide Turkey with Russia; the result was the peace of Bucharest, on May 28, 1812, which brought Bessarabia to Russia.

Alexander had not the third part of Napoleon's forces. The grand army, a medley of every nation, was one of the most numerous which the world had ever seen, 647,000 men strong. But on all sides the dislike of the nations to the oppression of Napoleon, as well as to the compliant sovereigns, made itself evident. A widespread ferment was noticeable among the usually peaceful Germans, while their sovereigns stood humbly round the potentate in Dresden, and tried to read their fate in his eyes; even Francis and Frederick William were not absent. He left Dresden on May 29. The Poles proclaimed in Warsaw the restoration of their kingdom. "The destinies of Russia shall be fulfilled; the Tartars shall be driven beyond Moscow." Without declaring war Napoleon entered Russia at Kowno, on June 25. The first Russian army, under Michael Barclay de Tolly, withdrew further and further into the interior, instead of uniting with the second army

under Prince Peter Bagration, and finally offered battle near Smolensk, and was defeated on August 17. The French, as had been the case in Spain, were faced by religious fanaticism, and the people took up arms. The enemy was lured further and further into the deserted country, where neither food nor shelter was to be found. But the golden cupolas of Moscow gleamed seductively, and Napoleon, looking back on his entry into Berlin and Vienna, Madrid and Lisbon, took for granted that Alexander would sue for peace so soon as he marched into Moscow.

The Old Russians now came to the helm; Kutusoff received the supreme command of the main army. But on September 7 Napoleon was again victorious in the bloody battle of Borodino, in which Bagration was mortally wounded. Napoleon was not fated to enjoy the victory to the full; his army had been reduced to some one hundred thousand men, and murmured at the privations which the emperor's ambition had brought on them. He entered Moscow on September 14, and took up his residence in the Kremlin, allowing the soldiers to plunder the city; but the governor-general, Count Fedor Rostopchin, a deadly enemy of France, united the fury of the population against the "unbaptised enemy," and in a rude outburst of patriotism, committed the "holy little mother" Moscow to the flames. The city burnt until September 20, and the French army lost all discipline. There was no talk of peace with a people which had ventured on so monstrous a deed; they would have continued the war as far as Siberia. A purifying fire glowed in Alexander's soul; supported by Stein and Arndt he displayed great energy. A German committee was formed in order to stir up the Germans against Napoleon, and the Russian people were ready for any sacrifices: many a nobleman raised an entire regiment out of his own pocket. A pitiless gulf yawned in front of Napoleon. The weeks went by in useless discussions; winter, Russia's most formidable ally, was approaching, and every one advised the emperor to retreat to Poland. But the fall from such a height seemed to him too sudden,—his pride resented it; nor did he forget the pusillanimity of Alexander after Austerlitz and Friedland.

When Murat had been defeated at Winkowo, Napoleon at last, on October 19, consented to retreat, and the Grand Army was soon doomed to destruction. Conquered at Malo-Jaroslawetz, Wjasma, Krasnoi, and other places, it reached the Beresina, which was crossed by the rear-guard on November 29, in a lamentable condition. The retreat was like a judgment of heaven; it led through an interminable waste of snows, where the peasants and Cossacks lay ambushed, the wounded died on the road, and desertion of the colours became prevalent. "Men no longer had any hopes or fears; an indifference to everything, even to death, mastered their completely dulled spirits; they had sunk into brute beasts." Such was the account of an eyewitness. On the way came the strange news that the half-insane General Claude François de Malet had spread in Paris, on October 23, the false tidings of Napoleon's death, and wished to bring in a republic; that was to say, that no regard had been paid to the empress and her son, to the existence of a Napoleonic dynasty. The cold reached — 30° Réaumur (36° below zero Fahrenheit), and the army was broken up. The last traces of discipline vanished, when Napoleon, once more thinking only of himself, deserted his army, on December 5, in Smorgoni, in order to enter the Tuileries on the 18th. Four days before that, the last troops had crossed the Prussian frontier, and everywhere it was whispered, "These are God's judgments." Napoleon, however, wrote to Cassel, "There is nothing left of the Westphalian detachment in the Grand Army."

Napoleon attributed the loss of his troops entirely to the northern winter, and wished to deceive every one by his falsehood, but he could not deceive himself. He tried to divert public attention from the Russian campaign to the Malet episode, as an unpardonable crime of the government. The authorities once more grovelled in the dust before the indignant deity, who now contemplated crowning his son, so soon as he should be old enough, as his successor on the throne, following the custom of his "predecessors on the throne," the Capets. It was important also to win new victories, in order to wipe out the Spanish and Russian defeats. A wider sphere presented itself to his creative imagination. In a few months he wished to have half a million soldiers under arms for a new war and wreak a bloody vengeance on Russia. The startled world was to be once more lulled into the old amazement.

The great calculator was, however, wrong this time, in his calculations; the allies adopted a different policy from that which they had formerly pursued when he was so easily quit with them. Alexander, under the persuasions of Stein, resolved to abandon all ideas of conquest and to continue the war outside Russia for the emancipation of Europe until Napoleon was annihilated. But Alexander vainly tried to win over the Poles, who still trusted to Napoleon's promises; and he was equally unsuccessful in inducing Austria to fight against Napoleon. Kutusoff, however, concluded on January 30, 1813, a secret truce with Prince Schwarzenberg, who commanded the Austrian auxiliary army. Frederick William did not venture to give the signal for war, that so many counselled him to do, but he paved the way for Russia and Austria, and resumed preparations. In the 10th Army Corps, led by Marshal Macdonald, the Prussians were commanded by General Hans David Ludwig von Yorck, a deadly enemy of the foreign yoke and a zealous supporter of the old order of things. He ventured on the decisive step at which his king hesitated; in order no longer to sacrifice the soldiers of Prussia to Napoleon he concluded on December 30, 1812, in the mill of the village of Poscherun the treaty of Tauroggen with the Russian Major-General Hans Karl Friedr. Anton von Diebitsch, and then remained neutral. The king, whom he had hoped to draw with him on the path of self-emancipation, made excuses to Napoleon for this high-handed policy and dismissed Yorck, but in his heart of hearts he rejoiced with Germany at the determination of the "iron" man. Hardenberg still nominally stood by Napoleon, and the court was able to evade the proposal to marry the Crown Prince with a Beauharnais or a Murat.

Metternich and Francis were not disposed to fight; they only wished to re-establish the old independence of the Austrian imperial dominion and to mediate a general peace. They saw in the North German patriots the promoters of schemes of emancipation, and Jacobins, and Napoleon assiduously increased their fear of this bogey. He also riveted the princes of the Rhenish Confederation to himself with the threatening prospect that men of revolutionary tendencies like Stein wished to dethrone them in order to found a "so-called Germany." But when Metternich thought of an armed mediation, when he wished to keep the Russian giant off Austria, to set limits to Napoleon's power, and to procure for Austria the leadership in a German Confederation of independent States, he forgot the most essential point; he did not reckon with the immeasurable arrogance of the imperial son-in-law. The Parisians displayed to this latter their disinclination for renewed war, and in the provinces many a fist was clenched against the "Bona-

[The letters enclosed in parentheses (SA) indicate the abbreviations given on the map.]

[illegible]

parte." But he appeared entirely a war minister, and even speculated with the property of the local communities, in order to raise money immediately for his preparations, without increasing direct taxation. On account of the religious element in the country he again approached Pius VII, who had been confined in Fontainebleau since 1812, tried flattery and threats by turns, personally negotiated, and finally on January 25, 1813, actually obtained a new concordat, according to which Avignon was to become the residence of the popes for the second time, and they were to renounce temporal power. But Pius was soon filled with remorse; on March 24 he renounced the bargain and henceforward steadily refused any curtailment of the *Patrimonium Petri*.

Hardenberg's policy of deceit lulled Napoleon into such reliance on Prussian support that Frederick William was able on January 22, 1813, to travel without hindrance from Potsdam, where he had been a sort of hostage, to Breslau where he was free. The preparations were eagerly pushed on. Volunteer Jäger corps were formed; as long as the war lasted no remission of the duty to serve was to be recognised. Stein took the lead in East Prussia, which was treated as if allied with Russia; steps were taken to organise the militia and arm the nation, and Yorck, being acquitted of all guilt by the king, undertook on his own responsibility the supreme command in East Prussia. Burgrave Alexander zu Dohna obtained in Breslau the royal assent to the independent action of East Prussia; Professor H. Steffens from his chair at Breslau carried away the students with enthusiasm, and all Prussia hailed the dawn of freedom; the iron ornaments of the German women told the men that, in Theodor Körner's words, "das höchste Heil, das letzte, im Schwerte liege" ("the last and greatest safety lies in the sword"). Frederick William yielded to popular feeling. On February 13 he issued his final declaration to Napoleon; on February 27 and 28 Scharnhorst and Hardenberg came to terms with the Russian plenipotentiaries in Breslau and Kalisch; it was a question of a defensive and offensive alliance "in order to make Europe free," and to restore the boundaries of Prussia as they had been before 1806, while Alexander hoped for the whole of Poland.

The Russians advanced under Count Ludwig zu Sayn-Wittgenstein; Yorck's Prussians followed over the Oder. By February, Cossacks were roaming round Berlin. The viceroy Eugène became uncomfortable and left Berlin on March 4, when the Russians and the Prussians entered. The knightly freebooter Friedrich Karl, Baron Tettenborn, occupied Hamburg, and in March induced the two Dukes of Mecklenburg to desert the Rhenish Confederation; this first proof of reviving courage by German princes was soon followed by Anhalt-Dessau. After the Czar had entered Breslau, Frederick William declared war with Napoleon on March 16. The whole nation became soldiers; one out of every seventeen subjects joined the colours, so that an army of two hundred and seventy-one thousand men was formed. On March 10 the birthday of the heroic and lamented Queen Louise, her husband instituted the order of the Iron Cross, and on March 17 the burning appeals, "To my People" and "To my Army" sped through the world. Saxony refused to join Prussia, since Frederick Augustus thought the defeat of his great ally impossible, and the allies took Dresden on March 27. On that day Napoleon, furious with the "ingratitude of Prussia," proposed to Austria its partition. But Metternich wisely declined the offer, and prepared to play the part of the armed mediator. On March 29 he concluded the secret agreement of Kalisch

with Russia, according to which Schwarzenberg withdrew before the Russians into Galicia and refrained from any acts of hostility. He refused a binding alliance with Russia and contented himself with an explanation which took place on April 2.

Count Münster, to whom the English Prince Regent and his ministers looked for information on German affairs, saw with displeasure the revival of Prussia, and the British gave no assistance to the Prussians. The Crown Prince of Sweden, Charles John, a somewhat ambiguous personality in the war of liberation, landed in May with his troops in Pomerania; Napoleon's efforts to draw to himself his old rival for the hand of Desirée Clary proved futile. The courts of the Rhenish Confederation still trembled before the Protector, and the army divisions from three quarters of Germany arrived punctually in order to assist him to sap the sources of Germany's freedom; thus Napoleon could reckon on roughly six hundred thousand soldiers. The plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia concluded a treaty in Breslau on March 19 which threatened all German princes, who within a definite time would not join the allies, with the loss of their territory, and held out the prospect of a central council of administration, of which Stein was the moving spirit, with unlimited powers, intended to administer temporarily the occupied territories, to conduct the preparations for war in them, and to distribute the revenues therefrom among the allies. The Czar would have preferred to depose the King of Saxony, and Stein to have abolished the system of petty States. Kutusoff, a typical anti-German Russian, in his proclamation of Kalisch struck strangely enough the national German chord, spoke of the right of nations to freedom, and held out to all German princes who continued to desert the German cause the alarming picture of annihilation by the force of public opinion and righteous arms. All these threats were fulfilled because it seemed as if the princes of the Rhenish Confederation did not care for the feeling of their subjects, but only submitted to force; to the parties threatened the threats sounded very "Jacobinical," and only confirmed them in their close adherence to the Protector. Napoleon might avert a complete change in the European situation if he, as Talleyrand said, became king of France, that is, if he formed part of the former European concert. Blücher, the Prussian commander-in-chief, quickly subjugated Saxony, whose king had fled and in the Treaty of Vienna of April 20 threw himself into the arms of Austria.

In order to prevent a repetition of the case of Malet, Napoleon, before taking the field, appointed Marie Louise as regent; he settled the last measures at Mayence. It is true that the new recruits were vastly inferior to the fallen veterans; the cavalry was the weakest. He had not two hundred thousand men, but five hundred thousand were soon to follow; the allies indeed had far fewer, and he wished to conduct the war as "General Bonaparte, not as Emperor." On April 5 the Prussians under York and Friedrich Wilhelm Baron von Bülow defeated the viceroy Eugène at Mückern. The Prussians were different from those in 1806, and the main army of the Russians entered Dresden on April 26. Napoleon, however, effected a junction on April 29 at Merseburg with his step-son and defeated the Russians and Prussians at Grossgörschen (Lützen). The Rhenish Confederation greeted the conqueror and Frederick Augustus not only came back to him repentantly, but put his army and country at his disposition. His lieutenant-general, Baron Thielmann, however, went over to the allies. Metternich sent Major-General Count Bubna with a programme of mediation to Napoleon. According to it the

latter would have retained France with vast dominions and have prevented Austria's entry into the alliance; but in his unbounded arrogance he dismissed Bubna after a stormy audience on May 16. Meanwhile Count Stadion had gone to the Russian headquarters with the same programme. Napoleon wished to negotiate directly with the Czar by means of Caulaincourt; but the Czar referred the mediator to Stadion.

While the Viceroy was forming an army in Italy and Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout (Duke of Auerstadt and Prince of Eggmühl) once more took Hamburg (May 30–31), Napoleon and Marshal Michel Ney (Duke of Elchingen, *le brave des braves*, Prince of Moscow) defeated the Russians under Barclay de Tolly and the Prussians under Blücher in the battle of Bautzen (May 20–21). The Elbe was once more in Napoleon's power from Dresden to the sea, and the retreat of the enemy left the greatest part of Prussia at his mercy. The Russians no longer wished to sacrifice themselves for foreign purposes, but appeared as if they would withdraw to Poland. Only a cessation of hostilities, which was as necessary for the allies as for Napoleon, could save the treaty of Kalisch from a premature termination. In consequence, the Armistice of Poischwitz was concluded (June 4). Metternich was proud of his triumph as a mediator, while the North German Patriots cursed the useless shedding of so much blood. Hardenberg was convinced that Napoleon would reject the mediation of Austria, and concluded on the 14th of June at Reichenbach a subsidiary treaty with Great Britain, which was followed there on the next day by a similar one between Great Britain and Russia. The latter and Prussia offered Napoleon favourable, and Austria still more favourable, terms of peace, and finally Austria promised on June 27 in Reichenbach to join Russia and Prussia in the war against Napoleon, if Napoleon did not accept, before July 20, the Austrian terms of peace. On the next day the emperor had such a stormy interview with Metternich in Dresden that the latter for the first time doubted the possibility of coming to any agreement. Napoleon afterwards regretted his outburst, and, since he had still to do with preparations, changed his views: he recognised the mediation of Austria and sent representatives to the General Peace Congress at Prague.

Meanwhile Spain was lost to Napoleon. Wellington's victory at Vittoria on June 21, 1813 cost Joseph the crown; he fled and was treated by the emperor as a criminal. The Marshals Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, and Louis Gabriel Suchet, Duke of Albufera, were repulsed everywhere. The six years was ended with the defeat of Napoleon, who had just been encouraged by the new homage of the confederate sovereigns in Dresden to believe that his will still was the law of the world. The allies fixed on their plan of campaign at Trachenberg (near Breslau) on July 12, and it was taken for granted that Austria would join them; Alexander Frederick William and the Crown Prince of Sweden had appeared in person. Bernadotte had hoped to become generalissimo, but he only received the command of the Northern army, and hindered operations in that quarter more than he helped them. On July 22 he joined the Kalisch alliance with the prospect of obtaining Norway. While he broke with Napoleon, he did not wish to offend the French irretrievably, and delayed as much as he could, casting sidelong looks at the French crown; Bülow and his colleagues felt that the Gascon was not to be trusted.

The Congress at Prague met on July 11. Caulaincourt kept it waiting for him

until July 28, and the Congress could not point to one fully attended sitting. It was clear that Napoleon merely wanted to gain time. When in conclusion he privately asked Metternich what would be the cost of Austria's alliance or neutrality, Metternich refused both and sent in an ultimatum; Napoleon gave no answer. At the opening of the sitting on August 11 the plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia, Joh. Protasius von Anstett and Wilhelm von Humboldt, declared their authority ended, and Metternich closed the Congress with a declaration of war on Napoleon. In this way the alliance included Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Austria; Spain and Portugal soon joined it.

In Spain the sovereign legislature, the Cortes, encouraged by the French disasters, had met in September, 1811, and had declared all the results of the events at Bayonne (p. 49) to be null and void and Ferdinand VII to be lawful king, and had drawn up a constitution in March, 1812. This bore a thoroughly democratic stamp and gave the crown a shadowy existence, but, notwithstanding all its defects, had for the moment the great value of an unambiguous acknowledgment of the universal wish for independence and of some union between different parties in their efforts to obtain it. A regency was to conduct the government until Ferdinand was released from French custody; Great Britain and Russia acknowledged it. The regency appointed by Prince Regent John before his flight to Brazil was also acting in Portugal, and received its orders mostly from England.

Against the army of the allies, which was almost half a million strong, Napoleon could this time only place in the field 440,000 men, amongst whom discontent at the renewal of war was rife. The Confederation of the Rhine willingly furnished soldiers, especially since Napoleon held before its eyes the bogey of the loss of sovereignty. Bavaria alone secretly prepared for defection and merely sent a weak division to Saxony, while its main army under Wrede remained on the Inn and watched developments. Napoleon lulled himself into his old confidence; he held the line of the Elbe from Königstein to Hamburg and went happily to the conflict, in which he wished above everything to crush Prussia. Great confidence prevailed in the Prussian forces. The commander-in-chief of the allies, on the contrary, Prince Schwarzenberg, who had arranged Napoleon's marriage a few years before, feared to meet him in the open field, being more of a diplomat than a general, and no match for a Napoleon.


Napoleon turned against the Silesian army, which he erroneously imagined to be the strongest of the three opposed to him, sent Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, with three army corps against Berlin, and ordered Marshal Davoust to cover the lower Elbe; he himself selected Dresden as the base of his own movements and was proceeding thither when the approach of the main Bohemian army under Schwarzenberg was announced; he had already transferred to Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Taranto, the chief command against Blücher. Oudinot's mission was completely frustrated by General von Bülow, who beat him on August 23 at Grossbeeren, and by the defeat of General Jean Baptiste Girard at Hagelberg on August 26. The March of Brandenburg was freed from the danger, and when Marshal Ney attempted a new expedition to Berlin, Bülow defeated him also on September 6, at Dennewitz. The whole of Silesia was cleared of the enemy, while "Marshal Forward," as Blücher was nicknamed, defeated Macdonald on August 26 on the historic battlefield of Katzbach. Schwarzenberg, on the contrary, who had delayed to capture Dresden by a *coup-de-main*, was utterly routed on the 26th



1



3



5



6

THE CHIEF ACTORS IN THE LIBERATION OF GERMANY

EXPLANATION OF PORTRAITS ON THE OTHER SIDE

- 1 Heinrich Friedrich Karl Baron von Stein (1757-1831); lithographed by Heyne.
- 2 Karl August, Baron von Hardenberg (1750-1822; 1814, Prince); painted by F. G. Weitsch, 1795, engraved by H. Sintzenich, 1798.
- 3 Queen Luise (1776-1810); painted by Tischbein.
- 4 King Frederick William III (1770-1840).
5. Gerhard Leberecht von Blucher (1742-1819; 1814, Prince of Wahlstatt); painted in 1816 by F. C. Groger and drawn on stone in 1825.
6. Hans David Ludwig von Yorck (1759-1830); in 1814 Count Yorck of Wartenburg; drawn by B. Woltze, engraved by L. Jacoby.

(1 and 2, 4-6, after W. v. Seydlitz's "Historisches Porträtwerk;" 3, after a photograph of the original picture formerly belonging to the Empress Frederick.)

and 27th of August at Dresden, Napoleon's last victory on German soil. The emperor has the satisfaction of knowing that his old opponent Moreau was among the mortally wounded in the Czar's camp. Schwarzenberg's army withdrew to Bohemia and General Vandamme, Count Hüneburg, hoped to be able easily to subdue it in the Teplitz valley; but the Russians reached the crest of the Erz mountains before he did, checked his further advance, and on August 30, the Prussians, who under General von Kleist attacked Vandamme in the rear from the heights of Nollendorf, won a decisive victory at Kulm; Vandamme was taken prisoner. Napoleon had lost 80,000 soldiers in a week. A presentiment crept over him that the time of his victories might be past, and he prepared himself for the possibility of defeats. "My moves on the board are getting confused," he confessed. His army was breaking up from discouragement and desertion.

Meantime the allied armies were jubilant, and the diplomatists were assiduously closeted together; on September 9, Russia concluded separate alliances with both Prussia and Austria, although with many reservations and without arriving at any honest agreement. If Russia and Prussia adopted a forward policy, Austria and Great Britain held timidly back, and Hardenberg yielded far too much to Metternich. The latter's chief aim was to induce Napoleon's vassals to join Austria by treating them with indulgence. The other allies left these negotiations to Metternich alone. The King of Bavaria now renounced the yoke, which he had borne so long, shook it off, and on October 8, by the treaty concluded through Wrede at Ried, in Upper Austria, entered the alliance as a fully qualified member, in return for which his sovereignty and dominions were guaranteed to him. The slender hold that the French rule now had on German soil was shown above all by the *coup-de-main* of the Cossack leader, Alexander Chernysheff, who forced Cassel to capitulate on September 30, and declared the kingdom of Westphalia to be broken up. It is true that the king returned to Cassel after the withdrawal of the Cossack *pulk*, on October 16, but he could no longer stay there permanently. Yorck defeated Bertrand's division at Wartenburg on the Elbe (October 3). Napoleon left Dresden with the Saxon court for the front on October 7, and entered Leipsic on October 14; the iron ring of the hostile forces encircled him more and more closely. The preliminary fight at Liebertwolkwitz (October 14) was followed by the defeat of Marmont by Blücher, at Möckern, on October 16. But this was cancelled by the success attained by Napoleon at Wachau on the same day, the first day of the great "battle of the nations" at Leipsic. He could not yet resolve to retire to the Rhine, and he also neglected to secure his retreat under any circumstances; on the contrary he tried (October 17), but without success, to enter into separate negotiations with his father-in-law. The allies were joined, on October 17, by further Austrians, Russians, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, so that they now numbered 250,000 men against 160,000 of Napoleon. On October 18, at Paunsdorf, 3,000 Saxons and some hundreds of Wurtembergers went over to the allies, with whom were the emperors of Russia and Austria, the King of Prussia and the Crown Prince of Sweden. Napoleon sustained a complete defeat at Probstheida, as did Ney at Schönefeld. In the early morning of the 19th of October, the vanquished army poured out of the city; King Frederick Augustus of Saxony was captured, Macdonald escaped, but Prince Poniatowski was drowned in the Elster. The fugitives hurried Napoleon on with them; he could no longer think of halting in Germany.

There was an end to the Confederacy of the Rhine; one prince after another left it; King Jérôme quitted Cassel for ever on October 26, and the kingdom of Westphalia, Napoleon's German daughter-kingdom, disappeared without a hand being raised on its behalf. Since Napoleon was compelled to abandon his garrisons in the fortresses on the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula, his loss amounted to a round total of 150,000 men. Desertion of the colours became threateningly common, and there were only 60,000 men, rank and file, when he got near to the Rhine. Metternich was able to check the deposition with which Frederick Augustus was threatened, and the incorporation of Saxony into Prussia; the king was confined in Berlin, afterwards in the castle of Friedrichsfeld, and Prince Nicholas Repnin-Wolkonski administered the country by order of the Central Administration, which had temporarily been established for countries which had been left without rulers, or whose rulers had not yet joined the alliance against Napoleon. The Prussian statesmen wanted to dethrone Napoleon; but Metternich was by no means desirous that he should be deposed, but only that he should be restricted to France, and meditated an alliance with him to stifle the revolutionary intrigues in Europe. Napoleon knew the views held at Vienna, and drew fresh hope from them. He conjectured that his brother-in-law, King Joachim of Naples (Murat), would betray him, when he hurried home from Erfurt; but Joachim went far farther than the emperor could have suspected; he wished not only to save his own crown from the crash, but to become independent of Napoleon and king of Italy.

At Hanau, Napoleon drove out of his path the Bavarians under Wrede, and an Austrian detachment, which wished to cut off his retreat (October 30–31), and with the remnants of the Grand Army the typhus entered Mayence. France was for weeks unprotected against the allies; when Napoleon started, on November 7, from Mayence for Paris, the important question then was to raise a new army from the soil. The fortresses in Germany and Poland surrendered, as did Hamburg, finally, in May, 1814, and Magdeburg in June. The picked troops garrisoning the fortresses were lost. The corps of Bülow, the victor of Grossbeeren and of Dennewitz, regained possession of the western provinces for Prussia, freed East Friesland and the province of Westphalia, where the inhabitants began a war of extermination against all that was French, and the old rulers, the Elector of Hesse, the dukes of Brunswick and of Oldenburg, and the Hanoverian government, were, in spite of all their harshness and shortcomings, welcomed back into their rescued dominions. On November 2, at Fulda, Wurtemberg, on the condition that its sovereignty and its existing possessions were guaranteed, went over to the side of Austria; and Baden, Würzburg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and the North German courts soon followed the example. Many reluctantly abandoned the foreign overlord, who had made them great. Frederick of Wurtemberg took this step "in expectation of the return of happier conditions;" Charles of Baden, "with sincere regret." Few showed any traces of enthusiasm for the German cause; most negotiated from the force of circumstances. The monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia now courted them just as Napoleon had previously done; the vassalage was the same, only the person of the lord had changed. Those that had been made sovereign States by Napoleon were accorded friendly treatment; those that had been "mediatised" by him, and who implored to be restored, were now rejected, and remained lifeless.

- The Prince-Primate and Grand Duke of Frankfurt abdicated on October 28, to

the Viceroy Eugène. The allies, however, occupied his territory, parcelled it out, and Frankfurt, like Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, became a free city. The Grand Duchy of Berg was dissolved on November 1; the princes of Isenburg-Birstein and Leyen were deposed, and their dominions confiscated. In November, in the Willemspark at the Hague, Van Hogendorp, Van der Duyn, and Count Limburg-Styrum placed the forbidden orange cockade in their hats and rode through the town of William the Silent with the cry of "*Oranje boven!*" Allegiance to Napoleon was renounced. The Prussians under Blücher and the Russians drove the French out of Holland. The Prince of Orange landed, on November 30, in Scheveningen, and was proclaimed a sovereign prince under the title of William I; Antwerp alone held out under Carnot until April 14. The situation of the Viceroy Eugène in Italy became more precarious every day. By the middle of October, 1813, he was forced to give up the line of the Isonzo and withdraw to the Etsch, where the Austrian field marshal, Count Bellegarde, held him in check. The tempting offers of the allies to make him king of Italy if he would abandon Napoleon, made no effect on the stainless Bayard of the Empire, whose task was rendered still harder by the desertion of Joachim of Naples.

Meanwhile, in Spain, Wellington had completed the most essential part of his work. There can be no doubt that the influence of the Peninsular War upon Napoleon's fortunes has been exaggerated by the national pride of English historians. It is true that from 1808 to 1813 large numbers of French troops were locked up in Spain and Portugal, and that some of the ablest of Napoleon's marshals had to be pitted against Wellington. This, however, did not prevent Napoleon from humbling Austria at Wagram; and while it is certain that the armies of Spain could not have changed the disaster of the Russian campaign into a triumph, it is more than doubtful whether the raw conscripts by whom the French cause in Spain was upheld, after the winter of 1811-1812, could have changed the result of the Battle of the Nations at Leipsic. The effect of Wellington's successes was moral rather than material. He had been the first to show that French invincibility was a myth; and in the dark years, 1810 and 1811, his successes at Busaco and Fuentes d'Onoro had kept hope alive. While Napoleon was advancing on Moscow, Wellington, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and by the victory of Salamanca, had cleared the road to Madrid, and freed one capital at the moment when another was threatened. Finally, in 1813, while Napoleon was facing the allies in Germany, Wellington and the English were advancing slowly but irresistibly to and through the Pyrenees. After the battle of Vittoria (June 21, 1813), it became clear that on the south, also, France would have to face invasion.

In November, 1813, the allied sovereigns made their headquarters in Frankfort-on-Main. The war, of which, in Körner's phrase, "the crowns knew nothing," the "crusade, the holy war," had become a war of selfish interests, and the diplomatists played their game. The people of Frankfurt welcomed the "good" emperor, Francis, as "their emperor" and the ruler of Germany; but he and Metternich would hear nothing of this unimportant title, and hoped for a more prominent position of Austria in a German confederation of sovereigns endowed with equal privileges, but meeting under the presidency of Austria. Metternich suspected the German Central Administration, from fear of revolutionary intrigues. Stein appeared to him a thorough-going Jacobin, and the Czar hardly less so. Frederick

William III, who had never been pleased with the German national movement, was only too easily convinced by Metternich's political wisdom, while Stein and Hardenberg saw, with much dissatisfaction, that a general amnesty was extended to the princes of the Rhenish Confederation.

Then would have been the most opportune moment for an invasion of France. The country was almost without troops, materially and morally disorganised. The nation no longer wished to water the tree of its world-empire with its own blood; it regarded itself as the victim of the mad ambition of a foreigner, who attached no value to the lives of the people. There was no longer any trace of that enthusiasm which had swept forward the French nation in the "days of innocence" of the great Revolution, and had intoxicated her with the ideal of the blessings of freedom. The long avoided increase of the direct, as well as the indirect, taxes did not avail much, and produced great bitterness. The Rentes had fallen enormously, and hard cash was scarce; the budget showed a great deficit. Napoleon had sixty-three million francs (£2,500,000) of his own savings lying in the cellars of the Tuileries, which he was carefully husbanding for his "last" war; on this reserve he had now to draw. He drew more heavily upon the blood of his French subjects. From the classes of veterans down to 1803, who had already served, Napoleon required three hundred thousand men,—the fathers of families, that is to say. But many withdrew, and by 1814 only one fifth had come in. Barely twenty thousand men of a newly constituted national guard presented themselves; and, in addition, there was the recruiting for 1815, with two hundred and eighty thousand men. Since the emperor required his old soldiers under marshals Suchet and Soult, he gave up Spain, and, without any regard for his own brother, concluded in December, 1813, the conditional treaty of Valençay with Ferdinand VII. When the Spanish Regency repudiated the treaty, he released Ferdinand unconditionally on March 15, 1814, and Spain was thus formally, as well as actually, relieved from the supremacy of France. The return of Ferdinand was greeted with boundless joy, which was soon destined to give way to indignation and despair at his terrible misgovernment. Napoleon also wished to release the pope, but Pius refused all negotiations until he again resided at Rome, and so the situation was not altered.

Metternich, from the headquarters where great dissensions prevailed, entered secretly into communications with Napoleon, contrary to the spirit of the treaties of Teplitz, by the agency of the imprisoned French diplomatist, Auguste Baron de St. Aignan, and offered France its old position as a power within the "natural frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees." Napoleon, in his reply, haughtily ignored these very favourable conditions. The question now was, ought the allies to show any further consideration to one who would not learn a lesson? Public opinion in France was more distinctly against him; but the reinstating of the Bourbons, which he always feared, still seemed far from probable. After much deliberation with a view to peace, and influenced by Caulaincourt, his new minister of foreign affairs, Napoleon accepted St. Aignan's proposals on December 2, but extended "natural frontiers" of France so widely that the allies could not possibly agree to his demands. At the headquarters in Frankfort the war-party, under Stein, Gneisenau, and Blücher, triumphed. Stein impetuously hurried Alexander and Frederick William on to a war *à l'outrance*. Pozzo di Borgo, who conducted the deliberations, composed, in accordance with Metternich's view, the proclama-

tion of December 1, which distinguished between the French and Napoleon; the allies attacked only the unbridled ambition of Napoleon, which was a menace to the world, but promised France, on the contrary, larger dominions than she had possessed in the days of the *ancien régime*. The phrase "natural frontiers" was omitted this time.

Pozzo went to England in order to rouse the Cabinet to greater enthusiasm. The English were eager to possess Antwerp and Flushing. The new secretary of state for foreign affairs, Viscount Castlereagh, a cool and calculating nature, was only gradually reconciled to the thought of a war *à l'outrance*, and contemplated founding a powerful kingdom of the Netherlands, directed by Great Britain. On the one hand, he entertained the deepest reverence for Metternich's wise statesmanship; on the other hand, a lively mistrust of the Czar, whom he wished to bind to the British policy, in order to make Great Britain, and not Russia, the first power in Europe after Napoleon's overthrow. In order to attain this object, the Cabinet of St. James spared neither subsidies nor soldiers, and Castlereagh reaped the harvest which had ripened under Canning's wise hand in the war against Napoleon.

The Crown Prince of Sweden swooped down on Denmark, advanced to the Eider, and exacted the Peace of Kiel on January 14, 1814. Norway fell to Sweden, which relinquished Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen to Denmark. Great Britain restored to Denmark all its colonies except Heligoland. Denmark now joined in the war against Napoleon, putting ten thousand men into the field. Napoleon was thus abandoned by his last ally.

The French nation was not merely unenthusiastic for the glory of the imperial name, it cursed the insatiate ambition of the tyrant; opposition was shown even in the legislative body. Jos. Henri Joachim Lainé openly declared the discontent of the nation at the interminable wars, which were contrary to the prosperity of France, and demanded peace; others spoke in the same vein. Napoleon, by dissolving on December 31, 1813, the legislative body as "factious," severed himself from the representation of the people, and produced the worst impression in the provinces. His action in dismissing the pope to Savona was not put to his credit, but was reckoned as weakness. The preparations of the enfeebled Napoleon ought to have been thwarted by a hasty and energetic invasion of France; at the outset Napoleon would not have been able to put more than sixty thousand men in the field. But, instead of marching directly on Paris, as the Prussians at headquarters desired, the allies decided on the Austrian plan, which was influenced by political *arrière-pensées*. Accordingly, the main army, under Schwarzenberg, advanced through Baden, Alsace, and Switzerland, and reached French soil on December 21, ultimately arriving at the highlands of Langres on January 18, 1814. Blücher, who had only obtained permission after many disputes, crossed with his Prussians and Russians the middle Rhine at Mannheim, Kaub, and Coblenz on the night of the new year, while Ferdinand Baron Wintzingerode crossed the lower Rhine near Düsseldorf with the Russians on January 13. On January 20 Blücher and Schwarzenberg were able to join hands at Epinal. Quarrels were still rife in the allied headquarters. Most would have gladly avoided a fight and concluded peace with Napoleon on the Frankfurt terms; but Alexander, in opposition to Metternich, was now in favour of continuing the war, and finally brought Frederick William over to his side. All that Francis obtained was that the negotiations should

be continued, even during the campaign, at a congress in Châtillon-sur-Seine, and that the frontiers of France should be those of 1792.

Napoleon transferred the regency to the empress, placed Cambacérès as first councillor at her side, and nominated Joseph Napoleon, formerly king of Spain, to be his lieutenant-general, with instructions to hold Paris to the very last. The family of Napoleon was to strain every nerve to keep their last throne. When the emperor took farewell of his wife and child on January 25, he did not suspect that he would never see the two again. His intention of preventing the junction of Blücher with Schwarzenberg was unsuccessful. It is true that he defeated Blücher and the Russians on the 27th and the 29th of January near St. Dizier and Brienne, where he had been a military student. But he was defeated by Blücher on February 1 near La Rothière, the first decisive victory for centuries which foreign troops had won over Frenchmen on French soil. Paris cried for peace, and even the emperor was inclined to listen. If the allies had made full use of their victory, his army would have been annihilated; but Schwarzenberg, under an agreement with Francis, who wished to rescue his son-in-law, separated himself from Blücher, and Napoleon slipped out of the net.

The emperor's situation had distinctly altered for the worse. King Joachim of Naples and his consort, Caroline, sister of Napoleon, after secret negotiations with Lord Bentinck, who commanded in the Mediterranean, and with Metternich, had deserted Napoleon's cause. Joachim had concluded an armistice with Bentinck and a treaty of alliance with Austria on January 11, 1814, in order to remain king. He declared war on his brother-in-law on February 15, and forced the viceroy, Eugène, to retreat behind the Mincio. His troops drove Napoleon's sister Elise, grand duchess of Tuscany, from her dominions, and she soon lost Lucca also. Joachim wished to become king of Italy and champion of the independence of Italy (cf. p. 64). Napoleon, it is true, sent back Pius VII to Rome in the spring of 1814 as the natural opponent of these efforts, but gained nothing by his policy.

The congress at Châtillon had met on February 5, 1814. The programme of peace, read aloud by Count Stadion, the Austrian plenipotentiary, demanded that France should be stripped of all that she had acquired since the beginning of the Revolution, and should renounce every sort of overlordship in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. The whole congress was one gigantic fraud, for Napoleon would never have consented to such terms. In his momentary straits, at the advice of Maret, he sent Caulaincourt as plenipotentiary to Châtillon in order to conclude peace. But the very next days showed that he was not serious in the matter, and only wished to gain time. With a speed worthy of the best days of his youth, he threw himself upon the divisions of his enemies which were widely separated, and was victorious in the battles of Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Étoges, Nangis, and Montereau (10th to 18th of February). He now revoked the powers which he had given to Caulaincourt, rejected every demand of the allies, whom he already regarded as prisoners of war, and missed the splendid opportunity for a favourable peace, relying on separate negotiations with his father-in-law. Blücher would hear nothing of an armistice and a peace, assumed, in place of Schwarzenberg, the leading rôle for his Silesian army, started for Paris on February 23, and on the way added to his forces Bülow and Wintzingerode, who had taken Soissons. Fresh negotiations for an armistice in Lusigny produced

no result. Schwarzenberg advanced on February 27 against Troyes, but failed to make full use of the victory of the Russians at Bar-sur-Aube over Oudinot. Napoleon recognised in Blücher his most dangerous antagonist, hastened therefore after him, that he might not occupy Paris, and defeated his Russians at Craonne (March 7). But this success meant little in face of the defensive and offensive treaty concluded on March 9 in Chaumont, between Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, which contained the promise that each power would keep one hundred and fifty thousand men under arms, and would enter into no private treaties until the great object was attained. On the 9th and 10th of March Kleist and York defeated Napoleon's right wing under Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, at Laon; but he dispersed the Russian corps of St. Priest on the 13th at Rheims, and turned against Schwarzenberg. He heard with satisfaction of the split in the allied headquarters, of the various views as to France's future, and of a growing dislike of Alexander's superiority, while he still cherished the hope that he could detach Francis from the Confederation.

From north and south came bad tidings; Soult and Suchet had been unfortunate against Wellington. The English had forced their way slowly but surely through the Pyrenees; Bayonne had fallen to them in January, and Soult was now in full retreat upon Toulouse. At Lyons the Austrians under Bubna were causing Augereau trouble, a heated atmosphere prevailed at Paris, and the soldiers and generals of the emperor seemed bewildered. Charles Philippe, Count of Artois, the youngest brother of the beheaded monarch, appeared in France with his sons, the dukes of Angoulême and Berry. The royalists displayed great activity, and under Baron Vitrolles importuned the Czar. At the invitation of the traitor Maire, Wellington, through his general, William Carr Beresford, took possession of Bordeaux for George III, while the town declared for "King Louis XVIII," who was living in Hartwell (Buckinghamshire, England). Bubna conquered Lyons on March 21, and the idea of the restoration of the Bourbons slowly gained strength.

The congress in Châtillon had communicated to Caulaincourt on February 17 the conditions of peace, which were based on the restriction of France to the frontiers of the year 1792 and on the independence of Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. No answer was even yet given, although Caulaincourt, like Francis and Metternich, emphatically urged Napoleon to give way, and the council of state advised that the proposals should be accepted. At last, on March 15, Caulaincourt brought the counter-proposals of Napoleon, which, demanding for France the Rhine and the Alps as frontiers, offended Austria, and made even Metternich dissatisfied. The congress thereupon broke up on March 19; and Lieutenant-General August von Gneisenau, who was the first of all the members at the headquarters to recommend a direct march on Paris, exclaimed joyfully, "Napoleon has done us a better service than the whole *corps diplomatique*."

The Bohemian army also advanced against Napoleon, and it was only due to the slowness of Schwarzenberg that his overthrow was once more postponed. On the 20th and 21st of March Schwarzenberg defeated him at Arcis-sur-Aube; the town was taken by storm, but he made good his escape. Instead of then hurrying to Paris with all available troops, he made a wide détour of Schwarzenberg's right wing and marched to St. Dizier, in order to attack the allies in the rear. They learnt of his intention from intercepted letters and deceived him; he mistook

Wintzingerode's division which was following him for the entire army. Blücher crossed the Marne and effected a junction with Schwarzenberg on March 23; they advanced on the 25th upon Paris. Gneisenau's advice was at last duly valued. Pozzo di Borgo and Toll had succeeded in bringing the Czar over to it; the king of Prussia and Schwarzenberg had assented. Francis alone remained in Burgundy in order not to be compelled to assist in the deposition of his son-in-law. Together with the allied army a spirited appeal sped through the country.

Napoleon by his flanking movement had left his capital exposed and cut himself off from its resources; he was lost. The weak divisions of marshals Marmont and Mortier were defeated on March 25 at La Fère-Champenoise by Count Peter Pahlen and by the Crown Prince William of Wurtemberg. The division of Count Pachtod had to surrender, and both marshals took up a position on the 29th under the walls of the capital. The greatest panic prevailed in the city, which was totally unprepared to face a regular siege. Napoleon hastened past Troyes at full speed, but in spite of forced marches arrived too late. Treachery was at work in Paris. Talleyrand and Fouché cut the ground from under the emperor's feet; King Joseph also was not competent for his duties as lieutenant-general, and quarrelled with the feeble-spirited empress regent. The emperor, remembering the fate of Astyanax, son of Hector, had charged them both not to allow the king of Rome to be taken prisoner. Marie Louise left Paris, therefore, for Blois, on March 29, amid the murmurings of the citizens, taking with her the child, the most valuable papers, the crown diamonds, and the rest of Napoleon's private treasure. King Louis Napoleon, with twelve hundred men of the Old Guard, accompanied her. Joseph was unable to spur the Parisians to present a bold front. Both marshals, who, by the addition of the National Guard, had brought their army up to thirty-four thousand men, were compelled on March 30, in spite of an obstinate resistance in the battle before Paris, to retreat step by step before one hundred thousand enemies, and to capitulate that night. Joseph hurried to Blois. When Napoleon reached Paris before daybreak all was over, and he went to Fontainebleau.

Among the allies many thought of revenge for Berlin, Vienna, and Moscow, now that their entry into Paris was imminent, and the "Tartars had forced their way into Paris," as Chateaubriand exclaimed. On March 31 Alexander, Frederick William, and Schwarzenberg entered the Porte St. Martin with the guards. The brave troops of York and Kleist had to remain outside, since their king did not consider their appearance suitable for a march past. The joy of the Parisians was undignified. Fine ladies embraced the warriors, the beautiful Duchess of Dino seated herself on the horse of a Cossack. The most abject demonstrations of homage were shown to the allied sovereigns in the streets and the theatres; their only title was "the liberators." The Bourbons, who had become as strange to the French as the imperial family of China, were now suddenly remembered, and from every window fell a shower of lilies; everywhere white scarves and cockades sprung up. At the same time some of the National Guard fastened the Order of the Legion of Honour to the tails of their horses, so as to drag it over the pavement, and it was merely due to the interposition of the Grand Duke Constantin and Count Fabian von der Osten-Sacken, who had been nominated military governor of Paris, that the statue of Napoleon was not torn down from the Vendôme column, for the mob had already begun to do so. Nothing was heard but abuse of

Napoleon. Alexander had alighted at Talleyrand's house ; everything was settled there.

(1) *The Deposition of Napoleon.* — Caulaincourt had informed Metternich on March 25 that he was now fully authorised to conclude peace ; but he learnt that it was too late. On March 31 the Czar, who allowed himself to be fêted as the "Agamemnon of the coalition," declared that there could be no negotiations with "Napoleon Bonaparte" or any member of his family, but that the senate would be requested to form a temporary government. Alexander expressed himself the most harshly of all against the man whom he had treated as a friend at Erfurt, and all Paris repeated his words, "Only Bonaparte is my enemy ; the French are my friends !" The most venal parasites of Napoleon were the first to desert him, and mendaciously assured Alexander that all France was royalist. The general council of the Department of the Seine called Napoleon the public enemy, and cried out for Louis XVIII. The senate nominated on April 2 a provisional government, with Talleyrand as president, declared Napoleon and his dynasty to be deposed, released all Frenchmen from the oath taken to him, overwhelming him with reproaches in its "reasons," and at the audience placed the Czar above Trajan and the Antonines, which called forth a biting rejoinder from Napoleon in the orders of the day for April 4. The relics of the legislative body and all the civil magistrates assented to the deposition on April 3. The press came into royalist hands. François René, Vicomte de Chateaubriand, threw on the market his envenomed pamphlet, "*De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*," whom he contrasted as "thirty-two good kings" with the "actor and his pretended greatness," and by it did more for Louis XVIII, as the latter often gratefully acknowledged, than a hundred thousand soldiers. Regicides, like Count Garat, praised the legitimists as "the wisest." Louis de Fontanes, the sycophant of Napoleon, asserted that as a non-Frenchman he could not revile the glory of France. Thus the pack vied with one another in their rantings, while the badges of the empire were proscribed.

But all danger was not yet past. The hero of the 18th of Brumaire had still troops at his disposal. He had come to the throne by troops ; would they not keep him on it ? He was in fact planning a military *coup d'état*. But the Parisian emissaries worked so skilfully upon the war-worn officers and soldiers that they abandoned his cause ; the generals wanted to enjoy their booty and their glory in tranquillity, and murmured at him mostly out of personal pique. Caulaincourt went to him, and told him the complete truth as to the matter. On April 4, marshals Lefèbvre, Oudinot, Ney, and Macdonald refused to serve him, and demanded his abdication in favour of the king of Rome. Napoleon abdicated the very same day, "for the welfare of the country, which was inseparable from the rights of his son, the regency of the empress, and the laws of the empire." He hoped to interest Austria especially by the regency of Marie Louise. Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt went to Paris with the document of abdication in favour of "Napoleon II." On the way they learnt that Marmont had negotiated with the allies, and they then abandoned the imperial cause. When Napoleon, in the hope of a rising in Italy, wished to take warlike steps, they, like Lefèbvre and Oudinot, counselled an unconditional abdication.

On April 6 Napoleon abdicated, for himself and his heirs, as emperor of the French and king of Italy, "because there was no personal sacrifice, not even

life itself, which he was not prepared to make for the interests of France." Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt brought this unconditional abdication from Fontainebleau to Paris. Marshals and generals, one after the other, disowned Napoleon; Augereau even accused him of cowardice. The senate, by the declaration of April 6, appointed to the throne "Louis Stanislaus Xavier, brother of the late king," thus silently passing over Louis XVII, and contradicting the assertion of the claimant that he had been king since 1795. The plenipotentiaries of the de-throned emperor, together with those of the allies, signed on April 11 the treaty of Fontainebleau. Napoleon retained the title of emperor, and became sovereign of the little island of Elba. He was allowed a few hundred men of his guard, and a civil list of two million francs; an equal amount was given to his family. For the future, however, only one million annually was to be paid to the empress Josephine; but she died soon afterward on May 29, 1814. Marie Louise retained the imperial title, and she received for herself and her son the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla as sovereign. The removal of the giant to Elba, lying between the two countries most nearly connected with him, France and Italy, and not to St. Helena, as Prussia had recommended, was an act of folly on the part of the Czar, if due account was taken of the excited mood of the two nations and the slender prospects of the restoration. Napoleon signed the contract on April 12. He certainly did not contemplate suicide; he felt that he still had a future, and made plans for it. He said quite imperturbably, "The Bourbons are now the best for you. The good king will not wish to do anything bad; if things go well, he will lie in my bed and only change the sheets." He left behind certainly a thoroughly centralised bureaucratic State, and might expect with satisfaction that his work would outlive his period of reigning. He was caused terrible grief when Marie Louise, consoled by Field-marshal Count Neipperg, severed her fate from his and did not follow him into exile, when she remained mute to all his letters and kept from him his son, the greatest happiness he possessed.

The family of Napoleon was scattered; he became more and more isolated daily; even Berthier deserted him. At last the carriage drove up which was to convey to Elba "the emperor of the West." The commissaries of Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia arrived, in order to accompany him. On the 20th of April he took a touching farewell from his guard in the "Cour des adieux," kissed their general Baron Petit and their glorious standard, and exhorted the soldiers to serve loyally the ruler whom the nation chose. Horace Vernet has perpetuated the scene in his picture. The farther the funeral procession of imperialism advanced in Southern France, the more fiercely surged the tide of hatred. In Provence Napoleon's life was in danger; the people wanted to tear him in pieces. The commissaries finally wrapped him in an Austrian cloak and pinned the Bourbon cockade on him. He himself was struck with fear of his former subjects, and he breathed again freely when on April 28, at that very Fréjus where, on his return from Egypt, he had commenced the victorious progress which ended in the 18th of Brumaire, he could go on board the British frigate "Undaunted." He landed on Elba May 4, 1814, and was received with acclamations. He at once began to improve the administration, formed a small army and a fleet, surrounded himself with an excellent force of police, and lived very economically, especially since the pension vouchsafed him by the treaty of Fontainebleau was not paid by Louis XVIII. His aged mother and his sister Pauline came to him, and by their

mediation he was reconciled to his brother Lucien. His brother-in-law King Joachim, whose throne was tottering, approached him. He maintained constant intercourse with Rome and Naples.

(*m*) *The First Restoration.* — The national flag had become the white standard instead of the tricolor, and this made a bad impression on the army. The senate had appointed the Count of Artois on April 14, 1814, to be lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and Talleyrand, who held the reins of government, concluded an armistice on April 23 with the allies, on the basis of the frontiers of January 1, 1792. On May 2 Louis XVIII entered St. Ouen, outside Paris; he dated his reign, as always, from 1795; would not acknowledge that his election by the senate and the people counted for anything, but maintained his divine right, promising, however, to give France a constitution. On May 3 Louis entered Paris amid a scene of wild rejoicings, but he soon showed himself a representative of the *ancien régime*. His ministry was disunited. Louis himself decided on the policy to be adopted, and retained the administrative system of the emperor, but repressed the army and lavished his treasure upon the emigrants.

The (first) treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, was primarily Talleyrand's work. France received more territory than it had possessed on January 1, 1792, paid no war indemnity, and only gave back the treasures of art carried off from other countries by Napoleon which had not yet been unpacked. Alexander showed himself magnanimous, especially at the cost of Prussia. The conditions of the peace were to be ratified at a general congress in Vienna. Louis concluded a sort of compromise with the Revolution by conceding the *Charte Constitutionnelle* of June 4, which had been drawn up by Count Beugnot on the model of the Magna Charta. Under this document Catholicism was recognised as the religion of the State, but all other sects were promised toleration. The *émigrés* were restored to their old titles, and those of Napoleon's nobility were confirmed. As to the government, the legislature was to consist of two chambers, — one of peers and one of elected representatives. Both for the active and the passive franchise there was a property qualification, which placed political power nominally in the hands of the middle classes. But the power of the legislature was confined within narrow limits. It is true that the lower chamber received the control of taxation and the right of supervising expenditure, and that ministers were to be responsible. But the right of initiating laws was reserved to the sovereign, and there was little prospect that the lower chamber, if it attempted to use its legal rights against the crown, would be supported by the chamber of peers, which consisted partly of *émigrés* and partly of Bonapartists who had humbled themselves before the restored dynasty. The new legislature was well satisfied with the king and with itself; but it did not attract the nation nor entirely please the supporters of Louis XVIII. The adherents of the Count of Artois were more royalist than the king, and, being intolerably retrogressive, considered the king to be a Jacobin who made excessive concessions to the Revolution. Artois felt insulted at words of disapproval uttered by the king, and sulked in St. Cloud. The country nobility, who thought their good time had dawned, found none of the spoils which they expected, and did not disguise their disappointment, — a confession which Béranger lashed in his "Marquis de Carabas" and other satiric poems. The Duke of Orleans lived in the Palais Royal like an ordinary citizen, apparently superintending the education of his troop

of children, but was quietly forming a party for himself, "a monarch in reserve." "His name," said Louis XVIII, "is a threatening danger, his palace is a rendezvous. He does not stir, and yet I notice that he advances. This activity without movement disquiets me. What can be done to prevent a man from advancing who does not apparently take one step? This question is for me to solve; I should not wish to be compelled to leave the solution to my successor."

Benjamin Constant, Madame de Staël, Lafayette, and many who had been prosecuted by Napoleon, appeared on the scene once more, laid the foundation of a constitutional party, and looked to find under the Bourbons the liberty of which they had been so long deprived. The party of the emperor, on the other hand, was still considerable. Its leader was the energetic ex-queen Hortense of Holland, Duchess of St. Leu; a number of ministers and some marshals belonged to it. The "regicides," Siéyès, Barras, and Tallien at their head, were especially discontented with the Bourbons, for the new constitution deprived them of their senatorial rank. Napoleon was suddenly considered by them to be the champion of liberty, and even the untrustworthy Fouché made overtures to them. In Southern France, especially in Languedoc, violent outbreaks occurred between Protestants and Catholics. And in the midst of this general excitement Napoleon's soldiers, released from imprisonment or from the evacuated fortresses, returned from every part of their native country, all still decorated with the tricolor. They saw in the Bourbons the accomplices of the foreigners, who had been brought back by hostile bayonets, but in the banished emperor the incarnation of the glory and world-wide rule of France. However lavishly Louis distributed orders and honours, the army awaited the vengeance of the emperor on his successor, and the private soldiers looked with contempt on their generals, who had suddenly turned Bourbon. The government came into conflict with the clergy on account of the Concordat, which was detested by the Restoration. The abrupt reintroduction of Sunday observance, and other measures of a similar tendency, caused bitter feeling against the power of the priests, to whom Louis himself was far from friendly. The restriction of the press aroused anger and served no useful purpose. Carnot wrote biting pamphlets, the comic paper "*Le Nain jaune*" was an effective weapon, and Béranger sounded every note of satire in his attacks upon the royalists. The emigrant Count Casimir Blacas, the treasurer of the household, enjoyed the full favour of Louis. He sold offices and posts and considered France to be fortunate, because he revelled in good fortune. He asserted that no monarchy had ever stood firmer than that of the Restoration; but he was devoid of all political insight, and was chiefly to blame for the perversities of the government. The police under Baron Dandré seemed to him to be unsurpassable, whereas they, as well as their head, were incapable. Fouché in vain warned Louis against self-deception, and sounded the "storm signal" in his ears. The government never noticed Napoleon's mole-like activity, nor how the soil in France was being undermined.

(n) *The Congress of Vienna.* — Meantime the congress met at Vienna, assuredly the most brilliant company which the gay imperial city ever saw (see accompanying picture, "The Congress of Vienna in the Year 1815"). There were so many emperors, kings, and princes of every rank that Talleyrand declared it was detrimental to the prestige of monarchy. Vienna became the rendezvous of the wealthy idler. Even the "mediatised" showed themselves again in the hope

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA IN 1815

JEAN BAPTISTE ISABEY has painted the Vienna Congress with the following twenty-three representatives of the five Great Powers and the three smaller Powers of Europe who took part in the Peace of Paris :

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| I. AUSTRIA : | 1. Klemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince von Metternich (1773-1859). |
| | 2. Johann Philipp, Baron von Wessenberg-Ampringen (1773-1858). |
| | 3. Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832). |
| | 4. Nikolaus, Baron von Wacken († 1834). |
| II. PRUSSIA : | 5. Karl August Fürst von Hardenberg (1750-1822). |
| | 6. F. Wilhelm Ch. K. F., Baron von Humboldt (1767-1835). |
| III. RUSSIA : | 7. Karl Robert, Count Nesselrode (1780-1862). |
| | 8. Andrei Kirillowitsch, Count, afterwards Prince Rasumowskij (1752 until 1836). |
| | 9. Gustav, Count Stackelberg (1766-1850). |
| IV. ENGLAND : | 10. Henry Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Marquis of Londonderry (1769-1822). |
| | 11. Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Vittoria, Prince of Waterloo (1769-1852). |
| | 12. Charles William Vane, Lord Stewart, Marquis of Londonderry (1778-1854 ; brother of Castlereagh). |
| | 13. William Shaw, Earl Cathcart (1755-1843). |
| | 14. Trench, Richard le Poer, Earl of Clancarty (1767-1837). |
| V. FRANCE : | 15. Charles Maurice, Prince de Talleyrand Périgord, Prince de Bénévent (1754-1838). |
| | 16. Alexis, Count de Noailles (1783-1835). |
| | 17. Marie Charles César de Fay, Count de la Tour du Pin (1758-1831). |
| | 18. Emmerich Joseph, Duke of Dalberg (1775-1833). |
| VI. SWEDEN : | 19. Gustav Karl Friedrich, Count of Löwenhjelm (1771-1856). |
| VII. SPAIN : | 20. Don Pedro Gomez Havelo, Marquis of Labrador. |
| VIII. PORTUGAL : | 21. Dom Pedro de Sousa-Holstein, Marquis and Duke of Palmella (1781-1850). |
| | 22. Saldanha de Gama. |
| | 23. Count Lobo de Silveira. |

of being resuscitated, flocking round the clever widowed Princess of Fürstenberg, Count Frederick Solms-Laubach, and the privy councillor Von Gärtner, who was called satirically "Monsieur le surchargé d'affaires." The congress cost the emperor Francis, whose finances, in spite of the efforts of his ministers, remained low, sixteen million guildens. He was the most liberal of hosts, and gave so many fêtes that Prince Ligne ventured to say, "The congress dances but does not progress." Maria Ludovica, the "empress of the congress," was naturally adapted to be the hostess of an assembly where the wit and beauty of Europe met.

By a secret clause in the treaty of Paris all the most important questions still outstanding had been reserved for the separate decision of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England. If this quadruple alliance should be maintained the influence of France upon the settlement would be extremely slight; and in fact Talleyrand, the representative of France, was at first only admitted on sufferance to the councils of the congress. But, thanks to his consummate powers of intrigue, he soon became a leading figure at Vienna, and his support was courted by kings and diplomatists. The hero of the Revolution, who had deserted one government after another, gave the French policy the stamp of disinterestedness and of a wish to benefit the nation. He laid down the fundamental principle of legitimacy, and championed historical rights against rude force and presumption. The principle of legitimacy became the most valuable protection of exhausted France and the shield of the balance of power in Europe. Great Britain, Russia, and the chief German sovereigns wished, at Stein's proposal, to see the German questions separated completely from the European and entrusted to a committee of five. But on September 30 Talleyrand and the Spanish representative, Labrador, appeared at the meeting, and Talleyrand without difficulty broke up the Quadruple Alliance; he demanded and obtained (October 5) that the eight signatories of the peace of Paris — that is to say, France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, besides those four — should form a commission in order to prepare the most weighty questions for the congress, and that this commission should appoint the committees.

The incorporation or personal union of Saxony with Prussia was introduced. Austria assented under a reservation of personal advantages. The protest of Frederick Augustus would have had no effect, even Great Britain would not have stirred for Saxony; but Talleyrand was there and protected Saxony. He interested Austria and Great Britain in preserving Saxony, which was all the more important since the Saxon and Polish questions converged, and Prussia threw itself into the arms of Russia. A great armed alliance against the aggrandisement of Russia and Prussia was being secretly formed under the influence of Talleyrand. No one, moreover, wished that Alexander should hold the entire grand duchy of Warsaw and create a new kingdom of Poland. Great Britain and Austria, Stein, Hardenberg, and Humboldt, were opposed to this. Frederick William alone, without informing Hardenberg, declared on the 5th of November for Alexander, who had not indeed merited such a service. Metternich expressed himself so openly against Russia's wishes that Alexander broke off communications with him on the 14th of December. Metternich demanded the admission of France and the sanction of Frederick Augustus to the proposed settlement of the Saxon question. The demand was refused by Prussia and Russia. Thereupon on the 3d of January, 1815, a secret offensive and defensive treaty was arranged between Talleyrand, Metternich, and Castlereagh to provide against the event of an outbreak of war. Bavaria,

Hesse-Darmstadt, Hanover, the Netherlands, and Sardinia joined it. On the 12th of January Talleyrand entered into the council of the Four (now Five) Courts, and Russia and Prussia were forced to content themselves on the 8th of February with the promise of half their extravagant demands. Talleyrand protected the petty States against Austria and Prussia. He considered it especially important to prevent the aggrandisement of the latter power, for France required a weak and federally organised Germany.

Stein was quite in the dark as to the question of Germany's new constitution. Hardenberg and Humboldt were thoroughly Prussian in their views, and did not calculate with the cries, as he did, but with realities. Stein's ideal was the German monarchy of the tenth to the thirteenth centuries; he wished for an Austrian hereditary monarchy, but also contemplated a division of Germany into north and south, or two separate confederations, each with a head, in which Austria should have the precedence of Prussia. Hardenberg and Humboldt, seeing that two separate confederations would imply the ruin of Germany, advocated that Austria and Prussia should share the powers in the administration of a united Germany, — a single confederation, that is to say, with two heads. Amongst the German people there was a strong current of opinion in favour of reviving the empire; but both Austria and Prussia were opposed to this solution. Even the treaty of Chaumont had rejected the idea of an empire. Hardenberg and Humboldt took different paths in the constitutional question. The committee of five German powers (Austria, Prussia, Hanover, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg) appointed on October 14, 1814, wrangled over Humboldt's five articles. Bavaria and Wurtemberg showed much bitterness, since they were unwilling to sacrifice one jot of their sovereignty. Stein lashed their selfish policy in Görre's "*Rhenish Mercury*." He helped to originate the petition of the twenty-nine petty States on November 16 for the revival of the empire. Even the smallest of the small stormed against the imperiousness of the Five, and by the mouth of their leader, Hans von Gagern, claimed a share in the highest power. Metternich, Humboldt, Hardenberg brought forward new proposals. On February 2, 1815, thirty-two princes and free towns demanded a general German congress for settling the constitution, and professed their readiness to grant constitutions with representative assemblies. Prussia and Austria agreed. Stein quite suddenly exerted himself once more for a German empire, but was unable to oppose Humboldt's influence.

(o) *The Hundred Days.* — A trustworthy agent of Talleyrand watched from Leghorn all the events on Elba, while dissension was rife in the congress of Vienna. Talleyrand and Louis would have been glad to know that the ex-emperor was safely in the Azores and there was some idea of removing him; but Napoleon, who learnt of this plan, resolved to anticipate it. It is true that there were traces of a movement in Italy in his favour, but he did not wish to come back to power by means of an Italian conspiracy, but looked steadfastly to France, and the universal discontent which prevailed there filled him with new life. The British commissary, Neil Campbell, had just started for Leghorn, and thus had not noticed that Napoleon, confiding his mother and sister to the inhabitants of Elba, set sail on February 26, 1815, with eleven hundred men and seven ships. Proclamations to the army and people were composed on the way, which were intended to be disseminated on landing. On the 1st of March he arrived unopposed, with the brig "*L'Inconstant*," at

the bay of Juan near Cannes. The red and white Elban flag with the three golden bees now gave way to the tricolor. Napoleon with careful calculation made his way through mountainous districts, whose poor inhabitants hoped to obtain from him the realisation of their modest wishes, and did not advance straight upon the rich towns, but marched along the foot of the Maritime Alps, and his proclamations, which spoke of citizens not subjects, worked with double power on a people whose minds were attuned to sympathy with the ideal by the influence of majestic natural scenery. He left the artillery behind on the way, sent the ships back to Elba, and the feeling of the population toward him, at first cold, grew gradually warmer. The troops and officials of Louis moved away when Napoleon approached any spot. After the soldiers of the fifth regiment of the line had joined him on the 7th of March at La Mure, his confidence grew greater. Numerous peasants accompanied the "Angel of the Lord." The seventh regiment of the line under Count La Bédoyère now went over to him, and the fourth regiment of artillery, in which he had served from 1791 to 1793, opened the gates of Grenoble to him. But he spoke the language of democracy and peace, and no longer that of despotism and everlasting war. He marched upon Lyons with seven thousand men.

Louis XVIII had received on the 2d of March under a black seal a prediction of the same fate which had befallen his royal brother. The Count of Artois had entreated him to place Fouché at the head of the police. Then Blacas announced on the 5th the landing of "Bonaparte with a handful of miscreants." Marshal Soult pledged himself to the loyalty of all the regimental commanders, but Louis considered soldiers and police alike insufficient and untrustworthy, and declared Bonaparte, in an ordinance of March 5, to be a traitor and insurgent, whom it was the duty of every one to arrest and bring before a court-martial. The princes of the royal house hastened into the departments. The Parisians knew no limits to their demonstrations of loyal sentiments. All the magistrates swore irrevocable loyalty; the "Moniteur" and the other newspapers abused Napoleon, only to announce a few days later the arrival of "His Imperial Majesty at his palace of the Tuileries." Ney assured the king he would bring him Bonaparte in a cage, and Soult hurled wild charges against the "mad adventurer and usurper." The Academy of Sciences struck him out of its lists, and everywhere there were shouts against "the new Satan, the executioner of six millions of French, the Corsican cannibal." The Count of Artois, however, now known as Monsieur, accompanied by the Duke of Orleans and Macdonald, found a cool reception in Lyons, which Napoleon entered on the 10th of March amid a storm of cheers. The second city of the kingdom was his. His language became more certain, more confident. The emperor was showing behind the champion of freedom and peace. He dissolved the chambers of Louis, summoned a "champ de Mai" to Paris, and called the sovereignty of the people the principle of his power, restored to the imperial officials their posts, and banished, on the other hand, many recently returned emigrants. He outlawed Talleyrand, the Duke of Dalberg, Marmont, Augereau, and others as traitors to their country, and ordered their property to be confiscated. He then indeed tried to win Talleyrand for his cause, but unsuccessfully. While H. J. Clarke, Duke of Feltre, the minister of war, assured the king that Napoleon was lost, the latter advanced, ordered that all Bourbons found in France must be put to death, and spread the falsehood that Austria and Great Britain had agreed to his return. Ney, in spite of all oaths, joined the emperor on the 14th of March

at Lons-le-Saulnier with the overwhelming majority of his soldiers. The road to Paris now lay open to Napoleon, and he entered Fontainebleau on the 20th.

When the king went on the 16th to the Palais Bourbon to open the extraordinary sitting of the chambers, the troops stationed there added to the official "Long live the king" the words "of Rome" under their breath. Louis' speech was spirited and kindled a last flash of enthusiasm. On the 18th the chamber of deputies declared the war against "Bonaparte" to be a national war and called the country to arms. Benjamin Constant thundered against the new "Attila and Genghis Khan," and the Duke of Berry assembled an army near Paris. But Fouché put everything before Louis in the most threatening light. Blacas and Clarke lost their heads, and in the night of the 19th the Bourbon family left the Tuileries to become emigrants once more; they went through Lille to Ghent. Napoleon, borne in the arms of officers and civil servants, entered the Tuileries on the evening of the 20th of March, the fourth birthday of his son. Without being compelled to fire a shot he had once more conquered France; his eagles had flown from church tower to church tower, and now rested on Notre Dame. Paris, on the whole, was tranquil; the great majority of the nation assumed a somewhat anxious mien. Only the veterans abandoned themselves to unrestrained enthusiasm for the plebeian emperor, and the peasants in the east of France and the masses of workmen in the towns hailed with acclamation the man of the people.

Napoleon recognised very clearly that the feeling in France had changed, and he now brought the charge against the Bourbons which he had formerly brought against the directory on his return from Egypt, that they had led "his France" to ruin. After appointing a ministry, to which he summoned Carnot, now ennobled by him, as minister of the interior, in order to win over popular opinion, while Joseph Fouché, Duke of Otranto, undertook the police, he promised peace to France and Europe. He abolished the censorship and posed as a lover of freedom; he asserted that nothing was farther from his purpose than to be the Cæsar of the human race and to covet a world sovereignty. Constant, a little while before his deadly enemy, was easily convinced when Napoleon said that he wished to be a plebeian emperor, a peasant emperor, and accepted the commission of drawing up a constitution. The royal troops gave way everywhere to those of Napoleon. The spirited Duchess of Angoulême vainly attempted to hold Bordeaux. The duke was taken prisoner by Grouchy, but was allowed to sail on the 16th of April for Spain; the duchess was compelled to evacuate Bordeaux and joined Louis XVIII at Ghent, where the Duke of Berry had been for some time. Even La Vendée was not for the Bourbons. But Europe would hear nothing of Napoleon. The accredited ambassadors in Paris asked for their passports, not one court received his representatives, and he vainly summoned his wife and child to him. It was only with the sword that he could compel Europe once more to acknowledge him; he therefore prepared for a new war, and with the royal treasure reorganised his army.

On the 7th of March, at a party of Metternich's at Vienna the couples suddenly stopped in the middle of a waltz, for the news spread from mouth to mouth, "He is in France!" Alexander I, who had long regretted the restoration of the Bourbons, as many of his pronouncements testify, boasted to Talleyrand of his prophetic vision, while Francis reproachfully told the Czar that he now saw whither the favour extended to the Jacobins had led. The allies immediately agreed to suspend the withdrawal of their troops from France, and armed for a second and

decisive struggle. Stein moved on the 8th of March the proscription of the public enemy, and on the 13th the eight allied powers issued the proclamation drawn up by Talleyrand to the effect that Napoleon Bonaparte had placed himself outside the pale of civil and political rights, and as the enemy and disturber of public tranquillity was liable to public prosecution. On the 25th of March, 1815, Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia renewed at the congress the treaty of Chaumont, offered assistance to all countries that would attack "Bonaparte," invited all powers to join them, and pledged themselves not to lay down their weapons until the public enemy was rendered harmless. The other States of Europe, with the Bourbons of Ghent at their head, joined the league, which was formed merely against "Bonaparte" and not against the French. The question, indeed, of a second restoration of the Bourbons was extremely doubtful. The Duke of Orleans and the former Viceroy Eugène of Italy were mentioned as possible candidates. In answer to the attitude of Europe Napoleon declared in a note to all the governments that the empire had been restored by the universal and voluntary decision of the French nation, and that he would rule peaceably and respect the rights of every nation. The foreign courts conducted his messengers back to the frontiers, and the congress at Vienna rejected on the 12th of March any and every proposal of Napoleon's. On the other hand, the powers sent their ambassadors to the legitimate king at Ghent. The venal Parisian "Moniteur" was opposed by the "Moniteur de Gand," under the management of Chateaubriand, Guizot, Lally-Tollendal, and others. British and German newspapers cursed Napoleon, and passionate speeches were made against him in the British parliament.

Napoleon, surrounded by the Bonaparte family, lived quietly at Paris in a gloomy and almost sad mood. The rentes, a good barometer, fell in April from 83 to 51. Everyone longed for peace and quiet. He alone wished to shed more blood, for he required war. Intense as was his thirst for power, yet he did not wish once more to make common cause with the Jacobins, to become king of a peasant war, and, in order to secure his own position, to inflict the horrors of anarchy on France. On the contrary, he abandoned his own system, renounced a dictatorship, and became, to some degree provisionally, a constitutional ruler. The result of Constant's labours was the "Acte additionnel aux constitutions de l'empire," promulgated on the 23d of April, which for a long time was the most liberal constitution of France. The emperor possessed the executive power, and exercised the legislative power in concert with the chamber of peers, whose members were to be hereditary, and with the chamber of representatives, which was elective; freedom of the press and of petitioning was granted. The nation, however, was not satisfied with the "additional" act; it had wished for an entirely new constitution. It saw through the deceit, and did not believe in the conversion of the Corsican into a lover of freedom, or in his regard for the rights of the people. Napoleon noticed the hostility of public feeling, and sustained a reverse when the nation was invited to vote the additional constitution; the vast majority kept silent, and but 1,300,000, including the army, voted for it, though only 4,000 voted against it. In order to offer a brilliant spectacle to the nation, the emperor, after the custom of his Merovingian "predecessors," proclaimed a "champ de Mai" for the 1st of June. But while he made a false parade of freedom he lacked his old self-reliance. Full of justifiable suspicion of Fouché, he set police to watch over the police; nevertheless Fouché found means to form a conspiracy with the court

at Ghent. The allied armies once more approached the frontiers. Castlereagh and Lord Liverpool, the English prime minister, furnished liberal subsidies, and Great Britain took the lead against Napoleon. Meantime the elections to the chambers went on very slowly. Most of the members elected were, it is true, partisans of the emperor, but opponents of his despotism; the royalists took no part in the matter. The old war in La Vendée between the Whites and the Blues broke out in May; the Marquis of Rochejacquelein, the leader, counted on British help, and Napoleon was obliged to send twenty thousand men, for want of whom he was to be sorely hampered at Waterloo, to crush the rising. In spite of the splendour of a military and national festival, a feeling of depression clung to the "champ de Mai." The empress and her son, whom Napoleon would have been delighted to have crowned, were absent, but round him were seated the dethroned kings of his own family. He styled himself indeed an "emperor, consul, and soldier, who depended on the nation for everything," and protested that he would sacrifice himself as gladly as Codrus. The whole spectacle resulted in nothing, and the opposition derived fresh strength from it. With inward reluctance Napoleon convened the chambers. He hoped to see his brother Lucien, whom he promoted to be prince, president of the chamber of representatives; but instead of Lucien, the ex-Girondist Count Languinais, an enemy of the emperor, was elected. There was thus no prospect of guiding this chamber; but there was more hope of some support in the chamber of peers by the entry of all the brothers of Napoleon, Cardinal Fesch, Prince Eugène, and numerous marshals and ministers. To both chambers Napoleon on the 7th of June professed that he would unreservedly, and at any cost to himself, uphold the constitutional monarchy.

(p) *The Labours of the Congress of Vienna.* — The congress of Vienna during these events had not merely organised fêtes, but had written sheafs of papers. Metternich, the president, carefully promoted German particularism, and found Austria's gain in the division and subdivision of Germany. He had, indeed, spoken to the Hanoverian plenipotentiary, Count Münster, of the idea of an emperor, but he did not wish to hear of a new German empire, and agreed with the view of his own master that a German confederation of independent and equally privileged sovereigns and free cities should be formed under the headship of Austria. Great Britain and Russia were, like Austria, opposed to the idea of a strong Prussian State and of a Prussian supremacy in Germany. The petty States and also the minor States of Germany were naturally enemies of Prussia and urged the final settlement of a constitution. Austria and Prussia proposed scheme after scheme in Vienna, and on the 23d of May the general conferences on the constitution question were opened, at which Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, and the petty States haggled about every article, and wretched wranglings as to precedence wasted much time. On the 10th of June the plenipotentiaries of all the German States except Wurtemberg and Baden signed the draft, when Prussia and Hanover openly expressed their opinion of the lamentable outcome of the labours of the congress. The Duke of Nassau in Usingen and Prince Nassau-Weilburg were the first among the German princes to give their dominions a constitution with considerable popular rights (September 2, 1814). The king of Bavaria, the grand duke of Baden, and the king of Wurtemberg promised constitutions; the king of Prussia issued, on May 22, 1815, a fundamental law of the State with promises of provincial estates and a representation of the people

Switzerland, which was declared neutral, received a new constitution. An ominous prelude and sequel to Napoleon's fall was that of King Joachim of Naples, who, being unsuccessful in the war with Austria, the pope, and the British, had been forced to fly after the defeat at Tolentino on May 2. When he once more set foot on Neapolitan soil in order to reconquer his kingdom, he was condemned to death by a court-martial, and was shot in the castle of Pizzo in Calabria (October 13, 1815). Ferdinand IV had been reinstated after Tolentino, and after the organic union of Naples and Sicily into one indivisible kingdom (December 11, 1816) he called himself "Ferdinand I, king of the Two Sicilies." The grand duchy of Warsaw was divided between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who all promised the Poles a representative constitution and national institutions. Alexander I took the title of a king of Poland, Frederick William III that of a grand duke of Posen, Francis I styled himself king of Galicia and Lodomeria, while Cracow became a free State under the protection of the three participating powers. Saxony concluded peace at Vienna on May 18 with Russia and Prussia, and Frederick Augustus ceded the greater part of his territory to Prussia. Besides this Prussia received back not only almost all its possessions between the Rhine and the Elbe, but also considerable parts of the territory of Cologne, Nassau, and other States. It gave Hanover, Hildesheim, Goslar, East Friesland, etc., in return for Lauenburg, and exchanged Lauenburg with Denmark for Swedish Pomerania; Bavaria received Wurzburg and Aschaffenburg, and the petty States did not come off empty-handed; Austria entered once more into possession of most of its Italian territory, which afterward formed the Lombard-Venetian and Illyrian kingdom; Tuscany and Modena became the territory of the younger Austrian archdukes; the empress Marie Louise received Parma; the "Etrurian" Bourbons and the pope took possession of Lucca and the States of the Church; the princes of Orange received Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Limburg, and Prince William assumed the title of "King of the Netherlands." Sardinia was increased by Genoa; the Elector of Hanover became king; the dukes of Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, and Saxe-Weimar became grand dukes, and Frankfurt once more a free city.

The Act of Federation, which implied a complete victory for Austria, was signed on June 8, 1815. The German confederation created by it was a federation of States, an international league of sovereign governments without a vestige of popular representation, a declaration of the dependent condition of the German people as a reward for its unprecedented sacrifices in the War of Liberation. The minor States of Germany, creations of Napoleon, were originally unwilling to enter into the federation, for fear of endangering their sovereignty, and would much have preferred to play the part of independent European powers. When subsequently they gave their subjects constitutions, they did so less from personal convictions than from fear of being forced to do so by the federation. The German people regarded the Act of Federation either with indifference or showed indignation at it; but few governments were content with it. Among the "special dispositions," section 13 was the most important, "In every country of the league there shall be meetings of the estates." The first eleven articles of the Act of Federation were guaranteed by the final act of the congress, which subsequently gave foreign nations a pretext to claim an European guardianship over the German league.

The final act of the congress of Vienna (June 9, 1815) comprised all the

treaties which the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Spain, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden had signed. The princes and free cities of Germany, on behalf of their territories which formerly belonged to the German Empire,—the king of Denmark for Holstein and the king of the Netherlands for Luxemburg,—established for ever the German federation, under the presidency of Austria, “for the maintenance of the external and internal security of Germany, and of the independence and the inviolability of the equally privileged States of the federation.” A federal diet in Frankfurt—a permanent congress of ambassadors, like the imperial diet of Ratisbon—was to transact business. The plenipotentiaries voted with eleven single votes and six collective votes (*Curie*). In questions of a fundamental nature the full session of the members met, in which Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Wurtemberg commanded four votes each; Baden, Electoral Hesse, Hesse-Darmstadt, Holstein, and Luxemburg three each; Brunswick, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Nassau two each; and all the other States one each; sixty-nine votes in all. This full session is to-day the basis of the modern German federal council. The federal States pledged themselves not to wage war on each other, but to lay their disputes before the federal diet. Baden did not join the federation until July 26, and Wurtemberg not before September 1, 1815.

(q) *The Close of the Career of Napoleon I.*—(a) *The Campaign and the End of the Hundred Days.*—Before Napoleon took the field for the last time, on June 12, 1815, he placed his brother Joseph at the head of the council of government, to which Lucien also belonged, while Jerome went on the campaign. Napoleon could with difficulty bring 128,000 men against Europe, and was forced to employ some 70,000 men to guard the wide expanse of the French frontiers; but veterans full of military efficiency formed the core of his army. Prince Schwarzenberg was chiefly to blame for the eccentric strategy of the allies. He did not bring the left wing of the united forces into action; even the Russians, under Count Barclay de Tolly, were not employed for any decisive operation. The right wing fought the war out. This, some 210,000 men strong, under Field-marshal Blücher and Wellington, stretched from the lower Moselle through Belgium to the North Sea, and was made up of Germans, British, and Netherlanders. Napoleon, who did not wish to wait until the Austrians and Russians moved, threw himself on the army in Belgium, which did not calculate on so rapid an attack. His soldiers applauded him rapturously. He skilfully concealed his march and crossed the Sambre on the 15th of June. His intention was to force his way between the troops of the two field-marshal and prevent their joining hands. In several engagements he inflicted heavy losses on the Prussians. He considered a battle against the whole Prussian army improbable, and sent away Ney against Wellington, who was posted near Quatrebras. But at Ligny Blücher faced him with his whole army. Napoleon missed Ney as much as Wellington did Blücher. Napoleon won a sanguinary victory, his last, at Ligny on the 16th of June, but did not make full use of it, and rendered it possible for the retreating hostile army to rally. Wellington defeated Ney that same day at Quatrebras, and the French gave way. Napoleon often seemed not to be the Napoleon of former days. All the Prussian corps were enabled to unite at Wavre, and Napoleon sent Grouchy with 32,000 men in a mistaken direction to pursue Blücher.

Blücher had promised Wellington his help for the 18th of June, should the battle be fought at Waterloo. Napoleon resolved to crush Wellington there, and eagerly pressed his attack with the utmost spirit; the terrible conflict was just taking a turn favourable to him, when Blücher, so eagerly expected by Wellington, came up, together with Bülow and Zieten. Napoleon was totally defeated. He fled with the army, exclaiming, "All is lost! let us save ourselves!" His carriage and treasure fell into the hands of the Prussians, and he hurried to Charleroi. Since Count Gneisenau indefatigably pushed on the pursuit, only ten thousand men of Napoleon's army entered Paris. Grouchy escaped destruction. The blame of the defeat was ascribed to him, and many accused him of treachery; but the fact is that he had been set to perform an impossible task, through Napoleon's imperfect knowledge of the country. While Napoleon wrote to Joseph that all was not yet lost, that firmness must be shown, and all available fighting material collected, he admitted in a despatch the whole truth as to the defeat, and, disastrously for himself, he left his soldiers on the 20th of June in Laon, in order to influence the popular feeling in Paris by his appearance. But the vanquished of Waterloo was a nonentity in Paris without an army; the Parisians only thought him a fresh burden, of which they must quickly rid themselves, in order not to share with him in the disfavour of Europe.

The emperor conferred with his brothers and ministers in the Palais de l'Elysée. Fouché, on the contrary, tried to become the Talleyrand of 1815, and dug the ground from under his feet. The emperor wanted to seize the dictatorship. But according to Carnot's advice he ought to have made the chambers offer it to him, and the chambers would not hear of such a thing. When the emperor and Lucien thought of an enforced dissolution, the chambers declared themselves in permanent session, and stigmatised every attempt at dissolution as high treason. The minister of war, Marshal Davoust, refused the assistance of the army in dissolving them. Lafayette induced both chambers to offer a decided resistance to Napoleon. The latter's proposal to nominate a committee for negotiations with foreign countries was rejected, and nothing remained to him but the choice between a voluntary abdication and outlawry. He despised once more any rescue by the Jacobins. When he had once been an absolute and constitutional emperor, it was repugnant to him to still belong to the Revolution. He therefore dictated on the 22d of June his abdication in favour of "Napoleon II." The ever-memorable Hundred Days, the "saturnalia of the monarchy," were past.

(β) *The Second Treaty of Paris and Napoleon's Banishment to St. Helena.*—Paris remained tranquil and almost unconcerned. A provisional government was formed under the direction of Fouché; the chambers, by a large majority, rejected Napoleon II, in spite of Lucien's advocacy, and Fouché negotiated with Louis XVIII. The king accelerated his return, and issued on the 25th of June the proclamation of Cambrai, in which he promised a fatherly government, excluding from the amnesty the chief instigators of the rising of 1815. He had reluctantly dismissed Blacas because the allies made that a condition of his return. On the 3d of July Paris surrendered to the allies, who entered on the 7th under Blücher and Wellington. "Marshal Forward" implored his sovereign not to let the diplomatists lose again what the soldier had attained by his blood. "This moment," he said, "is the last and only opportunity of securing Germany against

France." Davoust took the side of Louis. On the 8th of July the king, accompanied by Artois and Berry, re-entered Paris amid a wild scene of enthusiasm, and the deceitful ministry of Fouché came into office.

What Blücher suspected came to pass. Diplomacy once more cheated Germany of her gains. Russia, France, and Great Britain allowed her no increase of power. Stein openly declared that Russia's object was to keep Germany vulnerable, and prevent her from enjoying the fruits of her labours. Alsace and Lorraine were not restored to Germany, nor did the Grand Duke Charles receive the kingdom of Burgundy, as had been expected, but the Duke of Richelieu obtained for his country the very favourable second treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815). France received the frontiers of 1790, ceded the square between Maubeuge and Givet, which had been given her in the first treaty of Paris, to Belgium, Saarlouis and Saarbrücken to Prussia, Landau to Austria (which gave it to Bavaria), the eastern part of the small district of Gex to Geneva, and French Savoy to Piedmont. The northeastern provinces of France, which this time paid an indemnity of seven hundred million francs (£28,000,000), were to be occupied by one hundred and fifty thousand allies for three to five years, according to the condition of the country.

The threats of Davoust induced Napoleon to leave Paris and take up his residence at Malmaison, where everything reminded him of Josephine; Hortense and Lucien were with him. He knew that a part of the French were still for him. Could he once more collect seventy thousand men, — for the army certainly was devoted to him, — or ought he to abandon everything and emigrate to America? His mind was torn by conflicts and doubts. On the 29th of June he offered his services to the provisional government as a simple general, in order to rescue Paris and defeat the allies. But Fouché scornfully refused the offer, and counselled him to leave the country for his personal safety; a Prussian division was in fact ready to seize him and shoot him. Napoleon put on civilian clothes, took farewell of his family, and left Malmaison with four companions. On the way to Rochefort, which he reached on the 3d of July, he hesitated; perhaps, he thought, he could still play some part. The same thoughts occupied him at Rochefort, just as a prisoner condemned to death still hopes for a reprieve. He recurred to the idea of his army. The inhabitants showed him respect, and he did not wish to tear himself away from France, of which he had been the emperor for eleven years, and the hero since Toulon. Joseph visited him on the Isle d'Aix. His last hopes were dissipated; Louis XVIII was once more on the throne.

Napoleon now negotiated with Captain Maitland, who commanded the British ship "Bellerophon" lying in the roads of Basques, in order to be conveyed to England, and wrote, like a true actor, to the Prince Regent that he came as a second Themistocles to the hearth of his antagonist, the magnanimous British nation. On July 15, 1815, the "Bellerophon" received him, not, however, as he thought, as a guest, but as the prisoner of his deadly enemy. France lay behind him for ever. On the 26th of July the ship reached the shores of England; but the government forbade him to land, and passed a resolution that "General Bonaparte," in order that he might not again be able to disturb the peace of Europe, must be taken to the steep basaltic rock of St. Helena in the Atlantic Ocean, without arms, money, or valuables. These orders to some extent needlessly added to the misery of his position. Napoleon on July 30 protested against the violation of international rights, but

England received the protest with indifference. The agreement between the allies at Paris on August 2 consigned the ex-emperor to the custody of the four signatories of the treaty of Chaumont, and, besides Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria appointed commissioners to watch over Napoleon at St. Helena. On the 7th of August Napoleon, accompanied by some loyal followers, went on board the man-of-war "Northumberland;" on the voyage he dictated his memoirs to Baron Las Cases and the adjutant-general Baron Gourgaud. On the 17th of October, 1815, he landed on the desolate rock, on which he was doomed to languish. It was not until December that he took up his allotted residence at Longwood.

Napoleon's correspondence was subjected to strict supervision. All that he heard from Europe caused him pain. His family was broken up, banished from France, and deprived of their property; his retainers were prosecuted. It cannot cause any surprise that the title of emperor was not accorded to him on St. Helena, since George III had never recognised it. Sir Hudson Lowe, the governor, who arrived in April, 1816, was narrow-minded and unconciliatory, but a man of honour; he soon quarrelled so violently with the prisoner that after the fifth interview he ceased to visit him. Napoleon worked industriously, and published accounts of his position, full of exaggerations and misstatements, in order to effect a change in his lot; but he achieved nothing. Pius VII alone of the sovereigns sympathised with his misery, as his letter to Consalvi in October, 1817, testified, and the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 expressed its assent to the rigorous régime of Lowe. Napoleon abandoned any idea of escape, and did not accept the offer of his worthy mother and his brothers and sisters to share his exile. While he dictated to Las Cases, Gourgaud, Marquis Montholon-Sémonville, and others, he represented himself as an incomparable general and as a national hero of France. He, the friend and pupil of Talma, wished by a notoriously garbled literature to Napoleonise the history of the world, to sway and to delude his contemporaries and his posterity by the sense of his importance. His will, too, was drawn up in a thoroughly national spirit, and gave no hint of the cosmopolitan world despot. Napoleon I died on the 5th of May, 1821, the victim of painful sufferings, at the comparatively early age of fifty-two, with the conviction that "when I am dead, there will be a reaction everywhere, even in England, in my favour." And this reaction came. He was deified by France and Italy; poets, painters, and singers vied in glorifying him. Béranger, by his songs on Napoleon, became the national favourite; the veterans told their inquisitive grandchildren stories of the "Little Corporal," the son of the Revolution; and his ashes in St. Helena were a menace to the kings in Paris. Cleared from all reproach by the sufferings of his later years, he found his way irresistibly to the hearts of the French people.

4. THE REACTION

A. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SECOND RESTORATION

(a) *The State of Society.* — The position of King Louis XVIII, now brought back for the second time, was rendered difficult both by the fame of his predecessor and the follies of his own friends. The few months which had elapsed since the flight of April, 1814, had produced incalculable changes. Talleyrand had written

to the Count of Artois, "Hitherto we have had glory, do you bring us honour;" and the words of Beugnot, "Nothing is changed, only one more Frenchman has arrived," were put into the lips of Artois. The parties seemed once more to stand in the place which they had occupied before the 18th of Brumaire (p. 32), and Napoleon remarked rightly, "The Whites are still white, and the Blues remain blue."

Count Rostopchin (p. 57), a shrewd observer of the affairs in France, has very vividly pictured the situation. The champions of liberty of the Revolution had left nothing in its place, had trampled the laws under their feet, destroyed the government, desecrated the churches, and dragged the royal family to the scaffold. Heads were lopped like cabbages. Everyone, the worthless before the others, had given orders; no one had obeyed. That was called liberty and equality. Fear sealed the lips of the sensible and noble-minded. The revolutionists only knew two decisions, the lamp-post and the guillotine. When they had murdered each other sufficiently, they threw themselves upon the outside world. But when Bonaparte escaped from Egypt and said "Pst!" they were all silent. He drove out the clamorous, governed army, citizens, and clergy, and vigorously plied the whip. People were tired of a republic, and therefore everyone, though at first somewhat disconcerted by his firmness of hand, shouted "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The French now possessed the equality and liberty of sighing in the corner to their heart's content, while Bonaparte, "like a mad cat," rushed furiously through Europe. His government banished the Bourbons, whom the Revolution had hounded out of France, from the hearts of the French. Napoleon's memory was cherished even after his fall. Public opinion was against the Bourbons, who after a third expulsion would not have ventured to think of any return; and yet they ruled far more mildly than Napoleon, whose fame, however, tickled the French pride. France soon presented the picture of "a nation without thought, a throne without a king, a sovereign without movement, a government without power, a policy without views, and a dynasty without hopes." This was the verdict of the man who set fire to Moscow. And Alexander I wrote in 1820 to his friend Count Stroganoff that the genius of the Revolution did not allow the wounds of the people to be healed or social order to return with the peace of 1815; that, on the contrary, it did everything to degrade the rulers in the eyes of the ruled. Formerly it had been said "*divide et impera*," but now salvation lay in union alone; all the powers must respect the authority of the treaties and hold fast to the principles of order and discipline. Thus wisely, in contrast with the fickleness and impetuosity of the French, spoke the monarch of a people of whom Benjamin Constant said it was no nation, the first of a company which Mirabeau had termed "the premature fruit of a snow-covered hot-house." The society of France had been thoroughly democratised, while the administration did not sustain this character in its centralisation. The "Charta," the constitution of Louis XVIII, recognised this democratisation of society.

The court society, however, which behaved more royally than royalty itself, advised Louis to rule under the protection of the foreign armies, while he himself uttered unjustified complaints as to their pressure; it hated the new current of thought more than ever, and wished to fight it to the death. The "Pavillon Marsan," as this intractable party was called after the residence of the Count of Artois, was under the incapable leadership of the Abbé de Latil, Prince Jules Polignac, who was an uncompromising enemy of the Charta, and others. The chamber of peers and the chamber of deputies were reorganised, and this "*chambre introu-*

vable" was ultra royalist. Louis, both from calculation and from grasp of the situation, held fast to his constitution, and was involved in continued conflict with his brother and the royalists "*quand même*," the party of no compromise. He had promised an amnesty, but he did not succeed in checking the "White Terror" (p. 23) in Southern France. In Marseilles, Avignon, Nismes, Toulouse, and other places disorders broke out, in which religious fanaticism also played its part. Bonapartists and Protestants were murdered wholesale, among them Marshal Brune, Generals Lagarde and Ramel; courts and local authorities were powerless to check the outrages.

Fouché drew up the proscription-lists against those who were privy, or suspected of being privy, to the Hundred Days, but prudently forgot to put himself at the head of the list; and while the executions of General La Bédoyère and Marshal Ney, accompanied by the horrors in Lyons and Grenoble, were bound to make the position of the king impossible, and while the foremost men of France were driven out of the country, he was already conspiring with the Duke of Orleans, being also anxious to overthrow Talleyrand. Fouché was attacked, nevertheless, on all sides, and was compelled to resign the Ministry of Police in September, 1815, and was expelled, in 1816, as a relapsed regicide. His dismissal was followed closely by that of his rival, Talleyrand, who was appointed High Chamberlain, and replaced, to the satisfaction, and indeed at the wish, of Russia, by the former governor-general in Odessa, the Duke of Richelieu, an emigrant quite unacquainted with French affairs. Louis, who could not exist without favourites, had given his heart to the former secretary of Madame Mère, Decazes. As Fouché's successor, Count Decazes, Duke of Glücksburg, a place hunter, sided with the *Chambre Introuvable*, passed the most capricious, exceptional measures to maintain order, but was still far too mild for the ultra royalists, who exercised a sort of secondary government from the Pavillon Marsan, and procured Talleyrand's help against him.

(b) *The Holy Alliance*.—From their armed alliance against Napoleon, a certain feeling of federative union seized the European cabinets. The astounding events, the fall of the Cæsar from his dizzy height, had, after all the free thinking of the revolutionary period and the superficial enlightenment, once more strengthened the belief in the dispositions of a higher power. The effect on the Czar, Alexander I, was the most peculiar. Baroness Juliane Krüdener, a reformed lady of fashion, compared him with Napoleon as "the angel of light with the angel of darkness," and extolled him as a "saviour of the world." He had steeped himself in the theosophy of Fr. X. von Baader. Prince Alexander Galitzin, the friend of his youth, had referred him to the Bible as the source of peace and all wisdom. Bible societies flooded Russia; touches of mysticism were kindled by the side of Christianity. All this made Alexander susceptible to the new Magdalene. She had carried his heart by storm one evening during the campaign in Heilbronn; since then he was her pupil. In June, 1815, she lived at the same time as he did in Heidelberg, where they prayed together and studied the Bible. She went with him to Paris, and at the request of Richelieu and other Frenchmen, worked upon Alexander, so that he offered especially favourable terms to France.

The Baroness Krüdener often spoke to Alexander of a Christian union of nations, and stirred him to form the Holy Alliance. Alexander put his scheme

before her, and she amended it. Frederick William III immediately agreed, and Francis I, after some deliberation. On the 26th of September the three monarchs concluded this alliance in Paris. They wished to take as the standard of their conduct, both in the internal affairs of their countries and in external matters, merely the precepts of Christianity, justice, love, and peaceableness; regarding each other as brothers, they wished to help each other on every occasion. As plenipotentiaries of divine providence they promised to be the fathers of their subjects and to lead them in the spirit of brotherhood, in order to protect religion, peace, and justice; and they recommended their own peoples to exercise themselves daily in Christian principles and the fulfilment of Christian duties. Every power which would acknowledge such principles might join the alliance. Almost all the States of Europe gradually joined the Holy Alliance. The Sultan was obviously excluded, while the pope declared that he had always possessed the Christian verity and required no new exposition of it. Great Britain refused, from regard to her constitution and to parliament. There was no international basis to the Holy Alliance, which only had the value of a personal declaration, with merely a moral obligation for the monarchs connected with it. In its beginnings the Alliance aimed at an ideal; and its founders were sincere in their purpose. Hans von Gagern, C. von Schmidt-Phiseldek, and others, were enthusiastic for it. But it soon became, and rightly, the object of universal detestation; for Metternich was master of Alexander, and from the promise of the potentates to help each other on every opportunity, he deduced the right to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign States. The congresses of Carlsbad, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, were the offshoots of this unholy conception.

In addition to the Holy Alliance, the Treaty of Chaumont was renewed. On the 20th of November, 1815, at Paris, Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia pledged themselves that their sovereigns would meet periodically to deliberate on the peace, security, and welfare of Europe, or would send their responsible ministers for the purpose. France, which had so long disturbed the peace of Europe, was to be placed under international police supervision, even after the army of occupation had left its soil. Gentz greeted the new treaty as the "keystone of the whole building." A conference of ambassadors, sent by the Four Courts, was to meet every week in Paris. Count Pozzo di Borgo (pp. 47 and 66), played the chief rôle at it. There was no fear entertained of Louis XVIII, but only of the nation, whose head he had become for the second time; the fickleness, instability, and ambition of the French had for centuries disturbed the peace of the world. And, as the whole earth knew to its cost, its leader for the last twenty years had not been Louis XVIII, who after the horrors of persecution and banishment sought for rest and peace, but the insatiate glutton for conquest, who, radiant with the glory of blood-stained battlefields, could not live without war. If Louis embodied the principle of legitimacy, and rested absolutely on the past, and traced his claim to the throne from the blood of "thirty-two good kings," Napoleon was a man of the present, who dated all his career from his *coup d'état*. He manifested the most pronounced sense of actuality, without any veil of pretence. Like his mother, the Revolution, he had broken with former things, had closed the old book, and begun a new history of the world, which was as far removed as possible from a policy of sentimentality, and recognised no motives but those of self-interest and ambition.

En Nom De la Tris. Sainte et
Indivisible Trinité.

Les très Illustres l'Empereur
de Russie, l'Empereur d'Autriche et le Roi de Prusse,
par suite des grands événements
qui ont frappé en
Europe les cœurs des trois
derniers alliés et pour ce-
lébrer les bienfaits in-
effables qu'il a plu à la
divine Providence de ne
pas leur faire les États dont
les Gouvernements ont obtenu

Saint trijole et signé
à Paris, l'an de grace
1815 ¹⁴/₂₆ Septembre

Francis

Friedrich Wilhelm

Alexander.

INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE OF
SEPTEMBER 26, 1815

(From the Prussian document in the State Archives at Berlin)

EXPLANATION OF THE DOCUMENT ON THE OTHER SIDE

COPY.

Au Nom de la très Sainte et indivisible Trinité.

Leurs Majestés l'Empereur de Russie, l'Empereur d'Autriche et le Roi de Prusse, par suite des grands événemens qui ont signalé en Europe le cours des trois dernières années et principalement les bienfaits multipliés qu'il a plu à la Divine Providence de répandre sur les Etats dont les Gouverneurs ont placé leur confiance et leur espoir en Elle seule, ayant acquis la conviction certaine qu'il est nécessaire d'assoir la marche à adopter par les Puissances dans leur rapports mutuels sur les vérités sublimes que Nous enseigne l'Eternelle Religion du Dieu Sauveur:]

Fait triple et signé à Paris, l'an de grace 1815 14/26. Septembre

L. S.
L. S.
L. S.

François propria
Frédéric Guillaume
Alexandre.

TRANSLATION.

In the Name of the most Holy and Undivided Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia, in consequence of the great events which have marked in Europe the course of the last three years, and especially the numerous blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to bestow on the States, whose governors have placed [their confidence and hope in it alone, have obtained the sure conviction that it is necessary to base the course to be adopted by the Powers in their mutual relations on the sublime truths which the eternal religion of the Saviour teaches us.]

Executed and signed in triple at Paris in the year of grace 1815, 14/26 Sept.

Francis (with his own hand).
Frederick William.
Alexander.

(c) *Romanticism*.—A striking contrast to the pronounced realism of the Napoleonic era was now seen in romanticism. The spirit which animated it was thoroughly historical, and aimed at a revival of a previous state of things; it was intimately dependent on history, and often extolled the past at the cost of the present. The Romanticists were enemies of the Revolution and advocates of the Restoration; and owing to them a great stimulus was given to the study of history. The world was weary of the law of nature, and the hollow pretence of the Revolution, which had caused so much bloodshed and horror, such boundless confusion and uncertainty in all the conditions of life. There was an intense longing to leave the sterile and perplexing religion of reason for the positive faith which had been forcibly suppressed, and for the firmly founded Church of Christ (cf. Vol. VII, p. 344); men learnt once more how to pray; it was possible to know and to believe.

Romanticism was a sort of voluntary return to the religion of the past, and it wished to revive mediævalism. Justus Thibaut wanted to emancipate Germany from the Roman law, and demanded in 1814 a universal civil code for Germany; a very modern desire, but he wished to build it on the foundation of the law of nature. Friedrich Karl von Savigny immediately opposed this view, wrote "*Vom Beruf unsrer zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*," and thenceforward led the school of historical jurisprudence, which was founded by Gustav Hugo. To him "law" or "right" was a means of expressing the true nature of society, language the expression of the social spirit. The dispute, which started in Heidelberg, between the philosophic and the historic schools of law held the juridical world in suspense for years; after Thibaut, the Hegelian Eduard Gans continued it against Savigny. Only through this dispute and the new conceptions produced thereby, so men asserted, was jurisprudence brought within the range of science in the present meaning of the word. Savigny edited after 1815, in collaboration with Karl Friedrich Eichhorn and Johann Friedrich Ludwig Göschen, the "*Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft*;" in his "*Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter*" (1815-31) he proved the connection of ancient and modern law, and Eichhorn wrote his "*Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*."

Freiherr Karl vom Stein founded in January, 1819, the "*Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*." He was only too glad to desert politics for history, and had been for years busied with the idea of collecting and publishing the sources of German history. He now hoped for a new renaissance of Germany, and laid the foundation for the "*Monumenta Germaniæ historica*," of which he lived to see two volumes appear. Barthold Georg Niebuhr wrote between 1811 and 1830 his "*Römische Geschichte*," from which he excluded all the legends, while he followed the path of strict criticism, setting a model to all workers in the same field; he fully valued popular liberty, but set his face against all excesses. Augustin Thierry and Simonde de Sismondi produced works of permanent value on the history of France, England, and Italy. Fr. Chr. Schlosser, Friedrich von Raumer and Leopold Ranke also came to the front.

Romanticism endued all the sciences with a youthful strength, and there was a revival in favour of national individuality as compared with the uniformity and artificiality of the fallen Napoleonic world empire. The brothers Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm gave the German people a grammar and a science of Germanic philology; while Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano enriched it with

popular songs from the "Wunderhorn" of the German past. Germanic paganism and primitive times were no longer banned. Friedrich Schlegel's "*Sprache und Weisheit der Inder*" (1808) was the beginning of comparative philology, a science which was to find after 1816 its real creator in Franz Bopp. Herder and Goethe promoted, each in his own way, the natural sciences, and prepared the way for Alexander von Humboldt, the mighty hero of the "century of natural science."

There was something of the spirit of the Holy Alliance in the effort of Karl Ludwig von Haller, a native of Berne, to revive the proprietary rule of the Middle Ages. The standard-bearer of reactionary feudalism fought against Rousseau's "*Contrat Social*" and Kant; he conceived the relation of ruler and subject absolutely from the point of view of private law, regarded the State as the property of the ruling dynasty, and, as an enemy of the constitutional weakness of the age, declared that the ruler was not bound by the oath to a constitution.

Haller, like the Prussian Adam H. Müller, the opponent of Adam Smith's doctrines, carried his admiration for the past to an extreme; both, without exception, rejected any achievements of the Revolution. Haller's chief work, "*die Restauration der Staatswissenschaft*" (1816-20), was a reflection of the Middle Ages, and significant for the age of the Restoration, a catechism of reaction. The intellectual Joseph Görres, awaked from the intoxication of the Revolution, dreamt of a world other than that around him, sighed for the imperialism of the Middle Ages, with its feudal laws, and tried, though in vain, to combine the modern political requirements with the romanticism of the ages once governed by the Church.

In France appeared Count Joseph de Maistre, the bigoted Savoyard, whose first article of faith was that the world which had been thrown into confusion by the Revolution could only be reduced to order by Rome, and that only the pope could be the true world-ruler. ("*Du Pape*," 1819.) In opposition to him stood Benjamin Constant, who chiefly developed the constitutional theory of the State. Brought up under the influence of Schiller, Kant, and John von Müller, he was a warm friend of personal liberty, and would hear nothing of the omnipotence of the State, especially in the religious and intellectual spheres. With his constitutional views he took a peculiar path of reasoning, which led him from the *Acte Additionnel* (cf. *supra*, p. 79) to the sovereignty of the citizens.

Karl von Rotteck, more radical than Constant, wished once more to secure for the law of reason a victory over what had become historical, and regarded society from the standpoint of Rousseau; his superficial and extravagantly liberal "*Allgemeine Geschichte*" (1813-27), enjoyed a wide circulation. Even if his general theories did not conform to real life, Rotteck's lines of thought were always noteworthy, and his vigorous onslaught on class privileges worked in the service of enlightenment. He opposed, however, universal suffrage, since he well understood its folly. Similar views were held by his friend Karl Theodor Welcker, the chief collaborator in the "*Staatslexicon*" (1834-49), a man of less vigour, but of greater wealth of ideas. He and Rotteck personified South German liberalism in the chamber. Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, a character of the strictest integrity, showed by his Waterloo speech of 1815 that he wished not merely to instruct but to act in politics. He urged men to labour earnestly at the political renaissance of Germany. He advocated on principle the union of life and science, and was equally at his ease in the chair of the professor and on the platform of the politician, being at once an historian and a statesman. A friend of the monarchy, he

was especially enthusiastic for the constitutional rights of nations, and saw his ideal in the British constitution, which he wished to introduce into the continent. Thus even the political ideas of these men were more or less abruptly contrasted one against the other.

The romantic poetry then flourished in Germany; we need only mention the brothers Schlegel, Brentano, Arnim, Chamisso, Novalis, Fouqué, and Tisch, to characterise its spirit. Romantic music found its most eloquent expression in Karl Maria von Weber's "Freischütz." The painting of romanticism inspired Peter Cornelius and Friedrich Overbeck; the brothers Sulpice and Melchior Boisserée established their large collection of Old German pictures at Cologne, Heidelberg, and Munich. The Gothic style was the prevailing taste. Friedrich Schlegel was the first to appreciate the earlier German art by the side of the antique; he and Goethe pointed out the importance of the two Van Eycks (Vol. VII, p. 153), for art. Goethe indeed became a father of the history of art. The clearer thinkers among the artists and poets did not, for the sake of the heavenly gifts, forget the earthly good; they had a warm heart for the welfare of their country. Cornelius was convinced that "God wished to employ all the splendid germs which lay in the German nation, in order from it to spread a new kingdom of his power and glory over the earth." His patron, Louis I of Bavaria, thought as he did; each was the complement of the other. Ludwig Uhland expected great things from the time when "hope is kindled with fresh light, and the destiny of the people raises the pen expectantly." Although the Romanticists had chosen Goethe as their leader, their extravagance soon repelled him; they wandered off into mazes of mysticism, and produced crude poems of mystery and marvel.

Romanticism did not find its home only in German poetry. Other countries were equally under its sway. The Scandinavian poetry had a tinge of romanticism, though it escaped the bane of sickly sentiment. In the British Isles Robert Burns and the mighty Walter Scott, whom the outside world admired as much as his own country, were supreme. France saw its greatest Romanticist in François René, Vicomte de Chateaubriand, the standard-bearer of legitimacy, who in his politics was too advanced a free-thinker to please the legitimists. Italy looked with justifiable pride on Alessandro Manzoni and Silvio Pellico. In Russia the romantic school of the "*Arsamass*" successfully combated the French classicism of Gawril R. Dershawin.

The Roman theocracy, with the help of the Romanticists who were very friendly to it, obtained immense successes. With newly forged arms it went into the lists against the Revolution, just as the States of the Church re-emerged phoenix-like from the congress of Vienna. Pope Pius VII could feel himself the conqueror of his gaoler, the prisoner of St. Helena, whose lot he alone of the sovereigns tried to alleviate. Pius re-established on August 7, 1814, the Order of Jesuits by the brief "*Sollicitudo omnium*," and favoured the revival of the Inquisition in Spain under Ferdinand VII. There were numerous conversions to the Roman Church, in which millions saw the only support against the monster of the Revolution (cf. Vol. VII, p. 343). We need only remember Friedrich Schlegel, Count Stolberg, Adam Müller, or Karl Ludwig von Haller, and the conversions in the highest circles of England and Russia.

How triumphant was the language of Chateaubriand's countryman, the Breton abbé, Robert de Lamennais! He before all others employed the periodical press

for ultramontane purposes, fought against indifference in religious matters, and declared that the age was powerless against the Church; like de Maistre he deduced the papal infallibility from the sovereignty of the pope; he adapted the ideas of de Maistre to suit the people, and worked out the notion that implicit obedience was due to the infallible pope, who personified the reason of the whole body. Schools ought to be put into the hands of the Church, and Jesuits ought to become the keepers of the public conscience. The Vicomte de Bonald and de Maistre, who tabooed all the constitutional governments of modern times, saw in Rome a bulwark against revolution and unbelief, and longed for the return of the Middle Ages, not as they were conceived by the Romanticists, but as a period of theocracy, and overwhelmed Lamennais with commendations. Alphonse de Lamartine and Chateaubriand celebrated the praises of that unique man, who knew how to speak and to write in a style at once powerful and popular, and who counselled a penitent recurrence to papal authority and blind submission as the only remedy for the degraded society of Europe.

The final settlement at the congress of Vienna, which reconstituted the European world in the year 1815, showed no trace of the romantic feeling; it was, on the contrary, the result of a purely selfish policy. No one paid any regard to nationality in the matter; the nations were divided, according to the Napoleonic method, like flocks, and artificial agglomerates were made which did not and could not possess any genuine feeling of patriotism. Only the Holy Alliance bordered on romanticism. Metternich, the leading European minister, was, like his loyal servant, Friedrich von Gentz, free from all romanticism. But among the romanticists, who willingly offered themselves to him, like Adam Müller and Friedrich von Schlegel, he saw useful tools against the liberal demands of the age and against the hated "constitutional craze." He was firmly resolved to keep Austria free from that infirmity. Metternich was convinced that the political system of Europe as remodelled at Vienna was built on permanent foundations and guaranteed the peace of the world and the continuance of the separate States. He wished to maintain and strengthen what was already existent at any cost, and looked therefore with suspicion and disfavour on the nations who, after Napoleon's fall, to which they had largely contributed, demanded, more or less wildly, rights, liberties, and concessions. He tried to dismiss them with fair words, but they recurred again and again, and he could not be rid of them. The old friendship of the Austrian empire with Great Britain had been newly consolidated by him; Castlereagh and Wellington were sincere admirers and supporters of the wisdom of the chancellor.

B. THE POWERS

(a) *Great Britain.* — What was the aspect of affairs then in Great Britain, the much-lauded country of constitutional freedom? The results of her foreign and colonial policy had been brilliant. William Pitt, the younger (1759–1806), had taken care that arms, soldiers, and subsidies were put in play against the Revolution and against Napoleon, and after his death the sword of Albion remained unsheathed until the hour of Waterloo had struck; and its flag waved on every sea (cf. Vol. VI). The fleets of the other nations were annihilated by those of England, which were indisputably the first in the world. Great Britain had expanded in the West Indies, had raised Canada to prosperity, although she could not extinguish the old

love for France among the population, had obtained territory in Africa, and by means of the company exercised dominion in the East Indies over an empire which was far larger and more populous than the mother-country. The Sultan Tippoo Sahib of Mysore, a cautious ruler and a wary general, the deadly foe of the British, was conquered, and the power of the Mahrattas was broken two decades later by the Marquis of Hastings (1818). Almost all the States of India, including that of the Great Mogul in Delhi, lost their independence (cf. Vol. II). Burmah after a disastrous war forfeited its coast districts (1826), and attempts were made to draw Afghanistan into the sphere of British interests, a policy which led to complications with Russia. Vast treasures were brought to England from India, and the Indian trade assumed unexpected proportions. Intrepid navigators, who were hot upon the scent of James Cook, discovered new groups of islands, which were brought into the sphere of trade. The second treaty of Paris secured for the mistress of the seas the possession of the Cape and Ceylon, and gave her with Gibraltar the command of the strait between Europe and Africa, and with Malta that of the sea-route from the Western to the Eastern Mediterranean. "The United States of the Seven Ionian Isles" stood under British protection, but endured this dependence with ever-increasing dissatisfaction, notwithstanding all the advantages of a firm administration. The constitution was disliked by those who lived under it, and the power of the British commissioners was resented as excessive.

A series of great inventions had given the British a sort of monopoly for the manufacture of woollen and cotton stuffs. James Watt had discovered the steam engine, Henry Bell had worked the first steamship on the Clyde, and with the growth of industries trade had rapidly shot up. The British commanded the markets of the world and directed almost all sea-borne trade. Their total exports amounted in the period 1801-1810 to £41,000,000 annually. The Continental System of Napoleon had in no way effected the ruin of British trade, and after the removal of the embargo the volume of export trade increased from year to year. The national debt, it must be acknowledged, had grown enormously, owing to the long period of war by land and sea; in 1817 it amounted to £850,000,000, and the necessary interest on it was correspondingly great.

The slave trade, against which Thomas Clarkson, William Pitt the younger, and William Wilberforce had worked for decades, was abolished in the British Empire under Grenville's cabinet from the 1st of January, 1808. But Wilberforce wished for its abolition throughout the whole civilized world. He wrote to Alexander I, Frederick William III, and Talleyrand, and obtained the help of the latter and of Castlereagh at the congress of Vienna, with the result that France, Spain, and Portugal pledged themselves to abolish the slave trade. He and Clarkson became the vice-presidents of the Anti-Slavery Society in 1823. France, Spain, Portugal and Brazil renounced the slave trade; Wilberforce and his pupil, Thomas Fowell Buxton, did not rest until it was prohibited in the British colonies and until the Emancipation Act of Earl Grey's ministry (August, 1833), guaranteed that this would be done. Twenty millions sterling were voted by parliament as compensation to the owners. Dahlmann, in his Waterloo speech of 1815, called the British State "the only watch-tower of freedom left in the great flood." It stood in the foreground commanding respect, and its constitution was universally admired, just as Montesquieu had already blindly admired it.

And yet the English constitution contained many defects (cf. Vol. VII, pp. 387,

393). The landowning aristocracy alone possessed the public rights, the self-government, of which the nation was so proud. Their preponderance was felt even in the government of the towns. The landowners were supreme in the army and the Church, and made the enfranchised middle class dependent on their wishes. Thanks to primogeniture and strict entails, the landed interest displayed remarkable vitality. The ruling families of England escaped partitions which weakened and impoverished the German nobility and remained a mighty pillar of the constitution. Nearly four-fifths of the available land in the United Kingdom were in their possession, and they habitually availed themselves of the necessities of their poorer neighbours to increase their estates by purchase, and their acquisitions were leased to tenant farmers at the highest possible rent. Thus the large estates were formed and the class of small and middling freeholders diminished.

The House of Lords was naturally on the side of the aristocracy, and the latter knew how to extend their influence in the House of Commons. Flourishing towns like Birmingham and Manchester were unrepresented in the Lower House, while representatives were elected for a long list of unimportant "Rotten Boroughs," in which the votes of the electors were habitually put up to auction. It had long been emphatically urged that such a system was discreditable, and the elder Pitt, who had himself been returned for a "rotten borough," had uttered many protests; but he and his son both finally left things as they were. Although their industrial prosperity produced in the middle classes a far higher level of culture and intelligence than formerly, still they were quite inadequately represented in parliament; and since the rural districts contracted before the growth of centres of industrial activity, agriculture fell off greatly. The production of goods in factories employing machine-power gave the death blow to domestic industry, and workmen had to submit to the most shameful oppression by the great capitalists. Robert Owen (cf. Vol. VII, p. 374), endeavoured to promote more satisfactory relations between employers and employed; and his theories received a practical exemplification in the industrial colony which he founded in connection with his cotton-mills at New Lanark. But his example met with hardly any imitators; he himself was suspected by the champions of the old régime and its abuses; the poor man's loaf became neither cheaper nor better for his benevolent experiment. The landed proprietors wished to sell their wheat dear, and procured protective legislation against the import of corn from abroad. The price of corn went up enormously; and when it fell, parliament, acting entirely in the interests of the landowners, passed the Act of 1815, which laid a heavy duty on the importation of wheat, rye, barley, etc. Owen also recommended a national system of instruction without achieving any results; but another system, which he viewed with favour, that of Bell Lancaster, based on the idea of mutual instruction, came into vogue. The question of education as well as the state of the poor were most urgent problems in Ireland. In order partially to relieve their distress parents sold their children to the factories, where in spite of their tender age they were worked most unmercifully (cf. Vol. VII, 371); here again Owen's appeal for legislation for the protection of workmen was not immediately successful. It is hardly necessary to mention that such evils were bound to increase the number of criminals; and that the condition of the prisons was revolting.

A leading opponent of the abuses and defects of the administration of justice was Jeremy Bentham. He advocated legislative reform upon utilitarian principles

and roused the bitter opposition of the Tory party by demanding reconstruction of parliament. He attacked every prejudice which stood in the way of his suggestion with arguments drawn from the principle of utility; his ideas met with less response in England than in France and in the United States of America. William Cobbett, a deserter from the Tories, sounded a louder note; he overstepped all bounds in his journal, "The Weekly Register," and yet could never become a real friend of the people. His plans of revolutionary reform made no impression on parliament, but all the greater impression on clubs and public meetings; Cobbett became the leader and counsellor of a democratic party. He incited the masses against the government, which he said was the cause of their misery, revived the Hampden and Union Clubs, and influenced even the ideas of the city. Disturbances broke out in London; there was talk of secret societies, and the government in 1817 temporarily suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, adopted extraordinary measures, restricted the liberty of the press, and used the soldiery to break up riotous assemblies, a course which naturally intensified their unpopularity.

In foreign policy the British government was closely identified with Austria and entertained profound distrust of Russia, whose diplomatists were ubiquitous, while the Czar seemed much inclined to undertake a crusade against the bold pirates of the Barbary States, whom England had chastised in 1816, and against the Sultan. Alexander I was the only sovereign who kept up his army at full strength after the downfall of Napoleon; it may have been that the ambitions excited by Napoleon's promises at Tilsit and Erfurt were still fermenting in his brain.

The great rôle which Sir Robert Peel, the Tory, was destined to play in parliament, then began. The vigorous opponent of Catholic emancipation, he had worked from 1812 to 1818 in Ireland, as secretary of state, to secure good education and an effective police force throughout the country; by the Cash Payments Act, he had succeeded in terminating the period of an inconvertible paper currency, while the government endeavoured to bolster up the finances by the imposition of new taxes on partially indispensable objects. The general discontent of the people found in August 1819 a concerted expression in a monster procession from Manchester to St. Peter's Field; the incendiary speeches which formed the climax of the demonstration were interrupted by the charge of hussars and constables. This occurrence, in which many were wounded or killed, seemed to the Opposition, and above all to the radicals, a good pretext for accusing the government of illegality and cruelty, and the cry of murder was raised throughout the kingdom. The government replied by repressive measures, as it wished to prevent a revolution and curb the proletariat. The home secretary, Henry Addington, Viscount Sidmouth, like Castlereagh, Grenville, and others advocated the "Six Acts" of 1819, which conferred large powers on the executive authorities.

The sixty years' reign of George III, who had long been mentally afflicted, ended on the 29th of January, 1820. George III was a man of slow wit, and few talents, and was filled with jealousy of great men like the two Pitts; but in spite of deficient capacity he endeavoured to govern personally, an action naturally incompatible with the constitution. The first Guelph king born in England, George III thought and acted far more in the British spirit than his two predecessors; Hanover gradually became an appanage of the British Empire, while George I and George II had always set the interests of their native land above those of

Great Britain. Smitten as it were with blindness, George, whose worst fault was obstinacy, threw away the American colonies, declared with Lord North that his subjects in those parts were rebels and traitors, and preferred to lose a world than revoke some foolish commands (cf. Vol. I, p. 474); "in one campaign the crown lost more territory than Alexander the Great had conquered in his whole life." Repeated attempts on his life showed how unpopular George was, and he vainly tried to dam the swelling tide of popular feeling with the help of courtly ministers. He would not hear of Catholic Emancipation. Himself a strictly orthodox man, of whom his grandfather had said that he was fit for nothing except to read the Bible to his mother, he declared that he would sooner retire to a cottage or be beheaded than break his coronation oath and forget that he was a Protestant king.

George IV (Prince Regent since 1811), who succeeded George III, led, it is true, a profligate life, but maintained the same attitude toward the Catholics as his father and was in this respect at least emphatically Protestant. Since his only legitimate daughter, Charlotte, had died in 1817, as the young wife of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, his brother William, Duke of Clarence, who also had no legitimate children, became heir to the crown. George IV, a superficial voluptuary, always on the look-out for fresh *liaisons* and overwhelmed in debt, lived in open hostility to his imprudent wife, Caroline of Brunswick, and was on the worst of terms with his father. He, too, gradually became more unpopular, did nothing as a soldier or a statesman, and began his reign with the shameless trial of the queen; he lost his case in the eyes of his people and of the world. Caroline's powerful advocate in the royal *cause célèbre*, Henry Peter, Lord Brougham and Vaux, utterly routed the Premier, Charles Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool, who was George's adviser. The unhappy woman, excluded from the coronation, died soon afterward from chagrin (1821).

Rebellious movements in Scotland and England were quickly suppressed; the Cato Street Conspiracy of Thistlewood against the life of all the ministers was opportunely discovered and punished in 1820. The visits of George IV to Ireland (1821), and to Scotland (1822), parts of the kingdom which none of his three predecessors had ever visited, provoked boundless enthusiasm; George's sovereignty seemed to be more firmly established there than ever.

(b) *Austria*.—The Austrian State, totally disorganised by the period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, had nevertheless succeeded in rounding off its territories at the congress of Vienna. In internal affairs Francis I and Metternich tried as far as possible to preserve the old order of things; they wished for an absolute monarchy, and favoured the privileged classes. There was no more tenacious supporter of what was old, no more persistent observer of routine than the good Emperor Francis. He was an absolute ruler in the spirit of conservatism. He saw a national danger in any movement of men's minds which deviated from the letter of his commands, hated from the first all innovations, and ruled his people from the cabinet. He delighted to travel through his dominions, and receive the joyful greetings of his loyal subjects, since he laid the highest value on popularity; notwithstanding all his keenness of observation and his industry, he possessed no ideas of his own. Even Metternich was none too highly gifted in this respect. Francis made, at the most, only negative use of the abundance of his supreme power. Those who served him were bound to obey

him blindly; but he lacked the vigour and strength of character for great and masterful actions; his thoughts and wishes were those of a permanent official. Like Frederick William III, he loathed independent characters, men of personal views, and he therefore treated his brothers Charles and John with unjustified distrust. The only member of his family who was really acceptable to him was his youngest brother, the narrow-minded and characterless Louis. On the other hand, Francis was solicitous for the spread of beneficial institutions, and for the regulation of the legal system; in 1811 he introduced the "Universal Civil Code," and in so doing completed the task begun by Maria Theresa and Joseph II. His chief defect was his love of trifling details, which deprived him of any comprehensive view of a subject; and his constant interference with the business of the Council of State prevented any systematic conduct of affairs.

Francis owed it to Metternich that Austria once more held the highest position in Europe; he was therefore glad to entrust him with the management of foreign policy while he contented himself with internal affairs. Metternich was the centre of European diplomacy; but he was only a diplomatist, no statesman like Kaunitz and Felix Schwarzenberg; he did not consolidate the new Austria for the future, but only tried to check the wheel of progress and to hold the reins quietly with the assistance of his henchman Gentz; everything was to remain stationary. The police zealously helped to maintain this principle of government, and prosecuted every free-thinker as suspected of democracy. Austria was in the fullest sense a country of police; it supported an army of *mouchards* and informers. The post-office officials disregarded the privacy of letters, spies watched teachers and students in the academies; even such loyal Austrians as Franz Grillparzer and Joseph Christian Freiherr von Zedlitz came into collision with the detectives. The censorship was blindly intolerant and pushed its interference to extremes. Public education, from the university down to the village school, suffered under the suspicious tutelage of the authorities; school and Church alike were unprogressive.

The Provincial Estates, both in the newly acquired and in the recovered crown lands, were insignificant, leading, as a matter of fact, a shadowy existence, which reflected the depressed condition of the population. But Hungary, which since the time when Maria Theresa was hard pressed had insisted on its national independence, was not disposed to descend from its height to the general insignificance of the other crown lands, and the Archduke Palatine, Joseph, thoroughly shared this idea. It was therefore certain that soon there would be an embittered struggle with the government at Vienna, which wished to render the constitution of Hungary as unreal as that of Carniola and Tyrol. The indignation found its expression chiefly in the assemblies of the counties, which boldly contradicted the arbitrary and stereotyped commands from Vienna, while a group of the nobility itself supported the view that the people, hitherto excluded from political life, should share in the movement. In the Reichstag of 1825 this group spoke very distinctly against the exclusive rule of the nobility. The violent onslaught of the Reichstag against the government led, it is true, to no result; the standard-bearer of that group was Count Stephen Széchényi, whom his antagonist, Kossuth, called "the greatest of the Hungarians."

The Archduke Rainer, to whom the viceroyalty of the Italian possessions had been entrusted, was animated by the best intention of promoting the happiness

of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and of familiarising the Italians with the Austrian rule; but he was so hampered by instructions from Vienna that he could not exercise any marked influence on the government. The Italians would hear nothing of the advantages of the Austrian rule, opposed all *Germanisation*, and prided themselves on their old nationality. Literature, the press, and secret societies aimed at national objects and encouraged independence, while Metternich thought of an Italian confederation on the German model, and under the headship of Austria. It was also very disastrous that the leading circles at Vienna regarded Italy as the chief support of the whole policy of the empire, and yet failed to understand the great diversity of social and political conditions in the individual States of the Peninsula. Metternich, on the other hand, employed every forcible means to oppose the national wishes, which he regarded, both there and in Germany, as outcomes of the revolutionary spirit. Yet the hopes of the nations on both sides of the Alps were not being realised; the "Golden Age" had still to come.

The condition of the Austrian finances was deplorable. Since the year 1811, when Count Joseph Wallis, the finance minister, had devised a system which reduced by one fifth the nominal value of the paper money—which had risen to the amount of ten hundred and sixty million gulden—permanent bankruptcy had prevailed. Silver disappeared from circulation, the national credit fell very low, and the revenue was considerably less than the expenditure, which was enormously increased by the long war. In the year 1814 Count Philip Stadion, the former minister of the interior (p. 50), undertook the thankless duties of minister of finance. He honestly exerted himself to improve credit, introduce a fixed monetary standard, create order on a consistent plan, and with competent colleagues to develop the economic resources of the nation. But various financial measures were necessary before the old paper money could be withdrawn *en bloc*, and silver once more put into circulation. New loans had to be raised, which increased the burden of interest, in the years 1816 to 1823, from nine to twenty-four millions, and the annual expenditure for the national debt from twelve to fifty millions. The National Bank, opened in 1817, afforded efficient help. If Stadion did not succeed in remodelling the system of indirect taxes, and if the reorganisation of the land-tax proceeded slowly, the attitude of Hungary greatly added to the difficulties of the position of the great minister of reform, who died in May, 1824. The State of the Emperor Francis was naturally the Promised Land of custom-house restrictions and special tariffs; industry and trade were closely barred in. In vain did clear-headed politicians advise that all the hereditary dominions, excepting Hungary, should make one customs district; although the government built commercial roads and canals, still the trade of the empire with foreign countries was stagnant. Trieste never became for Austria that which it might have been; it was left for Karl Ludwig von Bruck of Elberfeld to make it, in 1833, a focus of the trade of the world by founding the Austrian Lloyd Shipping Company. Red tape prevailed in the army, innovations were shunned, and the reforms of the Archduke Charles were interrupted. This was the outlook in Austria, the "Faubourg St. Germain of Europe."

(c) *Prussia*.—Were things better in the rival State of Prussia? Frederick William III was the type of a homely bourgeois, a man of sluggish intellect and

of a cold scepticism, which contrasted sharply with the patriotic fire and self-devotion of his people. His main object was to secure tranquillity; the storm of the war of liberation, so foreign to his sympathies, had blown over, and he now wished to govern his kingdom in peace. Religious questions interested him more than those of politics; he was a positive Christian, and it was the wish of his heart to amalgamate the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches, and the spirit of the age seemed very favourable for the attempt. When the tercentenary of the Reformation was commemorated in the year 1817, he appealed for the union of the two confessions, and found much response. The new liturgy of 1821, issued with his own concurrence, found great opposition, especially among the Old Lutherans; its second form, in 1829, somewhat conciliated its opponents, although the old tutelage of the Church under the supreme bishop of the country still continued to be felt, and Frederick William, both in the secular and spiritual domain, professed an absolutism which did not care to see district and provincial synods established by its side. The union, indeed, produced no peace in the Church, but became the pretext for renewed quarrels; nevertheless it was introduced into Nassau, Baden, the Bavarian Palatinate, Anhalt, and a part of Hesse in the same way as into Prussia. The king wished to give to the Catholic Church also a systematised and profitable development, and therefore entered into negotiations with the Curia, which were conducted by the ambassador Barthold G. Niebuhr, a great historian but weak diplomatist. Niebuhr and Karl Freiherr zum Altenstein, the minister of public worship, made too many concessions to the Curia, and were not a match for Consalvi (p. 34), the cardinal secretary of state. On the 16th of July, 1821, Pope Pius VII issued the bull, "*De salute animarum*," which was followed by an explanatory brief, "*Quod de fidelium*." The king confirmed the agreement by an order of the cabinet; Cologne and Posen became archbishoprics, Treves, Munster, Paderborn, Breslau, Kulm, and Ermeland bishoprics, each with a clerical seminary. The cathedral chapters were conceded the right of electing the bishop, who, however, had necessarily to be a *persona grata* to the king.

The truce did not indeed last long; the question of mixed marriages led to renewed controversy (cf. Vol. VII, p. 343). Subsequently to 1803 the principle held good in the eastern provinces of Prussia that the children in disputed cases should follow the religion of the father, a view that conflicted with a bull of 1741; now, after 1825, the order of 1803 was to be valid for the Rhine province, which was for the most part Catholic. But the bishops of the districts appealed in 1828 to Pope Leo XII; he and his successor Pius VII conducted long negotiations with the Prussian ambassador, Christian Karl Josias Ritter von Bunsen, who, steeped in the spirit of romanticism, saw the surest protection against the revolution in a close adherence between national governments and the Curia. Pius VIII, a deadly enemy of all enlightenment, finally, by a brief of 1830, permitted the consecration of mixed marriages only when the promise was given that the children born from the union would be brought up in the Catholic faith; but the Prussian government did not accept the brief, and matters soon came to a dispute between the Curia and the archbishop of Cologne.

It was excessively difficult to form the new Prussian State into a compact unity of a firm and flexible type. Not merely its elongated shape, its geographical incoherency, and the position of Hanover as an excrescence on its body, but above everything its composition out of a hundred territorial fragments with the most

diversified legislatures and the most rooted dislike to centralisation, the aversion of the Rhenish Catholics to be included in the State which was Protestant by history and character, and the stubbornness of the Poles in the countries on the Vistula, quite counterbalanced a growth in population (more than doubled), which was welcome in itself. By unobtrusive and successful labour the greatest efforts were made toward establishing some degree of unity. The ideal of unity could not be universally realised in the legal system and the administration of justice. The inhabitants, therefore, of the Rhenish districts were conceded the Code Napoléon, with juries and oral procedure, but the larger part of the monarchy was given the universal common law. The narrow-minded and meddlesome system of the excise and the local variations of the land-tax system were intolerable.

The root idea of the universal duty of bearing arms, that pillar of the monarchy, was opposed on many sides. This institution, which struck deeply into family life, met with especial opposition and discontent in the newly acquired provinces. In large circles there prevailed the wish that there should no longer be a standing army. But finally the constitution of the army was adhered to; it cemented together the different elements of the country. The ultimate form was that of three years' active service, two years' service in the reserve, and two periods of service in the militia, each of seven years. The fact that the universal duties of bearing arms and defending the country were to be permanent institutions made Frederick William suspicious. His narrow-minded but influential brother-in-law, Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the sworn opponent of the reform legislation of Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharnhorst, induced him to believe that a revolutionary party whose movements were obscure wanted to employ the militia against the throne, and advised, as a counter precaution, that the militia and troops of the line should be amalgamated. But the originator of the law of defence, the minister of war, Hermann von Boyen, resolutely opposed this blissful necessity.

An ordinance of April 30, 1815, divided Prussia into ten provinces; but since East and West Prussia, Lower Rhine and Cleve-Berg, were soon united, the number was ultimately fixed at eight, which were subdivided into administrative districts. Lord-lieutenants (*Oberpräsidenten*) were placed at the head of the provinces instead of the former provincial ministries. Their administrative sphere was accurately defined by a cabinet order of November 3, 1817; they represented the entire government, and fortunately these responsible posts were held by competent and occasionally prominent men, like Sack, Von Vincke, Von Bülow, Merckel, and Von Schön. The amalgamation of the new territories with Old Prussia was complete, both externally and internally, however difficult the task may have been at first in the province of Saxony and many other parts, and however much consistency and resolution may have been wanting at headquarters, in the immediate vicinity of Frederick William. But the struggle with the forces of local particularism was long and obstinate.

The great period of Prince Hardenberg, chancellor of state, was over; he could no longer master the infinity of work which rested upon him, got entangled in intrigues and escapades, associated with despicable companions, and immediately lost ground with the king, himself the soul of honour; his share in the reorganisation of Prussia after the wars of liberation was too small. On the other hand, he guarded against Roman encroachment, and assiduously worked at the question of the Constitution; his zeal to realise his intentions there too frequently left the

field open to the reactionaries in another sphere. Most of the higher civil servants admired the official liberalism of the chancellor, and therefore, like Hardenberg and Stein, appeared to the reactionaries as patrons of the extravagant enthusiasm and "Teutonising" agitation of the youth,—as secret democrats, in short. Boyen was the closest supporter of Hardenberg; the finance minister, Count Bülow, formerly the distinguished finance minister of the kingdom of Westphalia, usually supported him, while the chief of the war office, Job von Witzleben, the inseparable counsellor of the king, who even ventured to work counter to the Duke of Mecklenburg, was one of the warmest advocates of the reform of Stein and Hardenberg. The reactionaries, under Friedrich von der Marwitz and other opponents of the great age of progress, relied on the ministers of the interior and of the police, the overcautious Friedrich von Schuckmann and Prince Wilhelm zu Sayn-Wittgenstein-Hohenstein. The latter was a bitter enemy of German patriotism and the Constitution, and the best tool of Metternich at the court of Berlin. The same reactionary feeling was displayed by J. P. Friedrich Ancillon, the former tutor of the crown prince, who now sat in the foreign office and had much influence with the king and crown prince, by Von Kamptz, a privy councillor, and others.

The reaction, which naturally followed the exuberant love of freedom shown in the war of liberation, was peculiarly felt in Prussia. Janke, Schmalz, the brother-in-law of Scharnhorst, and other place-hunters clumsily attacked in pamphlets the "seducers of the people" and the "demagogues," in order to recommend themselves to the governments as saviours of the threatened society. They suspected the demand of thousands upon thousands for a constitution and for the abolition of the system of petty States in favour of a strong Germany, and compared the fragments of the Tugendbund with the Jacobins of France. The indignation at these falsehoods was general; there appeared numerous refutations, the most striking of which proceeded from the pen of Schleiermacher and Niebuhr. The Prussian and Wurtemberg governments, however, stood on the side of Schmalz and his companions, and rewarded his falsehood with a decoration and acknowledgment. Frederick William III indeed strictly forbade, in January, 1816, any further literary controversy about secret combinations, but at the same time renewed the prohibition on such societies, at which great rejoicings broke out in Vienna. He also forbade the further appearance of the "Rhenish Mercury" of Joseph Görres, which demanded a constitution and liberty of the press. Gneisenau, to some extent as an accomplice of Görres, was removed from the general command in Coblenz, and their friend Justus Gruner, a "Teutonised Jacobin," was forced to retire from the post of ambassador at Berne. Wittgenstein's spies were continually active. The emancipation of the Jews, in contradiction to the royal edict of 1812, lost ground. The act for the regulation of landed property proclaimed in September, 1811, was "explained" in May, 1816, in a fashion which favoured so greatly the property of the nobles at the cost of the property of the peasants that it virtually repealed the Regulation Act.

In the course of the last decade there had been frequent talk of a general council. Stein's programme of 1808 proposed that the council of state should be the highest ratifying authority for acts of legislation. Hardenberg, on the other hand, fearing for his own supremacy, had contemplated in 1810 giving the council a far more modest rôle. But neither scheme received a trial; and in many quarters a council of state was only thought of with apprehension. When then finally

the ordinance of the 20th of March, 1817, established the council of state, it was merely the highest advisory authority, the foremost counsellor of the crown, and Stein's name was missing from the list of those summoned by the king.

The first labours of the council of state were directed to the reform of the taxation, which Count Bülow, the finance minister, wished to carry out in the spirit of modified free trade. His schemes were very aggressive, and aimed at freedom of inland commerce, but showed that, considering the financial distress of the moment, the state of the national debt, which in 1818 amounted to two hundred and seventeen million thalers (£33,000,000), the want of credit, and the deficit, no idea of any remission of taxation could be entertained. In fact, Bülow demanded an increase of the indirect taxes, a proposal which naturally hit the lower classes very hard. Wilhelm von Humboldt headed the opponents of Bülow, and a bitter struggle broke out. The notables convened in the provinces to express their views rejected Bülow's taxes on meal and meat, but pronounced in favour of the direct personal taxation, graduated according to classes, which was warmly recommended by the great statistician Joh. Gottfried Hoffmann, a member of the council of state.

Bülow was replaced as finance minister at the end of 1817 by Wilhelm Anton von Klewitz, the extent of whose office was, however, much diminished by all sorts of limitations, and received the newly created post of minister of trade and commerce. At the same time Altenstein became sole minister of public worship and instruction, departments which had previously been reckoned under the ministry of the interior; and Boyen became, as it were, a second minister of justice by the side of Kirchhausen, — a shuffling of offices which could not conduce to any solidity or unity. In Altenstein, who between 1808 and 1810 had failed to distinguish himself as finance minister, Prussia possessed a born minister of public worship. In spite of many unfavourable conditions he put the educational system on a sound footing; he was splendidly supported by the prominent schoolmaster Johannes Schulze, by Georg Heinrich, Ludwig Nicolovius, and others, and directed the department for twenty-three years, under the influence of Hegel's philosophy; he introduced in 1817 the provincial bodies of teachers, advocated universal compulsory attendance at school, encouraged the national schools, and was instrumental in uniting the University of Wittenberg with that of Halle, and in founding the University of Bonn (1818).

Bülow, a pioneer in his own domain, not inferior to Altenstein in the field of Church and school, administered the customs department, supported by the shrewd Karl Georg Maassen. The first preparatory steps were taken in 1816, especially in June, by the abolition of the waterway tolls and the inland and provincial duties. A cabinet order of the 1st of August, 1817, sanctioned for all time the principle of free importation, and Maassen drew up the Customs Act, which became law on May 26, 1818, and came into force at the beginning of 1819, according to Treitschke "the most liberal and matured politico-economic law of those days;" it was simplified in 1821 to suit the spirit of free trade, and the tolls were still more lowered. An order of the 8th of February, 1819, exempted from taxation out of the list of inland products only wine, beer, brandy, and leaf tobacco; on the 30th of May, 1820, a graduated personal tax and corn duties were introduced. Thus a well-organised system of taxation was founded, which satisfied the national economy for some time. All social forces were left with free power of movement

and scope for expansion. It mattered little if manufacturers complained, so long as the national prosperity, which was quite shattered, was revived. Prussia gradually found the way to the German Customs Union. No one, it is true, could yet predict that change; but, as if with a presentiment, complaints of the selfishness and obstinacy of the tariff loan were heard beyond the Prussian frontiers.

What progress had been made with the constitution granting provincial estates and popular representation, promised by the king by the edict of May 22, 1815? The commission promised for this purpose was not summoned until the 30th of March, 1817. Hardenberg directed the proceedings since it had assembled on July 7 in Berlin, sent Altenstein, Beyme, and Klewiz to visit the provinces in order to collect thorough evidence of the existing conditions, and received reports, which essentially contradicted each other. It appeared most advisable that the ministers should content themselves with establishing provincial estates, and should leave a constitution out of the question. Hardenberg honestly tried to make progress in the question of the constitution and to release the royal word which had been pledged; Frederick William, on the contrary, regretted having given it, and gladly complied with the retrogressive tendencies of the courtiers and supporters of the old régime. He saw with concern the contests in the South German chambers and the excitement among the youth of Germany; he pictured to himself the horrors of a revolution, and Hardenberg could not carry his point.

(d) *German Federation.* — The federal diet, the union of the princes of Germany, owed its existence to the Act of Federation of the 8th of June, 1815, which could not possibly satisfy the hopes of a nation which had conquered a Napoleon. Where did the heroes of the wars of liberation find any guarantee for their claims? Of what did the national rights consist, and what protection did the whole federation offer against foreign countries? Even the deposed and mediatised princes of the old empire were deceived in their last hopes; they had once more dreamed of a revival of their independence. But they were answered with cold contempt, that the new political organisation of Germany demanded that the princes and counts, who had been found already mediatised, should remain incorporated into other political bodies or be incorporated afresh; that the Act of Federation involved the implicit recognition of this necessity (Answer of Humboldt to the House of Arenberg, December 7, 1816). The Act of Federation pleased hardly anyone, not even its own designers, and the most caustic criticisms were uttered by journalistic circles; Luden's "Nemesis" said, "The German federation is a puzzle and a disgrace," and the "Rhenish Mercury" of Görres scoffed at "the Act of Federation, that, after all the efforts of the accoucheur, came into the world still-born; and was doomed before it saw the light."

The opening of the federal diet, convened for the 1st of September, 1815, was again postponed, since negotiations were taking place in Paris, and there were various territorial disputes between the several federal States to be decided. Austria was scheming for Salzburg and the Breisgau, Bavaria for the Baden Palatinate; the two had come to a mutual agreement at the cost of the House of Baden, whose elder line was dying out, and Baden was confronted with the danger of dismemberment. The two chief powers disputed about Mayence until the town fell to Hesse-Darmstadt, but the right of garrisoning the important federal fortress fell to them both. Baden only joined the federation on July 26, 1815, Wurtemberg on

September 1. Notwithstanding the opposition of Austria and Prussia permission was given to Russia, Great Britain, and France to have ambassadors at Frankfurt, while the federation had no permanent representatives at the foreign capitals. Many of the South German courts regarded the foreign ambassadors as a support against the leading German powers; the secondary and petty States were most afraid of Prussia. Finally, on the 5th of November, 1816, the Austrian ambassador, Johann Rudolf Count Buol-Schauenstein, opened the meeting of the federation in Frankfurt with a speech transmitted by Metternich. On all sides members were eager to move resolutions, and Metternich warned them against precipitation, the very last fault, as it turned out, of which the federal diet was likely to be guilty. On the question of the domains of Electoral Hesse, with regard to which many private persons took the part of the elector, the federation sustained a complete defeat at his hands. The question of the military organisation of the federation was very inadequately solved. When the Barbary States in 1817 extended their raids in search of slaves and booty as far as the North Sea, and attacked merchantmen (cf. Vol. IV, p. 251), the Hanseatic towns lodged complaints before the federal diet, but the matter ended in words. The ambassador of Baden, recalling the glorious past history of the Hansa, in vain counselled the federal States to build their own ships. The federation remained dependent on the favour of foreign maritime powers; the question of a German fleet was dropped. Nor was more done for trade and commerce; the mutual exchange of food-stuffs was still fettered by a hundred restrictions.

How did the matter stand with the performance of the thirteenth article of the Act of Federation, which promised diets to all the federal States?

Charles Augustus of Saxe-Weimar had granted a constitution on May 5, 1816, and placed it under the guarantee of the federation, which also guaranteed the Mecklenburg Constitution of 1817. The federation generally refrained from independent action, and omitted to put into practice the inconvenient article empowering them to sit in judgment on "the wisdom of each several government." Austria and Prussia, like most of the federal governments, rejoiced at this evasion; it mattered nothing to them that the peoples were deceived and discontented. The same evasion was adopted in the case of Article XVIII, on the liberty of the press. The north of Germany, which had hitherto lived apparently undisturbed, and the south, which was seething with the new constitutional ideas, were somewhat abruptly divided on this point.

In Hanover the feudal system, which had been very roughly handled by Westphalian and French rulers, returned cautiously and without undue haste out of its lurking-place after the restoration of the House of Guelph. In the general Landtag the landed interest was enormously in the preponderance. Count Münster-Ledenburg, who governed the new kingdom from London, sided with the nobility; the constitution imposed in 1814 rested on the old feudal principles. The estates solemnly announced on the 17th of January, 1815, the union of the old and new territories into one whole, and on the 7th of December, 1819, Hanover received a new constitution on the dual-chamber system, and with complete equality of rights for the two chambers. The nobility and the official class were predominant. There was no trace of an organic development of the commonwealth; the nobility conceded no reforms, and the people took little interest in the proceedings of the chambers.

The preponderance of the nobility was less oppressive in Brunswick. George IV acted as guardian of the young duke, Charles II, and Count Münster in London conducted the affairs of state, with the assistance of the privy council of Brunswick, and promoted the material interests of the State, and the country received on the 25th of April in the "renewed system of States" a suitable constitution. Everything went on as was wished until Charles, in October, 1823, himself assumed the government and declared war on the constitution. A régime of the most despicable caprice and license now began; Charles insulted King George IV, and challenged Münster to a duel. Finally the federal diet intervened to end the mismanagement, and everything grew ripe for the revolution of 1830 (p. 150).

In the kingdom of Saxony, so reduced in territory and population, matters returned to the old footing. Frederick Augustus I the Just maintained order in the peculiar sense in which he understood the word. Only quite untenable conditions were reformed, otherwise the king and the minister, Detlev Count Einsiedel, considered that the highest political wisdom was to persevere in the old order of things. Industries and trade were fettered, and there was a total absence of activity. The officials were as narrow and one-sided as the statesmen. In the federation Saxony always sided with Austria, being full of hatred of Prussia; Saxony was only important in the development of art. Even under King Anton (after May, 1827) everything remained in the old position. Einsiedel's statesmanship was as powerful as before, and the discontent among the people grew.

The two Mecklenburgs remained feudal States, in which the middle class and the peasants were of no account. Even the organic constitution of 1817 for Schwerin made no alteration in the feudal power prevailing since 1755; the knights were still as ever supreme in the country. The Sternberg diet of 1819 led certainly to the abolition of serfdom, but the position of the peasants was not improved by this measure. Emigration became more common; trades and industries were stagnant. Even Oldenburg was content with "political hibernation." Frankfort-on-Main received a constitution on the 18th of October, 1816, and many obsolete customs were abolished. In the Hansa towns, on the contrary, the old patriarchal conditions were again in full force; the council ruled absolutely. Trade and commerce made great advances, especially in Hamburg and Bremen. The founding of Bremerhaven by the burgomaster Johann Smidt, a clever politician, opened fresh paths of world commerce to Bremen.

The elector William I, who had returned to Hesse-Cassel, wished to bring everything back to the footing of 1806, when he left his country; he declared the ordinances of "his administrator Jérôme" not to be binding on him, recognised the sale of domains as little as the advancement of Hessian officers, but wished to make the fullest use of that part of the Westphalian ordinances which brought him personal advantage. He promised, indeed, a liberal representative constitution, but trifled with the Landtag, and contented himself with the promulgation of the unmeaning family and national law of March 4, 1817. When he died, unlamented, in 1821, the still more capricious and worthless régime of William II began, which was marked by debauchery, family quarrels, and public discontent. Far more edifying was the state of things in Hesse-Darmstadt, where the grand duke, Louis I, although by inclination attached to the old régime, worked his best for reform, and did not allow himself to be driven to reaction after the conference at Carlsbad. He gave Hesse on the 17th of December (18th of March), 1820, a

representative constitution, and was an enlightened ruler, as is shown, among other instances, by his acquiescence in the efforts of Prussia toward a customs union.

The most unscrupulous among the princes of the Rhenish Confederation, Frederick of Wurtemberg, readily noticed the increasing discontent of his subjects, and wished to meet it by the proclamation of January 11, 1815; that ever since 1806 he had wished to give his country a constitution and representation by estates; but when he read out his constitution to the estates on May 15, these promptly rejected it. The excitement in the country increased amid constant appeals to the "old and just right." Frederick tried to propitiate them by the mediation of Karl August Freiherr von Wangenheim; but the estates put no trust in his proffered arrangement. Frederick died in the middle of the dispute on October 30, 1816. Under his son William I, who was both chivalrous and ambitious, a better time dawned for Wurtemberg. But the estates offered such opposition to him that the constitution was not formed until September 25, 1819; the first diet of 1820-1821, on the contrary, was extremely amenable to the government. William was very popular, although his rule showed little liberalism.

Bavaria, after the dethronement of its second creator, Napoleon, had recovered the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and formed out of it the Rhenish Palatinate (Rhenish Bavaria), whose population remained for a long time as friendly to France as Bavaria was hostile. "Father Max" certainly did his best to amalgamate the inhabitants of the Palatinate and Bavaria, and his premier, Count Montgelas, effected so many profitable and wise changes for this kingdom, which had increased to more than thirteen hundred square German miles, with four million souls, that much of the blame attached to this policy might seem to be unjustified. His most dangerous opponents were the crown prince Louis, with his leaning toward romanticism and his "Teutonic" sympathies and hatred of France, and Field-marshal Karl Philipp, Count Wrede. While Montgelas wished not to hear a syllable about a new constitution, the crown prince deliberately adopted a constitutional policy, in order to prepare the downfall of the hated Frenchman. Montgelas' constitution of May 1, 1808, had never properly seen the light. He intended national representation to be nothing but a sham. The crown prince wished, in opposition to the minister, that Bavaria should be a constitutional State, a model to the whole of Germany. Montgelas was able to put a stop to the intended creation of a constitution in 1814-1815, while his scheme of an agreement with the Curia was hindered by an increase in the claims of the latter. He fell on February 2, 1817, a result to which the court at Vienna contributed, and Bavaria spoke only of his defects, without being in a position to replace Montgelas' system by another. The Concordat of June 5, 1817, signified a complete victory of the Curia, and was intolerable in the new state of Bavarian public opinion; the "kingdom of darkness" stood before the door. The crown met the general discontent by admitting into the constitution some provisions guaranteeing the rights of Protestants, and thus naturally furnished materials for further negotiations with the Curia. On May 26, 1818, Bavaria finally received its constitution; in spite of deficiencies and gaps it was full of vitality, and is still in force, although in the interval it has required to be altered in many points.

Bavaria thus by the award of a liberal constitution had anticipated Baden, which was forced to grant a similar one in order to influence public opinion in its favour. Prospects of the Baden Rhenish-Palatinate were opened up to Bavaria by

arrangements with Austria. The ruling house of Zähringen, except for an illegitimate line, was on the verge of extinction, and the Grand Duke Charles could never make up his mind to declare the counts of Hochberg legitimate. At the urgent request of Stein and the Czar Alexander, his brother-in-law, Charles had already announced to Metternich and Hardenberg in Vienna on the 1st of December, 1814, that he wished to introduce a representative constitution in his dominions, and so anticipated the Act of Federation. Stein once more implored the distrustful man, "whose indolence was boundless," to carry out his intention; but every appeal rebounded from him, and he once again postponed the constitutional question. The Bavarian craving for Baden territory became more and more threatening. A more vigorous spirit was felt in the Baden ministry after its reorganisation. At last, on the 4th of October, Charles, by a family law, proclaimed the indivisibility of the whole State and the rights of the Hochberg line to the succession. It was foreseen that Bavaria would not submit tamely to this. Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Tettenborn, Siegmund Freiherr von Reitzenstein, Karl August Barnhagen von Ense, and others worked upon public opinion in Europe, and upon the failing Grand Duke Charles. Russia, first and foremost of the powers, was forced to influence him. The solution throughout Germany was said to be a constitution; Baden was now forced to try to anticipate Bavaria in making this concession. Even the emperor Alexander opened the first diet of his kingdom of Poland on the basis of the Constitution of 1815, and took the occasion to praise the blessing of liberal institutions. Then Bavaria got the start of Baden. Tettenborn and Reitzenstein represented to Charles that Baden must make haste and create a still more liberal constitution. Karl Friedrich Nebenius drew up the scheme. Finally, on the 22d of August, 1818, Charles signed the constitution. It was, according to Barnhagen, "the most liberal of all German constitutions, the richest in germs of life, the strongest in energy." It entirely corresponded to the charter of Louis XVIII. The ordinances of the 4th of October, 1817, were also contained in it and ratified afresh. The rejoicings in Baden and liberal Germany at large were unanimous. In Munich there was intense bitterness. The crown prince Louis in particular did not desist from trying to win the Baden Palatinate, and we know now that even Louis II in the year 1870 urged Bismarck to obtain it for Bavaria. Baden ceded to Bavaria in 1819 a portion of the district of Wertheim, and received from Austria Hohengeroldseck. The congress at Aix-la-Chapelle had also pronounced in favour of Baden (1818).

Nassau, before the rest of Germany, had received, on the 2d of September, 1814, a constitution, for which Stein was partly responsible. But the estates were not summoned until the work of reorganising the duchy was completed. Duke William opened the assembly at last on March 3, 1818, and a tedious dispute soon broke out about the crown lands and State property. The minister of state, Ernst Freiherr von Bieberstein, a particularist and reactionary of the purest water, adopted Metternich's views. In popular opinion the credit of the first step was not given to Nassau, because it delayed so long to take the second.

(e) *Young Germany*. — Among the youth of Germany the patriotic songs of Ernst Moritz Arndt continued to sound, even when the sword was replaced in its sheath. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the old Lützower, the son of a priest from Priegnitz, trained the bodies of the young after the Spartan fashion in gymnastics, but

his theories involved much that was debatable and unnatural. He found pleasure in brutality and contempt of outward formalities, in foolish political invectives, and thus repelled nobler natures. Even men of incontestably liberal views, as Hendrik Steffens and Karl von Raumer, resolutely opposed the "Turnvater," who had taken a bad course. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the philosopher, believed, as early as 1811, in the beneficial effect which a league of German students would produce, and the first attempt in such a direction was made in 1814 by the brothers August Adolf Ludwig and Karl Follen, at the University of Giessen. But Jena soon surpassed "the Blacks" and their rules, the "Mirror of Honour." The "Burschenschaft," or Students' Association, was formed there after bloody struggles with the brutalised provincial associations (*Landsmannschaften*). Assuming the colours of Lützow, black, red, gold, it aimed at a united Germany and the union of all German students; its activity began on the 12th of June, 1815, and was at first free from the taint of party spirit. It rapidly spread from Jena to other universities, and in order to facilitate more intimate relations between the members, a friendly conference for the 18th of October, 1817, was proposed. This was intended to take place in the country of Charles Augustus, on the soil which nurtured the most liberal press in Germany. Some hundreds of students, entirely Protestant, simultaneously commemorated on the Wartburg the memory of the battle of liberation at Leipsic and the tercentenary of Luther's appearance at Wittenberg. The proceedings of the commemoration were at first dignified and free from political animosity; but then the meeting turned to the discussion of politics, and, following the example once set by Luther, committed to the flames a number of books on political science and other subjects, which seemed detestable to them as retrogressive, and thundered out a *Pereat!* at all "scoundrelly followers of Schmalz." This soon roused the governments. The fear of serious consequences was prominent in Munich, Dresden, Vienna, and Berlin. Weimar and Jena were decried as the nests of Jacobinism, and Charles Augustus heard the bitterest reproaches from Metternich and Hardenberg. The Prussian government even thought of sending an army of thirty thousand men to Weimar, and of curtailing academic liberty. But Charles Augustus extended his protection to the "Burschenschaft" and academic liberty, although he blamed their extravagances. Since Weimar and not Berlin was the focus of German literature, and Charles Augustus its patron in place of Frederick the Great, German freedom had nothing to hope for under Frederick William III, and it sought the protection of the former student (Altbursch) Charles Augustus.

(f) *Aix-la-Chapelle*. — Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia had decided on November 20, 1815, that periodical congresses were desirable in order to consult about the welfare of Europe; the first met at Aix-la-Chapelle, and showed Europe that an aristocratic league of powers stood at its head. Alexander, Francis, and Frederick William appeared in person accompanied by numerous diplomats, among them Metternich, Gentz, Hardenberg, Humboldt, Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and Capodistrias; France was represented by Richelieu; Great Britain, by Wellington, Castlereagh, and Canning. The chief question to be decided by the conferences, which began on September 30, 1818, was the evacuation of France. The Duke of Richelieu obtained on October 9 an agreement according to which France should be evacuated by the allied troops before the 30th of November, 1818, instead of

the year 1820, and the costs of the war and the indemnities still to be paid were considerably lowered. On the other hand, he did not succeed in forming a quintuple alliance by securing the admission of France as a member into the quadruple alliance. It is true that France was received on November 15 into the federation of the great powers, and that it joined the Holy Alliance; but the reciprocal guarantee of the five great powers, advocated by Alexander and Ancillon, did not come to pass, and the four powers renewed in secret on November 15 the alliance of Chaumont, and agreed upon military measures to be adopted in the event of a war with France. We have already spoken of the settlement of the dispute between Bavaria and Baden; the congress occupied itself also with other European questions without achieving any successes, and increased the severity of the treatment of the exile on St. Helena.

Alexander I of Russia, who was now making overtures to liberalism throughout Europe and supported the constitutional principle in Poland, soon returned from that path; he grew colder in his friendship for the unsatisfied Poles, and became a loyal pupil of Metternich, led by the rough "sergeant of Gatchina," the powerful Count Araktcheieff. Although art, literature, and science flourished in his reign, although the fame of Alexander Pushkin was at its zenith, yet the fear of revolution, assassination, and disbelief cast a lengthening shadow over the policy of Alexander, and he governed in a mystic reactionary spirit. Michail Speransky seemed to have laboured for no purpose. Various occurrences in Germany heightened Alexander's distrust of the love of freedom and the idealism of the nations.

When it became apparent that Alexander had broken with the liberal party, Metternich and Castlereagh rubbed their hands in joy at his conversion, and the pamphlet of the prophet of disaster, Alexander Stourdza, "On the Present Condition of Germany," which was directed against the freedom of study in the universities and the freedom of the press, when put before the Czar at Aix-la-Chapelle, intensified his suspicious aversion to all that savoured of liberty. The conference of ambassadors at Paris (p. 88) was declared closed. The greatest concord seemed to reign between the five great powers when the congress ended on the 21st of November.

(g) *Richelieu*. — Richelieu saw with horror the growth of the revolutionary spirit in France, and he therefore advised that it should be opposed by every means. The Conscription Act of March 10, 1818, which completely transformed the army, was his work; to him France owed the friendly and mild treatment which she experienced from the allies and the evacuation of her soil by the foreign soldiers. But the intended alteration of the disastrous Electoral Law of 1817 led to Richelieu's retirement on December 29, 1818.

The ministry of Dessoles, which now took the lead, was dominated by Richelieu's rival, the favourite Elie Decazes, who became minister of the interior. An arrangement was effected with the Curia on August 23, 1819. Freedom of the press was encouraged, and the extraordinary laws against the liberty of the subject were repealed. The ministry, however, at one time inclined to the constitutionalists, at another to the ultra royalists, and thus forfeited the confidence of all, and depended on the personal and vacillating policy of the king, while the intensity of party feeling was increased. Even a great batch of new peers in March, 1819, did not give the crown the hoped-for parliamentary support. An

alteration of the Electoral Law seemed imperative; it was essential to show fight against the Left. On the 20th of November, 1819, the country learnt that Dessoles was dismissed and Decazes had become first minister. The vacillating policy of Decazes quickly estranged all parties, and they only waited for an opportunity to get rid of him. On the 13th of February, 1820, the king's nephew, Charles Ferdinand, Duke of Berry, the only direct descendant of Louis XV from whom children could be expected, was stabbed at the opera, and the ultras dared to utter the lie that Decazes was the accomplice of Louvel the murderer. The royal family implored the monarch to dismiss his favourite, and Louis dismissed Decazes on February 21, 1820. Richelieu became first minister once more. Decazes went to London as ambassador, and received the title of duke. This compulsory change of ministers seemed to the king like his own abdication. Exceptional legislation against personal freedom was indeed necessary, but it increased the bitterness of the radicals, who were already furious at the menace of the Electoral Law of 1817. Matters came to bloodshed in Paris in June, 1820; the Right, however, carried the introduction of a new electoral law. The abandonment of France to the noisy emancipationists standing on the extreme Left was happily diverted. Richelieu administered the country in a strictly monarchical spirit, but never became the man of the ultra royalists of the Pavillon Marsan (p. 86).

(h) *Carlsbad*. — If Metternich looked toward Prussia, he saw the king in his element, and Hardenberg in continual strife with Wilhelm von Humboldt; if he turned his eyes to South Germany, he beheld a motley scene, which also gave him a hard problem to solve. In Bavaria the first diet led to such unpleasant scenes that the king contemplated the repeal of the Constitution. In Baden, where Rotteck and Baron Liebenstein were the leaders, a flood of proposals was poured out against the rule of the new grand duke, Louis I; the dispute became so bitter that Louis, on the 28th of July, 1819, prorogued the chambers. In Nassau and in Hesse-Darmstadt there was also much disorder in the diets.

The reaction saw all this with great pleasure. It experienced a regular triumph on March 23, 1819, by the bloody deed of the student Karl Ludwig Sand. It had become a rooted idea in the limited brain of this fanatic that the dramatist and Russian privy councillor, August von Kotzebue, was a Russian spy, the most dangerous enemy of German freedom and German academic life; he therefore stabbed him in Mannheim. While great and general sympathy was extended to Sand, the governments feared a conspiracy of the student associations where Sand had studied. Charles Augustus saw that men looked askance at him, and his steps for the preservation of academic liberty were unavailing.

Metternich possessed the power, and made full use of it, being sure of the assent of the majority of German governments, of Russia, and of Great Britain; even from France approval was showered upon him. Frederick William III, being completely ruled by Prince Wittgenstein and Kamptz, was more and more overwhelmed with fear of revolution, and wished to abolish everything which seemed open to suspicion. The universities, the fairest ornaments of Germany, were regarded by the rulers as hotbeds of revolutionary intrigues; they required to be freed from the danger. The authorities of Austria and Prussia thought this to be imperatively necessary, and during the season for the waters at Carlsbad they wished to agree upon the measures. Haste was urgent, as it seemed, for on July 1,

1819, Sand had already found an imitator. Karl Löning, an apothecary's apprentice, attempted to assassinate at Schwalbach Karl von Ibell, the president of the Nassau government, whom, in spite of his liberal and excellent administration, the crackbrained radicals loudly proclaimed to be a reactionary. The would-be assassin committed suicide after his attempt had failed. In Prussia steps were now taken to pay domiciliary visits, confiscate papers, and make arrests. Jahn was sent to a fortress, the papers of the bookseller Georg Andreas Reimer were put under seal, Schleiermacher's sermons were subject to police surveillance, the houses of Welcker and Arndt in Bonn were carefully searched and all writings carried off which the bailiffs chose to take. Protests were futile. Personal freedom had no longer any protection against the tyranny of the police. The secrecy of letters was constantly infringed, and the government issued falsified accounts of an intended revolution.

On July 29 Frederick William and Metternich met at Teplitz. Metternich strengthened the king's aversion to grant a general constitution, and agitated against Hardenberg's projected constitution. On August 1 the contract of Teplitz was agreed upon, which, though intended to be kept secret, was to form the basis of the Carlsbad conferences; a censorship was to be exercised over the press and the universities, and article 13 of the Act of Federation was to be explained in a corresponding sense. Metternich triumphed, for even Hardenberg seemed to submit to him.

Metternich returned with justifiable self-complacency to Carlsbad, where he found his selected body of diplomatists, and over the heads of the federal diet he discussed with the representatives of a quarter of the governments, from August 6 to 31, reactionary measures of the most sweeping character. Gentz, the secretary of the congress, drew up the minutes on which the resolutions of Carlsbad were mainly based. Metternich wished to grant to the federal diet a stronger influence on the legislation of the several States, and through it indirectly to guide the governments, unnoticed by the public. The interpretation of article 13 of the Act of Federation was deferred to ensuing conferences at Vienna, and an agreement was made first of all on four main points. A very stringent press law for five years was to be enforced in the case of all papers appearing daily or in numbers, and of pamphlets containing less than twenty pages of printed matter; and every federal State should be allowed to increase the stringency of the law at its own discretion. The universities were placed under the strict supervision of commissioners appointed by the sovereigns; dangerous professors were to be deprived of their office, all secret societies and the universal student associations were to be prohibited, and no member of them should hold a public post. It was enacted that a central commission, to which members were sent by Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau should assemble at Mayence to investigate the treasonable revolutionary societies which had been discovered, but, by the distinct declaration of Austria, such commission should have no judicial power. A preliminary executive order (to terminate after August, 1820) was intended to secure the carrying out the resolutions of the federation for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, and in given cases military force might be employed to effect it.

On the 1st of September the Carlsbad conferences ended, and the party of reaction sang their *Te Deum*. Austria appeared to be the all-powerful ruler of

Germany. "A new era is dawning," Metternich wrote to London. The federal diet accepted the Carlsbad resolutions with unusual haste on September 20, and they were proclaimed in all the federal States. Austria had stolen a march over the others, and the federal council expressed its most humble thanks to Francis therefor. All free-thinkers saw in the Carlsbad resolutions not merely a check on all freedom and independence, but also a disgrace; nevertheless the governments, in spite of the indignation of men like Stein, Rotteck, Niebuhr, Dahlmann, Ludwig Börne, and others, carried them out in all their harshness. The central commission of enquiry hunted through the federation in search of conspiracies, and, as its own reports acknowledge, found nothing of importance, but unscrupulously interfered with the life of the nation and the individual. Foreign countries did not check this policy, although many statesmen, Capodistrias at their head, disapproved of the reaction. The Students' Association was officially dissolved on the 26th of November, 1819, but was immediately reconstituted in secret.

There was no demagogism in Austria; Prussia was satisfied to comply with the wishes of the court of Vienna, and even Hardenberg was prepared for any step which Metternich prescribed. Every suspected person was regarded in Berlin as an imported conspirator. The edict of censorship of 1819, dating from the day of liberation, October 18, breathed the unholy spirit of Wöllner; foreign journals were strictly supervised. The reaction was nowhere more irreconcilable than in Prussia, where nothing recalled the saying of Frederick the Great, that every man might be happy after his own fashion. The gymnasia were as relentlessly persecuted as the intellectual exercises of university training; nothing could be more detestable than the way in which men like Arndt, Gneisenau, and Jahn were made to run the gauntlet, or a patriot like Justus Gruner was ill-treated on his very deathbed, or the residence of Görres in Germany rendered intolerable. This tendency obviously crippled the fulfilment of the royal promise of a constitution, — a promise in which Frederick William had never been serious. Hardenberg and Humboldt were perpetually quarrelling: Humboldt attacked the exaggerated power of the chancellor, who was not competent for his post; Hardenberg laid a new plan of a constitution before the king on August 11, 1819. The king, in this dispute, took the side of Hardenberg, and the dismissal of Boyen and Grolman was followed on December 31, 1819, by that of Humboldt and Count Beyme. Metternich rejoiced; Humboldt, the "thoroughly bad man," was put on one side, and thenceforth lived for science. Hardenberg's position was once more strengthened; his chief object was to carry the revenue and finance laws. On January 17, 1820, the ordinance as to the condition of the national debt was issued, from which the liberals received the comforting assurance that the crown would not be able to raise new loans except under the joint guarantee of the proposed assembly of the estates, and that the trustees of the debt would furnish the assembly with an annual statement of accounts. Shipping companies and banks were remodelled; the capital account was to be published every three years. Hardenberg then brought his revenue laws to the front, and in spite of many difficulties these laws, which, though admittedly imperfect, still demanded attention, were passed on May 20, 1820.

In accordance with the agreement made in Carlsbad, the representatives of the inner federal assembly met in Vienna, and deliberated from November 25, 1819, to May 24, 1820, over the head of the federal diet; the result, the final act of

Vienna of May 15, 1820, obtained the same validity as the federal act of 1815. In the plenary assembly of June 8, 1820, the federal diet promoted it to be a fundamental law of the federation. Particularism and reaction had scored a success, and the efficiency of the federal diet was once more crippled. But in spite of all efforts the national wish for a constitution could not be repressed nor the life in the representative assemblies of the several States destroyed; many articles of the act of federation remained unexecuted in Vienna. The nation was universally disappointed by the new fundamental law, which realised not one of its expectations; but Metternich basked in the rays of success, and found such homage paid him that the disapproval of Count Capodistrias and other liberalising Russian statesmen did not trouble him much.

The question of free intercourse between the federal States had also been discussed in Vienna, and turned men's looks to Prussia's efforts toward a customs union. The Customs Act of May 26, 1818, was unmercifully attacked; it was threatened with repeal at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, but it weathered the storm and found protection from Johann Friedrich Eichhorn. In the field of material interests Eichhorn had a free hand; he was a hero of unobtrusive work, who with indefatigable patience went toward his goal,—the union of the German States to Prussia by the bond of their own interests. In 1819 he invited the Thuringian States, which formed enclaves in Prussia, to a tariff union, and on the 25th of October in that year the first treaty for accession to the tariff union was signed with Schwarzburg-Sondershausen; since this was extremely advantageous to the petty State, it served as a model to all further treaties with Prussian enclaves. But now the most intense ill-feeling against the arrogance of Prussia was aroused on all sides, and it was popularly said that the Prussian tariff law must be abandoned, and that the federation alone could establish the commercial union of Germany. A similar tone prevailed at the conferences of Vienna. Anhalt-Köthen and Saxe-Coburg made a great outcry; their sovereignty seemed threatened. Other States also offered opposition, and the northern States in the federation showed themselves still more anti-Prussian, more friendly to Austria, and more tenacious of the old order than the South of Germany.

The German Commercial and Industrial Association of the traders of Central and Southern Germany was founded in Frankfurt during the April Fair of 1819, under the presidency of Professor Friedrich List of Tübingen. The memorial of the association, drawn up by List and presented to the diet, pictured as its ultimate aim the universal freedom of commercial intercourse between every nation; it called for the abolition of the inland tolls and existing federal tolls on foreign trade, but was rejected. List now attacked the several governments, scourged in his journal the faults of German commercial policy, was an opponent of the Prussian Customs Act, and always recurred to federal tolls.

Far clearer were the economic views of the Baden statesman Karl Friedrich Nebenius (p. 107), whose pamphlet was laid before the Vienna conferences. He too attacked the Prussian Customs Act, but his pamphlet, in spite of all its merits, had no influence on the development of the tariff union. Johann Friedrich Benzenberg alone of the well-known journalists of the day spoke for Prussia. Indeed the hostility to Prussia gave rise to the abortive separate federation of Southern and Central Germany, formed at Darmstadt in 1820. Such plans were foredoomed to failure. All rival tariff unions failed in the same way. Prussia alone was able

to reach the goal, though only after a hard struggle and much expenditure of diplomacy. Friedrich Christian Adolf von Motz, Eichhorn, and Karl Georg Maassen finally carried the German Customs Union (cf. below, p. 163), and thus prepared the ladder by which Prussia has in course of time mounted to the headship of Germany and the imperial crown.

(i) *The Disorders in Spain and Portugal.* — The disturbed condition of the Iberian Peninsula gave the leaders of the reaction a new justification for their policy and a new opportunity of applying it. Ferdinand VII, the king so intensely desired by the Spaniards, had soon shown himself a mean despot, whose whole government was marked by depravity and faithlessness, by falsehood and distrust. He abolished in May, 1814, the Constitution of 1812, which was steeped in the spirit of the French constituent assembly, dismissed the cortes, and with a despicable party (*camarilla*) of favourites and courtiers persecuted all liberals and all adherents of Joseph Napoleon (*Josefinos*, *Afrancesados*); he restored all the monasteries, brought back the Inquisition and the Jesuits, and scared Spain once more into the deep darkness of the Middle Ages; he destroyed all benefits of government and the administration of justice, filled the prisons with innocent men, and revelled with guilty associates. Trade and commerce were at a standstill, and in spite of all the pressure of taxation the treasury remained empty. The ministries and high officials continually changed according to the caprice of the sovereign, and there was no pretence at pursuing a systematic policy. Such evils led to the rebellions of discontented and ambitious generals such as Xaverio Mina, who paid the penalty of failure on the scaffold or at the gallows. Even the loyalty of the South American colonies wavered; they were evidently contemplating defection from the mother country, in spite of all counter measures (cf. Vol. I, p. 497); and the rising world power of the United States of North America was greatly strengthened. By the influence of the powers, particularly of Russia, Ferdinand was rudely awakened from the indolence into which he had fallen. Better days seemed to be dawning for Spain; but the reforming mood soon passed away.

Regiments intended to be employed against the rising in South America had been assembled at Cadiz, but at this centre a conspiracy against the government in Madrid broke out (cf. Vol. I, p. 500, and Vol. IV, p. 556). On New Year's day, 1820, the colonel of the regiment of Asturia, Rafael del Riego y Nuñez, proclaimed in Las Cabezas de San Juan on the Isla de Leon the Constitution of 1812, arrested at Arcos the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force together with his staff, drove out the magistrates, and joined Colonel Antonio Quiroga, who now was at the head of the undertaking. The attempt to capture Cadiz failed; Riego's march through Andalusia turned out disastrously, and he was forced on March 11 to disband his followers at Bienvenida. Quiroga also achieved nothing. But the cry for the Constitution of 1812 found a responsive echo even in Madrid. Galicia, Asturia, Cantabria, and Aragon revolted. The royal government completely lost heart, since it had too evil a conscience. The king, always a coward, capitulated with undignified alacrity, declared himself ready to gratify "the universal wish of the people," and on March 9 took a provisional oath of adherence to the Constitution of 1812.

The whole kingdom was at the mercy of the unruly and triumphant Left. It was headed by Quiroga and Riego, and the government was obliged to confer upon

both these mutineers the rank of field-marshal. Quiroga was the more moderate of the two, and as vice-president of the cortes, which met on July 9, endeavoured to organise a middle party. Riego preferred the favour of the mob; at Madrid he received a wild ovation (August 30 to September 6), and a hymn composed in his honour and called by his name was in everybody's mouth. Although his arrogance produced a temporary reaction, the party which he led was in the end triumphant. As captain-general of Galicia and Aragon, Riego became master of the situation, and the court was exposed to fresh humiliations. The spirit of discontent had also seized Portugal, where the reorganiser of the army, Field-marshal Lord Beresford, conducted the government for King John (João) VI, who was absent in Brazil (cf. Vol. IV, p. 556). A national conspiracy against the British was quickly suppressed in 1817; but the feeling of indignation smouldered, and when Beresford himself went to Rio Janeiro for commands, secret societies employed his absence to stir up fresh sedition. The rebellion broke out on August 24, 1820, under Colonel Sepulveda and Count Silveira in Oporto, and Lisbon followed suit on September 15. The juntas instituted in both places amalgamated into one provisional government on October 1, and when Beresford returned on October 10 he was not allowed to land. The cortes of 1821 drew up on March 9 the preliminary sketch of a constitution which limited the power of the crown, as it had been already limited in Spain. All the authorities swore to it; Count Pedro Palmella, the foremost statesman of the kingdom, advised John VI to do the same. John appeared in Lisbon, left his eldest son Dom Pedro behind as regent in Brazil, and swore to the principles of the constitution on July 3, 1821.

(k) *The Disorders in Italy.* — In Italy there was a strong movement on foot in favour of republicanism and union. But few placed their hopes on Piedmont itself, for King Victor Emmanuel I was a bigoted, narrow-minded ruler, who sanctioned the most foolish retrogressive policy, and, like William I at Cassel, declared everything that had occurred since 1798 to be simply null and void. There was no prospect of freedom and a constitution while he continued to reign. His prospective successor Charles Felix was as little of a liberal as himself. The nobility and the clergy alone felt themselves happy. The hopes of better days could only be associated with the head of the indirect line of Carignan, Charles Albert, who in Piedmont and Sardinia played the rôle of the Duke of Orleans in France, and represented the future of Italy for many patriots even beyond the frontiers of Piedmont. In Modena Duke Francis IV of the Austrian house did away with the institutions of the revolutionary period and brought back the old régime. The Society of Jesus stood at the helm. Modena, on account of the universal discontent, became a hotbed of secret societies. In the papal States the position was the same as in Modena; it was hardly better in Lucca, or in Parma, where Napoleon's wife, the empress Marie Louise, held sway. In Tuscany the Grand Duke Ferdinand III reigned without any spirit of revenge or bitterness; he was an enemy of the reaction, although often disadvantageously influenced from Vienna. The peace and security which his rule assured to Tuscany promoted the growth of intellectual and material culture. His was the best administered State in the whole of Italy; and when he died, in 1824, his place was taken by his son Leopold II, who continued to govern on the same lines and with the same happy results.

Pius VII and his great secretary of state, Cardinal Consalvi, had indeed the best intentions when the States of the Church were revived; but the upas-tree of the hierarchy blighted all prosperity. Not a vestige remained of the modern civilized lay State, especially after Consalvi was removed and Leo XII (1823-1829) assumed the reins of government. Secret societies and conspiracies budded, and brigandage took a fresh lease of life. The secret society of the Carbonari (Carboneria), having become too large for Neapolitan soil (1808), maintained relations with the Freemasons, who had influence in the Italian disputes, and with Queen Mary Caroline of Naples, who turned it to account against Joachim Murat. But soon the ties between the "Sect" and the Bourbons were loosened; the former joined Joachim, through whom it hoped to secure the unification and independence of Italy. The Bourbons, on the contrary, favoured the rival society of the Calderari, the reactionary associates of the court. The government vainly tried to suppress the Carbonari, who, though degraded by the admission of the most notorious criminals into their ranks, had gained a hold on every stratum of society.

The misgovernment of Naples and Sicily gave a plausible excuse for revolutionary agitation. King Ferdinand IV, a phlegmatic old man, full of cunning and treachery, licentiousness and cruelty, had not fulfilled one of the promises which he had given on his return to the throne, but had on the contrary secretly promised the court of Vienna that he would not grant his country a constitution until Austria set him the example. On the 11th of December, 1816, he united his States into the "Kingdom of the Two Sicilies," and assumed the title of Ferdinand I; and, although he left in existence many useful reforms which had been introduced during the French period, he bitterly disappointed his Sicilian subjects by abolishing the constitution which Lord Bentinck had given them in 1812. The police and the judicial system were deplorably bad; the minister of police was the worst robber of all, and the head of the Calderari. The army was neglected. Secret societies and bands of robbers vied with each other in harassing the country, and the government was powerless against them. The newly revived citizen militia was immediately infected by the Carbonari, which tempted it with the charm of a "constitution."

Guglielmo Pepe, an ambitious general but fickle character, became the soul of the Carbonari in the Sicilian army, and gave them a considerable degree of military efficiency. He contemplated in 1819 the arrest of the king, the emperor and empress of Austria, and Metternich, at a review. The plan was not executed, but the spell of the Spanish insurrection and the new constitution ensnared him and his partisans. On July 2, 1820, two sub-lieutenants raised the standard of revolt at Nola, and talked foolishly about the Spanish constitution, which was totally unknown to them. On the 3d this was proclaimed in Avellino. Pepe assumed the lead of the movement, which spread far and wide, and marched upon Naples. The ministry changed. Ferdinand placed the government temporarily in the hands of his son Francis, who was detested as the head of the Calderari, and the latter accepted the Spanish constitution on July 7, a policy which Ferdinand confirmed. On the 9th Pepe entered Naples in triumph, with soldiers and militia; and Ferdinand, the tears in his eyes, took an oath to the constitution on the 13th, in the palace chapel. The Bourbons began to wear the colours of the Carbonari. Pepe, as commander-in-chief and captain-general of the kingdom, was now supreme; but Ferdinand hastened to assure the indignant Metternich that all his

oaths and promises had been taken under compulsion and were not seriously meant.

Sicily no longer wished to be treated as a dependency of Naples, and claimed to receive back the Constitution of 1812. Messina revolted, and Palermo followed the example on the 14th of July; on the 18th there was fighting in the streets of Palermo. The governor, Naselli, fled, and the mob ruled; but on the 18th of July a provisional government was installed. The independent action of Sicily aroused great discontent in Naples. General Florestan Pepe, the elder brother of the captain-general, was despatched to Sicily with an army, and he soon made himself master of the island. But the crown repudiated the treaty concluded by him with the rebels on October 5, sacrificed Pepe to the clamour of the Neapolitan parliament, and the gulf between the two parts of the kingdom became wider. Metternich had been unmoved by the tidings of the Spanish agitation, but he was only the more enraged when he heard what had occurred in the Two Sicilies. He put all blame on the secret societies, and praised the good intentions of Ferdinand's "paternal" government.

(l) *Troppau and Laibach.*—The insurrection in Spain had made such an impression on Alexander that in a circular of May 2, 1820, he invoked the spirit of the Holy Alliance, and emphasised the danger of illegal constitutions. Metternich strengthened the Austrian forces in upper Italy, and stated, in a circular to the Italian courts, that Austria, by the treaties of 1815, was the appointed guardian of the peace of Italy, and wished for an immediate armed interference in the affairs of Naples; but he encountered strong opposition in Paris and in St. Petersburg. Alexander, whom Metternich actually suspected of Carbonarism, advised a conference of sovereigns and ministers; the conference met on the 20th of October, 1820, at Troppau. Alexander brought with him Capodistrias, an enemy of Metternich; Francis I brought Metternich and Gentz; Frederick William III was accompanied by Hardenberg and Count Günther von Bernstorff; the Count de la Ferronays appeared on behalf of Louis XVIII; and Lord Stewart represented the faint-hearted policy of his brother Castlereagh, which was condemned by the British nation. It was Metternich's primary object that the congress should approve the march of an Austrian army into Naples, and he induced the congress to invite Ferdinand to Troppau. Alexander always clung closer to the wisdom of Metternich, and the latter skilfully used the report of a mutiny among the Semenoff guards as an argument to overcome the liberalism of the Czar. Alexander saw before his own eyes how the Spanish and Italian military revolts excited imitation in the Russian army. Frederick William was equally conciliatory to Metternich, and was more averse than ever to granting a constitution on the model of Hardenberg's schemes. In the protocol of November 19, Austria, Prussia, and Russia came to an agreement, behind the back of the two Western powers, as to the position which they would adopt toward revolutions, and as to the maintenance of social order; but France and Great Britain rejected the idea of changing the principles of international law. Ferdinand took fresh oaths to his people and set out for Troppau.

After Christmas the congress closed at Troppau, but was continued in January, 1821, at Laibach. Most of the Italian governments were represented. Metternich again took over the presidency. Ferdinand was at once ready to break his word,

and declared that his concessions were extorted from him. The king of France at first hesitated. A miracle seemed to have been performed on behalf of the French Bourbons: the widow of Berry gave birth on the 29th of September, 1820, to a son, the Duke Henry of Bordeaux, who usually appeared later under the name of Count of Chambord. The legitimists shouted for joy, talked of the miraculous child, the child of Europe, of Astyanax, who would console his mother for the death of Hector, "the stem of Jesse when nearly withered had put forth a fresh branch." The child was baptised with water which Chateaubriand had drawn from the Jordan. The Spanish Bourbons looked askance at the birth; they were already speculating on the future succession to the throne, and the Duke of Orleans secretly suggested in the English press suspicions of the legitimacy of the child. Louis successively repressed several military revolts, but had constantly to struggle with the claims of the ultras, who embittered his reign. Although in his heart opposed to it, he nevertheless assented at Laibach to the programme of the Eastern powers.

Austria sent an army under General Johann Maria Baron Frimont over the Po, and upheld the fundamental idea of a constitution for the Two Sicilies. Ferdinand agreed to everything which Metternich arranged. France did not, indeed, at first consent to that armed interference with Spain which Alexander and Metternich required. On February 26, 1821, the deliberations of the congress terminated. The Neapolitan parliament, it is true, defied the threats of the Eastern powers, and declared that Ferdinand was their prisoner, and that therefore his resolutions were not voluntary. But their preparations for resistance were so defective that the Austrians had an easy task. The Neapolitan army broke up after the defeat of Guglielmo Pepe at Rieti (March 7, 1821), and on March 24 Frimont's army marched into Naples with sprigs of olive in their helmets. Pepe fled to Spain. In Naples the reaction perpetrated such excesses that the powers intervened; the victims were countless, while the Austrians maintained order.

In Piedmont the revolution broke out on the 10th of March, 1821; Charles Albert of Carignan did not keep aloof from it. The tricolor flag (red, white, and green) of the kingdom of Italy was hoisted in Alessandria, and a provisional junta on the Spanish model was assembled. Turin proclaimed the parliamentary constitution on the 11th of March, and the Carbonari seized the power. Victor Emmanuel I abdicated on March 13 in favour of his brother Charles Felix. Charles Albert, a vacillating and untrustworthy ruler, who was regent until the latter's arrival, accepted, contrary to his inward conviction, the new constitution, and swore to it on March 15. Charles Felix, however, considered every administrative measure null and void which had not emanated from himself. Charles Albert was panic-stricken, resigned the regency, and left the country. Alexander and Metternich agreed that there was need of armed intervention in Piedmont. Austria feared also the corruption of her Italian provinces, and kept a careful watch upon those friends of freedom who had not yet been arrested. At Novara, on April 8, the imperialists, under Marshal Bubna, won a victory over the Piedmontese insurgents, which was no less decisive than that of Rieti had been in Naples. Piedmont was occupied by the imperial army; the junta resigned, and Victor Emmanuel renewed his abdication on April 19 at Nice. Charles Felix then first assumed the royal title and decreed a criminal enquiry. On the 18th of October he made his entry into Turin amid the mad rejoicings of the infatuated mob, suppressed every

sort of political party, and ruled in deathlike quiet, being supported by the bayonets of Austria and by the dominion of the Jesuits in Church, school, and State. The Austrians did not leave his country until 1823. On May 12, 1821, a proclamation issued from Laibach by the Eastern powers announced to the world that they had rescued Europe from the intended general revolution, and that their weapons alone served to uphold the cause of right and justice.

Metternich, promoted by the emperor to the office of chancellor of state, stood at the zenith of his success, when on the 5th of May, 1821, Napoleon I, the man who had contested his importance and had ruled the world far more than Metternich, died at St. Helena. The black and yellow flag waved from Milan to Palermo; princes and peoples bowed before it. Legitimacy had curbed the revolutionary craving, and Italy was further from unification than ever. The apostles of freedom and unity, men like Silvio Pellico, disappeared in the dungeons of the Spielberg and other fortresses in Austria. Russia was now on the most friendly terms with Austria, and the result was soon seen when the monarchs and ministers still at Laibach received tidings of disorders in the Danubian principalities and in Greece.

(m) *The Beginnings of the Greek Insurrection.* — While Turkey was mouldering to ruin, the spirit of the French Revolution had been felt in Greece; and the aspirations of the Greeks, both those of a spiritual and those of a material character, had mounted high. When Napoleon's empire fell, the Greeks discovered that nothing was being done for them by Europe, and that they must act for themselves. A few individuals founded at Odessa, in the year 1814, the secret society of the Hetaeria Philike. The Hetaeria aimed at complete separation from Turkey and the revival of the old Greek empire in Constantinople. It failed to win Russian aid and could not reckon on Servian co-operation; on the other hand, it spread in Greece, in the islands of the Ionian and Ægean seas, in Rumelia, Thessaly, and South Russia, and shifted its centre in 1818 to Constantinople.

The Hetaeria hoped that Russia would now pronounce in its favour, especially since Count Capodistrias (Kapo d'Istrias), the favourite of the Czar, was a Corfiote. Capodistrias, it is true, declined the leadership of the movement in 1820, but he braved the certain disapproval of Alexander so far as to approve the idea that his friend the Fanariot, Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, a general in the Russian army, should be nominated "ephor-general of the Hetaeria." This enthusiast, round whose name romance has thrown a halo, was devoid of any gift for administration and politics, and was insignificant as a commander. It was an act of folly at the outset that he struck the first blow in Moldavia and not in the Morea, where the soil was to some degree prepared. The moment seemed to him favourable, since Sultan Mahmud II was at war with Ali Pasha of Janina, whose power had grown till it embraced almost the whole south of the Balkan Peninsula. Nor were the revolutions in Spain, Portugal, and Italy without their influence. On the 7th of March, 1821, Ypsilanti marched into Jassy, and, hinting at the help of Russia, roused the Hellenes to a war of liberation. Disorders and excesses followed him everywhere, even when he entered Bucharest, on April 9. But the Czar at Laibach, guided by Metternich, openly declared against Ypsilanti. The Hetaeria seemed to them both another form of Carbonarism, and they thought that Europe ought to be protected from such revolutionists. Ypsilanti was publicly

repudiated and excommunicated by the patriarch of Constantinople. Turkish armies advanced victoriously into Moldavia and Wallachia, and Ypsilanti, after his defeat at Dragachani (June 19), was forced to cross into Austrian territory with his brothers; he died in Vienna, on the 31st of January, 1828, having only been released from prison in the previous year. Isolated Greek bands continued to fight in the Danubian principalities. But in spite of all heroic courage the rebellion ended on the 20th of September, 1821, with a defeat at the monastery of Sekko, and the Turks wreaked a merciless vengeance.

The Morea was already in full revolt against the Turks. On the 4th of April, 1821, the insurgents took Kalamate, the capital of Messenia, and Patras raised the flag of the cross. The fire of revolt spread on every side, and raged destructively among the Moslems. The insurrection was led by the national hero, Theodore Kolokotroni, a bold adventurer and able general, though his followers often did not obey their head, and the fleet of the islands did excellent service. The successes of the Greeks aroused boundless fury in Constantinople. Intense religious hatred was kindled in the Divan, and at the feast of Easter (April 22) the patriarch Gregory of Constantinople and three metropolitans were hanged to the doors of their churches. In Constantinople and Asia Minor, in the Morea, and on the islands Islam wreaked its fury on the Christians.

The Russian people had felt ever since the beginning of the Hellenic war of independence the warmest sympathy for their oppressed brethren, and after the horrors of the 22d of April the government could no longer resist the exasperation felt against the Turks; a storm of indignation swept through the civilized world. The Russian ambassador, Baron Stroganoff, a Philhellene, spoke vigorously for the Christians, and suspended relations with the Porte in June; Juliane von Krüdener in her devotions designated the "angel of light," Alexander, as God's chosen instrument for the liberation of Greece and for the defeat of the Crescent; and Capodistrias announced to the world, in his note of June 28, an ultimatum to Turkey that the Turks were no longer entitled to remain in Europe. A mood very displeasing to Metternich had come over the fickle Czar; the cabinets of Vienna and St. James saw with astonishment that Stroganoff left Constantinople in August. Metternich once more laid stress on the fact that the triumph of the Greek revolution was a defeat of the crown, while Capodistrias was for the support of the Greeks and for war against Turkey. The Porte, well aware of the discord of the European cabinets, showed little willingness to give way and agree to their demands.

Kolokotroni had invested the Arcadian fortress of Tripolitza since the end of April, 1821. All Turkish attempts to relieve the garrison proved futile, while the militia had been drilled into efficient soldiers, and on October 5, 1821, Tripolitza fell. The Greeks perpetrated gross barbarities. Prince Alexander's brother, Prince Demetrius Ypsilanti, who also had hitherto served in Russia, had been *archistrategos* since June of that year; but he possessed little reputation and could not prevent outrages. The continued quarrels and jealousy between the leaders of the soldiers and of the civilians crippled the power of the insurgents. Prince Alexander Mavrogordato, a man of far-reaching imagination, undertook, together with Theodore Negri, the task of giving Hellas a fixed political system. In November, 1821, Western and Eastern Hellas, and in December the Morea, received constitutions. The national assembly summoned by Demetrius Ypsilanti

to Argos was transferred to Piadha, near the old Epidaurus, and proclaimed on January 13, 1822, the independence of the Hellenic nation and a provisional constitution, which prepared the ground for a monarchy. While it broke with the Heteria, it appointed Mavrogordato as *proedros* (president) of the executive council to be at the head of affairs, and in an edict of January 27 it justified the Greek insurrection in the eyes of Europe. Corinth became the seat of government. But the old discord, selfishness, and pride of the several leaders precluded any prospect of a favourable issue to the insurrection. Kurshid Pasha, after cunningly getting rid of Ali Pasha of Janina, who was hostile to the Sultan, in February, 1822, subjugated the Suliotes. As a result of the objectless instigation of Chios to revolt, a fleet landed in April under Kara Ali, and the island was barbarously chastised. Indignation at the Turkish misrule once more filled the European nations, and they hailed with joy the annihilation of Kara Ali's fleet by Andreas Voko Miaouli and Konstantin Kanari (June 19). In July a large Turkish army under Mahmud Dramali overran Greece from Phocis to Attica and Argos. The Greek government fled from Corinth. In spite of all the courage of Mavrogordato and General Count Normann-Ehrenfels, famous for the attack on Kitzen (June 17, 1813), Suli was lost, owing to the defeat at Peta (July 16-17), and Western Hellas was again threatened. About the same time Alexander again fell into the toils of Metternich, and Capodistrias, the enemy of Austrian influence, was dismissed in July, 1822; any independent action of Russia against Turkey was thus prevented. The Czar, whose loathing of revolutions grew more intense, was once more closely allied with Francis I, and the Holy Alliance was nearly consolidated.

(n) *Verona*. — In Spain the liberals made shameless misuse of their victory, and limited the power of the king to such a degree that he naturally tried to effect a change. His past was a guarantee that Ferdinand VII would not be at a loss for the means to his end. He courted the intervention of the continent; but Louis XVIII and Richelieu preferred neutrality. The ultra royalists, however, became more and more arrogant in France. The Pavillon Marsan (p. 86) expelled Richelieu in December, 1821, and brought in the ministry of Villèle; the reaction felt itself fully victorious, and the clergy raised their demands. The Carboneria was introduced from Italy, and secret societies were formed. New conspiracies of republican or Napoleonic tendency followed, and led to executions. The power of the ultras became gradually stronger in the struggle; party feeling increased, and even Count Villèle was not royalist enough for the ultras. Ferdinand VII, on the contrary, favoured the radicals, in order to employ them against the liberals. Riego became president of the cortes of 1822. A *coup de main* of the Guards to recover for Ferdinand the absolute power failed in July, 1822, and Ferdinand basely surrendered those who had sacrificed themselves for him. In the north guerilla bands spread in every direction on his behalf; in Seo de Urgel a regency for him was established on August 15, and an alliance entered into with France.

At the preliminary deliberations for the congress intended to be held at Verona, Metternich reckoned upon his "second self," on Castlereagh, now the Marquis of Londonderry. The latter died by his own hand on August 12, 1822, an event which provoked mad rejoicings among English liberals. His great successor in the

foreign office, George Canning, "a tory from inward conviction, a modern statesman from national necessity," broke with the absolutist-reactionary principles of the Holy Alliance, and entered the path of a national independent policy, thus dealing a heavy blow at Metternich and Austria. Metternich and Alexander stood the more closely side by side.

The congress of sovereigns and ministers at Verona was certainly the most brilliant since that of Vienna. In October, 1822, came Alexander, Francis, and Frederick William; most of the Italian rulers, Metternich, Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, Bernstorff, and Hardenberg; France was represented by Chateaubriand, the Duke of Laval-Montmorency, Count La Ferronays, and the Marquis of Caraman; Great Britain by Wellington and Viscount Strangford. Entertainments were on as magnificent a scale as at Vienna. Metternich wished to annul the Spanish and Portuguese revolution, and with it the extorted constitution; the Eastern powers and France united for the eventuality of further hostile or revolutionary steps being taken by Spain; Great Britain excluded itself from their agreements, while Chateaubriand's romanticism intoxicated the Czar. When the Greeks at the congress sought help against the Turks, they were coldly refused. On the other hand, an understanding was arrived at about the gradual evacuation of Piedmont by the Austrians; the army of occupation in the Two Sicilies was reduced; and good advice of every sort was given to the Italian princes. The Eastern powers and France saw with indignation that Great Britain intended to recognise the separation of the South American colonies from Spain, and their independence, according to the example given by the United States of North America in March, 1822. The congress of Verona ended toward the middle of December.

(o) *The Armed Intervention of France in Spain; the Separation of Portugal from Brazil; the End of Louis XVIII.* — The Viscount of Chateaubriand, now minister of foreign affairs, urged a rupture with Spain, at which Louis and Villèle still hesitated. The threatening notes of the powers at the Verona congress roused a storm of passion in Madrid, while the diplomatists in Verona had set themselves the question whether nations might put kings on their trial, as Dante does in his Divine Comedy, and whether the tragedy of Louis XVI should be repeated with another background in the case of Ferdinand VII. The Spanish nation revolted against the arrogance of foreign interference. The rupture was made; the ambassadors of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France left Spain in January, 1823. The adventurous George Bessières ventured on an expedition to Madrid; but the Spanish hope of British help against France, which was intended to carry out the armed interference, was not fulfilled.

Louis XVIII placed his nephew, Duke Louis of Angoulême, at the head of an army of one hundred thousand men, which was to free Ferdinand from the power of the liberals and put him once again in possession of despotic power. In the chamber at Paris the liberals, indeed, loudly decried the war, and trembled at the suppression of the Spanish revolution, although Canning openly desired the victory of the Spanish people. Ferdinand and the cortes went to Seville. Angoulême crossed the frontier stream, the Bidassoa, on April 7, and found no traces of a popular rising; nevertheless he advanced, without any opposition, and was hailed as a saviour, and entered Madrid on May 24. He appointed a temporary regency, and in order not to hurt the national pride, avoided any interference in internal affairs, although

the reactionary zeal of the regency caused him much uneasiness, and only retained the supreme military command. But the cortes in Seville relieved the king of the conduct of affairs and carried him off to Cadiz. Victory followed the French flag. The Spaniards lost heart, and were defeated or capitulated. Angoulême made forced marches to Cadiz, and on the night of August 31 stormed Fort Trocadero, which was considered impregnable. An expedition of Riego to the Isla de Leon ended in his flight and arrest, and on September 28 the cortes, in consequence of the bombardment of Cadiz, abandoned their resistance.

Ferdinand VII voluntarily promised a complete amnesty and made extensive professions. He was accorded a State reception by Angoulême on October 1, and was proclaimed as absolute monarch by a large party among the Spaniards. But hardly was he free before the perjurer began the wildest reaction. Many members of the cortes and the regency fled to England to escape the gallows, and Ferdinand exclaimed, "The wretches do well to fly from their fate!" The powers of Europe viewed his action with horror. Angoulême, whose warnings had been scattered to the winds, left Madrid in disgust on the 4th of November. Riego was hanged in Madrid on November 7, 1823; on the 13th Ferdinand returned triumphant, only to reign as detestably as before. Talleyrand called the war of intervention the beginning of the end; the result of it was that Spain floundered further into the mire. The ultras tormented the country and Ferdinand himself to such a degree that he began to weary of them. The colonies in South America were irretrievably lost (cf. Vol. I, p. 512); all the subtleties of the congress at Verona and of Chateaubriand could not change that fact. At Canning's proposal the British government, on January 1, 1825, recognised the independence of the new republics of Buenos Ayres, Colombia, and Mexico. This was a fresh victory over the principle of legitimacy which had been always emphasised by Austria, Spain, and France, as well as by Russia and Prussia.

The Spanish insurrection naturally affected the neighbouring country of Portugal. The September Constitution of 1820, far from improving matters there had actually introduced new difficulties. Constitutionalists and absolutists were quarrelling violently with each other. Dom Pedro, son of John VI, who had been appointed regent in Brazil, saw himself compelled by a national party, which wished to make Brazil an independent empire, to send away the Portuguese troops. He assumed in May, 1822, the title of a permanent protector of Brazil, and convened a national assembly at Rio de Janeiro, which on August 1 and on September 7 announced the independence of Brazil, and proclaimed him, on October 12, 1822, emperor of Brazil, under the title of Dom Pedro I (cf. Vol. I, p. 525). The Portuguese were furious, but were never able to reconquer Brazil.

Queen Charlotte, wife of John and sister of Ferdinand VII, a proud and artful woman, refused to take the oath to the Portuguese constitution, to which John swore, and, being banished, conspired with her younger son, Dom Miguel, the clergy, and many nobles, to restore the absolute monarchy. The counter revolution of Manoël de Silveira Pinto da Fonseca, Count of Amarante, in February, 1823, failed, it is true, but Dom Miguel put himself at its head, and Lisbon joined his cause. The weak John sanctioned this, and cursed the constitution; the cortes were dissolved. John promised a new constitution, and triumphantly entered Lisbon with his son on June 5. Portugal was brought back to absolutism. John was a mere cipher; but Miguel and Charlotte ruled, and did not shrink even from

the murder of opponents. Miguel headed a new revolt against his father on April 30, 1824, in order to depose him. But John made his escape on May 9 to a British man-of-war. The diplomatic body took his side, and at the same time the pressure brought to bear by the British government compelled Miguel to throw himself at his father's feet and to leave Portugal on May 13. An amnesty was proclaimed. The return of the old cortes which had sat before 1822 was promised, and by British mediation the treaty of Rio was signed on August 29, 1825, in which the independence and self-government of Brazil were recognised. On the 26th of April, 1826, Portugal received a liberal constitution by the instrumentality of Dom Pedro I of Brazil, who after his father's death (March 10, 1826) reigned for a short period over his native country as Pedro IV. Then (May 2) Pedro renounced the crown of Portugal in favour of his daughter, Dona Maria II da Gloria. On June 25, 1828, Dom Miguel proclaimed himself king, favoured by the British tory cabinet of Wellington and Aberdeen. His niece, Maria da Gloria, was forced to return to her father in Brazil.

The victory of Trocadero, which was audaciously compared by the French ultras to Marengo and Austerlitz, was of extraordinary advantage to the government of Louis XVIII. "It was not merely under Napoleon that victories were won; the restored Bourbons know this secret;" and the "hero of Trocadero" was hailed as their "champion" by the king on December 2, 1823. The elections to the chambers of 1824 were favourable to them; and a law of June in the same year prolonged the existence of the second chamber to seven years, which might seem some check on change and innovation. Villèle stood firm at the helm, overthrew Chateaubriand, and guided Baron Damas, his successor at the foreign office. But Chateaubriand revenged himself by the most bitter attacks in the press. Louis thereupon, at the advice of Villèle, revived the censorship on political journals and newspapers (August 16, 1824). The much-trying man was nearing his end. He warned his brother to uphold the charter loyally, the best inheritance which he bequeathed; if he did so, he too would die in the palace of his ancestors. Louis XVIII died on the 16th of September, 1824. France hailed Monsieur as Charles X, with the old cry, "*Le roi est mort, vive le roi.*" But Talleyrand had forebodings that the kingdom of Charles would soon decay; and, with his usual coarseness of sentiment, he said over the corpse of Louis, "I smell corruption here!"

C. EUROPEAN CONVULSIONS (FROM 1823 TO THE JULY REVOLUTION, 1830)

(a) *The Progress of the Reaction in Germany.* — While in Germany the cry for constitutional government re-echoed everywhere, and the struggle of the Greeks for their liberty led to the founding of Philhellenic societies, which were enraptured by the Greek songs of Wilhelm Müller of Dessau, the reaction, zealously fostered in Berlin and Vienna, celebrated its triumphs. Hardenberg's influence over Frederick William III had been extinguished by Metternich, and the chancellor of state was politically dead, even before he closed his eyes, on November 26, 1822. The king saw the Carboneria already entering Prussia, put aside Hardenberg's project for a general assembly, and found fault with him when reminded that he had pledged his royal word. A new constitution commission under the presidency of the crown prince Frederick William (IV), who was steeped in romanticism, consisted entirely of Hardenberg's opponents, and would

only be content with charters for the several provinces. The king consented to them. After Hardenberg's death the king could not consent to summon Wilhelm von Humboldt, but abolished the presidency in the cabinet; and there were thenceforward only departmental ministers, who went their own ways. The king contented himself with the law of June 5, 1823, as to the regulation of provincial estates. Bureaucracy and feudalism celebrated a joint victory in this respect. Austria could be contented with Prussia's aversion to constitutional forms, and, supported by it, guided the federal diet, in which Wurtemberg, owing to the frankness and independence of its representative, Karl August Freiherr von Wangenheim, now and again broke from the trodden path. Wangenheim suggested the plan of confronting the great German powers with a league "of pure and constitutional Germany," under the leadership of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and by this expedient proposed to create a triple alliance (Trias), such as Lindner's "Manuscript aus Süddeutschland" (1820), had demanded. But the Vienna conferences of January, 1823, arranged by Metternich, soon led to Wurtemberg's compliance. Wangenheim fell in July. The Carlsbad resolutions were renewed in August, 1824, and the federal diet did not agitate again, after it had quietly divided the unhappy Central Enquiry Commission at Mayence in 1828.

(b) *Great Britain and Reform.* — The trial of Queen Caroline had inflicted a severe blow on the British crown and the tory ministry. Byron hurled at George IV the poet's curse, —

"Charles to his people, Henry to his wife,
In him the double tyrant starts to life:
Justice and death have mix'd their dust in vain,
Each royal vampire wakes to life again.
Ah, what can tombs avail, since these disgorge
The blood and dust of both — to mould a George."

WINDSOR POETICS.

Fresh life was introduced by Canning into home and foreign policy; he lent his support to the effort for the emancipation of the Catholics, although without being able to bring it to a successful conclusion. In parliamentary reform Lord John Russell, who supported Canning as zealously as he opposed Wellington, took the foremost place. It was due to his unwearying perseverance that the bill of June 7, 1832, was finally passed. The president of the Board of Trade, William Huskisson, a pupil of Pitt, worked also in Canning's spirit; he gave full scope to a commercial policy, and undermined, even if he could not overthrow, the system of protective tariffs and import duties. The Navigation Act of 1651 was rendered less stringent; foreign commerce, freed from burdensome restrictions, increased by leaps and bounds (cf. Vol. VII, p. 128); the wool and silk industries flourished. Thousands upon thousands believed a golden age was dawning, and speculated wildly in the shares of the joint-stock companies which were springing up like mushrooms; there were the most exaggerated hopes as to the profits to be made by trading with the liberated Spanish colonies. The speculators had naturally not to wait long for a disillusion. Unspeakable misery was the end of this extravagant desire for wealth. The years 1825 and 1826 were terrible, in spite of all the bold efforts of Huskisson, Canning, and others. Canning might be regarded as a true high priest of liberal ideas, and thus it was a day of great significance

when in April, 1827, he became premier and first lord of the treasury. Ireland caused the government much trouble. Daniel O'Connell, a barrister and a born popular orator, together with Richard Sheil, raised the Catholic Association, at whose head he stood after 1815, to a power which dominated the whole island, and demanded equality of rights for the Catholics.

After January, 1828, Wellington stood at the head of a purely tory cabinet, in which Sir Robert Peel was home secretary. The Corporations Act and the Test Act were repealed in May, 1828, and the Catholic Emancipation Bill was finally passed on the 30th of March, 1829.

(c) *The Greek War of Liberation, 1823-1829.* — The year 1822 had been on the whole favourable to the struggles of the Greeks, and had found a happy conclusion in the capture of Nauplia in December and the destruction of the army of Dramali. Missolonghi defied its besiegers, and the Turkish general Omer Vronion was obliged to raise the siege on January 13, 1823. In the year 1823 fortune still favoured the Greeks, but internal discord was rending them. They began to fly at each other's throats, and civil wars simplified the operations of the Porte; the latter was now helped by the mighty Mehemet Ali of Egypt (cf. Vol. III, p. 717). His troops conquered Crete and Kaso in 1824, those of Khosrew Pasha took Psara, and on the 5th of February, 1825, Mehemet's adopted son, Ibrahim Pasha, landed at Modon in the Morea. One town after another fell into his power, and soon the Greeks could no longer hold the field. The Egyptians slaughtered and devastated in every direction. Keen interest was roused in the world by the new siege of Missolonghi by Redshid and Ibrahim Pasha. Lord Byron's death (April 19, 1824), for the cause of the Hellenes, had consecrated this place. The government at Nauplia placed Greece, in August, 1825, under the absolute protection of Great Britain. But Missolonghi fell on April 22-25, 1826, and the Morea was laid waste. Redshid threw himself upon Attica. On the 6th of May, 1827, the Greeks suffered a severe defeat before Athens, and on June 5 of that year Athens fell. All the sacrifices of the Greeks and the enthusiasm of the Philhellenes of the whole of Europe seemed unable to prevent the calamity.

After a meeting of the emperors Francis and Alexander at Czernowitz in October, 1823, the Russian government proposed conferences in St. Petersburg, in order to restore peace in Greece. A Russian note, dated January 9, 1824, was laid before the powers invited to attend, — Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, and France. But the Greeks and the Turks would not hear of this plan. The conferences in Constantinople and St. Petersburg produced no results. Canning, however, who even at Eton had written poetry in honour of the brave champions of freedom, felt sympathy with the Greeks, and threw overboard the policy, which his predecessors had pursued, of favouring the Turk. He fostered the distrust of Austria, which was already entertained in St. Petersburg, made friends with Russia, and obtained the lead in the Greek question. Then occurred the death of Alexander I, and Russia struck out a new line of policy. The Russians saw in Alexander's death a heaven-sent punishment for his weak desertion of the Greeks, their brethren in the faith.

The Czar had died with a sorrowful heart; for he had seen the love of his people toward him grow cold, and secret societies of a political nature, besides freemasonry introduced into the nation and the army. The "Vigilance Society" was

followed by the "Free Societies," "The League of Russian Knights," "The League of Public Welfare," and out of the ruins of the latter were constructed the "Southern and Northern Societies." In Volhynia the first attempt at a federation of all Slav peoples was seen in the "Society of United Slavs," and in Poland the "Patriotic Society" made its way. Every league had different plans, and many members held the wildest views. Colonel Paul Pestel and his companions contemplated the introduction of a republic, universal equality, the murder of Alexander and his family; others only thought of restricting his despotic power. The government noticed the very imprudent behaviour of the conspirators, mostly members of the nobility, in the army and navy; but before these ventured on a *coup de main* the Czar died at Taganrog, on December 1, 1825. The Grand Duke Constantine had renounced the succession, a fact of which hardly anyone was aware, and referred the officials, who were offering their homage, to his younger brother, Nicholas Paulovitch; a contest in renunciation now ensued, and it was difficult to decide who had become emperor. At length Nicholas issued a proclamation announcing his accession to the throne on December 24; but the conspirators on the 26th incited several regiments in St. Petersburg to revolt against him. A battle was fought on the senate-house square and in the adjoining streets, and Nicholas' victory was followed by the infliction of the severest penalties on the "Decabrists" ("December folk").

Nicholas, an autocrat in the widest sense of the word, ruled thenceforward with a blindly devoted, if not blameless, body of officials, with a force of police, and with a strict censorship, and suppressed with iron hand all liberalism. In spite of all his harshness, he was just and magnanimous. He ordered Michail M. Speransky, the Tribonian of Russia (p. 109), to form a collection of the Russian laws since 1649, the *Sswod zakonow*, which was introduced in 1835 as the only valid code. Russians studied under Savigny in Berlin; the knowledge of Russian law and Russian history was greatly increased.

Armenia was conquered by Ivan Paskevitch, and, unlike Alexander, Nicholas soon showed his teeth to Turkey, not from any sympathy with the Greeks, who in his eyes were mere rebels, but from reasons of policy. Wellington signed in St. Petersburg, on April 4, 1826, an Anglo-Russian protocol for the pacification of Greece, which, it was proposed, should take a position toward Turkey similar to that of the Danubian principalities. Although the Porte remonstrated, Nicholas and Canning pursued their way. Canning enlisted the sympathies of France also for the Greeks, and Nicholas prepared his armies. On the 6th of July, 1827, Russia, Great Britain, and France concluded the treaty of London, in which they offered their mediation between the Greeks and the Turks, and declared that they would not for the future tolerate the disturbance of peaceful commercial intercourse; the Porte should exercise full suzerainty over the tributary Greek State which was to be reorganised, but the Greeks should be subject to self-chosen authorities and a completely autonomous government. The treaty was Canning's farewell greeting; he died on August 8, 1827, and lamentations at his death resounded from the Greek Archipelago to the Andes of South America.

The Porte would not hear of European intervention, and the Triple Alliance resolved upon war. Its fleet annihilated the Turko-Egyptian fleet on October 20, 1827, at Navarino; Greece was freed from its most pressing danger. The majority of the Greek national assembly at Dhamala (Troizene), which was friendly to

Russia, elected on April 11, 1827, Count John Capodistrias president (Kybernetes) of Greece for seven years. He entered on his arduous post in January, 1828, at Ægina, only to become more submissive to Russian influence, and to be irreconcilably antagonistic to the liberals. In May, 1828, the war between Russia and the Turks began. Ivan Diebitsch crossed the Balkans, but when he proposed to advance from Adrianople to Constantinople, the Divan appealed to Prussia to mediate. The peace of Adrianople was concluded on the 14th of September, 1829; this extended Russia's territory in Asia, opened the Black Sea to Russian trade, and obtained for Greece a recognition of its independence from the Porte. The Western powers did not at all wish it to become a sovereign power under Russian influence, and it was finally agreed, on February 3, 1830, that the independent State should be confined to as narrow limits as possible, from the mouth of the Aspropotamos to the mouth of the Spercheios.

(d) *France under Charles X.* — The new ruler in France, Charles X, lived on the principle, "I would rather saw wood than be king on the terms of the king of England." He was a man of scrupulous honour and honesty, but full of prejudices and stubbornness, — a weak spirit, narrowed by pietism, and, in spite of his gray hairs, he still remained the Count of Artois of the emigration. At the opening of his reign he was praised by Victor Hugo and Lamartine; but his popularity soon vanished. Béranger sneered at him as "Charles le Simple," and made fun of the "Gerontocracy." Five-franc pieces represented him with the Jesuit hat. The power of the priests grew abnormally; official posts were given to followers of the Jesuits, and the order controlled the public system of education. Charles was anointed with the holy oil at Rheims, in which ceremony the old traditions were strictly observed; he followed all the processions in Paris, and many nobles took refuge in the Church as the natural support against the predominant liberalism. The law against sacrilege recalled the Middle Ages; in the monastery-law men detected the reintroduction of monasticism and mortmain. The act of the 27th of April, 1825, granted to the emigrants a milliard (£40,000,000) as a compensation, though certainly inadequate, for their losses since 1789.

Charles, against Villèle's advice, had immediately repealed the censorship. The liberal press now attacked unsparingly Jesuitism in State, Church, school, and society, and gained increasing reputation by the lawsuits which it had to face. The champion of the Gallican Church (Vol. VII, p. 201) and the deadly enemy of the ultramontanes, Dupin the elder, was the most celebrated man in the liberal camp, and there was great exultation over his speeches in defence of "*Le Constitutionnel*," "*Le Journal des Débats*," &c. The magistracy and the majority of the chamber took the side of the opposition. Charles wished to reintroduce the censorship, and bitterly repented having repealed it; but Chateaubriand termed the proposed law vandalism, and Royer-Collard called it atheistic, and the peers forced the government to withdraw the bill in April, 1827. Universal detestation, heightened by the disbanding of the National Guard, threatened Villèle; but the latter ventured on new steps in order to assert his position. An ordinance of June 24, 1827, had restored the censorship, and, disregarding the unanimous indignation of royalists (Chateaubriand, Hyde de Neuville) and liberals (Guizot, Count Salvandy, and Odilon Barrot), Villèle went boldly onward. Four ordinances of the 5th of November, 1827, enacted the abolition of the censorship, the dissolution of

the second chamber, which deserted Villèle, the regulation for a new election, and the nomination of seventy-six new peers, who were mostly bishops or thorough-going *émigrés*. The result of the new elections was distinctly unfavourable to the ministry. There was an insurrection in Paris, and barricades were erected for the first time since the days of the Fronde (Vol. VII, p. 436). Villèle could no longer remain at the helm.

Viscount de Martignac, the soul of the new ministry which entered on office January 5, 1828, was a man of honour and especially adapted to act as mediator. His clear intellect raised him head and shoulders above the mass of the royalists. He wished for moderation and progress, but he never possessed Charles' affection, and was no statesman. Charles opposed Martignac's diplomacy with the help of his confidants, Prince Jules Polignac and others; and while Martignac seemed to the king to be "too little of a Villèle," public opinion accused him of being "too much of a Villèle." His laws as to elections and the press seemed too liberal to Charles; his interference in the Church and the schools roused the fury of the Jesuits, and the Abbé Lamennais (p. 91), who had been won back by them, compared the king with Nero and Diocletian. Lamennais attacked the Gallican Church of "atheistic" France, called the constitutional monarchy of Charles the most abominable despotism which had ever burdened humanity, and scathingly assailed the ordinances which Charles had issued in June, 1828, relating to religious brotherhoods and clerical education. Martignac's government, he said, demoralised society, and the moment was near in which the oppressed people must have recourse to force, in order to rise up in the name of the infallible pope against the atheistic king. The abbé's treatise, "*Des progrès de la révolution et de la guerre contre l'église*" (1829), made a great sensation, and he himself became more and more democratic; it was the natural consequence of his doctrines. With the sanction of Pope Leo XII, the patron of the Jesuits, he founded the "Society for the Defence of the Catholic Religion," for which "*Le Catholique*" and "*Le Correspondant*" henceforward worked, and in September, 1830, there appeared, after the fall of Charles, so welcome to Lamennais, his Christian-revolutionary journal, "*L'Avenir*," in which Lacordaire, Count Montalembert, and Gerbet collaborated with him. The Church of Rome put on the cap of liberty! Martignac's cabinet could claim an important foreign success, when the Marquis de Maison, who led an expeditionary corps to the Morea, compelled the Egyptians, under Ibrahim Pasha, to retreat in August, 1828, and thwarted Metternich's plan of a quadruple alliance for the forcible pacification of Russia and Turkey. But when Martignac wished to decentralise the French administration, and brought in bills for this purpose in February, 1829, he was deserted by everyone. The extreme Right allied itself with the Left; Martignac was compelled to withdraw the proposals in April, and on the 8th of August, 1829, Prince Polignac took his place.

The name of Jules Polignac seemed to the country a presage of *coups d'état* and anti-constitutionalist reaction. A cry of indignation was heard, and the press made the most violent attacks on the new minister. The Duke of Broglie placed himself at the head of the society formed to defend the charter, called "*Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera*," republicans, eager for the fray, grouped themselves round Louis Blanqui, Étienne Arago, and Armand Barbès. The newspaper, "*National*," began its work on behalf of the Orleans family, for whom Talleyrand, Thiers, Jacques Laffite the banker, and Adelaide the sister of Duke Louis Philippe, cleared the road. Even

Metternich, Wellington, and the emperor Nicholas advised that no *coup d'état* should be made against the Charta. Charles, however, remained the untaught emigrant of Coblenz, and did not understand the new era; he saw in every constitutionalist a supporter of the revolutionary party and a Jacobin. Polignac was the dreamer of the restoration, a fanatic without any worldly wisdom, whom delusions almost removed from the world of reality, who considered himself, with his limited capacity, to be infallible. The Virgin had appeared to him and commanded him to cut off the head of the hydra of democracy and infidelity.

Polignac, originally only minister of foreign affairs, became on the 17th of November, 1829, president of the cabinet council. In order to gain over the nation, which was hostile to him, he tried to achieve foreign successes for it. He laid stress on the principle of the freedom of the ocean as opposed to Great Britain's claims to maritime supremacy, and sketched a fantastic map of the Europe of the future; if he could not transform this into reality, at all events military laurels should be won at the first opportunity which presented itself. The Dey of Algiers had been offended by the French, and had aimed a blow at their consul, Deval, during an audience. Since he would not listen to any remonstrances, France made preparations by land and sea. In June, 1830, the minister of war, Count Bourmont, landed with thirty-seven thousand men near Sidi-Ferruch, defeated the Algerians, sacked their camp, and entered the capital on July 6, where he captured much treasure. He banished the Dey, and was promoted to be marshal of France. Algiers became French, but Charles and Polignac were not destined to enjoy the victory.

The press and the parties in opposition became more confident; Royer-Collard candidly assured Charles that the chamber would oppose every one of his ministries. Charles, however, only listened to Polignac's boastful confidence, and at the opening of the chambers on the 2d of March, 1830, in his speech from the throne he threatened the opposition in such unmistakable terms, that doctrinaires, as well as ultra liberals, detected the unsheathing of the royal sword. Pierre Antoine Berryer, the most brilliant orator of legitimacy, and perhaps the greatest French orator of the century, had a lively passage of arms in the debate on the address with François Guizot, the clever leader of the doctrinaires, and was defeated; the chamber, by 221 votes against 181, accepted on March 16 a peremptory answer to the address, which informed the monarch that his ministers did not possess the confidence of the nation, and that no harmony existed between the government and the chamber. Charles, however, saw that the monarchy itself was at stake, declared his resolutions unalterable, and insisted that he would never allow his crown to be humiliated. He prorogued the chambers on March 19 until the 1st of September, and dismissed prefects and officials, while the 221 were fêted throughout France. Struck by these events, Charles demanded from his ministers a statement of the situation. But Polignac's secret memorandum of April 14 lulled his suspicions again. It said that only a small fraction of the nation was revolutionary and could not be dangerous; the charter was the gospel, and a peaceful arrangement was easy. Charles dissolved the chambers on May 16, and summoned a new one for August 3. Instead of recalling Villèle, he strengthened the ministry by followers of Polignac. On the 19th of May De Chantelauze and Count Peyronnet came in as minister of justice and minister of the interior. The appointment of Peyronnet was, in Charles' own words, a slap in the face for

public opinion, for there was hardly an individual more hated in France; he now continually advised exceptional measures and urged a *coup d'état* against the provisions of the Charta. In order to facilitate the victory of the government at the new elections, he explained in his proclamation to the people on June 13 that he would not give in. But the society "*Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera*" secured the re-election of the 221; the opposition reached the number of 272; the ministry, on the other hand, had only 145 votes.

Disorders were visible in the whole of France. Troops were sent to quiet them, but the press of every shade of opinion fanned the flame. Charles saw rising before him the shadow of his brother, whom weak concessions had brought to the guillotine, spoke of a dictatorship, and, being entirely under Polignac's influence, inclined toward the plan of adopting exceptional measures and reasserting his position as king. The Czar, Peyronnet himself, Jakob Rothschild, and others dissuaded him. But on the 25th of July, 1830, he signed the five ordinances proposed by Polignac. The freedom of the press was temporarily suspended, the publication of journals was made dependent on permission previously obtained, the chamber of deputies, which had not yet met, was dissolved and a new one summoned for the 28th of September. The electoral law was altered, and the ultra-royalist members of the council of state, who had been dismissed by Martignac, were recalled. The ordinances were published on July 26. The "*National*" of Adolphe Thiers at once became the centre of the press movement, but Charles at St. Cloud congratulated himself on his work and nominated the universally unpopular Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, to be commander-in-chief of the first military division. Marmont, as the popular excitement grew, called out the garrison of Paris, and, when the Revolution broke out there on July 27, proclaimed a state of siege on July 28; at the same time he and the Russian ambassador, Count Pozzo di Borgo, advised Charles to make concessions. From the barricades which had been hastily thrown up resounded the cry, "Down with the Bourbons!" Polignac, however, did not lose confidence, although the insurrection increased everywhere, and a part of the troops went over to the people. Paris was lost. The dauphin, Louis Antoine, Duke of Angoulême, took over the command of the troops and eagerly joined Marmont, who led the last troops from Paris to St. Cloud. The National Guard was restored in Paris and the veteran Lafayette took the command of them. A municipal committee was formed at Guizot's initiative; the citizens governed Paris, and Talleyrand invited the Duke of Orleans to come to Paris.

Charles X at last recognised that he was on the verge of destruction. He recalled the ordinances on July 30, dismissed the ministry of Polignac, and entrusted the Duke of Mortemart with the task of constructing a ministry, by drawing on the ranks of the Left Centre; but when Mortemart came to the house of Laffitte, which the opposition had made their headquarters, it was explained to him that it was too late. Louis Philippe assumed on July 31, at the wish of both chambers, the office of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, allowed himself to be embraced by Lafayette as a citizen-king, and nominated a ministry. On that very day Charles X migrated to the Trianon, and thence to Rambouillet. His court emptied as quickly as that of Louis XVI on a former occasion, and his troops deserted in masses. As a last resort, he offered, on August 1, as if on his own initiative, the office of lieutenant-general of the kingdom to Louis Philippe; but the

duke declined it, since he was already holding that position, conferred on him by the chambers. On the 2d of August Charles and the dauphin renounced the crown in favour of Berry's son, the Duke of Bordeaux, whom they proclaimed as King Henry V, and Charles required Louis Philippe to make all arrangements for Henry's accession to the throne. Louis Philippe, however, cheated Henry of the crown, and took the oath to the constitution as king of the French on August 9. Charles sailed on August 16 for England; in 1832 he crossed over to Austria. His hopes of a third restoration of the Bourbons were never to be realised (see p. 142).

II

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN EUROPE
BETWEEN 1830 AND 1859

By PROFESSOR DR. HANS VON ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST

1. CONSERVATIVE ABERRATIONS

AT the congress of Vienna nations were but rarely, and national rights and desires never, a subject of discussion. The Cabinets, that is to say the princes of Europe, their officials, and in particular the diplomatists, arranged the mutual relations of States almost exclusively with reference to dynastic interests and differences in national power; though in the case of France it was necessary to consult national susceptibilities, and in England the economic demands of the upper classes of society came into question. The term "state" implied a ruling court, a government, and nothing beyond, not only to Prince Metternich, but also to the majority of his coadjutors. These institutions were the sole surviving representatives of that feudal organism which for more than a thousand years had undertaken the larger proportion of the tasks of the State. Principalities of this kind were not founded upon the institutions of civic life, which had developed under feudal society; the rule of the aristocracy had fallen into decay, had grown antiquated or had been abolished, and as the monarchy increased in power at the expense of the classes it had invariably employed instruments of government more scientifically constructed in detail. Bureaucracies had arisen. Governments had intervened between princes and peoples and had become ends in themselves. The theory of "subordination," which in feudal society had denoted an economic relation, now assumed a political character; it was regarded as a necessary extension of the idea of sovereignty which had become the sole and ultimate basis of public authority in the course of the seventeenth century. The impulse of the sovereigns to extend the range of their authority, and a conception more or less definite of the connection between this authority and certain ideal objects, resulted in the theory that the guidance of society was a governmental task, and consequently laid an ever-increasing number of claims and demands upon the government for the time being (cf. the characteristics of the period between 1650 and 1780, Vol. VII, pp. 431-434).

To this conception of the rights of princes and their delegates as a result of historic growth the French Revolution had opposed the idea of "the rights of man;" to the National Assembly no task seemed more necessary or more imperative than the extirpation of erroneous theories from the general thought of the time; such theories had arisen from the exaggerated importance attached to monarchical power, had secured recognition, and had come into operation simply because they had never been confuted. Henceforward sovereignty was to be based upon the consent of the community as a whole. Thus supported by the sover-

eign will of the people, France had entered upon war with the monarchical States of Europe where the exercise of supreme power had been the ruler's exclusive right; it was as an exponent of the sovereign rights of the people that the empire of Napoleon Bonaparte had attempted to make France the paramount power in Europe; it was in virtue of the power entrusted to him by six millions of Frenchmen that the emperor had led his armies far beyond the limits of French domination and had imposed his personal will upon the princes of Europe by means of a magnificent series of battles. Within a period of scarce two decades the balance of power had swung to the opposite extreme and had passed back from the sovereign people to the absolute despot. Monarchs and nations shared alike in the task of overpowering this tyranny which had aimed at abolishing entirely the rights of nations as such; but from victory the princes alone derived advantage. With brazen effrontery literary time-servers scribbled their histories to prove that only the sovereigns and their armies deserved the credit of the overthrow of Napoleon; and that the private citizen had done no more service than does the ordinary fireman at a conflagration. However, their view of the situation was generally discredited. It could by no means be forgotten that the Prussians had forced their king to undertake a war of liberation, and the services rendered by Spain and the Tyrol could not be wholly explained by reference to the commands of legally constituted authorities; in either case it was the people who by force of arms had cast off the yoke imposed upon them. The will of the people had made itself plainly understood; it had declined the alien rule even though that rule had appeared under the names of freedom, reform, and prosperity.

Once again the princely families recovered their power and position; they had not entertained the least idea of dividing among themselves the spoils accumulated by the revolution which had been taken from their kin, their relations, and their allies; at the same time they were by no means inclined to divide the task of administering the newly created States with the peoples inhabiting them. They tacitly united in support of the conviction, which became an article of faith with all legitimists, that their position and prosperity were no less important than the maintenance of social order and morality. It was explained as the duty of the subject to recognise both the former and the latter; and by increasing his personal prosperity, the subject was to provide a sure basis on which to increase the powers of the government. However, "the limited intelligence of the subjects" strove against this interpretation of the facts; they could not forget the enormous sacrifices which had been made to help those States threatened by the continuance of the Napoleonic supremacy, and in many cases already doomed to destruction. The value of their services aroused them to question also the value of what they had attained, and by this process of thought they arrived at critical theories and practical demands which "legitimist" teaching was unable to confute.

The supreme right of princes to wage war and conclude peace rested upon satisfactory historic foundations and was therefore indisputable. In the age of feudal society it was the lords, the free landowners, who had waged war, and not the governments, and their authority had been limited only by their means. Neither the lives nor the property of the commonalty had ever come in question except in cases where their sympathies had been enlisted by devastation, fire, and slaughter; to actual co-operation in the undertakings of the overlord the man of the people had never been bound and such help had been voluntarily given.

After the conception of sovereignty had been modified by the idea of "government" the situation had been changed. Military powers and duties were now dissociated from the feudal classes; the sinews of war were no longer demanded from the warriors themselves, and the provision of means became a government duty. However, no new rights had arisen to correspond with these numerous additional duties. The vassal, now far more heavily burdened, demanded his rights; the people followed his example. That which was to be supported by the general efforts of the whole of the members of any body politic must surely be a matter of general concern. The State also has duties incumbent upon it, the definition of which is the task of those who support the State. Such demands were fully and absolutely justified; a certain transformation of the State and of society was therefore necessary and inevitable.

Few princes and still fewer officials recognised the overwhelming force of these considerations; in the majority of cases expression of the popular will was another name for revolution. The Revolution had caused the overthrow of social order. It had engendered the very worst of human passions, destroyed professions and property, sacrificed a countless number of human lives, and disseminated infidelity and immorality; revolution therefore must be checked, must be nipped in the bud in the name of God, of civilization and social order. This opinion was founded upon the fundamental mistake of refusing to recognise the fact that all rights implied corresponding duties; while disregarding every historical tradition and assenting to the dissolution of every feudal idea, it did nothing to introduce new relations or to secure a compromise between the prince and his subjects. This point of view is known as conservatism; its supporters availed themselves of the unnatural limitations laid upon the subject unduly to aggrandise and systematically to increase the privileges of the ruling class; and this process received the name of statecraft. This conservative statecraft, of which Prince Metternich was proud to call himself a master, proceeded from a dull and spiritless conception of the progress of the world; founded upon a complete lack of historical knowledge, it equally failed to recognise any distinct purpose as obligatory on the State. Political science Metternich had none; he made good the deficiency by the general admiration which his intellect and character inspired; his diaries and many of his letters are devoted to the glorification of these merits. A knowledge of his intellectual position and of that of the majority of his diplomatic colleagues is an indispensable preliminary to the understanding of the aberrations into which the statesmen of the so-called Restoration period fell.

The restored government of the Bourbons in France was indeed provided with a constitution; it was thus that the Czar, Alexander I, had attempted to display his liberal tendencies and his good-will to the French nation, but he had been forced to leave the Germans and Italians to their fate, and had satisfied his conscience by the insertion of a few expressions in the final protocol of the Vienna Congress. Subsequently he suffered a cruel disappointment in the case of Poland, which proceeded to misuse the freedom that had been granted to it by the concoction of conspiracies and by continual manifestations of dissatisfaction. He began to lose faith in Liberalism as such, and became a convert to Metternich's policy of forcibly suppressing every popular movement for freedom. Untouched by the enthusiasm of the German youth, which for the most part had displayed after the war of liberation the noblest sense of patriotism, and could provide for the work

of restoration and reorganisation coadjutors highly desirable to a far-seeing administration, incapable of understanding the Italian yearnings for union and activity, and for the foundation of a federal State free from foreign influences, the great powers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia employed threats and force in every form, with the object of imposing constitutions of their own choice upon the people, whose desires for reform they wholly disregarded. Austria had for the moment obtained a magnificent position in the German Confederacy. This, however, the so-called statecraft of conservatism declined to use for the consolidation of the federation, which Austria at the same time desired to exploit for her own advantage. Conservatism never, indeed, gave the smallest attention to the task of uniting the interests of the allied States by institutions making for prosperity, or by the union of their several artistic and scientific powers; it seemed more necessary and more salutary to limit as far as possible the influence of the popular representatives in the administration of the allied States, and to prevent the introduction of constitutions which gave the people rights of real and tangible value. The conservative statesmen did not observe that even governments could derive but very scanty advantage by ensuring the persistence of conditions which were the product of no national or economic course of development; they did not see that the power of the governments was decreasing, and that they possessed neither the money nor the troops upon which such a system must ultimately depend. In the East, under the unfortunate guidance of Metternich, Austria adopted a position in no way corresponding to her past or to her religious aspirations; in order not to alienate the help of Russia, which might be useful in the suppression of revolutions, Austria surrendered that right, which she had acquired by the heavy military sacrifices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of appearing as the liberator of the Balkan Christians from Turkish oppression.

Political history provides many examples of constitutions purely despotic, of the entirely selfish aspirations of persons, families, or parties, of the exploitation of majorities by minorities, of constitutions which profess to give freedom to all, while securing the dominance of individuals; but illusions of this kind are invariably connected with some definite object, and in every case we can observe aspirations for tangible progress or increase of power. But the conservatism of the Restoration period rests upon a false conception of the working of political forces, and is therefore from its very outset a policy of mere bungling, as little able to create as to maintain. Of construction, of purification, or of improvement, it was utterly incapable; for in fact the object of the conservative statesmen and their highest ambition was nothing more than to capture the admiration of that court society in which they figured in their uniforms and decorations. For many princely families it was a grave misfortune that they failed to recognise the untenable character of those "principles" by which their ministers, their masters of ceremonies, and their officers professed themselves able to uphold their rights and their possessions; many, indeed, have disappeared for ever from the scene of history, while others have passed through times of bitter trial and deadly struggle.

2. THE FALL OF THE BOURBONS IN FRANCE

THE French were the first to put an end to the weak policy of the Restoration. Their privileged position as "the pioneers of civilization" they used with that

light-hearted energy and vigour by which their national character is peculiarly distinguished, while maintaining the dexterity and the distinction which has invariably marked their public action. The cup of the Bourbons was full to overflowing. It was not that their powers of administration were in any material degree inferior to those of other contemporary royal houses; such a view of the situation would be entirely mistaken. They were, however, in no direct connection with their people, and were unable to enter into relations with the ruling society of Paris. The restored *émigrés*, the descendants of the noble families of the period of Louis XV and Louis XVI, whose members had lost their lives under the knife of the guillotine, were unable to appreciate the spirit which animated the France of Napoleon Bonaparte. This spirit, however, had availed itself of the interim which had been granted definitely to establish its position, and had become a social power which could no longer be set aside. Family connections in a large number of cases, and the ties of social intercourse, ever influential in France, had brought the Bonapartists into direct relations with the army, and with the generals and officers of the emperor who had been retired on scanty pensions. The floating capital, which had grown to an enormous extent, was in its hands, and was indispensable to the government if it was to free itself from the burden of a foreign occupation. By the decree of April 27, 1825, the reduced noble families whose goods had been confiscated by the nation were relieved by the grant of one billion francs. The decree, however, did not imply their restoration to the social position they had formerly occupied; the emigrant families might be the pensioners of the nation, but could no longer be the leading figures of a society which thought them tiresome and somewhat out of date.

Louis XVIII, a well-disposed monarch, and not without ability, died on September 16, 1824, and was succeeded by his brother, Charles X, who had, as Count of Artois, incurred the odium of every European court for his obtrusiveness, his avowed contempt for the people, and for his crotchety and inconsistent character; he now addressed himself with entire success to the task of destroying what remnants of popularity the Bourbon family had retained. He was, however, tolerably well received upon his accession. The abolition of the censorship of the press had gained him the enthusiastic praise of Victor Hugo, but his liberal tendencies disappeared after a short period. Jesuitical priests played upon his weak and conceited mind with the object of securing a paramount position in France under his protection. The French, however, nicknamed him, from the words of Béranger, the bold song-writer, "Charles le Simple," when he had himself crowned in Rheims after the old Carolingian custom. His persecution of the liberal press increased the influence of the journalists. The chambers showed no hesitation in rejecting the law of censorship introduced by his minister, Villèle. When he dissolved them, barricades were again raised in Paris and volleys fired upon citizens. Even so moderate a liberal as the Vicomte de Martignac, who had attempted to allay the popular excitement by more equitable press and education laws, and by the full protection of an expression of opinion founded upon scientific principles, could secure no recognition from the old man.

Jesuit pietism, which had voluntarily resigned the right of independent thought, alone possessed the confidence of the king. From this body he chose his favourite, the Duc de Polignac, and on August 28, 1829, placed him at the head of a ministry which included not a single popular representative among its members.

Polignac, who was as short-sighted as he was tenacious of purpose, was in no way disturbed by this fact, and hoped by comprehensive political undertakings abroad to secure the general admiration of France within a short time. However, his plan for a partition of European Turkey, and for the establishment of a territorial exchange and mart in connection therewith, by which France was to enter into possession of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the left bank of the Rhine, came too late, as Russia had already concluded the peace of Adrianople (p. 128). It was then hoped that the conquest of Algiers would so far satisfy the popular desires for prestige as to secure the voluntary sacrifice of certain inconvenient paragraphs in the constitution. However, before the reception of the news of the surrender of the Dey (July 3, 1830), popular feeling in Paris had risen so high that the French victory over a greedy pirate was of no counteracting influence. The new elections, for which writs were issued after the Chamber of Deputies had demanded the dismissal of Polignac, proved unfavourable to the ministry and forced the king either to change the ministry or make some change in the constitution. The Jesuits at that time had not yet adequately organised their political system, and were in France more ignorant and obscure than in Belgium and Germany. However, they thought themselves sure of their ground, and advised the king to adopt the latter alternative, notwithstanding the objections of certain members of his house, including the dauphine Marie Therèse.

On July 26 five royal ordinances were published. In these the freedom of the press as established by law was greatly limited; the Chambers of Deputies, though only just elected, were again dissolved; a new law for reorganising the elections was proclaimed, and a chamber to be chosen in accordance with this method was summoned for September 28. In other words, war was declared upon the constitution. According to paragraph 14 of the charter, the king "is chief head of the State. He has command of the military and naval forces; can declare war, conclude peace, alliances, and commercial treaties; has the right of making appointments to every office in the public service, and of issuing the necessary regulations and decrees for the execution of the laws and the security of the State." Had the king, as indeed was maintained by the journals supporting the ministry, ventured to claim the power of ruling through his own decrees, for which he alone was responsible, then all regulations as to the state of the legislature and the subordination of the executive would have been entirely meaningless. Paris, desiring freedom, was clear upon this point, and immediately set itself with determination to the task of resistance.

The first day began with the demonstrations of the printers, who found their occupation considerably reduced by the press censorship. This movement was accompanied by tumultuous demonstrations of dissatisfaction on the part of the general public in the Palais Royal, and the windows of the unpopular minister's house were broken. On the morning of the second day the liberal newspapers appeared without even an attempt to gain the necessary authorisation from the authorities. They contained a manifesto couched in identical language and including the following sentence: "In the present state of affairs obedience ceases to be a duty." The author of this composition was Adolphe Thiers, at that time the best known political writer in France (born in Marseilles, 15th April, 1797, practising as advocate in Aix in 1820). In 1821 he came to Paris and entered the office of the "Constitutionnel," and co-operated in the foundation of several

periodicals, writing at the same time his "*Histoire de la Révolution française*" (in ten volumes, 1823–1827). This work was rather a piece of journalism than a scientific history. It attained rapid popularity among the liberal bourgeois as it emphasised the great successes and the valuable achievements of the revolution, while discountenancing the aberrations and the lamentable excesses of an anarchical society; constitutionalism and its preservation were shown to be the results of all the struggles and sacrifices which France had undergone to secure freedom and power of self-determination to nations at large. Thiers also supported the view of the members that the charter of 1814 provided sufficient guarantees for the preservation and exercise of the rights of the people. These, however, must be retained in their entirety and protected from the destructive influences of malicious misinterpretation. Such protection he considered impossible under the government of Charles X. He was equally distrustful of that monarch's son, the Duke of Angoulême, and had already pretty plainly declared for a change of dynasty and the deposition of the royal line of the house of Bourbon in favour of the Orléans branch.

Thiers and his journalistic friends were supported by a number of the advocates present in Paris, including the financiers Jacques Laffitte and Casimir Périer. They also possessed a considerable following and enjoyed unlimited influence among the property-owning citizens, who were again joined by the independent nobility excluded from court. They gave advice upon the issue of manifestoes, while Marshal A. F. L. V. de Marmont, the Duke of Ragusa and military commander in Paris, strove, with the few troops at his disposal, to suppress the noisy gatherings of the dissatisfied element, which had considerably increased by the 27th July. Paris began to take up arms on the following night. On the 28th, thousands of workmen, students from the polytechnic schools, doctors and citizens of every profession, were fighting behind numerous barricades, which resisted all the efforts of the troops. Marmont recognised his inability to deal with the revolt, and advised the king, who was staying with his family and ministers in Saint Cloud, to withdraw the ordinances. Even then a rapid decision might have caused a change of feeling in Paris, and have saved the Bourbons at any rate for the moment; but neither the king nor Polignac suspected the serious danger confronting them, and never supposed that the Parisians would be able to stand against twelve thousand troops of the line.

This, indeed, was the number that Marmont may have concentrated from the garrisons in the immediate neighbourhood. In view of the well-known capacity of the Parisians for street fighting, their bravery and determination, this force would scarce have been sufficient, even granting their discipline to have been unexceptionable, and assuming their readiness to support the king's cause to the last. The troops, however, were by no means in love with the Bourbon hierarchy, and no one felt any inclination to risk his life on behalf of such a ridiculous coxcomb as Polignac, against whom the revolt appeared chiefly directed. The regiments advancing upon Paris from the neighbouring provinces halted in the suburbs. Within Paris itself two regiments of the line were won over by the brother of Laffitte the financier and deserted to the revolt. During the forenoon of July 29, Marmont continued to hold the Louvre and the Tuileries with a few thousand men. In the afternoon, however, a number of armed detachments made their way into the Louvre through a gap caused by the retreat of a Swiss

battalion, and Marmont was forced to retire into the Champs Elysées. In the evening the marshal rode off to Saint Cloud with the news that the movement in Paris could no longer be suppressed by force, and that the king's only course of action was to open negotiations with the leaders of the revolt. Marmont had done all he could for the Bourbon monarchy with the very inadequate force at his disposal, and was now forced to endure the aspersions of treachery uttered by the Duke of Angoulême before the guard. This member of the Bourbon family, who had been none too brilliantly gifted by Providence, was entirely spoiled by the ultra legitimist rulers and priests, who praised his Spanish campaign as a brilliant military achievement, and compared the attack on the Trocadero to Marengo and Austerlitz (p. 124). A prey to the many illusions emanating from the brain of the "sons of Saint Louis," it was left to his somewhat nobler and larger-minded father to inform him that even kings might condescend to return thanks, at any rate to men who had risked their lives in their defence.

Marmont was, moreover, mistaken in his idea that Charles could retain his throne for his family by negotiations, by the dismissal of Polignac, by the recognition of recent elections, or even by abdication in favour of his grandson Henry, afterward Count of Chambord. The fate of the Bourbons was decided on the 30th July, and the only remaining question for solution was whether their place should be taken by a republic or by a liberal constitutional monarchy under the princes of Orléans.

Louis Philippe, son of the Duke of Orléans and of the princess Louise Marie Adelaide of Penthièvre, had been given on his birth (6th October, 1673) the title of the Duke of Valois, and afterward of Duke of Chartres. During the Revolution he had called himself General Egalité, and Duke of Orléans after the death of his father (p. 14), the miserable libertine who had decided the death of Louis XVI. As he had been supported by Dumouriez in his candidature for the throne, he was obliged to leave France after the flight of that leader. He had then been forced to lead a very wandering life, and even to earn his bread in Switzerland as a school-master. Forgiveness for his father's sins and for his own secession to the revolvers had long been withheld by the royal house, until he was at length recognised as the head of the House of Orléans. He had visited almost every country in Europe, and in North America had enjoyed the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the democratic state and its powers of solving the greatest tasks without the support of princes or standing armies. Consequently upon his return to France he was considered a liberal, was both hated and feared by the royal family, and became highly popular with the people, the more so as he lived a very simple life notwithstanding his regained wealth; he associated with the citizens, invited their children to play with his sons and daughters, and in wet weather would put up his umbrella and go to the market and talk with the saleswomen. He had become a very capable man of business and was highly esteemed in the financial world. Complicity on his part in the overthrow of his relatives cannot be proved: such action was indeed unnecessary; but there can be no doubt that he desired their fall and turned it to his own advantage. In his retreat at Raincy at Neuilly he received the message of Laffitte and the information from Thiers in person that the chamber would appoint him lieutenant-general to the king and invest him with full power. He then returned to Paris (p. 131) and was there entrusted by Charles X with that office in his own name and as representative of Henry V, who

was still a minor. He conformed his further procedure to the spirit of these commands as long as he deemed this course of action favourable to his own interests. As soon as he became convinced that the king's word was powerless, he announced the monarch's abdication, but kept silence upon the fact that he had abdicated in favour of his grandson. No doubt the representations of his adherents that he alone could save France from a republic largely contributed to the determination of his decision.

On July 31 it was definitely decided that France should be permanently relieved of the Bourbons who had been imposed upon her; however, concerning the future constitution widely divergent opinions prevailed. The decision lay with the Marquis of Lafayette, the author of the "Rights of Man" theory, the patriarch of the Revolution who had already taken over the command of the National Guard on the 29th, at the request of the chamber of deputies. The republicans, who had been responsible for all the work of slaughter, and had inspired the people to take up arms, reposed full confidence in him as a man after their own heart, and entrusted him with the office of dictator. The rich bourgeoisie, and the journalists in connection with them, were, however, afraid of a republican victory and of the political ideals and social questions which this party might advance for solution. That liberalism which first became a political force in France is distinguished by a tendency to regulate freedom in proportion to social rank, and to make the exercise of political rights conditional upon education and income. The financial magnates of Paris expected to enter unhindered into the inheritance of the legitimists, and permanently to secure the powers of government so soon as peace had been restored. For this purpose they required a constitutional king of their own opinions, and Louis Philippe was their only choice. He probably had no difficulty in fathoming their designs, but he hoped when once established on the throne to be able to dictate his own terms and address himself forthwith to the task of reducing the republican party to impotence. He proceeded in a solemn procession to the town hall, with the object of winning over Lafayette by receiving the supreme power from his hands. The old leader considered this procedure entirely natural, constituted himself plenipotentiary of the French nation, and concluded an alliance with the "citizen-king," whom he introduced, tricolour in hand, to the people as his own candidate.

In less than a week the new constitution had been drawn out in detail. It was to be "the direct expression of the rights of the French nation;" the king became head of the State by the national will, and was to swear to observe the constitution upon his accession. The two chambers were retained; an elected deputy was to sit for five years, and the limits of age for the passive and the active franchise were fixed respectively at thirty and twenty-five years. The right of giving effect to the different tendencies which were indispensable to the existence of a constitutional monarchy as conceived by liberalism was reserved for the legislature. Such were the provisions for trial by jury of offences against the press laws, for the responsibility of ministers, for full liberty to teachers, for compulsory education in the elementary schools, for the yearly vote of the conscription, and so forth. The deputies chosen at the last election passed the proposals by a large majority (219 against 38). Of the peers, eighty-nine were won over to their side; eighteen alone, including Chateaubriand, the novelist of the romantic school, supported the rights of Henry V.

In the meantime Charles had retired from Saint Cloud to Rambouillet, retaining the Guards and certain regiments which had remained faithful; he once again announced his abdication, and that of Angoulême, to the Duke of Orléans, and ordered him to take up the government in the name of Henry V. To this demand Louis Philippe sent no answer; he confined his efforts to getting his inconvenient cousin out of the country, which he already saw at his own feet. When his representations produced no effect in this direction, his adherents organised a march of the National Guard to Rambouillet, a movement which, though more like a holiday procession than an intimidating movement, brought about the desired result. The Bourbons and their parasites showed not a spark of knightly spirit; not the smallest attempt was made to teach the insolent Parisians a lesson, or to let them feel the weight of the "legitimist" sword. With ostentatious deliberation a move was made from Rambouillet to Cherbourg without awakening the smallest sign of sympathy. Charles X betook himself for the moment to England. On November 6, 1836, he died in Görz, where the Duke of Angoulême also passed away on June 3, 1844. To the duchess Marie Caroline of Berry, the daughter of Francis I of Naples, remained the task of stirring up the loyalists of La Vendée against the government of the treacherous Duke of Orléans, and of weaving, at the risk of her life, intrigues for civil war in France. In spite of her capture (November 7, 1832, at Nantes) she might have been a source of serious embarrassment to Louis Philippe, and perhaps have turned his later difficulties to the advantage of her son, if she had not fallen into disfavour with her own family, and with the arrogant legitimists, on account of her secret marriage with a son of the Sicilian prince of Campofranco, the Conte Ettore Carlo Lucchesi Palli, to whom she bore a son while in captivity at Blaye, near Bordeaux, the later Duca della Grazia. Her last son by her first marriage, the Count of Chambord, contented himself throughout his life with the proud consciousness of being the legal king of France; however, the resources of the good Henry were too limited for him to become dangerous to any government.

France had thus relieved herself of the Bourbons at little or no cost; she was now to try the experiment of living under the house of Orléans, and under a constitutional monarchy. The republicans were surprised at their desertion by Lafayette; they could not but observe that the mass of the people who were insensible to political conviction, and accustomed to follow the influences of the moment, hailed with acclamation the new constitution adjusted by the prosperous liberals. For the moment they retired into private life with ill-concealed expressions of dissatisfaction, and became the nucleus for a party of malcontents which was speedily and naturally reinforced by recruits from every direction.

"The King of the French," as the Duke of Orléans entitled himself from August 9, 1830, at the very outset of his government stirred up a dangerous strife, and by doing so undermined his own position, which at first had seemed to be founded upon the national will. He ought to have honourably and openly enforced the "republican institutions" which upon Lafayette's theory were meant to be the environment of his royal power; he ought to have appeared as representing the will of the nation, and should in any case have left his fate exclusively in the hands of the people. He attempted, however, to secure his recognition from the great powers, to assert his claims to consideration among the other dynasties of Europe, and to gain their confidence for himself and France. Prince Metternich supported him in these attempts as soon as he observed that the influences of the

Left had been nullified, and that the new king was making a serious effort to suppress that party. The Austrian chancellor fully recognised that Louis Philippe, in preventing the formation of a republic by his intervention, had done good service to the cause of reaction; he readily thanked him for his erection of a constitutional throne, whereby the monarchies had been spared the necessity of again taking the field against a republican France. The Bonapartists had proposed to bring forward an opposition candidate to Louis Philippe in the person of the highly gifted and ambitious son of Napoleon I ("le fils de l'homme") and the arch-duchess Maria Louise, who had been brought up under the care of his grandfather in Vienna. Metternich strongly opposed this idea, although the emperor Francis was not disinclined to support it. The untimely death of the excellent Duke of Reichstadt, who succumbed to a galloping consumption on July 22, 1832 (which was not, as often stated, the result of excessive self-indulgence), freed "the citizen-king" from a danger which had seemed to increase with every year. At the end of August 30 England recognised unconditionally and without reserve the new government in France; her example was followed by Austria and Prussia, to the extreme vexation of the Czar Nicholas I. The House of Orléans might thus far consider itself at least tolerated as the successor of the French Bourbons.

3. NATIONAL RISINGS BETWEEN 1830 AND 1840

THE events of 1830 in Paris introduced a new revolutionary period in Europe which was to produce far more comprehensive and permanent transformations than the Revolution of 1789. From that date was broken the spell of the reactionary theory which forbade all efforts for the identification of monarchical and popular rights, and demanded blind submission to the decrees of the government. This tyranny had been abolished by the will of a people which, notwithstanding internal dissensions, was fully united in its opposition to the Bourbons. Thirty or forty thousand men, with no military organisation and without preparation of any kind, had defeated in street fighting twelve thousand troops of the line, under the command of an experienced general, a marshal of the Grand Army of Napoleon I. Though gained by bloodshed, the victory was not misused or stained by atrocities of any kind; at no time was any attempt made to introduce a condition of anarchy. Upon the capture of the Louvre by bands of armed citizens, little damage had been done, and the artistic treasures of the palace had been safely removed from the advance of the attacking party. In the course of a fortnight a new constitution had been organised by the joint action of the leading citizens, a new régime had been established in every branch of the administration, and a new dynasty had been entrusted with supreme power. It had been shown that revolutions did not of necessity imply the destruction of social order, but might also become a means to the attainment of political rights.

Proof had thus been given that it was possible for a people to impose its will upon selfish and misguided governments, even when protected by armed force. The so-called conservative great powers were not united among themselves, and were therefore too weak to exclude a nation from the exercise of its natural right of self-government when that nation was ready to stake its blood and treasure on the issue. Other peoples living under conditions apparently or actually intol-

erable might be tempted to follow this example and to revolt. The weight of a foreign yoke, a term implying not only the rule of a conqueror king, but also that of a foreigner legally in possession of the throne, is more than ever galling if not supported upon a community of interests. The strong aversion which springs from the contact of characters fundamentally discordant can never be overcome even by consideration of the mutual advantages to be gained from the union, however great these advantages may be. Repugnance and animosity purely sentimental in their origin, and impossible of suppression by any process of intellectual exercise, are influences as important in national as in individual life. Physical repulsion has contributed as much as moral indignation to the anti-Semitic movement. And in cases of international quarrel does the German ever allow himself to manifest that personal animosity to the Frenchman or to the Italian, which he can only suppress with difficulty in the case of the Slav? Irritated ambition, exaggerated pride, the under and over estimation of defects and advantages, are so many causes of national friction, with tremendous struggles and political convulsions as their consequence. To prefer national sentiment to political necessity is naturally an erroneous doctrine, because contrary to the fundamental laws of civilization, which define man's task as the conquest of natural forces by his intellectual power for his own good. Yet such a doctrine is based at least upon the ascertained fact that, notwithstanding ages of intellectual progress, instinct is more powerful than reason, and that the influences of instinct must be remembered both by nations and individuals in the pursuit of their several needs.

In nineteenth-century Europe the development of inherent national powers was entirely justified, if only because for centuries it had been neglected and thwarted, or had advanced, if at all, by a process highly irregular. Many European countries had developed a political vitality under, and as a consequence of, monarchical government; and if this vitality was to become the realisation of the popular will, it must first gain assurance of its own value and importance, and acquire the right of self-government. It was to be tested in a series of trials which would prove its vital power and capacity, or would at least determine the degree of dependency which should govern its relations to other forces. Hence it is that national revolutions are the substratum of European political history after the Vienna congress. Hence it is that cabinet governments were gradually forced to undertake tasks of national importance which had never before even attracted their notice. Hence, too, such nations as were vigorous and capable of development must be organised and tested before entering upon the struggle for the transformation of society, — a struggle which ultimately overshadowed national aspirations and became itself the chief aim and object of civilized endeavour.

The oppression of an alien rule to which Europe had been forced to submit was, if not entirely overthrown, at any rate shaken to its foundations. The tyranny under which the Christian inhabitants of the Balkan countries had groaned since the middle of the fifteenth century, and which had entirely checked every tendency to progress, was now in process of dissolution. Among the Slav races of the Balkans the Servians had freed themselves by their own power, and had founded the beginnings of a national community. With unexampled heroism, which had risen almost to the point of self-immolation, the Greeks had saved their nationality and had united a considerable portion of its numbers into a self-contained State. In Germany and Italy the national movement, together with the political, had been

crushed in the name of the conservative great powers and their "sacred" alliances; in this case it was only to be expected that the influence of the French Revolution would produce some tangible effect. It was, however, in two countries where systems unusually artificial had been created by the arbitrary action of dynasties and diplomatists that these influences became earliest and most permanently operative: in the new kingdom of the United Netherlands, and in Poland under the Russian protectorate.

A. BELGIUM

IN 1813 and 1815 the Dutch had taken an honourable share in the general struggle for liberation from the French yoke; they had formed a constitution which, while providing a sufficient measure of self-government to the nine provinces of their kingdom, united those nine into a uniform body politic. They had abolished their aristocratic republic (cf. Vol. VII, p. 447), which had been replaced by a limited hereditary monarchy; the son of their last hereditary stadtholder, Prince William Frederick of Orange, had been made king, with the title of William I, and so far everything had been done that conservative diplomacy could possibly desire (cf. above, p. 81). Conservatism, however, declined to allow the Dutch constitution to continue its course of historical development, and proceeded to ruin it by the artificial addition of Belgium, — a proceeding which may well serve as an example of the incompetent bureaucratic policy of Prince Metternich. The Orange king naturally regarded this unexpected accession of territory as a recognition of his own high capacity, and considered that he could best serve the interests of the great powers by treating the Belgians, whom he considered as Frenchmen, as subjects of inferior rank. Many disabilities were laid upon them by the administration, which was chiefly in the hands of Dutchmen. Dutch trade had begun to revive, and Belgian industries found no support in Holland. Day by day it became clearer to the Belgians that union with Holland was for them a disastrous mistake, and they proceeded to demand separation. Not only by the Catholic conservative party, but also by the liberals, the existing difference of religious belief was thought to accentuate the opposition of interests. The attitude of hostility to their evangelical neighbours which the Catholic provinces of the Netherlands had adopted during one hundred and fifty years of Spanish government had never been entirely given up, and was now resumed, after a short armistice, with much secret satisfaction.

Without any special preparation, the ferment became visible on the occasion of a performance of the "Revolution Opera" completed in 1828, "*The Dumb Girl of Portici*," by D. F. E. Auber (August 25, 1830). Personal intervention might even then perhaps have saved the political union of the Netherland countries. The king, however, made no honourable attempt to secure the confidence of the Belgians, and any possibility of agreement was removed by the attempt to seize Brussels, which he was persuaded to make through Prince Frederick, who had ten thousand men at his command (street warfare from September 23 to 25). On November 10, 1830, the national congress decided in favour of the introduction of a constitutional monarchy, and for the exclusion of the House of Orange in favour of a new dynasty. Here also the expression of popular will failed to coincide with the hopes of the Revolution leaders, who were inclined to republicanism. The liberal coteries, who were forced in Belgium to act in concert with the Church, preferred government under a constitutional monarchy; if a republic were

formed, an ultramontane majority would inevitably secure tyrannical supremacy, and all freedom of thought would be impossible. A royal family, if not so intellectually incapable as the Bourbons, would never bind itself hand and foot to please any party, but, while respecting the rights of the minority, would unite with them in opposition to any attempted perversion of power.

The ready proposal of the Belgians to accept a monarchical government was received with satisfaction by the great powers, who were reluctantly considering the necessity of opposing the Revolution by force. The Czar Nicholas had already made up his mind to raise his arm against the West; his attention, however, was soon occupied by far more pressing questions within his own dominions. Metternich and Frederick William III were disinclined, for financial reasons, to raise contingents of troops; the scanty forces at the command of Austria were required in Italy, where the Carbonari (p. 116) were known to be in a state of ferment. Louis Philippe decided the general direction of his policy by declining to listen to the radical proposals for a union of Belgium with France, and thereby strengthened that confidence which he had already won among the conservative cabinets. The proposal of England to call a conference at London for the adjustment of the Dutch-Belgium difficulty was received with general approbation. On the 20th December the independence of Belgium was recognised by this assembly, and the temporary government in Brussels was invited through ambassadors to negotiate with the conference. The choice of the new king caused no great difficulty; the claims of Orange, Orléans, and Bavarian candidates were considered and rejected, and the general approval fell upon Prince Leopold George of Coburg, a widower, who had been previously married to Charlotte of England. On the 4th June, 1831, the national congress appointed him king of the Belgians, and he entered upon his dignity in July.

It proved a more difficult task to induce the king of Holland to agree to an acceptable compromise with Belgium and to renounce his claims to Luxemburg. In the session of the 15th October, 1831, the conference passed twenty-four articles, proposing a partition of Luxemburg, and fixing Belgium's yearly contribution to the Netherland national debt at 8,400,000 guildens. On two occasions it became necessary to send French troops as far as Antwerp to protect Belgium, a weak military power, from reconquest by Holland; and on each occasion diplomatic negotiation induced the Dutch to retire from the land they had occupied. It was not until 1838 that peace between Belgium and Holland was definitely concluded; King William had fruitlessly strained the resources of his State to the utmost, and for the increased severity of the conditions imposed upon him he had merely his own obstinacy to thank. Belgium's share of the payment toward the interest due upon the common national debt was ultimately fixed at 5,000,000 guildens. On the 9th August, 1832, King Leopold married Louise of Orléans, the eldest daughter of Louis Philippe; though not himself a Catholic, he had his sons baptised into that faith, and thus became the founder of a new Catholic dynasty in Europe, which rapidly acquired importance through the politic and dignified conduct of Leopold I.

B. POLAND

WHAT the Belgians had gained without any unusual effort, Poland was unable to attain in spite of the streams of blood which she poured forth in her struggle

with Russia. She had been a nation on an equality with Russia, with an excellent constitution of her own ; her resistance now reduced her to the position of a province of the empire, deprived of all political rights, and subjected to a government alike despotic and arbitrary. The popular will was unable to find expression, for the nation which it inspired had been warped and repressed by a wholly unnatural course of development ; there was no unity, no social organism, to support the expansion of classes and professions. There were only two classes struggling for definite aims : the great territorial nobility, who were attracted by the possibility of restoring their exaggerated powers, which had depended on the exclusion of their inferiors from legal rights ; and the small party of intelligent men among the *Schlachtha*, the petty nobility, civil officials, military officers, teachers, etc., who had identified themselves with the principles of democracy, and were attempting to secure their realisation. Though its purity of blood was almost indisputable, the Polish race had sunk so low that the manufacturing and productive element of the population, the craftsmen and agricultural workers, had lost all feeling of national union and had nothing to hope from a national state. Averse to exertion, incapable of achievement, and eaten up by preposterous self-conceit, Polish society, for centuries the sole exponent of national culture, was inaccessible to the effect of any deep moral awakening ; hence national movement in the true sense of the term was impossible.

At the outset the Polish revolution was marked by some display of resolution and enthusiasm. It was, however, a movement animated rather by ill-feeling and injured pride than originating in the irritation caused by intolerable oppression. It is true that the government was for the most part in the hands of the Russians, but there is no reason to suppose that it was in any way more unjust or more corrupt than the monarchical republic that had passed away. It cannot be said that the Russian administration prevented the Poles from recognising the defective results of their social development, from working to remove those defects, to relieve the burdens of the labouring classes, and to found a community endowed with some measure of vitality, the advantages of which were plainly to be seen in the neighbouring Prussian districts. The moderate independence which Alexander I had left to the Polish national assembly was greater than that possessed by the Prussian provincial assemblies. The Poles possessed the means for relieving the legislature of the arrogance of the nobles, whom no monarchy, however powerful, had been able to check, and thus freeing the people from the weight of an oppression far more intolerable than the arbitrary rule of individuals, officials, and commanders. Yet was there ever a time when the much-lauded patriotism of the Poles attempted to deal with questions of this nature ? So long as they failed to recognise their duty in this respect, their patriotism, founded upon a vanity which had risen to the point of monomania, was valueless to the nation at large.

Events proved that the struggle between Poland and Russia cannot be described as purposeless. The revolutionary party had long been quietly working, and when the progress of events in France became known, was immediately inflamed to action. Its first practical steps were generally attended with a high measure of success. After the storm of the *Belvedere* (29th November, 1830), occupied by the governor, the Grand Duke Constantine, this personage was so far intimidated as to evacuate Warsaw with his troops. On the 5th December, 1830, a provisional government was already in existence. On the 25th January, 1831,

the assembly declared the deposition of the House of Romanoff, and in February a Polish army of seventy-eight thousand men was confronting one hundred thousand Russians, who had been concentrated on the frontiers of Old Poland under Field-Marshal Hans Karl Diebitsch-Sabalkanski (p. 128), and his general staff officer, Karl Friedrich, Count of Toll. These achievements were the unaided work of the nobility; their military organisation had been quickly and admirably successful. Their commander-in-chief, Prince Michael Radziwill, who had served under Thaddeus Kosciuszko and Napoleon, had several bold and capable leaders at his disposal. If at the same time a popular rising had taken place throughout the country, and a people's war in the true sense of the word had been begun, it is impossible to estimate the extent of the difficulties with which the Russian government would have had to deal. Notwithstanding the victories of Bialolenka and Grochow (24th to 25th February, 1831), Diebitsch did not dare to advance upon Warsaw, fearing to be blockaded in that town; he waited for reinforcements, and even began negotiations, considering his position extremely unfavourable. However, Wolhynia and Podolia took no serious part in the revolt. The deputies of the Warsaw government found scattered adherents in every place they visited; but the spirit of enterprise and the capacity for struggle disappeared upon their departure. It was only in Lithuania that any extensive rising took place.

On 26th May, Diebitsch, in spite of a heroic defence, inflicted a severe defeat at Ostrolenka upon the main Polish army under Jan Boncza Skrzynecki. Henceforward the military advantage was decidedly on the side of the Russians. The outbreak of cholera, to which Diebitsch succumbed on the 10th June, might perhaps have produced a turn of fortune favourable to the Poles. Count Ivan Feodvitch Paskevitch-Erivanski (p. 127), who now assumed the chief command, had but fifty thousand men at his disposal, and would hardly have dared to advance from Pultusk if the numerous guerilla bands of the Poles had done their duty and had been properly supported by the population. Never, however, was there any general rising; terrified by the ravages of the cholera, the mob declined to obey the authorities, and their patriotism was not proof against their panic. Skrzynecki and his successor, Henry Dembinski, had fifty thousand men under their colours when they attempted to resist the advance of Paskevitch upon Warsaw; but within the capital itself a feud had broken out between the aristocrats and the democrats, who were represented among the five members of the civil government by the historian Joachim Lelevel, after the dictatorship of Joseph Chlopicki had not only abolished but utterly shattered the supremacy of the nobles. The government, at the head of which was the senatorial president, Prince Adam George Czartoryiski, was forced to resign, and the purely democratic administration which succeeded fell into general disrepute. Military operations suffered from lack of concerted leadership. The storm of Warsaw on the 6th and 7th of September, carried out by Paskevitch and Toll, with seventy thousand Russians against forty thousand Poles, decided the struggle. The smaller divisions still on foot, under the Genoese Girolamo Ramorino, Mathias Rybinski, Rozycki, and others, met with no support from the population, and were speedily forced to retreat beyond the frontier.

The Polish dream of freedom was at an end. The kingdom of Poland, to which Alexander I had granted nominal independence, became a Russian province in 1832 by a constitutional edict of the 26th of February; henceforward its history

was a history of oppression and of stern and cruel tyranny. However, the consequent suffering failed to produce any purifying effect upon the nation, though European liberalism, with extraordinary unanimity, manifested a sympathy which, in Germany, rose to the point of ridiculous and hysterical sentimentalism. It was by conspiracies, secret unions, and political intrigues of every kind, by degrading mendicancy and sponging, that these "patriots" thought to recover freedom and independence for their native land. Careless of the consequences and untaught by suffering, in 1846 they instigated revolts in Posen and in the little free State of Krakow (p. 81), which was occupied by Austria at the request of Russia, and eventually incorporated with the province of Galicia. The peasant revolt, which was characterised by unexampled ferocity and cruelty, made it plain to the world at large that it was not the Russian, the Austrian, or the Prussian whom the Polish peasant considered his deadly enemy and oppressor, but the Polish noble

C. THE REVOLTS IN MODENA AND THE CHURCH STATES

THE revolutionary party in connection with the revolution of July brought little to pass in Italy except abortive conspiracies and a general state of disturbance. The nation as a whole was inspired by no feeling of nationalism; the moderate party kept aloof from the intrigues of the Carbonari, who continued their activities in secret after the subjugation of Piedmont and Naples by the Austrians (1821; p. 117). The chief Austrian adherents were to be found in the Church States; there, however, an opposition union, that of the "Sanfedists," had been formed, with the countenance of the papacy. While striving for the maintenance of the papal power and the strengthening of religious feeling, the party occupied itself with the persecution of all liberals, and rivalled the Carbonari in the use of poison and dagger for the attainment of its ends. Cardinal Consalvi had availed himself of the help of the Sanfedists; but he allowed their power to extend only so far as it might be useful for the furtherance of his political objects. However, under the government of Pope Leo XII (1823-1829), the influence of the party increased considerably, and led the Cardinal Rivarola, the legate of Ravenna, to perpetrate cruelties upon the Carbonari in Faenza, a policy which contributed to increase the general ill-feeling with which Italy regarded the futile administration of the papacy.

Pius VIII (1829-1830) and Cardinal Albani supported the union of the Sanfedists; their continued attempts at aggrandisement resulted in the temporary success of the revolution in Bologna. This movement had been long prepared, and broke out on the 4th February, 1831, when Menotti in Parma gave the signal for action. The Duke of Modena, Francis IV (p. 115), imprisoned Menotti in his own house; feeling himself, however, too weak to deal with the movement, he fled into Austrian territory with his battalion of soldiers, and hastened to Vienna to appeal to Metternich for help. His example was followed by Pope Gregory XVI, elected on the 2d of February, 1831 (formerly Bartolommeo Cappelleri, general of the Camaldulensian order), whose supremacy was no longer recognised by the Umbrian towns which had broken into revolt, by the legations, or by the marks. The Austrian chancellor thought it advisable to maintain at any cost the protectorate exercised by the emperor in Italy; notwithstanding the threats of France, who declared that she would regard the advance of Austrian troops into the Church

States as a *casus belli*, he occupied Bologna (21st March), after seizing Ferrara and Parma in the first days of March. Ancona was also forced to surrender; in this town the provisional government of the Romagna had taken refuge, together with Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, son of the king of Holland and of Hortense Beauharnais, who first came into connection with the revolutionary party at this date. The task of the Austrians was then completed. On the 15th of July they retired from the papal States, but were obliged to return on the 24th of January, 1832, in consequence of the new revolt which had been brought about by the cruelties of the *papalini*, or papal soldiers. Louis Philippe attempted to lend some show of support to the Italian liberal party by occupying Ancona at the same time (22d February). Neither France nor Austria could oblige the pope to introduce the reforms which he had promised into his administration. The ruling powers of the Curia were apprehensive of the reduction of their revenues, and steadily thwarted all measures of reorganisation. When Gregory XVI enlisted two Swiss regiments for the maintenance of peace and order, the foreign troops evacuated his district in 1838.

D. THE EFFECTS OF THE JULY REVOLUTION UPON GERMANY

IN Germany the effects of the July revolution varied according to differences of political condition, and fully represented the divergences of feeling and opinion prevailing in the separate provinces. There was no uniformity of thought, nor had any tendency to nationalist movement become apparent. Liberal and radical groups were to be found side by side, divided by no strict frontier line; moreover, operations in common were inconceivable, for no common object of endeavour had yet been found. In particular federal provinces special circumstances gave rise to revolts intended to produce a change in the relations subsisting between rulers and ruled.

Brunswick was a scene of events as fortunate for that State as they were rapid in development. Charles, Duke of Brunswick, who had begun his rule in 1823 as a youth of nineteen years of age, showed himself totally incompetent to fulfil the duties of his high position. He conducted himself toward his relations of England and Hanover with an utter want of tact; and toward his subjects, whose constitutional rights he declined to recognise, he was equally haughty and dictatorial. After the events of July he had returned home from Paris, where he had spent his time in the grossest pleasures, and immediately oppressed the nobles and the citizens as ruthlessly as ever. Disturbances broke out in consequence on the 7th September, 1830, and so frightened the cowardly libertine that he evacuated his capital with the utmost possible speed and deserted his province. At the request of Prussia, his brother William, who had taken over the principality of Öls, offered himself to the people of Brunswick, who received him with acclamation. Notwithstanding the opposition of Metternich in the diet, the joint action of Prussia and England secured William's recognition as duke on the 2d of December, after Charles had made himself the laughing-stock of Europe by a desperate attempt to cross the frontier of Brunswick with a small body of armed ruffians.

The people of Hesse forced their elector, William II, to summon the representatives of the orders in September, 1830, and to assent to the constitution which they speedily drew up. On the 8th of January, 1831, the elector, in the presence

of the crown prince Frederick William, signed the documents and handed them to the orders; however, the people of Hesse were unable to secure constitutional government. They declined to allow the elector to reside among them in Cassel, with his mistress, Emilie Ortlöpp, whom he made countess of Reichenbach in 1821, and afterward countess of Lessonitz; they forced him to withdraw to Hanover and to appoint the crown prince as co-regent (30th September, 1831), but found they had merely fallen out of the frying-pan into the fire. In August, 1831, Frederick William I married Gertrude Lehmann, *née* Falkenstein, the wife of a lieutenant, who had been divorced by her husband in Bonn (made countess of Schaumburg in 1831, and princess of Hanau in 1853); in the result he quarrelled with his mother, the princess Augusta of Prussia, and with the orders, who espoused the cause of the injured electress. He was a malicious and stubborn tyrant, who broke his plighted word, deliberately introduced changes into the constitution through his minister, Hans Daniel von Hassenpflug, whom he supported in his struggle with the orders until the minister also insulted him and opposed his efforts at unlimited despotism. Hassenpflug left the service of Hesse in July, 1837, first entering the civil service in Sigmaringen (November, 1838), then that of Luxemburg (June, 1839), ultimately taking a high place in the public administration of Prussia, 1841. The people of Hesse then became convinced that their position had rather deteriorated than otherwise; the Landtag was continually at war with the government, and was repeatedly dissolved. The liberals went to great trouble to claim their rights in endless appeals and proclamations to the federal council, but were naturally and invariably the losers in the struggle with the unscrupulous regent, who became elector and gained the enjoyment of the revenues from the demesnes and the trust property by the death of his father on the 20th November, 1847. The liberals were not anxious to resort to any violent steps which might have provoked the federal council to interference of an unpleasant kind; they were also unwilling to act in concert with the radicals.

Even more helpless and timorous was the behaviour of the Hanoverians, when their king, Ernst August, who had contracted debts amounting to several million thalers as Duke of Cumberland, was so narrow-minded as to reject on December 26, 1833, the constitution which had been arranged after long and difficult negotiations between the nobility and the representatives of the peasants. Seven professors of Göttingen (Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, Wilhelm Weber and Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Heinrich Ewald and Wilh. Ed. Albrecht) protested against the patent of November 1, 1837, which absolved the State officials from their oaths of fidelity to the constitution. The State prosecution and merciless dismissal of these professors aroused a general outcry throughout Germany against the effrontery and obstinacy of the Guelphs; none the less the orders, who had been deprived of their rights, were too timid to make a bold and honourable stand against the powers oppressing them. A number of the electors consented, in accordance with the decrees of 1819, which were revived by the king, to carry through the elections for the general assembly of the orders, thereby enabling the king to maintain that in form at least his State was constitutionally governed in the spirit of the act of federation. In vain did that indomitable champion of the popular rights, Johann Karl Tertern Stüve, burgomaster of Osnabrück, protest before the federal council against the illegal imposition of taxes by the Hanoverian government. The prevailing disunion enabled the faith-

less ruler to secure his victory; the compliance of his subjects gave a fairly plausible colouring to his arbitrary explanation of these unconstitutional acts; his policy was interpreted as a return to the old legal constitution, a return adopted, and therefore ratified, by the orders themselves.

The Saxons had displayed far greater inclination to riot and conspiracy; however, in that kingdom the transition from class privilege to constitutional government was completed without any serious rupture of the good relations between the people and the government; both King Anton, and also his nephew Friedrich August (II), whom he had appointed co-regent, possessed sufficient insight to recognise the advantages of a constitution; the co-operation of large sections of the community would define the distribution of those burdens which State necessities inevitably laid upon the shoulders of individuals. They supported the minister Bernhard August of Lindenau, one of the wisest statesmen in Germany under the old reactionary régime, when he introduced the constitution of September 4, 1831, which provided a sufficient measure of representation for the citizen classes, and protected the peasants from defraudation; they continued their support as long as he possessed the confidence of the second chamber. When his progressive tendencies proved incompatible with the favour which the Saxon court attempted to show the Catholic Church, the two princes considered in 1843 that they were able to dispense with his services. The great rise in prosperity manifested in every department of public life under his government was invariably ascribed to his statesmanship and capacity.

Not entirely disconnected are those political phenomena which occurred in Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Bavarian Palatinate, as results of the changes which had been brought to pass in France. In these provinces it became plain that liberalism and the legislation it promoted was incapable of satisfying the people as a whole, or of creating a body politic sufficiently strong to secure the progress of sound economic development. Nowhere throughout Germany was the parliamentary spirit so native to the soil as in Baden, where the democrats, under the leadership of the Freiburg professors Karl von Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker, the Heidelberg jurist Karl Joseph Mittermayer, and the Mannheim high justice Johann Adam von Itzstein, had become predominant in the second chamber. The constitutions of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt gave full license to the expression of public opinion in the press and at public meetings. But liberalism was impressed with the insufficiency of the means provided for the expression and execution of the popular will; it did not attempt to create an administrative policy which might have brought it into line with the practical needs of the poorer classes: it hoped to attain its political ends by unceasing efforts to limit the power of the crown and by extending the possibilities of popular representation. The result was distrust on the part of the dynasties, the government officials, and the classes in immediate connection with them, while the discontented classes, who were invariably too numerous even in districts so blessed by nature as these, were driven into the arms of the radical agitators, who had immigrated from France, and in particular from Strassburg. The very considerable freedom allowed to the press had fostered the growth of a large number of obscure publications, which existed only to preach the rejection of all governmental measures, to discredit the monarchical party, and to exasperate the working classes against their more prosperous superiors. The numerous Polish

refugees who were looking for some convenient and exciting form of occupation, requiring no great expenditure of labour, were exactly the tools and emissaries required by the leaders of the revolutionary movement, and to them the general sympathy with the fate of Poland had opened every door. The first disturbances broke out in Hesse-Darmstadt at the end of September, 1830, as the result of incorporation in the Prussian customs union, and were rapidly suppressed by force of arms by the minister Karl du Bas, Freiherr du Thil; the animosity of the mob was, however, purposely fostered and exploited by the chiefs of a democratic conspiracy who were preparing for a general rising.

In May, 1832, the radicals prepared a popular meeting at the castle of Ham-bach, near Neustadt on the Hardt. No disguise was made of their intention to unite the people for the overthrow of the throne and the erection of a democratic republic. The unusual occurrence of a popular manifestation proved a great attraction. The turgid outpourings, seasoned with violent invectives against every form of moderation, emanating from those crapulous scribblers who were transported with delight at finding in the works of Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Baruch Börnes inducements to high treason and anti-monarchical feeling, inflamed minds only too accessible to passion and excitement. As the vintage advanced feeling grew higher, and attracted the students, including the various student corps which had regained large numbers of adherents, the remembrance of the persecutions of the twenties having been gradually obliterated (p. 199). At Christmas time, 1832, an assembly of the accredited representatives of these corps in Stuttgart were induced to accede to the proposal to share in the forthcoming popular rising. The result was that after the émeute set on foot by the democrats in Frankfort-on-Main on April 3, 1833, when an attempt was made to seize the federal palace and the bullion there stored, it was the students who chiefly had to pay for their lack of common sense and irresponsibility; the measures of intimidation and revenge undertaken by the German government at the demand of Metternich fell chiefly and terribly on the heads of the German students. No distinction was made between the youthful aberrations of these corps, which were inspired merely by an overpowering sense of national feeling, and the bloodthirsty designs of malevolent intriguers (for example, of the priest Friedrich Ludwig Weidig in Butzbach) or the unscrupulous folly of revolutionary monomaniacs, such as the Göttingen privat-dozent Von Rauschenplat. Hundreds of young men were consigned for years to the tortures of horrible and pestilential dungeons by the cold-blooded cruelty of red-tape indifferentism. The brilliant narratives of Fritz Reuter in "*Aus seiner Festungszeit*" display by no means the worst of the deeds of cruelty then committed by Prussian officials. The punitive measures of justice then enforced, far from creating a salutary feeling of fear, increased the existing animosity, as is proved by the horrors of the Revolution of 1848.

E. THE NEW KINGDOM OF GREECE UNDER OTTO I

AFTER the Porte had given its consent to the protocol of February 3, 1830 (cf. p. 127), the great powers of Europe addressed themselves to the task of reorganising the Greek kingdom. Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, even Acarnania, remained under Turkish supremacy; but a considerable portion of the Greek people forming a national entity, though limited in extent, were now able to begin a new

and free existence as a completely independent State. This success had been attained by the remarkable tenacity of the Greek nation, by the continued support of England, and above all by the pressure which the Russian co-religionists of the Greeks had brought to bear upon the Turkish military power. The work of liberation was greatly hindered by the diplomacy of the other great powers, and particularly by the support given to the Turks, the old arch enemies of Christendom, by Catholic Austria. To Austria it is due that the Greek question has remained unsolved to the present day; that instead of developing its inherent strength the Greek nation is still occupied with the unification of its different tribes, and that the Turkish State, which was hostile to civilization, and has justified its existence only by means of the bayonets of Anatolian regiments, still exists on sufferance as a foreign body within the political system of Europe. Once again the obstacle to a thorough and comprehensive reform of the political conditions within the Balkan peninsula was the puerile fear of the power inherent in a self-determining nation, and, in a secondary degree, a desire for the maintenance or extension of influence which might be useful in the peninsula. The true basis of such influence was not as yet understood. It is not the statesmanship of ambassadors and attachés which gives a nation influence abroad, but the power of the nation to assert its will when its interest so demands. National influence rests upon the forces which the State can command, upon the industry of its traders, the value and utility of its products, the creative power of its labour and capital.

The Greeks were now confronted with the difficult task of concentrating their forces, accommodating themselves to a new political system, and making their independence a practical reality; for this purpose it was necessary to create new administrative machinery, and for this there was an entire dearth of the necessary material. The problem was further complicated by the fact that a desperately contested war had not only unsettled the country, but reduced it almost to desolation. The noblest and the bravest of the nation had fallen upon the battlefields or under the attacks of the Janissaries and Albanians, had been slaughtered and hurled into the flames of burning towns and villages, after the extortion of their money, the destruction of their property, and the ruin of their prosperity. The contribution of the European powers to facilitate the work of reconstruction consisted of a king under age and sixty million francs at a high rate of interest. Prince Leopold of Coburg, the first candidate for the Greek throne, had unfortunately renounced his project; he would have proved a capable and benevolent ruler, and would perhaps have adapted himself to the peculiar characteristics of Greek life and thought, with the eventual result of providing a starting-point for the introduction of more civilized and more modern methods. In consequence of his retirement, the presidency of the count Johannes Capodistrias (Kapo d'Istrias) continued for some time, until the murder of this statesman, who had deserved well of his people (9th October, 1831); then followed the short reign of his brother Augustine, who did not enjoy the recognition of the constitutional party, the Syntagmatikoi.

Ultimately, by working on the vanity of King Louis of Bavaria, European diplomacy persuaded this monarch to authorise his son Otto, born on the 1st of June, 1815, to accept the Greek throne. The government was to be carried on by three Bavarian officials until the youth attained his majority. This settlement was brought about by the London "Quadruple Convention" on the 7th May, 1832, and

is one of the most ill-considered pieces of work ever performed by the so-called statesmen of the old school. Of the young prince's capacity as a ruler not even his father can have had the smallest idea; yet at so early an age he was handed over to fate, to sacrifice the best years of his life in a hopeless struggle for power and recognition. The Greeks were fooled with promises impossible of fulfilment, and inspired with mistrust and hatred for their "benefactors." King Otto and his councillors had not the patience to secure through the national assembly a gradual development of such conditions as would have made constitutional government possible; they would not devote themselves to the task of superintendence, of pacification, of disentangling the various complications, and restraining party action within the bounds of legality. The Bavarian officials, who might perhaps have done good service in Würzburg or Amberg, were unable to accommodate themselves to their Greek environment; their mistakes aroused a passionate animosity against the Germans, resulting in their complete expulsion from Hellas in 1843. On the 16th March, 1844, King Otto was obliged to agree to the introduction of a new constitutional scheme, the advantages of which were hidden to him by the fact that it merely aroused new party struggles and parliamentary discord. Consequently he did not observe this constitution with sufficient conscientiousness to regain the national respect. Disturbances in the East and the Crimean War proved so many additional obstacles to his efforts, which were ended by a revolt in October, 1862; the Greeks declined to admit their king within the Piræus as he was returning from the Morea, and thus unceremoniously dismissed him from their service.

4. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FROM 1830-1850

A. THE RELIGIOUS FERMENT

THE great revolutions which had taken place in the political world since 1798 were not calculated to produce satisfaction either among contemporaries or posterity. Disillusionment and fear of the degeneration of human nature, distrust of the capacity and the value of civic and political institutions, were the legacy from these movements. As men lost faith in political movement as a means of ameliorating the conditions of life or improving morality, so did they yearn for the contentments and the consolations of religion. "Many believe, all would like to believe," said Alexis de Tocqueville of France after the July revolution. However, the germs of piety, "which, though uncertain in its objects, is powerful enough in its effects," had already sprung to life during the Napoleonic period. Throughout the nineteenth century there is a general yearning for the restoration of true Christian feeling (cf. Vol. VII, p. 342). It was a desire that evoked attempts at the formation of religious societies often of a very extraordinary nature, without attaining any definite object; on the other hand, it opened the possibility of a magnificent development to the power of Catholicism. The progress of the movement has made it plain that only a church of this nature can be of vital importance to the history of the world, and that the revival of Christianity can be brought about upon no smaller basis than that which is held by this church. The force of the movement which resulted in the intensification of papal supremacy enables us to estimate the power of reaction which was bound to occur, though the oppression of

this supremacy will in turn become intolerable and the foundations of ultramontanism and of its successes be shattered.

The restoration of power to the Catholic Church was due to the Jesuit order, which had gradually acquired complete and unlimited influence over the papacy; for this reason the success attained was purely artificial. Jesuitism has no ideals; for it, religion is merely a department of politics. By the creation of a hierarchy within a temporal State it hopes to secure full scope for the beneficent activity of Christian doctrine confined within the trammels of dogma. For this purpose Jesuitism can employ any and every form of political government. It has no special preference for monarchy, though it simulates such a preference for dynasties which it can use for its own purposes; it is equally ready to accommodate itself to the conditions of republican and parliamentary government. Materialism is no hindrance to the fulfilment of its task, the steady increase of the priestly power; for the grossest materialism is accompanied by the grossest superstition, and this latter is one of its most valuable weapons. While fostering imbecility and insanity, it is also able to share in the hobbies of science, criticism, and research. One maiden marked with the *stigmata* can repair the damage done to society by the well-meaning efforts of a hundred learned fathers.

On the 7th of August, 1814, Pope Pius VII issued the encyclical *Sollicitudo omnium*, reconstituting the Society of Jesus, which retained its original constitution and those privileges which it had acquired since its foundation (p. 91). At the congress of Vienna Cardinal Consalvi had succeeded in convincing the Catholic and Protestant princes that the Jesuit order would prove a means of support to the legitimists, and would, in close connection with the papacy, undertake the interests of the royal houses, — a device successfully employed even at the present day. This action of the papacy, a step as portentous for the destinies of Europe as any of those taken during the unhappy years of the first peace of Paris, appeared at first comparatively unimportant. The new world power escaped notice until the highly gifted Dutchman, Johann Philip of Roethaan, took over the direction on July 9, 1829, and won the Germans over to the order. The complaisance with which the French and the Italians lent their services for the attainment of specific objects deserves acknowledgment. But even more valuable than their diplomatic astuteness in the struggle against intellectual freedom were the blind unreasoning obedience and the strong arms of Flanders, Westphalia, the Rhine districts, and Bavaria. At the outset of the thirties the society possessed, in the persons of numerous young priests, the implements requisite for destroying that harmony of the churches which was founded upon religious toleration and mutual forbearance. By the same means the struggle against secular governments could be begun, where such powers had not already submitted by concordat to the Curia, as Bavaria had done in 1817 (p. 106).

The struggle raged with special fury in Prussia, though this State, considering its very modest pecuniary resources, had endowed the new-created Catholic bishoprics very handsomely. The Jesuits declined to tolerate a friendly agreement in things spiritual between the Catholics and Protestants in the Rhine territories, to allow the celebration of mixed marriages with the "passive assistance" of the Catholic pastor; they objected to the teaching of George Hermes, professor in the Catholic faculty at the new-created university of Bonn, who propounded to his numerous pupils the doctrine that belief in revelation necessarily implied the

exercise of reason, and that the dictates of reason must not therefore be contradicted by dogma.

After the death of the excellent archbishop of Cologne, Count Ferdinand August von Spiegel zum Desenberg (died August 2, 1835), the blind confidence of the government elevated the prebendary Klemens August Freiherr von Droste-Vischering to the Rhenish archbishopric. He had been removed from the general vicariate at Münster as a punishment for his obstinacy. In defiance of his previous promises, the ambiguity of which had passed unnoticed by the minister Von Altenstein, the archbishop arbitrarily broke off the agreement concerning mixed marriages arranged by his predecessor. His repeated transgression of his powers and his high-handed treatment of the Bonn professors obliged the Prussian government to pronounce his deposition on November 14, 1837, and forcibly to remove him from Cologne. The Curia now protested in no measured terms against Prussia, and displayed a galling contempt for the Prussian ambassador, Christian Josias von Bunsen, who had exchanged the profession of archæology for that of diplomacy. Prince Metternich had formerly been ready enough to claim the good services of the Berlin cabinet whenever he required their support; his instructive diplomatic communications were now withheld, and with some secret satisfaction he observed the humiliation of his ally by Roman statecraft. The embarrassment of the Prussian administration was increased both by the attitude of the liberals, who with doctrinaire shortsightedness disputed the right of the government to arrest the bishop, and by the extension of the Catholic opposition to the ecclesiastical province of Rosen-Gnesen, where the insubordination and disloyalty of the archbishop, Martin von Dunin, necessitated the imprisonment of that prelate also (cf. Vol. VII, p. 344).

Those ecclesiastical dignitaries who were under Jesuit influence proceeded to persecute such supporters of peace as the prince-bishop of Breslau, Count Leopold of Sedlnitzky (1840), employing every form of inter-collegiate pressure which the labours of centuries had been able to excogitate. In many cases congregations were ordered to submit to tests of faith, with which they eventually declined compliance. A more vigorous, and in its early stages a more promising, resistance arose within the bosom of the Church itself. This movement was aroused by the exhibition in October, 1844, of the "holy coat" in Trèves, a relic supposed to be one of Christ's garments, an imposture which had long before been demonstrated; an additional cause was the disorderly pilgrimage thereto, promoted by Bishop Wilhelm Arnoldi. The chaplain, Johannes Ronge, characterised the exhibition as a scandal, and denounced the "idolatrous worship of relics" as one of the causes of the spiritual and political humiliation of Germany. He thereby became, together with the chaplain, Johann Czerski in Schneidemühl (Posen), the founder of a reform movement, which at once assumed a character serious enough to arouse hopes that the Catholic Church would now undergo the necessary process of purification and separation, and would break away from the ruinous influence of Jesuitism. About two hundred "German Catholic" congregations were formed in the course of the year 1845, and a Church council was held at Leipsic from March 23 to 26, with the object of finding a common basis for the constitution of the new Church. However, it proved impossible to arrange a compromise between the insistence upon free thought of the one party and the desire for dogma and ritual manifested by the other. What was wanted was the

uniting power of a new idea, brilliant enough to attract the universal gaze and to distract attention from established custom and its separatist consequences. Great and strong characters were wanting, though these were indispensable for the direction and organisation of the different bodies who were attempting to secure their liberation from one of the most powerful tyrants that has ever imposed the scourge of slavery upon an intellectually dormant humanity. As long as each party went its own way, proclaimed its own war-cry to be the only talisman of victory, and adopted new idols as its ensign, so long were they overpowered by the determined persistency of the Society of Jesus.

Within the Protestant churches also a movement for intellectual independence arose, directed against the suppression of independent judgment, and the subjugation of thought to the decrees of the "Superiors," a party comprising the Berlin theologian Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg and the supporters of his newspaper, the "Evangelical Church" (Vol. VII, p. 346). The movement was based upon the conviction that belief should be controlled by the dictates of reason and not by ecclesiastical councils. The Prussian government limited the new movement to the utmost of its power; at the same time, it was so far successful that the authorities avoided the promulgation of decrees likely to excite disturbance and practised a certain measure of toleration. The revelations made by the scientific criticism of the evangelical school gave a further impulse in this direction (Vol. VII, pp. 344 and 350), as these results were utilised by David Friedrich Strauss in his "Life of Jesus" (1835), and in his "Christian Dogma, explained in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science" (1840-1841), — works which made an epoch in the literary world, and the importance of which remained undiminished by any measures of ecclesiastical repression.

Among the Romance peoples religious questions were of less importance than among the Germans. In Spain, such questions were treated purely as political matters; the foundation of a few Protestant congregations by Manuel Matamoros exercised no appreciable influence upon the intellectual development of the Spaniards. The apostacy of the Roman prelate Luigi Desancti to the Waldenses and the appearance of scattered evangelical societies produced no effect upon the position of the Catholic Church in Italy. In France, the liberal tendencies introduced by Alphonse de Lamartine and Victor Hugo remained a literary fashion; the efforts of Père Jean Baptiste Lacordaire and of Count Charles Forbes de Tryon-Montalembert to found national freedom upon papal absolutism were nullified by the general direction of Roman policy.

There was, however, one phenomenon deserving a closer attention, — a phenomenon of higher importance than any displayed by the various attempts at religious reform during the nineteenth century, for the reason that its evolution displays the stages which mark the gradual process of liberation from Jesuitism. Hugues Félicité Robert de Lamennais began his priestly career as the fiery champion of the papacy, to which he ascribed infallibility. He hoped to secure the recognition of its practical supremacy over all Christian governments. Claimed by Leo X as the "last father of the Church," he furiously opposed the separatism of the French clergy, which was based on the "Gallican articles;" he attacked the government of Charles X as being "a horrible despotism," and founded after the July revolution a Christian-revolutionary periodical, "L'Avenir" (p. 129), with the motto, "*Dieu et Liberté — le Pape et le Peuple*;" by his theory, not only was the Church

to be independent of the State, it was also to be independent of State support, and the clergy were to be maintained by the voluntary offerings of the faithful. This demand for the separation of Church and State necessarily brought Lamennais into connection with political democracy; hence it was but a step to the position that the Church should be reconstructed upon a democratic basis. This fact was patent not only to the French episcopate, but also to Pope Gregory XVI, who condemned the doctrines of the "father of the Church," and, upon his formal submission, interdicted him from issuing any further publications. Lamennais, like Arnold of Brescia or Girolamo Savonarola in earlier times, now recognised that this papacy was incompetent to fulfil the lofty aims with which he had credited it; he rejected it in his famous "*paroles d'un croyant*" (1834), and found his way to that form of Christianity which is based upon brotherly love and philanthropy, and aims at procuring an equal share for men in the enjoyment of this world's goods.

B. THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL QUESTION

THAT Christian socialism to which Lamennais had been led by reason and experience was a by-product of the numerous attempts to settle the pressing question of social reform, attempts begun simultaneously in France and England, and resulting in a movement which soon affected every nation. The great revolution had accomplished nothing in this direction. The sum total of achievement hitherto was represented by certain dismal experiences of "State help" in the distribution of bread and the subsidising of bakers. The phrase inscribed in the "Cahiers" of the deputies of the third order in 1789 had now been realised in fact: "the voice of freedom has no message for the heart of the poor who die of hunger." F. N. Babeuf, the only French democrat who professed communistic views, was not understood by the masses, and his martyrdom, one of the most unnecessary political murders of the Directory (Vol. VII, p. 398), had aroused no movement among those for whom it was undergone. The general introduction of machinery in many manufactures, together with the more distant relations subsisting between employer and workman, had resulted in an astounding increase of misery among the journeymen labourers; the working classes, condemned to hopeless poverty and want, and threatened with the deprivation of the very necessities of existence, broke into riot and insurrection; factories were repeatedly destroyed in England at the beginning of the century; the silk weavers of Lyons (1831) and the weavers of Silesia (1844) rose against their masters. These facts aroused the consideration of the means by which the appalling miseries of a fate wholly undeserved could be obviated.

Among the wild theories and fantastic aberrations of Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Count of Saint-Simon, were to be found many ideas well worth consideration which could not fail to act as a stimulus to further thought. The pamphlet of 1814, "*Réorganisation de la Société Européenne*," had received no consideration from the congress of Vienna, for it maintained that congresses were not the proper instrument for the permanent restoration of social peace and order. It was, however, plainly obvious that even after the much-vaunted "restoration" the lines of social cleavage had rapidly widened, and that the majority were oppressed with crying injustice. Not wholly in vain did Saint-Simon repeatedly appeal to manufacturers, industrial potentates, business men, and financiers, with warnings against

the prevailing sweating system; not in vain did he assert in his "Nouveau Christianisme" (1825; cf. Vol. VII, p. 399), that every church in existence had stultified its Christianity by suppressing the loftiest teaching of Christ, the doctrine of brotherly love. His ideas poured forth in tumultuous disorder without logical connection, but they bore their fruit; they gave an impulse to the examination of the ultimate basis of inheritance, of individual proprietorship, and of other institutions indissolubly connected with old social systems then prevailing, but of questionable value for the social transformations of the future. No immediate influence was exerted upon the social development of Europe by Barthélemy Prosper Constantin's proposals for the emancipation of the flesh (Vol. VII, p. 401), and for the foundation of a new "theocratic-industrial State," or by Charles Fourier's project of the "Phalanstère," a new social community having all things in common (*ibid.*, p. 402), or by the utopian dreams of communism expounded by Étienne Cabet (*ibid.*, p. 403) in his "Voyage en Icarie" (1842). Such theorising merely cleared the way for more far-seeing thinkers, who, from their knowledge of existing institutions, could demonstrate their capacity of transformation.

In England, Robert Owen (Vol. VII, p. 373), the manager of the great spinning-works at New Lanark in Scotland, was the first to attempt the practical realisation of a philosophical social system. The experiment at first appeared successful, but its futility became apparent the moment that it passed the narrow limits of a single undertaking under the direction of a single personality, and came in contact with the movement for the subversion of class interests and conditions of life, and for the destruction of those fundamental religious convictions which are inseparable from the life of thought and feeling. In spite of these aberrations, Owen's theories may be pronounced a definite advance, as demonstrating that capitalism as a basis of economics was not founded upon any law of nature, but must be considered as the result of an historical development, and that competition is not an indispensable stimulus to production, but is an obstacle to the true utilisation of labour.

The facts thus ascertained were worked into a socialist system by the efforts of a German Jew, Karl Marx, born in 1818 at Trèves (Vol. VII, p. 411), a man fully equipped with Hegelian criticism, and possessed by an extraordinary yearning to discover the causes which had brought existing conditions of life to pass, a characteristic due, according to Werner Sombart, to "hypertrophy of intellectual energy." His theories exhibited no trace of the utopianism which had inspired the systems of French social reformers and communists. He freed the social movement from the revolutionary spirit which had been its leading characteristic hitherto. He placed one definite object before the movement, the "nationalisation of means of production," the method of attaining this end being a vigorous class struggle. Expelled from German soil by the Prussian police, he was forced to take up residence in Paris, and afterward in London. There he gained an accurate knowledge of the social conditions of Western Europe, devoting special attention to the important developments of the English trades-union struggles (Vol. VII, p. 378), and thus became specially qualified as the founder and guide of an international organisation of the proletariat, which he had himself explained to be an indispensable condition of victory in the class struggle he had proclaimed. In collaboration with Friedrich Engel of Elberfeld he created the doctrine of socialism, which has remained the basis of the socialist movement to the end of the nineteenth century. That movement chiefly centred in Germany, after Ferdinand Lassalle had assured its triumph in the sixties (Vol. VII, p. 415).

The social movement exerted but little political influence upon the events arising out of the July revolution ; its influence, again, upon the revolutions of the year 1848 was almost inappreciable. It became, however, an important modifying factor among the different democratic parties, who were looking to political revolution for some transformation of existing public rights, and for some alteration of the proprietary system in their favour.

5. THE GERMAN FEDERATION AND THE GERMAN CUSTOMS UNION

A. GERMANY AS REPRESENTED BY THE DIET

DURING the period subsequent to the Congress of Vienna a highly important modification in the progress of German history took place, in spite of the fact that such expressions of popular feeling as had been manifested through the existing constitutional outlets had effected but little alteration in social and political life. This modification was not due to the diet, which, properly speaking, existed to protect the common interests of the German States collectively : it was the work of the Prussian government, in which was concentrated the keenest insight into the various details of the public administration, and which had therefore become a centre of attraction for minds inclined to political thought and for statesmen of large ideals. In Germany the political movement had been preceded by a period of economic progress ; the necessary preliminary to such a movement, a certain level of prosperity and financial power, had thus already been attained. This achievement was due to the excellent qualities of most of the German races, to their industry, their thrift, and their godliness. The capital necessary to the economic development of a people could only be gradually recovered and amassed after the enormous losses of the French war, by petty landowners and the small handicraftsmen. However, this unconscious national co-operation would not have availed to break the fetters in which the economic life of the nation had been chained for three hundred years by provincial separatism. Of this oppression the disunited races were themselves largely unconscious ; what one considered a burden, his neighbour regarded as an advantage. Of constitutional forms, of the process of economic development, the nation severally and collectively had long since lost all understanding, and it was reserved for those to spread such knowledge who had acquired it by experience and intellectual toil.

These two qualifications were wanting to the Austrian government, which had formed the German federation according to its own ideas. Even those who admire the diplomatic skill of Prince Metternich must admit that the Austrian chancellor displayed surprising ignorance and ineptitude in dealing with questions of internal administration. His interest was entirely concentrated upon matters of immediate importance to the success of his foreign policy, upon the provision of money and recruits ; of the necessities, the merits and the defects of the inhabitants of that empire to which he is thought to have rendered such signal service, of the forces dormant in the State over which he ruled, he had not the remotest idea. The members of the bureaucracy which he had collected and employed were, with few exceptions, men of limited intelligence and poor education ; cowardly and subservient to authority, they were so utterly incompetent to initiate any improvement of exist-

ing circumstances, that the first preliminary to any work of a generally beneficial nature was the task of breaking down their opposition. The archduke John, the brother of the emperor Francis, a man fully conscious of the forces at work beneath the surface, a man of steady and persistent energy, suffered many a bitter experience in his constant attempts to improve technical and scientific training, to benefit agriculture and the iron trades, co-operative enterprises, and savings banks. The emperor Francis and his powerful minister had one aversion in common, which implied unconditional opposition to every form of human endeavour, — an aversion to pronounced ability. Metternich's long employment of Gentz (cf. the explanation to the plate facing p. 74) is to be explained by the imperative need for an intellect so pliable and so reliable in its operations, and also by the fact that Gentz would do anything for money; for a position of independent activity, for a chance of realising his own views or aims, he never had any desire. Men of independent thought, such as Johann Philipp of Wessenberg, were never permanently retained, even for foreign service. This statesman belonged to the little band of Austrian officials who entertained theories and proffered suggestions upon the future and the tasks before the Hapsburg monarchy, its position within the federation, and upon further federal developments. His opinion upon questions of federal reform was disregarded, and he fell into bad odour at the London conference, when his convictions led him to take an independent position with reference to the quarrel between Belgium and Holland (p. 146).

The fate of the German federation lay entirely in the hands of Austria, and Austria is exclusively responsible for the ultimate fiasco of the federation, which she eventually deserted. The form and character of this alliance, as also its after development, were the work of Metternich. People and government asked for bread, and he gave them a stone. He conceived the State to be merely an institution officered and governed by police. When more than twenty millions of Germans declared themselves a commercial corporation with reference to the world at large, with the object of equalising the conditions of commercial competition, of preventing an overwhelming influx of foreign goods, and of opening the markets of the world to their own producers, in that memorable year of 1834 the Austrian government, after inviting the federal representatives to months of conferences in Vienna, could find nothing of more pressing importance to bring forward than proposals for limiting the effectiveness of the provincial constitutions as compared with the State governments, for increased severity in the censorship of the press, and for the surveillance of university students and their political activity. Student interference in political life is utterly unnecessary, and can only be a source of mischief; but Metternich and his school were unable to grasp the fact that such interference ceases so soon as political action takes a practical turn. If Austria was disappointed in her expectations of the German federal States, her feelings originated only in the fact that Prussia, together with Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, and Baden entertained far loftier views than she herself upon the nature of State existence and the duties attaching thereto.

B. THE CUSTOMS UNION

THE kingdom of Prussia had by no means developed in accordance with the expectations entertained by Metternich in 1813 and 1815; it was a military State,

strong enough to repel any possible Russian onslaught, but badly "rounded off," and composed of such heterogeneous fragments of territory that it could not in its existing form aspire to predominance in Germany. Prussia was as yet unconscious of her high calling; she was wholly spellbound by Austrian federal policy, but none the less she had completed a task incomparably the most important national achievement since the attainment of religious freedom,—the foundation of the pan-Germanic customs union. Joh. Friedrich von Cotta, the greatest German book and newspaper publisher, and an able and important business man, had been able to shield the loyal and thoroughly patriotic views of Ludwig I of Bavaria from the inroads of his occasionally violent paroxysms of personal vanity, and had secured the execution of the act of May 27, 1829, providing for a commercial treaty between Bavaria-Wurtemberg and Prussia with Hesse-Darmstadt, the first two States to join a federal customs union. The community of interests between North and South Germany, in which only far-seeing men, such as Friedrich List (p. 113), the national economist, had believed, then became so incontestable a fact that the commercial treaty took the form of a customs union, implying an area of uniform economic interests. The "Central German Union," which was intended to dissolve the connection between Prussia and South Germany and to neutralise the advantages thence derived, rapidly collapsed. It became clear that economic interests are stronger than political, and the dislike amounting to aversion of Prussia entertained by the Central German governments became friendliness as soon as anything was to be gained by a change of attitude,—in other words, when it seemed possible to fill the State exchequers. The electorate of Hesse had taken the lead in opposing the Hohenzollern policy of customs federation; as early as 1831 she recognised that her policy of commercial isolation spelt ruin. A similar process led to the dissolution of the so-called "Einbeck convention" of March 27, 1830, which had included Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, and the electorate of Hesse. Saxony joined Prussia on March 30, as did Thüringen on May 11, 1833; on May 22, 1833, the Bavarian-Wurtemberg and the Prussian groups were definitely united. On January 1, 1834, the union included eighteen German States, with twenty-three millions of inhabitants; in 1840 these numbers had risen to twenty-three States with twenty-seven millions of inhabitants. In 1841 the union was joined by Brunswick, and by Luxemburg in 1842; Hanover did not come in until September 7, 1851, when she ceased to be an open market for English goods. The expenses of administration and of guarding the frontiers were met from a common fund. The profits were divided among the States within the union in proportion to their population. In 1834 the profits amounted to fifteen silver groschen (one mark fifty pf.) per head; in 1840, to more than twenty silver groschen (two marks).

In the secondary and petty States public opinion had been almost entirely opposed to such unions. Prussia was afraid of the Saxon manufacturing industries, and Leipzig foresaw the decay of her great markets. The credit of completing this great national achievement belongs almost exclusively to the governments and to the expert advisers whom they called in (cf. p. 114). Austria now stood without the boundary of German economic unity. Metternich recognised too late that he had mistaken the power of this union. Proposals were mooted for the junction of Austria with the allied German States, but met with no response from the industrial and manufacturing interests. The people imagined that a process of division

was even then beginning which was bound to end in political separation; but the importance of Prussia, which naturally took the lead in conducting the business of the union, notwithstanding the efforts of other members to preserve their own predominance and independence, became obvious even to those who had originally opposed the conclusion of the convention. The Wurtemberg deputy and author, Paul Pfizer, recognised the necessity of a political union of the German States under Prussian hegemony, and saw that the separation of Austria was inevitable. In 1845, in his "Thoughts upon Rights, State and Church," he expounded the programme which was eventually adopted by the whole nation, though only after long struggles and severe trials. "The conditions," he there said, "of German policy as a whole seem to point to a national alliance with Prussia and to an international alliance with the neighbouring Germanic States and with Austria, which is a first-class power even apart from Germany. There can be no question of abolishing all political connection between Germany and Austria. In view of the danger threatening Germany on the east and west, nothing would be more foolish; no enemy or rival of Germany can be allowed to become paramount in Bohemia and Central Germany. But the complete incorporation of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria, together with that of the Tyrol, Carinthia, and Styria, would be less advantageous to Germany than the retention of these countries by a power connected with her by blood relationship and an offensive and defensive alliance, a power whose arm can reach beyond the Alps on the one hand and to the Black Sea on the other."

C. THE BEGINNINGS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV

It was now necessary for Prussia to come to some agreement with the German people and the State of the Hapsburgs. For more than three centuries the latter had, in virtue of their dynastic power, become the representatives of the Romano-German Empire. Their historical position enabled them to lay claim to the leadership of the federation, though their power in this respect was purely external. Certain obstacles, however, lay in the way of any settlement. It was difficult to secure any feeling of personal friendship between the South Germans and the Prussians of the old province. Some measure of political reform was needed, as well for the consolidation of existing powers of defence as for the provision of security to the individual States which might then form some check upon the severity of Prussian administration. Finally, there was the peculiar temperament of Frederick William IV, who had succeeded to the government of Prussia upon the death of his father, Frederick William III, on June 7, 1840. In respect of creative power, artistic sense, and warm, deep feeling, his character can only be described as brilliant. He was of the ripe age of forty-five, and his first measures evoked general astonishment and enthusiasm. But he did not possess the strong grasp of his great ancestors, and their power of guiding the ship through critical dangers unaided. He had not that inward consciousness of strength and that decisiveness which shrinks from no responsibility; least of all had he a true appreciation of the time and the forces at work.

Prussia's great need was a constitution which would enable her to send up to the central government a representative assembly from all the provinces, such assembly to have the power of voting taxes and conscriptions, of supervising the

finances, and of legislating in conjunction with the crown. On May 22, 1815, Frederick William had made some promises in this direction (cf. p. 103); but these remained unfulfilled, as the government could not agree upon the amount of power which might be delegated to an imperial parliament without endangering the position of the executive (p. 125). Such danger undoubtedly existed. The organisation of the new-formed provincial federation was a process which necessarily affected private interests and customs peculiar to individual areas which had formerly been independent orders of the empire, and were now forced into alliance with other districts with which little or no connection had previously existed (p. 100). The conflicting views and the partisanship inseparable from parliamentary institutions would have checked the quiet, steady work of the Prussian bureaucracy, and would in any case have produced a continual and unnecessary agitation. The improvements in the financial condition created by the better regulation of the national debt, by the limitation of military expenditure, and the introduction of a graduated system of taxation (p. 102), could not have been more successfully or expeditiously carried out than they were by such ministers as Count L. F. V. H. Bülow and A. Wilhelm von Klewitz.

So soon as the main part of this transformation of the Prussian State had been accomplished, prosperity began to return to the peasant and citizen classes, and the results of the customs regulations and the consequent extension of the market began to be felt. The citizens then began to feel their power and joined the inheritors of the rights formerly possessed by the numerous imperial and provincial orders in a demand for some share in the administration. It was found possible to emphasise these demands by reference to the example of the constitutional governments existing in neighbouring territories. The speeches delivered by Frederick William IV at his coronation in Königsberg (September 10, 1840), and at his reception of homage in Berlin (October 15, 1840), in which he displayed oratorical powers unequalled by any previous prince, appeared to point to an immediate fulfilment of these desires. The king's assertion that in Prussia there prevailed "unity between the head and the members, between prince and people, a magnificently great and general unity in the efforts of every class to one splendid goal" (September 10); his question to his subjects whether they were ready to support him "in the struggle for light, for justice and truth" (October 15),—these were considered as preparatory to the introduction of a constitutional form of government. It soon became clear, however, that to such forms Frederick William had a deep-rooted aversion. His ideal State was modelled upon the so-called "medievalism" invented by romantic poets. While ever ready to cherish dreams of heroic devotion, personal fidelity, and self-sacrifice by king and people, he declined to consider the question of regulating the executive by fixed rules of law, because these might affect his divine mission and the sanctity of his calling.

The king was deeply moved by the outburst of national enthusiasm in Germany which was evoked by the unjustifiable menaces directed against Germany by France in the autumn of 1840 during the Eastern complications. The minister, Thiers, who had been in office since March 1, suddenly broke away from the great powers during the Turco-Egyptian war (cf. Vols. III and V), and initiated a policy of his own in favour of Egypt,—a short-sighted departure which obliged England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia to conclude the quadruple alliance of July 15, 1840, with the object of compelling Mehemet Ali to accept the conditions of peace.

which they had arranged. With a logic peculiarly their own, the French considered themselves justified in securing their immunity on the Continent, as they were powerless against England by sea. The old nonsensical argument of their right to the Rhine frontier was revived and they proceeded to mobilise their forces. The German nation made no attempt to disguise their anger at so insolent an act of aggression, and showed all readiness to support the proposals for armed resistance. Nikolaus Becker composed a song against the French which became extremely popular:—

“For free and German is the Rhine,
And German shall remain,
Until its waters overwhelm
The last of German name.”

The nation were united in support of their princes, most of whom adopted a dignified and determined attitude toward France. Then was the time for Frederick William IV to step forward. Supported by the warlike temper of every German race (with the exception of the Austrians, who were in financial difficulties), and by the popularity which his speeches had gained for him, he might have intimidated France both at the moment and for the future. However, he confined himself to the introduction of reforms in the federal military constitution at Vienna, and thus spared Austria the humiliation of openly confessing her weakness. The result of his efforts was the introduction of a regular inspection of the federal contingents and the occupation of Ulm and Rastatt as bases for the concentration and movements of future federal armies.

Thus was lost a most favourable opportunity for securing the federal predominance of Prussia by means of her military power, for she could have concentrated a respectable force upon the German frontier more quickly than any other member of the federation. Moreover, the attitude of Prussia at the London conference was distinctly modest, and in no way such as a great power should have adopted. The king's lofty words at the laying of the foundation stone of Cologne cathedral on September 4, 1842, produced no deception as to his lack of political decision. Frederick William IV was a good German in the eyes of those worthy citizens who were everywhere working to foster a national poetry and arouse enthusiasm for the German virtues. These poetical Philistines and their king with his high-flown speeches aroused the sense of nationalism. This was very meritorious and as it should have been, but from a king of Prussia something more in the way of action was to be expected. Nor was this the only failure. Whenever a special effort was expected or demanded in an hour of crisis, Frederick William's powers proved unequal to the occasion, and the confidence which the nation reposed in him was deceived.

6. THE COLLAPSE OF METTERNICH'S SYSTEM

A. CONSERVATIVE STATESMANSHIP IN AUSTRIA

THE lack of initiative displayed by the king of Prussia was a valuable help to Metternich in carrying out his independent policy. The old chancellor in Vienna had become ever more profoundly impressed with the insane idea that Providence had specially deputed him to crush revolutions, to support the sacred thrones of Europe, Turkey included, and that he was the discoverer of a political system by

which alone civilization, morality, and religion could be secured. The great achievement of his better years was one never to be forgotten by Germany,—the conversion of Austria to the alliance formed against the great Napoleon, and the alienation of the emperor Francis from the son-in-law whose power was almost invincible when united with that of the Hapsburg emperor. At that time, however, Metternich was not the slave of a system; his action was the expression of his will, and he relied upon an accurate judgment of the personalities he employed, and an accurate estimation of the forces at his disposal. As he grew old, his self-conceit and an exaggerated estimate of his own powers led him blindly to follow those principles which had apparently determined his earlier policy in every political question which arose during the European supremacy which he was able to claim for a full decade after the Vienna congress. His belief in the system—a belief of deep import to the destinies of Austria—was materially strengthened by the fact that the Czar Alexander I, who had long been an opponent of the system, came over to its support before his death and recognised it as the principle of the Holy Alliance. The consequence was a degeneration of the qualities which Metternich had formerly developed in himself. His clear appreciation of the situation and of the main interests of Europe in the summer of 1813 had raised Austria to the most favourable position which she had occupied for centuries. Her decision determined the fate of Europe, and so she acquired power as great as it was unexpected. This predominance was the work of Metternich, and so long as it endured the prince was able to maintain his influence. He, however, ascribed that influence to the superiority of his own intellect and to his incomparable system, neglecting the task of consolidating and securing the power already gained. Those acquisitions of territory which Metternich had obliged Austria to make were a source of mischief and weakness from the very outset. The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom implied no increase of power (p. 98), and its administration implied a constant drain of money and troops. The troops, again, which were drawn from an unwarlike population, proved unreliable. The possession itself necessitated interference in Italian affairs (p. 118), and became a constant source of embarrassment and of useless expense. Valuable possessions, moreover, in South Germany already in the hands of the nation were abandoned in consideration for this kingdom, and acquisitions likely to become highly profitable were declined. Within the kingdom a state of utter supineness prevailed in spite of the supervision bestowed upon it, and the incompetency of the administration condemned the State and its great natural advantages to impotence.

Far from producing any improvement, the death of the emperor Francis I (March 1, 1835) caused a marked deterioration in the condition of the country. The archdukes Charles and John were unable to override the supremacy of Metternich. As hitherto, they were unable to exercise any influence upon the government which the ill-health and vacillation of Ferdinand I, the successor, had practically reduced to a regency. Franz Anton, count of Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, attempted to breathe some life into the council of state, but his efforts were thwarted by Metternich, who feared the forfeiture of his own power. The Czar Nicholas upon his visit to Teplitz and Vienna (1835) had observed that Austria was no longer capable of guaranteeing a successful policy, and that her "system" could not be maintained in practice, remarks which had done no good. It was impossible to convince Metternich that the source of this weakness lay in himself

and his determination to repress the very forces which should have been developed. The archduke Ludwig, the emperor's youngest uncle and a member of the State conference, was averse to any innovation, and therefore inclined to uphold that convenient system which laid down the maintenance of existing institutions as the first principle of statesmanship.

However, within Austria herself the state of affairs had become intolerable. The government had so far decayed as to be incapable of putting forth that energy, the absence of which the Czar had observed. The exchequer accounts betrayed an annual deficit of thirty million gulden, and the government was forced to claim the good offices of the class representatives, and, what was of capital importance, to summon the Hungarian Reichstag on different occasions. In that assembly the slumbering national life had been aroused to consciousness, and proceeded to supply the deficiencies of the government by acting in its own behalf. Count Stefan Széchenyi (p. 97) gave an impetus to science and art and to other movements generally beneficial. Ludwig Kossuth, Franz Pulszky, and Franz Deák espoused the cause of constitutional reform. A flood of political pamphlets published abroad (chiefly in Germany) exposed in full detail the misgovernment prevailing in Austria and the crown territories. European attention was attracted to the instability of the conditions obtaining there, which seemed to betoken either the downfall of the State or a great popular rising. Austria's prestige among the other great powers had suffered a heavy blow by the peace of Adrianople, and now sank yet lower. Metternich was forced to behold the growth of events, and the accomplishment of deeds utterly incompatible with the fundamental principles of conservative statesmanship as laid down by the congresses of Vienna, Carlsbad, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona.

B. THE PARTY STRUGGLES IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

(a) *Portugal, 1830-1833.*—The July revolution and the triumph of liberalism in England under William IV caused the downfall of Dom Miguel, "king" of Portugal, who had been induced by conservative diplomacy to abolish the constitutional measures introduced by his brother, Dom Pedro of Brazil. To this policy he devoted himself, to his own complete satisfaction. The revolts which broke out against him were ruthlessly suppressed, and thousands of liberals were imprisoned, banished, or brought to the scaffold. Presuming upon his success and relying upon the favour of the Austrian court, he carried his aggrandisements so far as to oblige England and France to use force and to support the cause of Pedro, who had abdicated the throne of Brazil in favour of his son, Dom Pedro II, then six years of age, and was now asserting his claims to Portugal. Pedro I adhered to the constitutionalism which he had recognised over-seas as well as in Portugal, thus securing the support not only of all Portuguese liberals, but also of European opinion, which had been aroused by the bloodthirsty tyranny of Miguel. The help of the English admiral, Charles Napier, who annihilated the Portuguese fleet at Cape São Vicente on July 5, 1833, enabled Pedro to gain a decisive victory over Miguel, which the latter's allies among the French legitimists were unable to avert, though they hurried to his aid. His military and political confederate, Don Carlos of Spain, was equally powerless to help him.

(b) *Spain, 1833-1843.* — In Spain also the struggle broke out between liberalism and the despotism which was supported by an uneducated and degenerate priesthood, and enjoyed the favour of the great powers of Eastern Europe. The conflagration began upon the death of King Ferdinand VII (September 29, 1833), the material cause being a dispute about the hereditary right to the throne resulting from the introduction of a new order of succession (cf. Vol. IV, p. 557). The decree of 1713 had limited the succession to heirs in the male line; but the Pragmatic Sanction of March 29, 1830, transferred the right to the king's daughters Isabella and Louise by his marriage with Maria Christina of Naples. Don Carlos declined to recognise this arrangement, and on his brother's death attempted to secure his recognition as king. After the overthrow of Dom Miguel and his consequent retirement from Portugal, Don Carlos entered Spain in person with his adherents, who were chiefly composed of the Basques fighting for their special rights (*fueros*), and the populations of Catalonia and Old Castile who were under clerical influence. The liberals gathered round the queen regent, Maria Christina, whose cause was adroitly and successfully upheld by the minister Martinez de la Rosa. The forces at the disposal of the government were utterly inadequate, and their fleet and army was in so impoverished a condition that they could make no head against the rebel movement. Under the leadership of Thomas Zumala-Carregui the Carlists won victory after victory, and would probably have secured possession of the capital, had not the Basque general received a mortal wound before Bilbao.

Even then the victory of the "Cristinos" was by no means secure. The radicals had seceded from the liberals upon the question of the reintroduction of the constitution of 1812. The revolution of La Granja gave the radicals complete influence over the queen regent; they obliged her to accept their own nominees, the ministry of Calatrava, and to recognise the democratic constitution of June 8, 1837. Their power was overthrown by Don Baldomero Espartero, who commanded the queen's troops in the Basque provinces. After a series of successful movements he forced the Basque general Maroto to conclude the capitulation of Vergara (August 29, 1839). The party of Don Carlos had lost greatly both in numbers and strength, owing to the carelessness and pettifogging spirit of the pretender and the dissensions and domineering spirit of his immediate adherents, who seemed the very incarnation of all the legitimist foolishness in Europe. When Carlos abandoned the country on September 15, 1839, General Cabrera continued fighting in his behalf; however, he also retired to French territory in July, 1840.

The queen regent had lost all claims to respect by her intrigues with one of her body-guard, and was forced to abdicate on October 12. Espartero, who had been made Duke de la Vittoria, was then entrusted by the Cortes with the regency. The extreme progressive party, the Exaltados, failed to support him, although he had attempted to fall in with their views. They joined the Moderados, or moderate party, with the object of bringing about his fall. Queen Isabella was then declared of age, and ascended the throne on the 8th and 10th of November respectively. Under the ministry of Don Ramon Maria Narvaez, Duke of Valencia, the constitution was changed in 1837 to meet the wishes of the Moderados, and constitutional government in Spain was thus abolished. Though his tenure of office was repeatedly interrupted, Narvaez succeeded in maintaining peace and order in Spain, even during the years of revolution, 1848-1849 (cf. Vol. IV, p. 559).

C. THE STRUGGLES FOR UNITY IN ITALY

THE moral support of the great powers and the invasion of the French army under the Duke of Angoulême had been powerless to check the arbitrary action of the Bourbons and clergy in Spain. No less transitory was the effect of the Austrian victories in Italy (p. 119); the Italian people had now risen to full consciousness of the disgrace implied in the burden of a foreign yoke. The burden indeed had been lighter under Napoleon and his representatives than under the Austrians. The governments of Murat and Eugène had been careful to preserve at least a show of national feeling; their military power was taken from the country itself, and consisted of Italian regiments officered with French, or with Italians who had served in French regiments. The French had been highly successful in their efforts to accommodate themselves to Italian manners and customs, and were largely helped by their common origin as Romance peoples. The Germans, on the other hand, the Czechs, Magyars, and Croats, who formed the sole support of the Austrian supremacy in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, knew but one mode of intercourse with the Italians, — that of master and servant; any feeling of mutual respect or attempt at mutual accommodation was impossible. A small number of better-educated Austrian officers and of better-class individuals in the rank and file, who were preferably composed of Slav regiments, found it to their advantage to maintain good relations with the native population; but the domineering and occasionally brutal behaviour of the troops as a whole was not calculated to conciliate the Italians. The very difference of their uniforms from all styles previously known served to emphasise the foreign origin of these armed strangers. Ineradicable was the impression made by their language, which incessantly outraged the delicate Italian ear and its love of harmony.

Of any exchange of commodities, of any trade worth mentioning between the Italian provinces and the Austrian crown lands, there was not a trace. The newly acquired land received nothing from its masters but their money. Italian consumption was confined to the limits of the national area of production; day by day it became clearer that Italy had nothing whatever in common with Austria, and was without inclination to enter into economic or intellectual relations with her. The sense of nationalism was strengthened by a growing irritation against the foreign rule; this feeling penetrated every class, and inspired the intellectual life and the national literature. Vittorio Alfieri, the contemporary of Napoleon, was roused against the French yoke by the movement for liberation (cf. p. 37). His successors, Ugo Foscolo, Silvio Pellico, Giacomo Leopardi, created a purely nationalist enthusiasm. Their works gave passionate expression to the deep-rooted force of the desire for independence and for equality with other free peoples, to the shame felt by an oppressed nation, which was groaning under a yoke unworthy of so brilliantly gifted a people, and could not tear itself free. Every educated man felt and wept with them, and was touched with the purest sympathy for the unfortunate victims of policy, for the conspirators who were languishing in the Austrian fortresses. Highly valuable to the importance of the movement was the share taken by the priests, who zealously devoted themselves to the work of rousing the national spirit, and promised the support and practical help of the Catholic Church for the realisation of these ideals. It was Vincenzo Gioberti who

first demonstrated to the papacy its duty of founding the unity of the Italian nation.

Mastai Ferretti, bishop of Imola, now Pope Pius IX, the successor of Gregory XVI (died June 1, 1846), was in full sympathy with these views. To the Italians he was already known as a zealous patriot, and his intentions were yet more definitely announced by the decree of amnesty issued July 17, 1846, recalling four thousand political exiles to the Church States. Conservative statesmen in general, and the Austrian government in particular, had granted the Catholic Church high privileges within the State, and had looked to her for vigorous support in their suppression of all movement toward freedom. What more mortifying situation for them than the state of war now subsisting between Austria and papal Italy? The cabinet of Vienna was compelled to despatch reinforcements for service against the citizen guards which Pius IX had called into existence in his towns, and therefore in Ferrara, which was in the occupation of Austrian troops.

When Christ's vicerent upon earth took part in the revolt against the "legitimist" power, no surprise need be felt at the action of that repentant sinner, Karl Albert of Sardinia. Formerly involved with the Carbonari, he had grown sceptical upon the advantages of liberalism after the sad experiences of 1821 (p. 118). He now renounced that good will for Austria which he had hypocritically simulated since the beginning of his reign (1831). Turin had also become a centre of revolutionary intrigue. Opinion in that town pointed to Sardinia and its military strength as a stronger nucleus than the incapable papal government for a nation resolved to enter upon a war of liberation. Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (born August 10, 1810), the editor of the journal "*Il Risorgimento*," strongly recommended the investment of Charles Albert and his army with the military guidance of the revolt. The Milan nobility were influenced by the court of Turin, as were the more youthful nationalists and the numerous secret societies which the July revolution had brought into existence throughout Italy, by Giuseppe Mazzini, one of the most highly gifted, and therefore one of the most dangerous, leaders of the democratic party in Europe.

Austria was therefore obliged to make preparations for defending her Italian possessions by force of arms. The administration as conducted by the amiable archduke Rainer was without power or influence. On the other hand, Count Johann Josef Radetzky of Radetz had been at the head of the Austrian forces in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom since 1831. He was one of the first strategists of Europe, and no less distinguished for his powers of organisation; in short, he fully deserved the high confidence which the court and the whole army reposed in him. He was more than eighty years of age, for he had been born on November 4, 1766, and had been present at the deliberations of the allies upon their movements in 1813; yet the time was drawing near when this aged general was to be the mainstay of the Austrian body politic, and the immutable corner-stone of that tottering structure.

D. THE DOWNFALL OF JESUIT PREDOMINANCE IN SWITZERLAND

A VERY appreciable danger menacing the progress of nations toward self-determination had arisen within the Swiss confederation, where the Jesuit order

had obtained much influence upon the government in several cantons. By the constitution of 1815 the federal members had acquired a considerable measure of independence, sufficient to permit the adoption of wholly discordant policies by the different governments. The Jesuits aimed at the revival of denominational institutions to be employed for far-reaching political objects, a movement which increased the difficulty of maintaining peace between the Catholic and the reformed congregations. Toleration in this matter was provided by the constitution, but its continuance naturally depended upon the abstention of either party from attempts at encroachment upon the territory of the other.

In 1833 an unsuccessful attempt had been made to reform the principles of the federation and to introduce a uniform legal code and system of elementary education. The political movement then spread throughout the cantons, where the most manifold party subdivisions, ranging from conservative ultramontanists to radical revolutionaries, were struggling for majorities and predominance. In Aargau a peasant revolt led by the monks against the liberal government was defeated, and the church property was sold (1841), while in Zürich the conservatives were uppermost, and prevented the appointment of David Frederic Strauss to a professorship at the university. In Lucerne the ultramontanists stretched their power to most inconsiderate extremes, calling in the Jesuits, who had already established themselves in Freiburg, Schwyz, and Wallis, and placing the educational system in their care (October 24, 1844). Two democratic assaults upon the government were unsuccessful (December 8, 1844, and March 30, 1845), but served to increase the excitement in the neighbouring cantons, where thousands of fugitives were nursing their hatred against the ultramontanes, who were led by the energetic peasant Peter Leu.

The murder of Leu intensified the existing ill-feeling and ultimately led to the formation of a separate confederacy, composed of the cantons of Lucerne, Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, Freiburg, and Wallis, the policy being under Jesuit control. This Catholic federation raised great hopes among conservative diplomatists. Could it be strengthened, it would probably become a permanent counterpoise to the liberal cantons, which had hitherto been a highly objectionable place of refuge to those peace breakers, who were hunted by the police of the great powers. At the federal assembly the liberal cantons were in the majority, and voted on July 20, 1847, for the dissolution of the separate federation, and on September 3 for the expulsion of the Jesuits from the area of the new federation. At Metternich's proposal, the great powers demanded the appointment of a congress to deal with the situation. However, the diet distrusting foreign interference, and with good reason, declined to accede to these demands, and proceeded to put the federal decision into execution against the disobedient cantons. Thanks to the careful forethought of the commander-in-chief, William Henry Dufour, the famous cartographer, who raised the federal military school at Thun to high distinction, and also to the rapidity with which the overwhelming numbers of the federal troops were mobilised (thirty thousand men), the "*Sonderbund* war" was speedily brought to a close without bloodshed. Austrian help proved unavailing, and the cantons were eventually reduced to a state of impotency.

The new federal constitution of September 12, 1848, then met with unanimous acceptance. The central power, which was considerably strengthened, now decided the foreign policy of the country, peace and war, and the conclusion of

treaties, controlling also the coinage, the postal and customs organisation, and maintaining the cantonal constitutions. The theories upon the nature of the federal State propounded by the jurist professor, Dr. Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, were examined and adopted with advantageous results by the radical-liberal party, which possessed a majority in the constitutional diet. Bluntschli had himself espoused the conservative-liberal cause after the war of the separate federation, which he had vainly tried to prevent. Forced to retire from the public life of his native town, he transferred his professional activities to Germany (Munich and Heidelberg). The developments of his political philosophy were not without their influence upon those fundamental principles which have given its special political character to the constitution of the North German federation and of the modern German Empire. The Swiss confederation provided a working example of the unification of special administrative forms, of special governmental rights, and of a legislature limited in respect of its sphere of action, in conjunction with a uniform system of conducting foreign policy. Only such a government can prefer an unchallenged claim to represent the State as a whole and to comprehend its different forces.

E. THE ROMANTIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENTS IN PRUSSIA

NEITHER Metternich nor the king of Prussia were courageous enough to support the exponents of their own principles in Switzerland. Prussia had a special inducement to such action in the fact of her sovereignty over the principality of Neuenburg, which had been occupied by the liberals in connection with the movement against the separate federation, and had been received into the confederation as an independent canton. In the aristocracy and upper classes of the population Frederick William IV had many faithful and devoted adherents, but he failed to seize so favourable an opportunity of defending his indisputable rights by occupying his principality with a sufficient force of Prussian troops. His vacillation in the Neuenburg question was of a piece with the general uneasiness of his temper, which had begun with the rejection of his draft of a constitution for Prussia and the demands of the representatives of the orders for the institution of some form of constitution more honourable and more in consonance with the rights of the people.

But rarely have the preparations for an imperial constitution been so thoroughly made or so protracted as they were in Prussia. From the date of his accession the king had been occupied without cessation upon this question. The expert opinion of every adviser worth trusting was called in, and from 1844 commission meetings and negotiations continued uninterruptedly. The proposals submitted to the king emanated, in full accordance with conservative spirit, from the estates as constituted; they provided for the retention of such estates as were competent, and for the extension of their representation and sphere of action in conjunction with the citizen class; but this would not satisfy Frederick William. The constitution drafted in 1842 by the minister of the interior, Count Adolf Heinrich von Arnim-Boitzenburg, was rejected by the king in consequence of the clauses providing for the legal and regular convocation of the constitutional estates. The king absolutely declined to recognise any rights appertaining to the subject as against the majesty of the ruler; he was therefore by no means inclined to make

such rights a leading principle of the constitution. By the favour of the ruler, exerted by him in virtue of his divine right, the representatives of the original constitutional estates might from time to time receive a summons to tender their advice upon questions of public interest. As the people had every confidence in the wisdom and conscientiousness of their ruler, agreements providing for their co-operation were wholly superfluous. "No power on earth," he announced in his speech from the throne on April 11, 1847, "would ever induce him to substitute a contractual form of constitution for those natural relations between king and people, which were strong above all in Prussia by reason of their inherent reality. Never under any circumstances would he allow a written paper, a kind of second providence, governing by paragraphs and ousting the old sacred faith, to intervene between God and his country."

Such was the residuum of all the discussion upon the Christian State and the "hierarchical feudal monarchy of the Middle Ages," which had been the work of the Swiss Ludwig von Haller (p. 90 *ad fin.*) and his successors, the Berlin author Adam Müller, the Halle professor Heinrich Leo, and Frederick Julius Stahl, a Jew converted to evangelicalism, whom Frederick William IV had summoned from Erlangen to Berlin in 1840. By a wilful abuse of history the wild conceptions of these theorists were explained to be the proven facts of the feudal period and of feudal society. Constitutional systems were propounded as actual historical precedents which had never existed anywhere or at any time. The object of these efforts as declared by Stahl was the subjection of reason to revelation, the reintroduction of the Jewish theocracy into modern political life. Frederick William had allowed himself to be convinced that such was the Germanic theory of existence, and that he was forwarding the national movement by making his object the application of this theory to the government and administration of his State. He was a victim to the delusion that the source of national strength is to be found in the admiration of the vague and intangible precedents of past ages, whereas the truth is that national strength must at every moment be employed to cope with fresh tasks, unknown to tradition and unprecedented.

William, prince of Prussia, the heir presumptive to the throne, as Frederick William was childless, was fully alive to the real nature of these political hallucinations. He was by no means convinced of the necessity of a constitution, and was apprehensive lest popular representation should tend to limit unduly the military expenditure and so weaken the power of the State and reduce her prestige in the eyes of foreign powers. If, however, so important a step as an alteration in the form of government was inevitable, he considered it the king's duty to satisfy public opinion and to give full and frank recognition to the constitution when arranged. Notwithstanding the emphatic protest of the prince to the ministry, at the head of which was Ernst von Bodelschwingh, and though no single minister gave an unqualified assent to the project, the king summoned the eight provincial landtags to meet at Berlin as a united Landtag for April 11, 1847. The patent issued on February 3 announced that this procedure might be adopted "when State necessities required fresh loans or the introduction of new taxes or the raising of existing taxation," or whenever the king might think desirable in view of national questions of special importance. In case of war, however, the king deemed himself justified in imposing, as heretofore, extraordinary taxes without the consent of the united Landtag. Deliberations were to be carried on in two

chambers: in the "estate of the nobility," including the princes of the blood, the original German estates, the princes of Silesia and elsewhere, with the counts and heads of the provincial landtags; and in the "assembly of the deputies of the knightly orders, the towns, and local communities." Resolutions by the two chambers in concert were necessary only in questions of taxation; petitions and protests were only to be brought before the king when supported by a two-thirds majority in either chamber.

Even before the opening of the assembly it became manifest that this constitutional concession, which the king considered a brilliant discovery, pleased nobody. The old orders, which retained their previous rights, were as dissatisfied as the citizens outside the orders, who wanted a share in the legislature and administration. The speech from the throne, a long-winded piece of conventional oratory, was marked in part by a distinctly uncompromising tone. Instead of returning thanks for the concessions which had been made, the Landtag proceeded to draw up an address demanding the recognition of their rights without any promise of their good will; at this the king displayed great indignation. The wording of the address, which was the work of Alfred von Auerswald, was extremely moderate in tone, and so far mollified the king as to induce him to promise the convocation of another Landtag within the next four years; but further negotiations made it plain that both the representatives of the nobility and the city deputies, especially those from the industrial Rhine towns, were entirely convinced that the Landtag must persevere in demanding further constitutional concessions.

The value to the State of the citizen class was emphasised by Freiherr Georg von Vincke of Westphalia, Hermann von Beckerath of Krefeld, Ludolf Camphausen of Cologne, and David Hansemann of Aix-la-Chapelle. These were capitalists and employers of labour, and had therefore every right to speak. They were at the head of a majority which declined to assent to the formation of an annuity bank for relieving the peasants of forced labour and to the proposal for a railway from Berlin to Königsberg, the ground of refusal being that their assent was not recognised by the crown ministers as necessary for the ratification of the royal proposals, but was regarded merely as advice requested by the government on its own initiative. The Landtag was then requested to proceed with the election of a committee to deal with the national debt. Such a committee would have been superfluous if financial authority had been vested in a Landtag meeting at regular intervals, and on this question the liberal majority split asunder. The party of Vincke-Hansemann declined to vote, the party of Camphausen-Beckerath voted under protest against this encroachment upon the rights of the Landtag, while the remainder (two hundred and eighty-four timorous liberals and conservatives) voted unconditionally. The king was much dissatisfied with this result. He clearly saw that he had alienated every man of sense and character, and that the submissive party were not likely to help in the introduction of any such constitutional reforms as would be compatible with his own conception of the position of the crown.

The conviction was thus forced upon liberal Germany that the king of Prussia would not voluntarily concede any measure of constitutional reform, for the reason that he was resolved not to recognise the rights of the people. Prussia was not as yet capable of mastering that popular upheaval, the beginnings of which could be felt, and using its strength for the creation of a German constitution to take the place of the incompetent and discredited federation.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS

A. THE FOUNDATION OF THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC

(a) *The Fall of the Orléans Monarchy.* — The kingdom of Louis Philippe of Orléans had become intolerable by reason of its dishonesty. The French cannot be blamed for considering the Orléans rulers as Bourbons in disguise. This scion of the old royal family was not a flourishing offshoot; rather was it an excrescence, with all the family failings and with none of its nobler qualities. Enthusiasm for such prudential, calculating, and unimpassioned rulers was impossible, whatever their education or their claims. Their bad taste and stinginess destroyed their credit as princes in France, and elsewhere their position was acknowledged rather out of politeness than from any sense of respect.

The "citizen-king" certainly made every effort to make his government popular and national. He showed both jealousy for French interests and gratitude to the liberals who had placed him on the throne; he spent troops unsparingly to save the honour of France in Algiers (cf. pp. 130 and 138). After seven years' warfare a completion was made of the conquest, which the French regarded as an extension of their power. The bold Bedouin sheik, Abd el Kader (Vol. IV, p. 253), was forced to surrender to General L. L. Juchault de Lamoricière on December 22, 1847. Louis Philippe imprisoned this noble son of the desert in France, although his son Henri, Duc d'Aumâle, had promised, as governor-general of Algiers, that he should have his choice of residence on Mohammedan territory. The king also despatched his son François, Duc de Joinville, to take part in the war against Morocco, and gave him a naval position of equal importance to that which Aumâle held in the army. He swallowed the insults of Lord Palmerston in order to maintain the "*entente cordiale*" among the Western powers. He calmly accepted the defeat of his diplomacy in the Turco-Egyptian quarrel (p. 165), and surrendered such influence as he had acquired with Mehemet Ali, in return for paramountcy in the Marquesas Islands and Tahiti. He married his son Anton, Duke of Montpensier, to the Infanta Louise of Spain, with some idea of reviving the dynastic connection between France and Spain.

While thus resuming the policy of Louis XIV, he also went to some pains to conciliate the Bonapartists, and by careful respect to the memory of Napoleon to give his government a national character. The remains of the great emperor were removed from St. Helena by permission of England and interred with great solemnity in the cathedral of the Invalides, on December 15, 1840. Louis Bonaparte, the nephew, had contrived to avoid capture by the Austrians at Ancona (cf. p. 150), and had proposed to seize his inheritance; twice he appeared within the French frontiers (at Strassburg on October 30, 1836, and at Boulogne on August 6, 1840), in readiness to ascend the throne of France, with the help of his uncle's partisans. He only succeeded in making himself ridiculous, and eventually paid for his temerity by imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. There he remained, condemned to occupy himself with writing articles upon the solution of the social question, the proposed Nicaraguan canal, etc., until his faithful follower, Dr. Conneau, smuggled him into England under the name of Maurer Badinguet.

Thus far the reign of Louis Philippe had been fairly successful; but the French

were growing weary of it. They were not entirely without sympathy for the family to which they had given the throne, and showed some interest in the princes, who were usually to be found wherever any small success might be achieved. The public sorrow was unfeigned at the death of the eldest prince, Louis, Duc d'Orléans, who was killed by a fall from a carriage on July 13, 1842. These facts, however, did not produce any closer ties between the dynasty and the nation. Parliamentary life was restless and ministries were constantly changing. Majorities in the chambers were secured by artificial means, and by bribery in its most reprehensible forms. Conspiracies were discovered and suppressed, and plots for murder were made the occasion of the harshest measures against the radicals; but no one of the great social groups could be induced to link its fortunes permanently with those of the House of Orléans.

Unfortunately for himself, the king had reposed special confidence in the historian François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, the author of histories of the English revolution and of the French civilization, who had occupied high offices in the State since the Restoration. He had belonged to the first ministry of Louis Philippe, together with the Duc de Broglie; afterward he had several times held the post of minister of education, and had been in London during the quarrel with the English ambassador. After this affair, which brought him no credit, he returned to France, and on the fall of Thiers (October, 1840) became minister of foreign affairs, with practical control of the foreign and domestic policy of France, subject to the king's personal intervention. His doctrinaire tendencies (cf. p. 130) had gradually brought him over from the liberal to the conservative side and thrown him into violent opposition to his former colleagues, Thiers in particular. The acerbity of his character was not redeemed by his learning and his personal uprightness; his intellectual arrogance alienated the literary and political leaders of Parisian society.

The republican party had undergone many changes since the establishment of the July monarchy: it now exercised a greater power of attraction upon youthful talent, a quality which made it an even more dangerous force than did the revolts and conspiracies which it fostered from 1831 to 1838. These latter severely tested the capacity of the army for street warfare on several occasions. It was twice necessary to subdue Lyons (in November, 1831, and July, 1834), and the barricades erected in Paris in 1834 repelled the National Guards, and only fell before the regiments of the line under General Bugeaud. The communist revolts in Paris under Armand Barbés and Louis Auguste Blanqui, in May, 1839, were more easily suppressed, though the Hôtel de Ville and the Palais de Justice had already fallen into the hands of the rebels. These events confirmed Louis Philippe in his intention to erect a circle of fortifications round Paris, for protection against enemies from within rather than from without. Homicidal attempts were no longer perpetrated by individual desperadoes or bloodthirsty monomaniacs, such as the Corsican Joseph Fieschi, on July 28, 1835, whose infernal machine killed eighteen people, including Marshal Mortier. They were undertaken in the service of republican propagandism, and were repeated with the object of terrorising the ruling classes, and so providing an occasion for the abolition of the monarchy. The doctrines of communism were then being disseminated throughout France (cf. Vol. VII, p. 402), and attracted the more interest as stock-exchange speculation increased, fortunes were made with incredible rapidity, and expenditure

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS

A. THE FOUNDATION OF THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC

(a) *The Fall of the Orléans Monarchy.* — The kingdom of Louis Philippe of Orléans had become intolerable by reason of its dishonesty. The French cannot be blamed for considering the Orléans rulers as Bourbons in disguise. This scion of the old royal family was not a flourishing offshoot; rather was it an excrescence, with all the family failings and with none of its nobler qualities. Enthusiasm for such prudential, calculating, and unimpassioned rulers was impossible, whatever their education or their claims. Their bad taste and stinginess destroyed their credit as princes in France, and elsewhere their position was acknowledged rather out of politeness than from any sense of respect.

The "citizen-king" certainly made every effort to make his government popular and national. He showed both jealousy for French interests and gratitude to the liberals who had placed him on the throne; he spent troops unsparingly to save the honour of France in Algiers (cf. pp. 130 and 138). After seven years' warfare a completion was made of the conquest, which the French regarded as an extension of their power. The bold Bedouin sheik, Abd el Kader (Vol. IV, p. 253), was forced to surrender to General L. L. Juchault de Lamoricière on December 22, 1847. Louis Philippe imprisoned this noble son of the desert in France, although his son Henri, Duc d'Aumâle, had promised, as governor-general of Algiers, that he should have his choice of residence on Mohammedan territory. The king also despatched his son François, Duc de Joinville, to take part in the war against Morocco, and gave him a naval position of equal importance to that which Aumâle held in the army. He swallowed the insults of Lord Palmerston in order to maintain the "*entente cordiale*" among the Western powers. He calmly accepted the defeat of his diplomacy in the Turco-Egyptian quarrel (p. 165), and surrendered such influence as he had acquired with Mehemet Ali, in return for paramountcy in the Marquesas Islands and Tahiti. He married his son Anton, Duke of Montpensier, to the Infanta Louise of Spain, with some idea of reviving the dynastic connection between France and Spain.

While thus resuming the policy of Louis XIV, he also went to some pains to conciliate the Bonapartists, and by careful respect to the memory of Napoleon to give his government a national character. The remains of the great emperor were removed from St. Helena by permission of England and interred with great solemnity in the cathedral of the Invalides, on December 15, 1840. Louis Bonaparte, the nephew, had contrived to avoid capture by the Austrians at Ancona (cf. p. 150), and had proposed to seize his inheritance; twice he appeared within the French frontiers (at Strassburg on October 30, 1836, and at Boulogne on August 6, 1840), in readiness to ascend the throne of France, with the help of his uncle's partisans. He only succeeded in making himself ridiculous, and eventually paid for his temerity by imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. There he remained, condemned to occupy himself with writing articles upon the solution of the social question, the proposed Nicaraguan canal, etc., until his faithful follower, Dr. Conneau, smuggled him into England under the name of Maurer Badinguet.

Thus far the reign of Louis Philippe had been fairly successful; but the French

were growing weary of it. They were not entirely without sympathy for the family to which they had given the throne, and showed some interest in the princes, who were usually to be found wherever any small success might be achieved. The public sorrow was unfeigned at the death of the eldest prince, Louis, Duc d'Orléans, who was killed by a fall from a carriage on July 13, 1842. These facts, however, did not produce any closer ties between the dynasty and the nation. Parliamentary life was restless and ministries were constantly changing. Majorities in the chambers were secured by artificial means, and by bribery in its most reprehensible forms. Conspiracies were discovered and suppressed, and plots for murder were made the occasion of the harshest measures against the radicals; but no one of the great social groups could be induced to link its fortunes permanently with those of the House of Orléans.

Unfortunately for himself, the king had reposed special confidence in the historian François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, the author of histories of the English revolution and of the French civilization, who had occupied high offices in the State since the Restoration. He had belonged to the first ministry of Louis Philippe, together with the Duc de Broglie; afterward he had several times held the post of minister of education, and had been in London during the quarrel with the English ambassador. After this affair, which brought him no credit, he returned to France, and on the fall of Thiers (October, 1840) became minister of foreign affairs, with practical control of the foreign and domestic policy of France, subject to the king's personal intervention. His doctrinaire tendencies (cf. p. 130) had gradually brought him over from the liberal to the conservative side and thrown him into violent opposition to his former colleagues, Thiers in particular. The acerbity of his character was not redeemed by his learning and his personal uprightness; his intellectual arrogance alienated the literary and political leaders of Parisian society.

The republican party had undergone many changes since the establishment of the July monarchy: it now exercised a greater power of attraction upon youthful talent, a quality which made it an even more dangerous force than did the revolts and conspiracies which it fostered from 1831 to 1838. These latter severely tested the capacity of the army for street warfare on several occasions. It was twice necessary to subdue Lyons (in November, 1831, and July, 1834), and the barricades erected in Paris in 1834 repelled the National Guards, and only fell before the regiments of the line under General Bugeaud. The communist revolts in Paris under Armand Barbés and Louis Auguste Blanqui, in May, 1839, were more easily suppressed, though the Hôtel de Ville and the Palais de Justice had already fallen into the hands of the rebels. These events confirmed Louis Philippe in his intention to erect a circle of fortifications round Paris, for protection against enemies from within rather than from without. Homicidal attempts were no longer perpetrated by individual desperadoes or bloodthirsty monomaniacs, such as the Corsican Joseph Fieschi, on July 28, 1835, whose infernal machine killed eighteen people, including Marshal Mortier. They were undertaken in the service of republican propagandism, and were repeated with the object of terrorising the ruling classes, and so providing an occasion for the abolition of the monarchy. The doctrines of communism were then being disseminated throughout France (cf. Vol. VII, p. 402), and attracted the more interest as stock-exchange speculation increased, fortunes were made with incredible rapidity, and expenditure

rose to the point of prodigality. Louis Blanc, nephew of the Corsican statesman Pozzo di Borgo, went a step further toward the transformation of social and economic life in his treatise "*L'Organisation du Travail*," which urged that collectivist manufactures in national factories should be substituted for the efforts of the individual employer (cf. Vol. VII, p. 403). The rise of communistic societies among the republicans obliged the old-fashioned democrats to organise in their turn; they attempted and easily secured an understanding with the advanced liberals. The "dynastic opposition," led by Odilon Barrot (cf. above, p. 128), to which Thiers occasionally gave a helping hand when he was out of office, strained every nerve to shake the public faith in the permanence of the July dynasty. The republican party in the second chamber were led by Alexandre Aug. Ledru-Rollin after the death of Étienne Garnier Pagès and of Armand Carrel, the leaders during the first decade of the Orléans monarchy. A distinguished lawyer and brilliant orator, Rollin soon overshadowed all other politicians who had aroused any enthusiasm in the Parisians. His considerable wealth enabled him to embark in journalistic ventures; his paper "*La Réforme*" pointed consistently and unhesitatingly to republicanism as the only possible form of government after the now imminent downfall of the July monarchy.

(b) *The Disturbances in Paris from February 22 to 24.* — The action of the majority now destroyed such credit as the chamber had possessed; they rejected proposals from the opposition forbidding deputies to accept posts or preferment from the government, or to have an interest in manufacturing or commercial companies, the object being to put a stop to the undisguised corruption then rife. Constitutional members united with republicans in demanding a fundamental reform of the electoral system. Louis Blanc and Ledru-Rollin raised the cry for universal suffrage. Banquets, where vigorous speeches were made in favour of electoral reform, were arranged in the autumn of 1847, and continued until the government prohibited the banquet organised for February 22, 1848, in the Champs Élysées. However, Ch. M. Tannegui, Count Duchâtel, was induced to refrain from ordering the forcible dispersion of the meeting, the liberal opposition giving up the projected banquet on their side. A great crowd collected on the appointed day in the Place Madeleine, whence it had been arranged that a procession should march to the Champs Élysées. The republican leaders invited the crowd to march to the houses of parliament, and it became necessary to call out a regiment of cavalry for the dispersion of the rioters. This task was successfully accomplished, but on the 23d the disturbances were renewed. Students and workmen paraded the streets arm in arm, shouting not only "Reform!" but also "Down with Guizot!" These cries were taken up by the National Guard, and the king, who had hitherto disregarded the movement, began to consider the outlook as serious; he dismissed Guizot and began to confer with Count Louis Matthieu Molé, a leader of the moderate liberals, on the formation of a new ministry. Thus far the anti-dynastic party had been successful, and now began to hope for an upright government on a purely constitutional basis. In this they would have been entirely deceived, for uprightness was not one of the king's attributes. But on this point he was not to be tested.

On the evening of February 23 the crowds which thronged the boulevards gave loud expression to their delight at the dismissal of Guizot. Meanwhile the republi-

can agents were busily collecting the inhabitants of the suburbs, who had been long since prepared for a rising, and sending them forward to the more excited quarters of the city. They would not, in all probability, have been able to transform the good-tempered and characteristic cheerfulness which now filled the streets of Paris to a more serious temper, had not an unexpected occurrence filled the mob with horror and rage. A crowd of people had come in contact with the soldiers stationed before Guizot's house. Certain insolent youths proceeded to taunt the officer in command; a shot rang out, a volley followed, and numbers of the mockers lay weltering in their blood. It was but one of those incidents which are always possible when troops are subjected to the threats and taunts of the people, and in such a case attempts to apportion the blame are futile. The thing was done, and Paris rang with cries of "Murder! To arms!" About midnight the alarm bells of Notre Dame began to ring, and thousands flocked to raise the barricades. The morning of February 24 found Paris in revolution, ready to begin the struggle against the people's king. "Louis Philippe orders his troops to fire on the people, like Charles X. Send him after his predecessor!" This proposal of the "Réforme" became the republican solution of the question.

(c) *The Proclamation of the French Republic.* — The monarchy was now irrevocably lost; the man who should have saved it was asking help from the liberals, who were as powerless as himself. A would-be ruler must know how to use his power, and must believe that his will is force in itself. When, at his wife's desire, the king appeared on horseback before his regiments and the National Guard, he knew within himself that he was not capable of rousing the enthusiasm of his troops. Civilian clothes and an umbrella would have suited him better than sword and epaulettes. Louis Philippe thus abdicated in favour of his grandson, the Count of Paris, whom he left to the care of Charles, Duke of Nemours, took a portfolio of such papers as were valuable, and went away to St. Cloud with his wife. The bold daughter of Mecklenburg, Henriette of Orléans, brought her son, Louis Philippe, who was now the rightful king, into the chamber of deputies, where Odilon Barrot, in true knightly fashion, broke a lance in behalf of the king's rights and of constitutionalism. But the victors in the street fighting had made their way into the hall, their comrades were at that moment invading the Tuileries, and legitimists and democrats joined in deposing the House of Orléans and demanding the appointment of a provisional government.

The question was dealt with by the "Christian moralist," poet, and diplomatist, Alphonse de Lamartine, whose "History of the Girondists" in eight volumes, with its glorification of political murder, had largely contributed to advance the revolutionary spirit in France. Though the electoral tickets had fallen into the greatest confusion, he contrived to produce a list of names which were backed by a strong body of supporters; these included Louis Garnier-Pagès, half-brother of the deceased Étienne, Ledru-Rollin, the astronomer Dominique François Arago, the Jewish lawyer Isak Crémieux, who was largely responsible for the abdication of Louis Philippe, and Lamartine himself. The list was approved. The body thus elected effected a timely junction with the party of Louis Blanc, who was given a place in the government with four republican consultative members. They then took possession of the Hôtel de Ville, filled up the official posts, and with the concurrence of the people declared France a republic on February 25. The dethroned

king and the members of his house were able, if not unmenaced, at any rate without danger, to reach the coasts of England and safety, or to cross the German frontier.

The new government failed to satisfy the socialists, who were determined, after definitely establishing the "right of labour," to insist upon the right of the wage they desired. The installation of State factories and navy labour at two francs a day was not enough for them; they formed hundreds of clubs under the direction of a central bureau, with the object of replacing the government for the time being by a committee of public safety, which should proceed to a general redistribution of property. Ledru-Rollin was not inclined to accept the offer of the presidency of such an extraordinary body; he and Lamartine, with the help of General N. A. Th. Changarnier and the National Guards, entirely outmanœuvred the hordes which had made a premature attempt to storm the town hall, and forced them to surrender. Peace was thus assured to Paris for the moment. The emissaries of the revolutionaries could not gain a hearing in the departments, and it was possible to go on with the elections, which were conducted on the principle of universal suffrage. Every forty thousand inhabitants elected a deputy; every department formed a uniform electorate. Lamartine, one of the nine hundred chosen, obtained two million three hundred thousand votes in ten departments. The assembly was opened on May 4.

B. REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

(a) *Mazzini*.—To the organised enemies of monarchy the February revolution was a call to undisguised activity; to the world at large it was a token that the times of peace were over, and that the long-expected movement would now inevitably break out. It is not always an easy matter to decide whether these several events originated in the inflammatory labours of revolutionaries designedly working in secret, or in some sudden outburst of feeling, some stimulus to action hitherto unknown. No less difficult is the task of deciding how far the conspirators were able personally to influence others of radical tendencies, but outside their own organisations. These organisations were most important to France, Italy, Germany, and Poland. The central bureaus were in Paris and Switzerland, and the noble Giuseppe Mazzini, indisputably one of the purest and most devoted of Italian patriots, held most of the strings of this somewhat clumsy network. His journals "*La Giovine Europa*" and "*La Jeune Suisse*" were as short-lived as the "*Giovine Italia*," published at Marseilles in 1831; but they incessantly urged the duty of union upon all those friends of humanity who were willing to share in the task of liberating peoples from the tyranny of monarchs.

From 1834 a special "union of exiles" had existed at Paris, which declared "the deposition and expulsion of monarchs an inevitable necessity," and looked for a revolution to break out in France or Germany, or a war between France and Germany or Russia, in the hope of assisting France in the attack upon the German rulers. Its organisation was as extraordinary as it was secret; there were "mountains," "national huts," "focal points," "circles," wherein preparation was to be made for the transformation of Germany in the general interests of humanity. The "righteous" had diverged from the "outlaws," and from 1840 were reunited with the "German union," which aimed at "the formation of a free State embracing

the whole of Germany." The persecutions and continual "investigations" which the German federation had carried on since the riots at Frankfurt had impeded, though not entirely broken off, communications between the central officials in Paris and their associates residing in Germany. From Switzerland came a continual stream of craftsmen, teachers, and authors, who were sworn in by the united republicans. Karl Mathy, afterward minister of state for Baden, who had been Mazzini's colleague in Solothurn, was one of their members in 1840, when he was called to Carlsruhe to take up the post of editor of the "*Landtagszeitung*."

(*b*) *South Germany*.—The deliberations of the united Landtag at Berlin (p. 113) had attracted the attention of the South German liberals to the highly talented politicians in Prussia, on whose help they could rely in the event of a rearrangement of the relative positions of the German States. The idea of some common movement toward this end was mooted at a gathering of politicians at Heppenheim on October 16, 1847, and it was determined to lay proposals for some change in the federal constitution before the assemblies of the individual States. In the grand duchy of Baden the democrats went even further at a meeting held at Offenburg on September 12. Proceedings were conducted by a certain lawyer of Mannheim, one Gustav von Struve, an overbearing individual of a Livonian family, and by Friedrich Hecker, an empty-headed prater, also an attorney, who had already displayed his utter incapacity for political action in the Baden Landtag. To justifiable demands for the repeal of the decrees of Carlsbad, for national representation within the German federation, for freedom of the press, religious toleration, and full liberty to teachers, they added the most extravagant and immature proposals, as to the practicable working of which no one had the smallest conception. They looked not only for a national system of defence and fair taxation, but also for "the removal of the inequalities existing between capital and labour and the abolition of all privileges." Radicalism thus with characteristic effrontery plumed itself upon its own veracity, and pointed out the path which the masses who listened to its allurements would take,—a result of radical incapacity to distinguish between the practicable and the unattainable.

Immediately before the events of February in Paris were made known, the kingdom of Bavaria, and its capital in particular, was in a state of revolt and open war between the authorities and the members of the State. The king and poet, Ludwig I, had conceived a blind infatuation for the dancer Lola Montez, an Irish adventuress (Rosanna Gilbert) who masqueraded under a Spanish name. This fact led to the downfall of the ministry, which was clerical without exception, and had been stigmatised as such by Karl von Abel of Hesse since 1837; a further consequence were street riots, unjustifiable measures against the students who declined to show respect to the dancing-woman, and finally bloody conflicts. It was not until the troops displayed entire indifference to the work of executing the tyrannical orders which had been issued that the king yielded to the entreaties of the citizens, on February 11, 1848, and removed from Munich this impossible beauty, who had been made a countess.

The first of those surprising phenomena in Germany which sprang from the impression created by the February revolution was the session of the federal assembly on March 1, 1848. Earlier occurrences in the immediate neighbourhood of Frankfurt no doubt materially influenced the course of events. In Baden, before his

fate had fallen upon the July king, Karl Mathy had addressed the nation from the chamber on February 23: "For thirty years the Germans have tried moderation and in vain; they must now see whether violence will enable them to advance, and such violence is not to be limited to the States meeting-hall!" At a meeting of citizens at Mannheim on the 27th, an address was carried by Struve which thus formulated the most pressing questions: Universal military service with power to elect the officers, unrestrained freedom of the press, trial by jury after the English model, and the immediate constitution of a German parliament. In Hesse-Darmstadt, a popular deputy in the Landtag, one Heinrich Freiherr von Gagern, the second son of the former statesman of Nassau and the Netherlands, demanded that the government should not only call a parliament, but also create a central governing power for Germany. The request was inspired by the fear of an approaching war with France, which was then considered inevitable. It was fear of this war which suddenly convinced the high federal council at Frankfort-on-Main that the people were indispensable to their existence. On March 1 they issued "a federal decree to the German people," whose existence they had disregarded for three centuries, emphasising the need for unity between all the German races, and asserting their conviction that Germany must be raised to her due position among the nations of Europe. On March 1 Herr von Struve led a gang of low-class followers in the pay of the republicans, together with the deputies of the Baden towns, into the federal chamber. Ejected thence, he turned upon the castle in Carlsruhe, his aim being to foment disturbances and bloody conflict, and so to intimidate the moderately minded majority. His plan was foiled by the firm attitude of the troops. But the abandonment of the project was not to be expected, and it was clear that the nationalist movement in Germany would meet with its most dangerous check in radicalism.

Telegrams from Paris and West Germany reached Munich, when the newly restored peace was again broken. The new minister, State Councillor von Berks, was denounced as a tool of Lola Montez, and his dismissal was enforced. On March 6 King Ludwig, in his usual poetical style, declared his readiness to satisfy the popular demands. However, fresh disturbance was excited by the rumour that Lola Montez was anxious to return. Ludwig I, who declined to be forced into the concession of any constitution upon liberal principles, lost heart and abdicated in favour of his son Maximilian (II). He saw clearly that he could no longer resist the strength of the movement for the recognition of the people's rights. The political storm would unchain the potent forces of stupidity and folly which the interference of short-sighted majorities had created. When Ludwig retired into private life, Metternich had already fallen.

(c) *The Fall of Metternich.*—The first act of the Viennese, horrified at the victory of the republicans in Paris, was to provide for the safety of their money bags. The general mistrust of the government was shown in the haste with which accounts were withdrawn from the public savings banks. It was not, however, the Austrians who pointed the moral to the authorities. On March 3, in the Hungarian Reichstag, Kossuth proposed that the emperor should be requested to introduce constitutional government into his provinces, and to grant Hungary the national self-government which was hers by right. In Vienna similar demands were advanced by the industrial unions, the legal and political reading clubs, and the students.

It was hoped that a bold attitude would be taken by the provincial Landtag, which met on March 13. When the anxious crowds promenading the streets learned that the representatives proposed to confine themselves to a demand for the formation of a committee of deputies from all the crown provinces, they invaded the council chamber and forced the meeting to consent to the despatch of a deputation to lay the national desire for a free constitution before the emperor. While the deputation was proceeding to the Hofburg, the soldiers posted before the council chamber, including the archduke Albrecht (eldest son of the archduke Karl, who died in 1847), were insulted and pelted with stones. They replied with a volley. It was the loss of life thereby caused which made the movement a serious reality. The citizens of Vienna, startled out of their complacency, vied with the mob in the loudness of their cries against this "firing on defenceless men." Their behaviour was explained to Count Metternich in the Hofburg, not as an ordinary riot capable of suppression by a handful of police, but as a revolution with which he had now to deal. Nowhere would such a task have been easier than in Vienna had there been any corporation or individual capable of immediate action, and able to make some short and definite promise of change in the government system. There was, however, no nucleus round which a new government could be formed, Prince Metternich being wholly impracticable for such a purpose. All the State councillors, the court dignitaries, and generally those whom chance or curiosity rather than definite purpose had gathered in the corridors and ante-chambers of the imperial castle, were unanimous in the opinion that the chancellor of state must be sacrificed. This empty figurehead stood isolated amid the surrounding turmoil, unable to help himself or his perplexed advisers; he emitted a few sentences upon the last sacrifice that he could make for the monarchy and disappeared.

He left no one to take up his power; no one able to represent him, able calmly and confidently to examine and decide upon the demands transmitted from the street to the council chamber. The emperor Ferdinand was himself wholly incapable of grasping the real meaning of the events which had taken place in his immediate neighbourhood. The archduke Ludwig, one of Metternich's now useless tools, was utterly perplexed by the conflict of voices and opinions. In his fear of the excesses that the "Reds" might be expected to perpetrate, he lost sight of the means which might have been used to pacify the moderate party and induce them to maintain law and order. The authorisation for the arming of the students and citizens was extorted from him perforce, and he would hear nothing of concessions to be made by the dynasty to the people. Neither he nor Count Franz Anton Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky ventured to draw up any programme for the introduction of constitutional principles. Even on March 14 they demurred to the word "constitution" and thought it possible to effect some compromise with the provincial deputations. Finally, on March 15 the news of fresh scenes induced the privy councillor of the royal family to issue the following declaration: "Provision has been made for summoning the deputies of all provincial estates in the shortest possible period, for the purpose of considering the constitution of the country, with increased representation of the citizen class and with due regard to the existing constitutions of the several estates." The responsible ministry of Kolowrat-Ficquelmont, formed on March 18, included among Metternich's worn-out tools one man only possessed of the knowledge

requisite for the drafting of a constitution in detail; this was the minister of the interior, Freiherr Franz von Pillersdorf, who was as weak and feeble in character as in bodily health.

(d) *Hungary.*—In Hungary the destructive process was far more comprehensive and imposing. On March 14 Lajos (Louis) Kossuth in the Reichstag at Pressburg secured the announcement of the freedom of the press, and called for a system of national defence for Hungary, to be based upon the general duty of military service. Meanwhile his adherents, consisting of students, authors, and "jurats" (idle lawyers), seized the reins of government in Ofen-Pest, and replaced the town council by a committee of public safety, composed of radical members by preference. On the 15th the State assembly of the Reichstag was transformed into a national assembly. Henceforward its conclusions were to be communicated to the magnates, whose consent was to be unnecessary. On the same day a deputation of the Hungarian Reichstag, accompanied by jurats, arrived at Vienna, where Magyars and Germans swore to fellowship with all pomp and enthusiasm. The deputation secured the concession of an independent and responsible ministry for Hungary. This was installed on March 23 by the Archduke Palatine Stephan, and united the popular representatives among Hungarian politicians, such as Count Ludwig Batthyány and Stephan Széchenyi, with Prince Paul Eszterházy, the Freiherr Josef von Eötvös, Franz von Deák, and Louis Kossuth. After a few days' deliberation the Reichstag practically abolished the old constitution. The rights of the lords were abrogated, and equality of political rights given to citizens of towns; the right of electing to the Reichstag was conceded to "the adherents of legally recognised religions;" laws were passed regulating the press and the National Guards. The country was almost in a state of anarchy, as the old provincial administrations and local authorities had been abolished and replaced by committees of public safety, according to the precedent set at Pest.

(e) *The March Revolution of Berlin.*—The example of Austria influenced the course of events throughout Germany; there the desire for a free constitution grew ever hotter, and especially so in Berlin. The taxation committees were assembled in that town when the results of the February revolution became known. The king dismissed them on March 7, declaring himself inclined to summon the united Landtag at regular intervals. The declaration failed to give satisfaction. On the same day a popular meeting at the pavilions in the zoological gardens had resolved to request the king forthwith to convoke the assembly. In the quiet town public life became more than usually lively; the working classes were excited by the agitators sent down to them; in inns and cafés newspapers were read aloud and speeches made. The king was expecting an outbreak of war with France. He sent his confidential military adviser, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, at full speed to Vienna to arrange measures of defence with Metternich. He proposed temporarily to entrust the command of the Prussian troops upon the Rhine to the somewhat unpopular Prince William of Prussia. However, he was warned that the excitement prevailing among the population of the Rhine province would only be increased by the appearance of the prince. Despatches from Vienna further announced the fall of Metternich. The king now resolved to summon the

united Landtag to Berlin on April 17; he considered, no doubt, that Prussia could very well exercise her patience for a month.

On March 15 the first of many riotous crowds assembled before the royal castle, much excited by the news from Vienna. Deputations constantly arrived from the provinces to give expression to the desire of the population for some constitutional definition of their rights. The king went a step further and altered the date of the meeting of the Landtag to April 2; but in the patent of March 18 he explained his action by reference only to his duties as federal ruler, and to his intention of proposing a federal reform, to include "temporary federal representation of all German countries." He even recognised that "such federal representation implies a form of constitution applicable to all German countries," but made no definite promise as to any form of constitution for Prussia. Nevertheless, in the afternoon he was cheered by the crowd before the castle. But the false leaders of the mob, who desired a rising to secure their own criminal objects, dexterously turned gratitude into uproar and bloodshed. The troops concentrated in the castle under General von Prittwitz were busy until midnight clearing the streets from the Linden to the Leipzigerstrasse and Alexander square. The authorities had twelve thousand men at their disposal, and could easily have stormed the barricades next morning; but the king's military advisers were unable to agree upon their action, and his anxiety and nervousness were increased by the invited and uninvited citizens who made their way into the castle. He therefore ordered the troops to cease firing, and the next day, after receiving a deputation of citizens, commanded the troops to concentrate upon the castle, and finally to retire to barracks. The arguments of such liberals as the Freiherr von Vincke (p. 175) and of the Berlin town councillors induced the king to this ill-advised step, the full importance of which he failed to recognise. It implied the retreat of the monarchical power before a riotous mob inspired only by blind antipathy to law and order, who, far from thanking the king for sparing their guilt, proclaimed the retreat of the troops as a victory for themselves, and continued to heap scorn and insult upon king and troops alike.

A new ministry was formed on the 19th of March, the leadership being taken by Count Adolf Heinrich von Arnim-Boitzenburg. On the 29th his place was taken by Ludolf Camphausen, president of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce, who was joined by Hansemann (p. 175) and the leaders of the liberal nobility, Alfred von Auerswald, Count Maximilian of Schwerin, and Heinrich Alex. of Arnim. The ministry would have had no difficulty in forming a constitution for the State had not the king reduced the monarchy to helplessness by his display of ineptitude. That honest enthusiasm for the national cause which had led him on March 21 to escort the banner of black, red, and gold on horseback through the streets of Berlin, far from winning the popular favour for him, was scorned and flouted by the republicans. The energy displayed in summoning the parliament was too rapid a change, made the German States distrustful, and exposed him to degrading refusals, which embittered his mind and lowered his dignity in the eyes of his own people.


The united Landtag met on April 2, 1848, and determined upon the convocation of a national assembly, for the purpose of forming a constitution upon the basis of universal suffrage. To this the government agreed, at the same time insisting that the Prussian constitution was a matter for arrangement between

themselves and the assembly. During the elections, which took place simultaneously with those to the German parliament, the democrats uttered their war-cry, to the effect that the resolutions of the Prussian national assembly required no ratification. Thus the popular claim to a share in the administration disappeared, and was overshadowed by the struggle for supremacy waged by the masses under the guidance of ambitious agitators.

C. THE CONVOCAION OF THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT

(a) *The Preliminary Conference (Vorparlament).*—On March 5, 1848, fifty-one of the better known German politicians met at Heidelberg upon their own initiative by invitation; their object was to discuss what common action they should take to guide a general national movement in Germany. Most of them belonged to the Rhine States; but Prussia, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria were represented, and an Austrian writer who happened to be on the spot joined the meeting in order to place it in relation with Austria. The twenty representatives from Baden included the radical democrat Hecker (p. 181), who even then spoke of the introduction of a republican constitution as a wish of the German people. He, however, was obliged to support the resolution of the majority, to the effect that the German nation must first have the opportunity of making its voice heard, for which purpose preparation must be made for the convocation of a German national assembly. All were agreed upon the futility of waiting for the federal council to take action; they must bring their influence to bear upon the council and the German government by their own energy, by the use of accomplished facts, and by specific demands. A committee of seven members was appointed to invite a conference on March 30, at Frankfort-on-Main, "of all past or present members of provincial councils and members of legislative assemblies in all German countries," together with other public men of special influence. This "preliminary conference" (*Vorparlament*) was then to arrive at some resolutions for the election of the German national assembly.

Both the federal assembly and the majority of the German governments viewed these proceedings with favourable eyes; they saw that the nation was at the highest pitch of excitement, and would be prevented from rushing into violence by occupation in political matters. The results of the Parisian revolution led them to think the overthrow of every existing form of government perfectly possible. The only remaining course was to treat with the liberals and enlist their support for the existing States and dynasties by the concession of constitutional rights. Only in Hanover and in the electorate of Hesse were there difficulties at the outset. However, the fall of Metternich shattered even the pride of Ernst August and of the elector Friedrich Wilhelm (p. 151). Instead of her aged federal deputy, Fr. L. R. Freiherr von Blittersdorf, Baden sent the Freiburg professor Karl Welcker (p. 152) to Frankfort. On March 7 he proposed on behalf of his government the convocation of a German parliament to discuss and carry out the reform of the federal constitution in conjunction with the representatives of the government. In Hesse-Darmstadt Heinrich von Gagern (p. 182) made a similar proposal in the chamber. The king of Wurtemberg called one of the members of the Heidelberg conference, Friedrich Romer, to the head of a new ministry, to which Paul Pfizer also belonged. In Saxony, Friedrich August, after unnecessarily alarming the inhabitants of



DESCRIPTION OF THE CARICATURES OVERLEAF

Above: Caricatures of some of the chief speakers or other notable members of the Frankfort Parliament, 1848-1849.

Gagern,	Schmerling,	Venedey,	Vogt,	Stedmann,	Zitz,
Dahlmann,	Raveaux,	Eisenmann,	Jahn,	Blum,	Heckscher,
Gistra,	Detmold,	Radowitz,	Boddien,	Pagenstecher,	Mittermaier.

The description below this collection of heads is "Piepmeyer buys the portraits of the different members of Parliament." From Facts and Opinions of Herr Piepmeyer, deputy member of the Constituent National Assembly of Frankfort-on-Main, by J(ohn) H(ermann) D(etmold) and A(dolph) S(chrödter); Frankfort-on-Main (1849).

Below: Caricatures of Bismarck, Gerlach, and Stahl, under the satirical motto, "The new Peter of Amiens and the Crusaders." Under the picture is the following description in rhyme:

"Saint Gerlach leads the troops, Saint Stahl he doth the donkey guide,
 While Bismarck, leading villain, walks in armour by his side;
 And hard behind, upon their mares, two gallant knights do trot;
 Old Sancho Panza Gödschen with Sir Wagner Don Quixote."

(Drawing by Wilhelm Scholz in "Kladderadatsch" II year, number 45, November 4, 1849.)

Leipsic by the concentration of troops, was obliged to give way to dissolve the ministry of Jul. Traug. von Könneritz, and to entrust the conduct of government business to the leader of the progressive party in the second chamber, Alexander Karl Hermann Braun. Of the liberals in Saxony, the largest following was that of Robert Blum, formerly theatre secretary, bookseller, and town councillor of Leipsic. He was one of those trusted public characters who were summoned to the preliminary conference, and directed the attention of his associates to the national tasks immediately confronting the German people. In the patent convoking the united Landtag for March 18, even the king of Prussia had declared the formation of a "temporary federal representation of the States of all German countries" to be a pressing necessity; hence from that quarter no opposition to the national undertaking of the Heidelberg meeting was to be expected.

Five hundred representatives from all parts of Germany met at Frankfort-on-Main for the conference in the last days of March; they were received with every manifestation of delight and respect. The first general session was held in the church of St. Paul, under the presidency of the Heidelberg jurist, Anton Mittermayer, a Bavarian by birth (p. 152); the conference was then invited to come to a decision upon one of the most important questions of German politics. The committee of seven had drawn up a programme dealing with the mode of election to the German national assembly, and formulating a number of fundamental principles for adoption in the forthcoming federal constitution. These demanded a federal chief with responsible ministers, a senate of the individual States, a popular representative house with one deputy to every seventy thousand inhabitants of a German federal State, a united army, and representation abroad; a uniformity in the customs systems, in the means of communication, in civil and criminal legislation. This premature haste is to be ascribed to the scanty political experience of the German and his love for the cut and dried; it gave the radicals, who had assembled in force from Baden, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and Nassau under Struve and Hecker, an opportunity of demanding similar resolutions upon the future constitution of Germany. Hecker gave an explanation of the so-called "principles" propounded by Struve, demanding the disbanding of the standing army, the abolition of officials, taxation, and of the hereditary monarchy, which was to be "replaced by a parliament elected without restriction under a president similarly elected, all to be united by a federal constitution on the model of the free States of North America." Until the German democracy had secured legislation upon these and many other points, the Frankfurt conference should be kept on foot, and the government of Germany continued by an executive committee elected by universal suffrage.

Instead of receiving these delectable puerilities with the proper amount of amusement, or satirising them as they deserved (see the upper part of the plate, "Caricatures of the Members of the National Conference at Frankfurt," etc.), the moderate democrats and liberals were inveigled into serious discussion with the radicals. Reports of an insignificant street fight aroused their fears and forebodings, and both sides condescended to abuse and personal violence. Finally, however, the clearer-sighted members of the conference succeeded in confining the debate to the subjects preliminary to the convocation of the parliament. The programme of the committee of seven and the "principles" of the radicals were alike excluded from discussion. Hecker's proposition for the permanent constitution of

the conference was rejected by 368 votes to 143, and it was decided to elect a committee of fifty members to continue the business of the preliminary parliament. On the question of this business great divergence of opinion prevailed. The majority of the members were convinced that the people should be now left to decide its own fate, and to determine the legislature which was to secure the recognition of its rights. A small minority were agreed with Heinrich von Gagern upon the necessity of keeping in touch with the government and the federal council, and constructing the new constitution by some form of union between the national representatives and the existing executive officials. This was the first serious misconception of the liberal party upon the sphere of action within which the parliament would operate. They discussed the "purification" of the federal council and its "aversion to special resolutions of an unconstitutional nature;" they should have put the past behind them, have united themselves firmly to the federal authorities, and carried them to the necessary resolutions.

The mistrust of the liberals for the government was greater and more lasting than their disgust at radical imbecility, a fact as obvious in the preliminary conference as in the national assembly which it called into being. This is the first and probably the sole cause of the futility of the efforts made by upright and disinterested representative men to guide the national movement in Germany. Franz von Soiron of Mannheim proposed that the decision upon the future German constitution should be left entirely in the hands of the national assembly, to be elected by the people; with this exception, the constitutional ideal was abandoned and a utopia set up in its place not utterly dissimilar to the dream of "the republic with a doge at its head." Soiron, who propounded this absurdity, became president of the committee of fifty.

The mode of election to the national constituent assembly realised the most extreme demands of the democrats. Every fifty thousand inhabitants in a German federal province, East and West Prussia included, had to send up a deputy "directly;" that is to say, appointment was not made by any existing constitutional corporation. The Czechs of Bohemia were included without cavil among the electors of the German parliament, no regard being given to the scornful refusal which they would probably return. The question of including the Poles on the Prussia Baltic provinces was left to the decision of the parliament itself. The federal council, in which Karl Welcker had already become influential, prudently accepted the resolutions of the preliminary conference and communicated them to the individual States, whose business it was to carry them out.

(b) *The Attitude of Austria and Prussia.* — Feeling in the different governments had undergone a rapid transformation, and in Prussia even more than elsewhere. On March 21, after parading Berlin with the German colours (p. 185), Frederick William IV had made a public declaration, expressing his readiness to undertake the direction of German affairs. His exuberance led him to the following pronouncement: "I have to-day assumed the ancient German colours and placed myself and my people under the honourable banner of the German Empire. Prussia is henceforward merged in Germany." These words would have created a great effect had the king been possessed of the power which was his by right, or had he given any proof of capacity to rule his own people or to defend his capital from the outrages of a misled and passionately excited mob. But the occurrences

at Berlin during March had impaired his prestige with every class; he was despised by the radicals, and the patriotic party mistrusted his energy and his capacity of maintaining his dignity in a difficult situation. Moreover, the German governments had lost confidence in the power of the Prussian State. Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Nassau, and Wurtemberg had shown themselves ready to confer full powers upon the king of Prussia for the formation, in their name, of a new federal constitution with provision for the popular rights. They were also willing to accept him as head of the federation, a position which he desired, while declining the imperial title with which the cheers of the Berlin population had greeted him. When, however, Max von Gagern arrived in Berlin at the head of an embassy from the above-mentioned States, the time for the enterprise had gone by; a king who gave way to rebels and did obeisance to the corpses of mob leaders who had fallen in a street fight, was not the man for the dictatorship of Germany at so troublous a time.

Notwithstanding their own difficulties, the Vienna government had derived some advantage from the events at Berlin; there was no reason for them to resign their position in Germany. The emperor Ferdinand need never yield to Frederick William IV. The Austrian statesmen were sure of the approval of the German people, even of the national and progressive parties, if they straightway opposed Prussian interference in German politics. Relying upon nationalist sentiment and appealing to national sovereignty, they might play off the German parliament against the king of Prussia. Austria was, upon the showing of the government and the popular leaders, the real Germany. Austria claimed the precedence of all German races, and therefore the black, red, and gold banner flew on the Tower of Stephan, and the kindly emperor waved it before the students, who cheered him in the castle. The offer of Prussian leadership was declined; the German constitution was to be arranged by the federal council and the parliament, and Austria would there be able to retain the leading position which was her right.

(c) *The Republican Revolt of Hecker and Struve in April, 1848.* — The case of the king of Prussia was sufficiently disheartening; but no less serious for the development of the German movement was the attitude of the liberals toward the republicans. The professions and avowals of the latter had not been declined with the decisiveness that belong to honest monarchical conviction. Even before the meeting of parliament disturbances had been set on foot by the Baden radicals, and it became obvious that radicalism could result only in civil war and anarchy, and would imperil the national welfare. But the liberals had not learned the great truth that popular rights can be secured only in well-ordered States under a strong government, where the monarchical power is firmly established; instead of placing their great influence at the service of the governments, they looked to their own fine speeches to preserve peace and order.

The Struve-Hecker party was deeply disappointed with the results of the preliminary conference. It had not taken over the government of Germany; no princes had been deposed, and even the federal council had been left untouched. The leaders, impelled thereto by their French associates, accordingly resolved to initiate an armed revolt in favour of the republic. The "moderate" party had cleared the way by assenting to the proposal of "national armament." Under the pretext of initiating a scheme of public defence, arms for the destruction of con-

stitutional order were placed in the hands of the ruffians who had been wandering about the Rhine land for weeks in the hope of robbery and plunder, posing as the retinue of the great "friends of the people." Acuter politicians, like Karl Mathy (p. 181), discovered too late that it was now necessary to stake their whole personal influence in the struggle against radical insanity and the madness of popular agitators. In person he arrested the agitator Joseph Fickler, when starting from Karlsruhe to Constance to stir up insurrection; but his bold example found few imitators. The evil was not thoroughly extirpated, as the "people's men" could not refrain from repeating radical catchwords and meaningless promises of popular supremacy and the downfall of tyrants in every public-house and platform where they thought they could secure the applause for which they thirsted like actors.

Hecker had maintained communications with other countries from Karlsruhe, and had been negotiating for the advance of contingents from Paris, to be paid from the resources of Ledru-Rollin (p. 178). After Fickler's imprisonment on April 8 he became alarmed for his own safety, and fled to Constance. There, in conjunction with Struve and his subordinates, Doll, Willich, formerly a Prussian lieutenant, Mögling of Wurtemberg, and Bruhe of Holstein, he issued an appeal to all who were capable of bearing arms to concentrate at Donaueschingen on April 12, for the purpose of founding the German republic. With a republican army of fifty men he marched on the 13th from Constance, where the republic had maintained its existence for a whole day. In the plains of the Rhine a junction was to be effected with the "legion of the noble Franks," led by the poet Georg Herwegh and his Jewish wife. In vain did two deputies from the committee of fifty in Frankfurt advise the republicans to lay down their arms: their overtures were rejected with contumely. The eighth federal army corps had been rapidly mobilised, and the troops of Hesse and Wurtemberg brought this insane enterprise to an end in the almost bloodless conflicts of Kandern (April 20) and Günterstal at Freiburg (April 23). The republicans were given neither time nor opportunity for any display of their Teutonic heroism. Their sole exploit was the shooting of the general Friedrich von Gagern from an ambush as he was returning to his troops from an unsuccessful conference with the boastful Hecker. Herwegh's French legion was dispersed at Dossenbach (April 26) by a company of Wurtemberg troops. These warriors took refuge for the time being in Switzerland with the "generals" Hecker, Struve, and Franz Siegl.

8. THE STRUGGLES FOR THE RIGHT OF NATIONAL AUTONOMY

A. ITALY

As early as January, 1848, the population of the Lombard States had begun openly to display their animosity to the Austrians. The secret revolutionary committees, who took their instructions from Rome and Turin, organised demonstrations, and forbade the purchase of Austrian cigars and lottery tickets, the profits of which went to the Austrian exchequer. Threats and calls for blood and vengeance upon the troops were placarded upon the walls, and cases of assassination occurred. Field-Marshal Count Radetzky had felt certain that the national movement, begun in the Church States, would extend throughout Italy, and oblige Austria to defend her territory by force of arms. He was also informed of the warlike feeling in

Piedmont and of the secret preparations which were in progress there. This view was well founded. Any dispassionate judgment of the political situation in the peninsula showed that the governments of the individual States were in a dilemma; either they might join the national yearning for liberation from the foreign rule and help their subjects in the struggle, or they would be forced to yield to the victorious advance of republicanism. The Savoy family of Carignan (p. 118), the only ruling house of national origin, found no difficulty in deciding the question. As leaders of the patriotic party they might attain a highly important position, and at least become the leaders of a federal Italy; while they were forced to endanger their kingdom, whatever side they took.

Radetzky was indefatigable in his efforts to keep the Vienna government informed of the approaching danger, but his demands for reinforcements to the troops serving in the Lombardo-Venetian provinces were disregarded. The old war minister, Count H. Hardegg, who supported Radetzky, was harshly dismissed from his position in the exchequer, and died of vexation at the affront. Not all the obtuseness and vacillation of the Vienna bureaucracy could shake the old field-marshal (on August 1, 1847, he began his sixty-fourth year of service in the imperial army) from his conviction that the Austrian house meant to defend its Italian possessions. He was well aware that the very existence of the monarchy was involved in this question of predominance in Italy. A moment when every nationality united under the Hapsburg rule was making the most extravagant demands upon the State was not the moment voluntarily to abandon a position of the greatest moral value.

After the outbreak of the revolt many voices recommended an Austrian retreat from Lombardy and Venice. It was thought impossible that these two countries, with independent governments of their own, could be incorporated in so loosely articulated a federation as the Austrian Empire seemed likely to become. Such counsels were not inconceivable in view of the zeal with which kings and ministers, professors, lawyers, and authors, plunged into the elaboration of political blunders and misleading theories; but to follow them would have been to increase rather than to diminish the difficulties of Austrian politics, which grew daily more complicated. In the turmoil of national and democratic aspirations and programmes the idea of the Austrian State was forgotten; its strength and dignity depended upon the inflexibility and upon the ultimate victory of Radetzky and his army. The war in Italy was a national war, more especially for the Austro-Germans; for passion, even for an ideal, cannot impress the German and arouse his admiration to the same extent as the heroic fulfilment of duty. Additional influences upon the Austrians were the military assessment, their delight in proved military superiority, and their military traditions. Nationalism was indisputably an animating force among the Germans of the Alpine districts. Never did Franz Grillparzer so faithfully represent the Austrian spirit as in the oft-repeated words which he ascribed to the old field-marshal, upholding the ancient imperial banner upon Guelf soil: "In thy camp is Austria; we are but single fragments."

It is not difficult to imagine that a statesman of unusual penetration and insight might even then have recognised that Austria was no longer a force in Germany, that the claim of the Hapsburgs to lead the German nation had disappeared with the Holy Roman Empire. We may conceive that, granted such recognition of the facts, a just division of influence and power in Central Europe might have been

brought about by a peaceful compromise with Prussia ; but it was foolishness to expect the House of Hapsburg voluntarily to begin a partition of the countries which had fallen to be hers. The acquisition of Italy had been a mistake on the part of Metternich ; but the mistake could not be mended by a surrender of rights at the moment when hundreds of claims would be pressed. To maintain the integrity of the empire was to preserve its internal solidarity and to uphold the monarchical power. The monarchy could produce no more convincing evidence than the victories of the army. An army which had retreated before the Piedmontese and the Gueff guerilla troops would never have gained another victory, not even in Hungary.

In an army order of January 15, 1848, Radetzky announced in plain and unambiguous terms that the emperor of Austria was resolved to defend the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom against internal and external enemies, and that he himself proposed to act in accordance with the imperial will. He was, however, unable to make any strategical preparations for the approaching struggle ; he had barely troops enough to occupy the most important towns, and in every case the garrisons were entirely outnumbered by the population. Hence it has been asserted that the revolution took him by surprise. The fact was that he had no means of forestalling a surprise, and was obliged to modify his measures in proportion to the forces at his disposal. The crowds began to gather on March 17, when the news of the Vienna revolution reached Milan ; street fighting began on the 18th and 19th, and the marshal was forced to concentrate his scattered troops upon the gates and walls of the great city, lest he should find himself shut in by an advancing Piedmontese army.

On March 21 it became certain that Charles Albert of Sardinia would cross the Ticino with his army. Radetzky left Milan and retreated beyond the Mincio to the strong fortress of Verona, which, with Mantua, Peschiera, and Legnago, formed "the quadrilateral" which became famous in the following campaign. Most of the garrisons in the Lombard towns were able to cut their way through, comparatively few surrendering. However, the sixty-one thousand infantry of the imperial army were diminished by the desertion of the twenty Italian battalions which belonged to it, amounting to ten thousand men. It was necessary to abandon most of the State chests ; the field-marshal could only convey from Milan to Verona half a million florins in coined money, which was saved by the division stationed in Padua, which made a rapid advance before the outbreak of the revolt.

Venice had thrown off the yoke. The lawyer Daniel Manin, of Jewish family, and therefore not a descendant of Lodovico Manin, the last doge, had gained over the arsenal workers. With their help he had occupied the arsenal and overawed the field-marshal, Count Ferdinand Zichy, a brother-in-law of Metternich, who was military commander in conjunction with the civil governor, Count Pálffy of Erdöd. Zichy surrendered on March 22, on condition that the non-Italian garrison should be allowed to depart unmolested. Manin became president of the new democratic republic of Venice, which was joined by most of the towns of the former Venetian *terra firma* ; however, England and France declined to recognise the republic, which was soon forced to make common cause with Sardinia. Mantua was preserved to the Austrians by the bold and imperturbable behaviour of the commandant general, Von Gorczkowski.

The Italian nationalist movement had also spread to the south Tyrol. On March 19 the inhabitants of Trent demanded the incorporation into Lombardy of the Trentino, that is, the district of the former prince-bishopric of Trent. The appearance of an Austrian brigade under General von Zobel to relieve the hard-pressed garrison of the citadel secured the Austrian possession of this important town, and also strengthened the only line of communication now open between Radetzky's headquarters and the Austrian government, the line through the Tyrol. The defence of their country was now undertaken by the German Tyrolese themselves; they called out the defensive forces which their legislature had provided for centuries past, and occupied the frontiers. They were not opposed by the Italian population on the south, who in many cases volunteered to serve in the defence of their territory; hence the revolutionary towns were unable to make head against these opponents, or to maintain regular communication with the revolutionists advancing against the frontier. Wherever the latter attempted to break through they were decisively defeated by the admirable Tyrolese guards, who took up arms against the Guelfs with readiness and enthusiasm.

On March 29, 1848, the king of Sardinia crossed the Ticino, without any formal declaration of war, ostensibly to protect his own territories. He had at his disposal three divisions, amounting to about forty-five thousand men, and after gaining several successes in small conflicts at Goito, Valeggio, and elsewhere, against weak Austrian divisions, he advanced to the Mincio on April 10. Mazzini (p. 180) had appeared in Milan after the retreat of the Austrians; but the advance of the Piedmontese prevented the installation of a republican administration. For a moment the national movement was concentrated solely upon the struggle against the Austrian supremacy. Tumultuous public demonstrations forced the petty and central States of Italy to send their troops to the support of the Piedmontese. In this way nearly forty thousand men from Naples, Catholic Switzerland, Tuscany, Modena, and elsewhere were concentrated on the Po under the orders of General Giacomo Durando, to begin the attack on the Austrian position in conjunction with Charles Albert.

After the despatch of the troops required to cover the Etsch valley and to garrison the fortresses, Radetzky was left with only thirty-five thousand men; however, he was able, with nineteen Austrian battalions, sixteen squadrons, and eighty-one guns, to attack and decisively defeat the king at Santa Lucia on May 6, as he was advancing with forty-one thousand men and eighty guns. The Zehner light infantry under Colonel Karl von Kopal behaved admirably; the archduke Franz Joseph, heir presumptive, also took part in the battle. The conspicuous services of these bold warriors to the fortunes of Austria have made this obstinate struggle especially famous in the eyes of their compatriots. Radetzky's victory at Santa Lucia is the turning-point in the history of the Italian revolution. The Austrian troops definitely established the fact of their superiority to the Piedmontese, by far the best of the Italian contingents. Conscious of this, the little army was inspired with confidence in its own powers and in the generalship of the aged marshal, whose heroic spirit was irresistible. Many young men from the best families of Vienna and the Alpine districts took service against the Italians. The healthy-minded students were glad to escape from the *aula* of the University of Vienna, with its turgid orations and sham patriotism, and to shed their blood for the honour of their nation side by side with the brave "volunteers," who went into

action with jest and laugh. Such events considerably abated the enthusiasm of the Italians, who began to learn that wars cannot be waged by zeal alone, and that their fiery national spirit gave them no superiority in the use of the rifle.

Radetzky was not to be tempted into a reckless advance by the brilliant success he had attained; after thus vigorously repulsing Karl Albert's main force, he remained within his quadrilateral of fortresses, awaiting the arrival of the reserves which were being concentrated in Austria. Sixteen thousand infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, and fifty-four guns marched from Isonzo under Laval, Count Nugent, master of the ordnance, an old comrade of Radetzky. He was an Irishman by birth, and had entered the Austrian army in 1793; in 1812 he had seen service in Spain during the war of liberation, and in 1813 had led the revolt on the coast districts. On April 22 Nugent captured Udine, and advanced by way of Pordenone and Conegliano to Belluno, Feltre, and Bassano, covering his flank by the mountains, as Durando's corps had gone northward from the Po to prevent his junction with Radetzky. Nugent fell sick, and after continual fighting General Count Georg Thurn led the reserves to San Bonifacio at Verona, where he joined the main army on May 22.

Meanwhile the monarchical government in Naples had succeeded in defeating the republicans, and the king accordingly recalled the Neapolitan army, which had already advanced to the Po. The summons was obeyed except by two thousand men, with whom General Pepe reinforced the Venetian contingent. This change materially diminished the danger which had threatened Radetzky's left flank; he was now able to take the offensive against the Sardinian army, and advanced against Curtatone and Goito from Mantua, whither he had arrived on May 28 with two corps and part of the reserves. He proposed to relieve Peschiera, which was invested by the Duke of Genoa; but the garrison had received no news of the advance of the main army, and were forced from lack of provisions to surrender on May 30. However, after a fierce struggle at Monte Berico on June 10, in which Colonel von Kopal, the Roland of the Austrian army, was killed, Radetzky captured Vicenza, General Durando being allowed to retreat with the Roman and Tuscan troops. They were joined by the "crociati" (crusaders), who had occupied Treviso. Padua was also evacuated by the revolutionaries, and almost the whole of the Venetian province was thus recovered by the Austrians. Fresh reinforcements from Austria were employed in the formation of a second reserve corps under General von Welden on the Piave; this force was to guard Venetia on the land side.

At this period the provisional government in Milan offered the Lombardo-Venetian crown to the king of Sardinia. Charles Albert might reasonably hope to wear it, as the Austrian government, which had retired to Innsbruck on the renewal of disturbances in Vienna, showed some inclination to conclude an armistice in Italy. England and France, however, had declared the surrender by Austria of the Italian provinces to be an indispensable preliminary to peace negotiations. Radetzky hesitated to begin negotiations for this purpose, and remained firm in his resolve to continue the war, for which he made extensive preparations in the course of June and July, 1848. He formed a third army corps in south Tyrol, under Count Thurn, a fourth in Legnago, under General von Culoz, and was then able with the two corps already on foot to attack the king in his entrenchments at Sona and Sommacampagna. Operations began here on July 23 and ended on the 25th,

with the battle of Custoza. The king was defeated, and Radetzky secured command of the whole line of the Mincio.

Charles Albert now made proposals for an armistice. However, Radetzky's demands were such as the king found impossible to entertain. He was forced to give up the line of the Adda, which the field-marshal crossed with three army corps on August 1 without a struggle. The battle of Milan on the 4th so clearly demonstrated the incapacity of the Piedmontese troops, that the king must have welcomed the rapidity of the Austrian advance as facilitating his escape from the raging mob with its cries of treason. Radetzky entered Milan on August 6, and was well received by some part of the population. Peschiera was evacuated on the 10th. With the exception of Venice, the kingdom of the double crown had now been restored to the emperor. An armistice was concluded between Austria and Sardinia on August 9 for six weeks; it was prolonged by both sides, though without formal stipulation, through the autumn of 1848 and the winter of 1848-1849.

In Tuscany the grand duke Leopold II thought he had completely satisfied the national and political desires of his people by the grant of a liberal constitution and by the junction of his troops with the Piedmont army. Since the time of the great Medici, this fair province had never been so prosperous as under the mild rule of the Hapsburg grand duke; but the republicans gave it no rest. They seized the harbour of Livorno and also the government of Florence in February, 1849, under the leadership of Mazzini's follower, Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi, whom Leopold was forced to appoint minister. The grand duke fled to Gaeta, where Pope Pius IX had sought refuge at the end of November, 1848, from the republicans, who were besieging him in the Quirinal. Mazzini and his friend Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had led a life of adventure in South America after the persecutions of the thirties, harassed the Austrians with the adherents who had gathered round them. They operated in the neighbourhood of Lago Maggiore, where they could easily withdraw into Swiss territory, and also stirred their associates in Piedmont to fresh activity.

King Charles Albert saw that a renewal of the campaign against the Austrians was the only means of avoiding the revolution with which he also was threatened. He had therefore, by dint of energetic preparation, succeeded in raising his army to one hundred thousand men. He rightly saw that a victory would bring all the patriots over to his side; but he had no faith in this possibility, and announced the termination of the armistice on March 12, 1849, in a tone of despair. Radetzky had long expected this move, and, far from being taken unawares, had made preparations to surprise his adversary. Instead of retiring to the Adda, as the Sardinian had expected, he started from Lodi with fifty-eight thousand men and one hundred and eighty-six guns, and made a turn to the right upon Pavia. On March 20 he crossed the Ticino and moved upon Mortara, while Charles Albert made a corresponding manœuvre at Buffalora and entered Lombard territory at Magenta. He had entrusted the command of his army to the Polish revolutionary general, Adalbert Chrzanowski, whose comrade, Ramorino (p. 148), led a division formed of Lombard fugitives. Radetzky's bold flank movement had broken the connection of the Sardinian forces; Chrzanowski was forced hastily to despatch two divisions to Vigevano and Mortara to check the Austrian advance which was directed against the Sardinian line of retreat. The stronghold of Mortara was none the less captured on March 21 by the corps d'Aspre, the first division of which was led by the

archduke Albrecht. The Sardinian leaders were then forced to occupy Novara with fifty-four thousand men and one hundred and twenty-two guns, their troops available at the moment. Tactically the position was admirable, and here they awaited the decisive battle. Retreat to Vercelli was impossible, in view of the advancing Austrian columns.

On March 23 Radetzky despatched his four corps to converge upon Novara. About 11 A.M. the archduke Albrecht began the attack upon the heights of Bicocca, which formed the key to the Italian position. For four hours fifteen thousand men held out against fifty thousand, until the corps advancing on the road from Vercelli were able to come into action at 3 P.M. This movement decided the struggle. In the evening the Sardinians were ejected from the heights of Novara and retired within the town, which was at once bombarded. The tactical arrangement of the Italians was ruined by the disorder of their converging columns, and many soldiers were able to take to flight. Further resistance was impossible, and the king demanded an armistice of Radetzky, which was refused. Charles Albert now abdicated, resigning his crown to Victor Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, his heir, who happened to be present. During the night he was allowed to pass through the Austrian lines and to make his way to Tuscany.

On the morning of March 24 King Victor Emanuel had a conversation with Radetzky in the farmstead of Vignale, and arranged an armistice on conditions which were to serve as the basis of a future peace. The *status quo ante* in respect of territorial possession was to be restored; the field-marshal waived the right of marching into Turin, which lay open to him, but retained the Lomellina, the country between the Ticino and the Sesia, which he occupied with twenty-one thousand men until the conclusion of peace. It was stipulated that Sardinia should withdraw her ships from the Adriatic and her troops from Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and should forthwith disband the Hungarian, Polish, and Lombard volunteer corps serving with the army. Brescia, which the republicans had occupied after the retreat of the Austrians from Milan, was stormed on April 1 by General von Haynau, who brought up his reserve corps from Padua. In the preceding battles the Italians had committed many cruelties upon Austrian prisoners and wounded soldiers. For this reason the conquerors gave no quarter to the defenders of the town; all who were caught in arms were cut down, and the houses burned from which firing had proceeded.

With the defeat of Sardinia the Italian nationalist movement became purposeless. The restoration of constitutional government in the Church States, Tuscany, and the duchies was opposed only by the democrats. Their resistance was, however, speedily broken by the Austrian troops, Bologna and Ancona alone necessitating special efforts; the former was occupied on May 15, the latter on the 19th. Under Garibaldi's leadership Rome offered a vigorous resistance to the French and Neapolitans, who were attempting to secure the restoration of the pope at his own desire. The French general Victor Oudinot, a son of the marshal of that name under Napoleon I, was obliged to invest the eternal city in form from June 1 to July 3 with twenty thousand men, until the population perceived the hopelessness of defence and forced Garibaldi to withdraw with three thousand republicans. From the date of her entry into Rome until the year 1866 (and again

from 1867 to 1870) France maintained a garrison in the town for the protection of the pope. Venice continued to struggle longest for her independence. Manin rejected the summons to surrender, even after he had received information of the overthrow and abdication of Charles Albert. The Austrians were compelled to drive parallels against the fortifications in the lagoons, of which Fort Malghera was the most important, and to bombard them continuously. It was not until communication between the town and the neighbouring coast line was entirely cut off by a flotilla of rowing boats that the failure of provisions and supplies forced the town council, to which Manin had entrusted the government, to surrender.

Italy was thus unable to free herself by her own efforts. Since the summer of 1848 the Austrian government had been forced to find troops for service against the rebels in Hungary. It was not until the autumn that the capital of Vienna had been cleared of rioters; yet Austria had been able to provide the forces necessary to crush the Italian power. Her success was due to the generalship and capacity of the great marshal, who is rightly called the saviour of the monarchy, and in no less degree to the admirable spirit, fidelity, and devotion of the officers, and to the superior bravery and endurance of the German and Slav troops. High as the national enthusiasm of the Italians rose, it could never compensate for their lack of discipline and military capacity.

B. THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY, 1848-1849

THE struggle between Italy and Austria may be considered as inevitable; each side staked its resources upon a justifiable venture. The same cannot be said of the Hungarian campaign. Under no urgent necessity, without the proposition of any object of real national value, blood was uselessly and wantonly shed, and the most lamentable aberrations and political blunders were committed. The result was more than a decade of bitter suffering both for the Magyars and for the other peoples of the Hapsburg monarchy. Such evils are due to the fact that revolutions never succeed in establishing a situation in any way tolerable; they burst the bonds of oppression and avenge injustice, but interrupt the normal course of development and of constitutional progress, thereby postponing improvements perfectly attainable in themselves.

(a) *Vienna from April to August, 1848.*—Both in Vienna and in Hungary the month of March had been a time of great confusion. In the sudden excitement of the population and the vacillation of the government, rights had been extorted and were recognised; but their exercise was impeded, if not absolutely prevented, by the continued existence of the State. In Vienna the most pressing questions were the right of the students to carry arms and to enter public life; in Hungary, the creation of a special war office and an exchequer board of unlimited power. The students were the leading spirits of political life in Vienna. There was no constitutional matter, no question of national or administrative policy, in which they had not interfered and advanced their demands in the name of the people. Movements in the capital, the seat of government, were therefore characterised by a spirit of immaturity, or, rather, of childishness. Quiet and deliberate discussion on business methods was unknown, every conclusion was rejected as soon as made, and far-sighted men of experience and knowledge of administrative

work were refused a hearing. Fluent and empty-headed demagogues, acquainted with the art of theatrical rant, enjoyed the favour of the excitable middle and working classes, and unfortunately were too often allowed a determining voice and influence in government circles. Any systematic and purposeful exercise of the rights that had been gained was, under these circumstances, impossible; for no one could appreciate the value of these concessions. Like children crying for the moon, they steadily undermined constituted authority and could put nothing in its place.

The students were seduced and exploited by ignorant journalists, aggressive hot-headed Jews, inspired with all Börne's hatred of monarchical institutions; any sensible proposal was obscured by a veil of Heine-like cynicism. To the journalists must be added the grumblers and the base-born, who hoped to secure lucrative posts by overthrowing the influence of the more respectable and conscientious men. These so-called "democrats" gained the consideration even of the prosperous classes by reason of their association with the students, who represented popular feeling. They controlled the countless clubs and unions of the National Guard in the suburbs, and stirred up the working classes, which in Vienna were in the depths of political ignorance; they had been, moreover, already inflamed by the emissaries which the revolutionary societies sent out into France, Switzerland, and West Germany, and were inspired with the wildest dreams of the approach of a new era, bringing freedom, license, and material enjoyment in boundless measure. Together with the Jews, the Poles also attained to great importance, especially after the disturbances in the Polish districts of Austria had been crushed by the energies of the count Franz Stadion, governor of Galicia, and of the town commandant of Krakow. The agitators who were there thrown out of employment received a most brilliant reception at Vienna, and their organisation of "lightning petitions" and street parades soon made them indispensable. On April 25, 1848, was published the constitution of Pillersdorf (p. 184), a hastily constructed scheme, but not without merit; on May 9 the election arrangements followed. Both alike were revolutionary; they disregarded the rights of the Landtag, and far from attempting to remodel existing material, created entirely new institutions in accordance with the political taste prevailing at the moment. Centralisation was a fundamental principle of these schemes; they presupposed the existence of a united territorial empire under uniform administration, from which only Hungary and the Lombard-Venetian kingdom were tacitly excluded. The Reichstag was to consist of a senate and a chamber of deputies. The senate was to include male members of the imperial house over twenty-four years of age, an undetermined number of life-members nominated by the emperor, and one hundred and fifty representatives from among the great landowners; in the chamber thirty-one towns and electoral districts of fifty thousand inhabitants each were to appoint three hundred and eighty-three deputies through their delegates.

From the outset the radicals were opposed to a senate and the system of indirect election; the true spirit of freedom demanded one chamber and direct election without reference to property or taxation burdens. Such a system was the expression of the people's rights, for the "people" consisted, naturally, of democrats. All the moderate men, all who wished to fit the people for their responsibilities by some political education, were aristocrats, and aristocrats were enemies of the people, to be crushed, muzzled, and stripped of their rights. Popular

dissatisfaction at the constitution was increased by the dismissal of the minister of war, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Peter Zanini, and the appointment of Count Theodor Baillet de Latour (April 28). The former was a narrow-minded scion of the middle class, and incapable of performing his duties, for which reason he enjoyed the confidence of the democrats. The latter was a general of distinguished theoretical and practical attainments and popular with the army; these facts and his title made him an object of suspicion to the "people." At the beginning of May the people proceeded to display their dissatisfaction with the ministerial president Count Karl Ficquelmont by the howls and whistling of the students. On May 14 the students fortified themselves with inflammatory speeches in the *aula* and allied themselves with the working classes; on the 15th they burst into the imperial castle and surprised Pillersdorf, who gave way without a show of resistance, acting on the false theory that the chief task of the government was to avoid any immediate conflict. Concessions were granted providing for the formation of a central committee of the democratic unions, the occupation of half the outposts by National Guards, and the convocation of a "constituent Reichstag" with one chamber.

The imperial family, which could no longer expect protection in its own house from the ministry, left Vienna on May 17 and went to Innsbruck, where it was out of the reach of the democrats and their outbursts of temper, and could more easily join hands with the Italian army. It was supported (from June 3) by Johann von Wessenberg, minister of foreign affairs, a diplomatist of the old federal period (p. 162), but of wide education and clever enough to see that in critical times success is only to be attained by boldness of decision and a certain spirit of daring. After Radetzky's victory on the Mincio he speedily convinced himself that compliance with the desires of France and England for the cession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom would be an absolute error, — one, too, which would arouse discontent and irritation in the army, and so affect the conclusion of the domestic difficulty; he therefore decisively rejected the interposition of the Western powers in the Italian question. Wessenberg accepted as seriously meant the emperor's repeated declarations of his desire to rule his kingdom constitutionally. As long as he possessed the confidence of the court he affirmed that this resolve must be carried out at all costs, even though it should be necessary to use force against the risings and revolts of the radical party. He was unable to secure as early a return to Vienna as he had hoped; hence he was obliged to make what use he could of the means at his disposal by entrusting the archduke Johann with the regency during the emperor's absence. The regent's influence was of no value; at that time he was summoned to conduct the business of Germany at Frankfort-on-Main, and his action in Vienna was in consequence irregular and undertaken without full knowledge of the circumstances.

On July 18 the archduke Johann, as representing the emperor, formed a ministry, the president being the progressive landowner Anton von Doblhoff. The advocate Dr. Alexander Bach, who had previously belonged to the popular party, was one of the members. The elections to the Reichstag were begun after Prince Alfred of Windisch-Graetz, the commander of the imperial troops in Bohemia, had successfully and rapidly suppressed a revolt at Prague which was inspired by the first Slav congress (p. 210). This achievement pacified Bohemia (p. 211). On July 10 the deputies of the Austrian provinces met for preliminary discussion. The

claims of the different nationalities to full equality caused a difficulty with respect to the language in which business should be discussed; objections were advanced against any show of preference to German, the only language suitable to the purpose. However, the necessity of a rapid interchange of ideas, and dislike of the wearisome process of translation through an interpreter, soon made German the sole medium of communication, in spite of the protests raised by the numerous Polish peasants, who had been elected in Galicia against the desires of the nobility. The most pressing task, of drafting the Austrian constitution, was entrusted to a committee on July 31; the yet more urgent necessity of further and immediately strengthening the executive power was deferred till the committee should have concluded its deliberations. The ministry was reduced to impotence in consequence, and even after the emperor's return to Schönbrunn (August 12) its position was as unstable as it was unimportant.

(b) *The Movement for Independence in Hungary.*—While these events were taking place in Vienna a new State had been created in Hungary, which was not only independent of Austria, but soon showed itself openly hostile to her. For this result two reasons may be adduced: in the first place, misconceptions as to the value and reliability of the demands advanced by the national spokesmen; and, secondly, the precipitate action of the government, which had made concessions without properly estimating their results. The Magyars were themselves unequal to the task of transforming their feudal State into a constitutional body politic of the modern type as rapidly as they desired. They had failed to observe that the application of the principle of personal freedom to their existing political institutions would necessarily bring to light national claims of a nature to imperil their paramountcy in their own land, or that, in the inevitable struggle for this paramount position, the support of Austria and of the reigning house would be of great value. With their characteristic tendency to overestimate their powers, they deemed themselves capable of founding a European power at one stroke. Their impetuosity further increased the difficulties of their position. They were concerned only with the remodelling of domestic organisation, but they strove to loose, or rather to burst asunder, the political and economic ties which for centuries had united them to the German hereditary possessions of their ruling house. They demanded an independence which they had lost on the day of the battle of Mohács (Vol. V, and Vol. VII, p. 259). They deprived their king of rights which had been the indisputable possession of every one of his crowned ancestors. Such were, the supreme command of his army, to which Hungary contributed a number of men, though sending no individual contingents; the supreme right over the coinage and currency, which was a part of the royal prerogative, and had been personally and therefore uniformly employed by the representatives of the different sovereignties composing the Hapsburg power. The legal code confirmed by the emperor and King Ferdinand at the dissolution of the old Reichstag, April 10, 1848, not only recognised the existing rights of the kingdom of Hungary, but contained concessions from the emperor which endangered and indeed destroyed the old personal union with Austria. Of these the chief were the grant of an independent ministry, and of the union of Hungary and Transylvania without any obligation of service to the crown, without the recognition of any community of interests, without any stipulation for such co-operation as might be needed to secure the existence of the joint monarchy.

In Croatia, Slavonia, in the Banat, and in the district of Bacska inhabited by the Servians, the Slavonic nationalist movement broke into open revolt against Magyar self-aggrandisement; the Hungarian ministry then demanded the recall of all Hungarian troops from the Italian army, from Moravia and Galicia, in order to quell the "anarchy" prevailing at home. The imperial government now discovered that in conceding an "independent" war ministry to Hungary they had surrendered the unity of the army, and so lost the main prop of the monarchical power. The difficulty was incapable of solution by peaceful methods; a struggle could only be avoided by the voluntary renunciation on the part of Hungary of a right she had extorted but a moment before. No less intolerable was the independent attitude of Hungary on the financial question, wherein she showed no inclination to consider the needs of the whole community. She owed her political existence to German victories over the Turks (Vol. VII, p. 259), but in her selfishness would not save Austria from bankruptcy by accepting a quarter of the national debt and making a yearly payment of ten million gulden to meet the interest. The majority of the ministry of Batthyány, to which the loyalist Franz von Deák (p. 168) belonged, were by no means anxious to bring about a final separation between Hungary and Austria; they were even ready to grant troops to the court for service in the Italian war, if the imperial government would support Hungarian action against the malcontent Croatians. In May, Count Louis Batthyány hastened to the imperial court at Innsbruck and succeeded in allaying the prevailing apprehensions. The court was inclined to purchase Hungarian adherence to the dynasty and the empire by compliance in all questions affecting the domestic affairs of Hungary. But it soon became clear that Batthyány and his associates did not represent public feeling, which was entirely led by the fanatical agitator Kossuth, who was not to be appeased by the offer of the portfolio of finance in Batthyány's ministry.

Louis Kossuth was a man of extravagant enthusiasm, endowed with great histrionic powers, a rhetorician who grew more and more excited as he spoke, and was thoroughly well able to assume the pose of an apostle and martyr. Of political reflection he was wholly incapable; his powers were only manifested under the influence of strong excitement. He lived only for the moments when his eloquence made hundreds and thousands the blind implements of his will; his ambition demanded a place in some contest of high excitement, where such great issues were at stake as the destinies of a State and of a nation. It is perhaps uncertain whether Kossuth began his political career with the intention of overthrowing the Hapsburgs and setting up a Hungarian republic with himself in supreme power as president (cf. p. 168). But that such would have been the course of the movement in Hungary had Kossuth become its leader is beyond dispute; for he was wholly incapable of self-restraint, yearned for the stimulus of excitement, recoiled from no extremity, while his boundless imaginative powers were ever devising new and adventurous schemes for the realisation of his objects.

For such national rights as the Magyars could claim for themselves full provision was made by the constitution, which they had devised on liberal principles, abolishing the existing privileges of the nobility and corporations; every freedom was thus provided for the development of their strength and individuality. On July 2, 1848, the Reichstag elected under the new constitution met together. The great task before it was the satisfaction of the other nationalities,

the Slavs, Roumanians, and Saxons, living on Hungarian soil; their acquiescence in the Magyar predominance was to be secured without endangering the unity of the kingdom, by means of laws for national defence, and of other innovations making for prosperity. Some clear definition of the connection between Hungary and Austria was also necessary, if their common sovereign was to retain his prestige in Europe; and it was of the first importance to allay the apprehensions of the court with regard to the fidelity, the subordination, and devotion of the Magyars. Kossuth, however, brought before the Reichstag a series of proposals calculated to shatter the confidence which Batthyány had exerted himself to restore during his repeated visits to Innsbruck. The Austrian national bank had offered to advance twelve and one-half million gulden in notes for the purposes of the Hungarian government. This proposal Kossuth declined, and issued Hungarian paper for the same amount; he then demanded further credit to the extent of forty-two millions, to equip a national army of two hundred thousand men. He even attempted to determine the foreign policy of the emperor-king. Austria was to cede all Italian territory as far as the Etsch, and, as regarded her German provinces, to bow to the decisions of the central power in Frankfurt. In case of dispute with this power she was not to look to Hungary for support. Such a point of view was wholly incompatible with the traditions and the European prestige of the House of Hapsburg; to yield would have been to resign the position of permanency and to begin the disruption of the monarchy.

It was to be feared that Hungarian aggression could be met only by force. The federal allies, who had already prepared for what they saw would be a hard struggle, were now appreciated at their true value. They included the Servians and Croatsians, who were already in open revolt against the Magyars and had been organised into a military force by Georg Stratimirov. The banace of Croatia was a dignity in the gift of the king, though his nominee was responsible to Hungary. Since the outbreak of the revolution the position had been held by an Austrian general belonging to a distinguished family upon the military frontier, the Freiherr (afterward count) Joseph Jellačić. Though no professional diplomatist, he performed a master-stroke of policy in securing to the support of the dynasty the southern Slav movement fostered by the "Great Illyrian" party (cf. Vol. V). He supported the majority of the Agram Landtag in their efforts to secure a separation from Hungary, thereby exposing himself to the violent denunciations of Batthyány's ministry, which demanded his deposition. These outcries he disregarded, and pacified the court by exhorting the frontier regiments serving under Radetzky to remain true to their colours and to give their lives for the glory of Austria. The approbation of his comrades in the imperial army strengthened him in the conviction that it was his destiny to save the army and the imperial house. He formed a Croatian army of forty thousand men, which was of no great military value, though its numbers, its impetuosity, and extraordinary armament made it formidable.

The victories of the Italian army and the reconquest of Milan raised the spirit of the imperial court. On August 12 the emperor returned to the summer palace of Schönbrunn, near Vienna (p. 200), and proceeded to direct his policy in the conviction that he had an armed force on which he could rely, as it was now possible to reconcentrate troops by degrees in different parts of the empire. On August 31, 1848, an imperial decree was issued to the palatine archduke Stephan, who had hitherto enjoyed full powers as the royal representative in Hungary and

Transylvania; the content of the decree referred to the necessity of enforcing the Pragmatic Sanction (cf. Vol. VII, p. 523). Such was the answer to the preparations begun by Kossuth. This decree, together with a note from the Austrian ministry upon the constitutional relations between Austria and Hungary, was at once accepted by Kossuth as a declaration of war, and was made the occasion of measures equivalent to open revolt. On September 11 the minister of finance made a passionately furious speech, which roused his auditors to a frenzied excitement, in which he declared himself ready to assume the dictatorship, on the retirement of Batthyány's ministry. On the same day the Croatian army crossed the Drave and advanced upon Lake Platten.

(c) *Vienna in September and October, 1848.*—The Vienna democrats, who might consider themselves masters of the capital, had been won over to federal alliance with Hungary. The most pressing necessity was the restoration of a strong government which would secure respect for established authority, freedom of deliberation to the Reichstag, and power to carry out its conclusions. The Reichstag, however, preferred to discuss a superficial and ill-conceived motion brought forward by Hans Kudlich, the youthful deputy from Silesia, for releasing peasant holdings from the burdens imposed on them by the overlords. The work of this Reichstag, which contained a large number of illiterate deputies from Galicia, may be estimated from the fact that it showed a strong inclination to put the question of compensation on one side. Dr. Alexander Bach was obliged to exert all his influence and that of the ministry to secure a recognition of the fundamental principle, that the relief of peasant holdings should be carried out in legal form. The "people" of Vienna took little part in these negotiations; their attention was concentrated upon the noisy outcries of the democrats, who were in connection not only with the radical element of the Frankfurt parliament, but also with Hecker and his associates (p. 181).

As early as the middle of September a commencement was made with the task of fomenting disturbances among the working classes, and the retirement of the ministry was demanded. Great excitement was created by the arrival of a large deputation from the Hungarian Reichstag, with which the riotous Viennese formed the tie of brotherhood in a festive celebration (September 16). The Hungarians were able to count upon the friendship of the Austrian revolutionaries after their manifestations of open hostility to the court. The Hungarian difficulty weakened the impression made by Radetzky's victories, and radical minds again conceived hopes of overthrowing the imperial house and forming a federal Danube republic.

At the request of the archduke palatine, Count Louis Batthyány made another attempt to form a constitutional ministry on September 17, with the object of abolishing Kossuth's dictatorship; however, no practical result was achieved. The die had been already cast, and the military party had established the necessity of restoring the imperial authority in Hungary by force of arms. The archduke Stephan attempted to bring about a meeting with Jellačić, to induce him to evacuate Hungarian territory, but the Banus excused himself; at the same time the palatine was informed that Field-Marshal Count Franz Philipp von Lamberg had been appointed commander-in-chief of the imperial troops in Hungary, and that the Banus was under his orders. This was a measure entirely incompatible with the then existing constitution. The archduke recognised that he would be forced

to violate his constitutional obligations as a member of the imperial house; he therefore secretly abandoned the country and betook himself to his possessions in Schaumberg without making any stay in Vienna. When Count Lamberg attempted to take up his post in the Hungarian capital he fell into the hands of Kossuth's most desperate adherents, and was cruelly murdered on September 28, 1848, at the new suspension bridge which unites Pesth and Ofen. An irreparable breach with the dynasty was thus made, and the civil war began. At the end of September the Hungarian national troops under General Johann Moga, a force chiefly composed of battalions of the line, defeated Jellačić and advanced into Lower Austria. They were speedily followed by a Hungarian army which proposed to co-operate with the revolted Viennese, who were also fighting against the public authorities.

It was on October 6, 1848, that the Viennese mob burst into open revolt, the occasion being the march of a grenadier battalion to the Northern railway station for service against the Hungarians. The democratic conspirators had been stirred up in behalf of republicanism by Johannes Ronge (p. 157), Julius Fröbel, and Karl Tausenau; they had done their best to inflame the masses, had unhinged the minds of the populace to the point of rebellion, and made the maintenance of public order impossible. The uproar spread throughout the city, and the minister of war, Count Latour, was murdered. The radical deputies, Löhner, Borrosch, Fischhof, Schuselka, and others now perceived that they had been playing with fire and had burnt their fingers. They were responsible for the murder, in so far as they were unable to check the atrocities of the mob, which they had armed.

Once again the imperial family abandoned the faithless capital and took refuge in the archbishop's castle at Olmütz. The immediate task before the government was to overpower the republican and anarchist movement in Vienna. In Olmütz the government was represented by the Freiherr von Wessenberg (p. 199), and was also vigorously supported by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, who had hastened to the court from Radetzky's camp. He had been employed not only on military service, but also in diplomatic duties in Turin and Naples. He declared for the maintenance of the constitutional monarchy, and supported the decree drafted by Wessenberg, to the effect that full support and unlimited power of action should be accorded to the Reichstag summoned to Kremsier for discussion with the imperial advisers upon some mutually acceptable form of constitution for the empire.

There was strong feeling in favour of placing all power in the hands of Prince Alfred Windisch-Graetz, and establishing a military dictatorship in his person, with the abolition of all representative bodies; but for the moment this idea was not realised. Windisch-Graetz was appointed field-marshal and commander-in-chief of all the imperial forces outside of Italy, and undertook the task of crushing the revolt in Vienna and Hungary. The subjugation of Vienna was an easy task. The garrison, consisting of troops of the line under General Count Karl Joseph von Auersperg, had withdrawn into a secure position outside the city on October 7, where they joined hands with the troops of the Banus Jellačić on the Leitha. These forces gradually penetrated the suburbs of Vienna. On October 21 the army of Prince Windisch-Graetz, marching from Moravia, arrived at the Danube, crossed the river at Nussdorf, and advanced with Auersperg and Jellačić upon the walls which enclosed Vienna.

The democrats in power at Vienna, who had secured the subservience of the members of the Reichstag remaining in the city, showed the courage of bigotry;

they rejected the demands of Windisch-Graetz, who required their submission, the surrender of the war minister's murderers, and the dissolution of the students' committees and of the democratic unions; they determined to defend Vienna until Hungary came to their help. Robert Blum, who, with Julius Fröbel, had brought an address from the Frankfurt democrats to Vienna, was a leading figure in the movement for resistance. Wenzel Messenhauser, the commander of the National Guard, undertook the conduct of the defence, and headed a division of combatants in person. The general assault was delivered on October 28. Only in the Praterstern and in the Jägerzeile was any serious resistance encountered. By evening almost all the barricades in the suburbs had been carried, and the troops were in possession of the streets leading over the glacis to the bastions of the inner city. On the next day there was a general feeling in favour of surrender. Messenhauser himself declared the hopelessness of continuing the struggle, and advised a general surrender. However, on the morning of October 30 he was on the tower of Stephan watching the struggle of Jellačić against the Hungarians at Schwechat, and was unfortunately induced to proclaim the news of the Hungarian advance with an army of relief, thereby reviving the martial ardour of the desperadoes, who had already begun a reign of terror in Vienna. He certainly opposed the fanatics who clamoured for a resumption of the conflict; but he quailed before the intimidation of the democratic ruffians, and resigned his command without any attempt to secure the due observance of the armistice which had been already concluded with Windisch-Graetz. On the 31st the field-marshal threw a few shells into the town to intimidate the furious proletariat; but it was not until the afternoon that the imperial troops were able to make their way into the town. They arrived just in time to save the imperial library and the museum of natural history from destruction by fire.

Vienna was conquered on November 1, 1848; those honourable and distinguished patriots who had spent the month of October in oppression and constant fear of death were liberated. The revolution in Austria could now be considered at an end. The capture of Vienna cost the army sixty officers and one thousand men killed and wounded. The number of the inhabitants, combatants and non-combatants, who were killed in the last days of October can only be stated approximately. Dr. Anton Schütte, an eye-witness, estimates the amount at five thousand.

(d) *The Hungarian Revolt.*—The next problem was the conduct of the war with Hungary, which had already raised an army of one hundred thousand men, and was in possession of every fortress of importance in the country with the exception of Arad and Temesvár. The battle of Schwechat (October 30, 1848) had ended with the retreat of the thirty thousand men and the seven and one-half batteries brought up by General Moga. The energy of the Hungarians had not been equal to the importance of the occasion. A Hungarian victory at that time would have implied the relief of Vienna, and the question of the separation of the crown of Stephan from the House of Hapsburg would certainly have become of European importance.

Upon the abdication of the emperor Ferdinand and the renunciation of his brother the archduke Franz Karl, the archduke Franz Joseph ascended the throne on December 2, 1848. On the same day Prince Windisch-Graetz advanced upon

the Danube with forty-three thousand men and two hundred and sixteen guns, while General Count Franz Schlick started from Galicia with eight thousand men, and General Balthasar von Simunich moved upon Neutra from the Waag with four thousand men. After a series of conflicts at Pressburg (17th), Raab (27th), Moor (December 30, 1848), and after the victory of Schlicks at Kaschau (December 11), the provisional government under Kossuth was forced to abandon Pesth and to retire to Debreczin; the Banate was speedily evacuated by the national troops, as soon as Jellačić, who now commanded an army corps under Windisch-Graetz, was able to act with the armed Servians. However, the field-marshal underestimated the resisting power of the nation, which, as Kossuth represented, was threatened with the loss of its political existence, and displayed extraordinary capacities of self-sacrifice and devotion in those dangerous days. He was induced to advance into the district of the upper Theiss with too weak a force, and divided his troops, instead of halting in strong positions at Ofen and Waitzen on the Danube and waiting for the necessary reinforcements. The battle of Kápolna (February 26 and 27, 1849) enabled Schlick to effect the desired junction, and could be regarded as a tactical victory. Strategically, however, it implied a turn of the scale in favour of the Hungarians; they gradually concentrated under the Polish general Henryk Dąbrowski (p. 148) and under the Hungarians Arthur Görgey, Ernst von Pötenberg, Georg Klapka, Anton Vetter von Doggenfeld, and were able to take the offensive at the end of March, 1849, under the general command of Görgey. This commander won a victory at Isaszég (Gödöllő) on April 6. Ludwig von Melden, the representative of Windisch-Graetz, who had been recalled to Olmütz, was forced to retire to the Raab on April 27 to avoid being surrounded. The town of Komorn, under Josef von Maythény and Ignaz von Torök had offered a bold resistance to the Austrian besiegers, who had hitherto failed to secure this base, which was of importance for the further operations of the imperial army. General Moritz Perczel made a victorious advance into the Banate. General Joseph Bem fought with varying success against the weak Austrian divisions in Transylvania under General Anton, Freiherr von Puchner: the remnants of these were driven into Wallachia on February 20. By April, 1849, the fortresses of Ofen, Arad, and Temesvár alone remained in the occupation of the Austrians.

The promulgation of a new constitution for the whole of Austria, dated March 4, 1849, was answered by Kossuth in a proclamation from Debreczin on April 14, dethroning the House of Hapsburg. In spite of the armistice with Victor Emanuel, Italy was as yet too disturbed to permit the transference of Radetzky's army to Hungary. Accordingly on May 1 the emperor Franz Joseph concluded a convention with Russia, who placed her forces at his disposal for the subjugation of Hungary, as the existence of a Hungarian republic threatened to revive a rebellion in Poland. It was now possible to raise an overwhelming force for the subjection of the brave Hungarian army. General von Haynau (p. 196) was recalled from the Italian campaign to lead the imperial army in Hungary. He advanced from Pressburg with sixty thousand Austrians, twelve thousand Russians, and two hundred and fifty guns. Jellačić led forty-four thousand men and one hundred and sixty-eight guns into south Hungary, while the Russian field-marshal Prince Paskevitch (p. 148) marched on north Hungary by the Dukla pass with one hundred and thirty thousand men and four hundred and sixty guns. Görgey repulsed an attack delivered by Haynau at Komorn on July 2; on the 11th he was removed

from the command in favour of Dembinski, and defeated on the same battlefield, then making a masterly retreat through upper Hungary with three corps to Arad without coming into collision with the Russian contingents. On August 5 Dembinski was driven back from Szoráy to the neighbourhood of Szegedin and the Hungarian leaders could no longer avoid the conviction that their cause was lost. On August 11 Kossuth fled from Arad to Turkey. On the 13th Görgey, who had been appointed dictator two days previously, surrendered with thirty-one thousand men, eighteen thousand horse, one hundred and forty-four guns, and sixty standards, at Világos, to the Russian general Count Fedor W. Rüdiger. Further surrenders were made at Lugos, Boros-Jenő, Mehadia, and elsewhere. On October 5 Klapka marched out of Komorn under the honourable capitulation of September 27.

Hungary was thus conquered by Austria with Russian help. For an exaggeration of her national claims, which was both historically and politically unjustifiable, she paid with the loss of all her constitutional rights. She brought down grievous misfortune upon herself, and no less upon the Austrian crown territories; these also were handed over to a reactionary party, which was guided by principles of predominance rather than of policy, and fought for paramountcy without scruple. The Magyar nationalists had expected the Western powers to approve their struggles for independence and to support the new Magyar State against Austria and Russia; they calculated particularly upon help from England. They were now to learn that the Hungarian question is not one of European importance, and that no one saw the necessity of an independent Hungarian army and ministry of foreign affairs except those Hungarian politicians whose motive was not patriotism, but self-seeking in its worst form.

C. SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

AN entirely strong and healthy national feeling came to expression in those "sea-girt" duchies, the masters of which had also been kings of Denmark since the fifteenth century. During the bitter period of the struggle for the supremacy of the Baltic (cf. Vol. VII) they had but rarely been able to assert their vested right to separate administration. They, however, had remained German, whereas the royal branch of the House of Holstein-Oldenburg, one of the oldest ruling families in Germany, had preferred to become Danish. The members of the ducal house of Holstein, which had undergone repeated bifurcations, largely contributed to maintain German feeling in Schleswig and Holstein, and asserted their independence with reference to their Danish cousins by preserving their relations with the empire and with their German neighbours. In the eighteenth century the consciousness of their independence was so strong among the estates of the two duchies, that the "royal law" of 1660, abolishing the assembly of the estates and establishing the paramountcy of the Danish branch of the House of Oldenburg, could not be executed in Schleswig and Holstein.

The result of the Vienna congress had been to secure the rights of the German districts and to separate them definitely from Napoleon's adherent. Metternich's policy had bungled this question, like so many other national problems, by handing over Schleswig to the Danes, while including Holstein in the German federation. Unity was, however, the thought that inspired the population of either country.

This feeling increased in strength and became immediately operative, when Denmark was so impolitic as to defraud the Germans by regulations which bore unjustly upon the imperial bank, founded in 1813. The disadvantages of Danish supremacy then became manifest to the lowest peasant. Danish paper and copper were forced upon the duchies, while their good silver streamed away to Copenhagen. The struggle against this injustice was taken up by the German patriot leaders, who were able to make the dissension turn on a constitutional point after the publication of the "open letter" of King Christian VIII. On July 8, 1848, he announced the intention of the Danish government, in the event of a failure of male heirs, to secure the succession to the undivided "general monarchy" to the female line, in accordance with the Danish royal law. Christian's only son, Frederick, was an invalid and childless, and the duchies had begun to speculate upon the demise of the crown and the consequent liberation from a foreign rule. Their constitution recognised only succession in the male line, a principle which would place the power in the hands of the ducal house of Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, while in Denmark the successor would be Prince Christian of Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, who had married Louise of Hesse-Cassel, a niece of Christian VIII. Schleswig had the prospect of complete separation from Denmark, and this object was approved in numerous public meetings and adopted as a guiding principle by the assembly of the estates. Schleswig objected to separation from Holstein, and to any successor other than one in the male line of descent.

Christian VIII died on January 20, 1848, and was succeeded by his son Frederic II. This change and the impression created by the revolutions in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin confirmed the duchies in their resolve to grasp their rights and assert their national independence. Had the king met these desires with a full recognition of the provincial constitutions and the grant of a separate national position and administration, he would probably have been able to retain possession of the two countries under some form of personal federation without appealing to force of arms, and perhaps to secure their adherence for the future. He yielded, however, to the arguments of the "Eider Danes," who demanded the abandonment of Holstein and the incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark, regarding the Eider as the historical frontier of the Danish power. This party required a joint constitutional form of government, and induced the king to elect a ministry from their number, and to announce the incorporation of Schleswig in the Danish monarchy to the deputation from the Schleswig-Holstein provinces in Copenhagen on March 22, 1848. Meanwhile the assembly of the estates at Rendsburg had determined to declare war upon the Eider Danes. On March 24 a provisional government for the two duchies was formed at Kiel, which was to be carried on in the name of Duke Christian of Augustenburg, at that time apparently a prisoner in the hands of the Danes, until he secured liberty to govern his German territories in person.

The new government was recognised both by the population at large and by the garrisons of the most important centres. It was unable, however, immediately to mobilise a force equivalent to the Danish army, and accordingly turned to Prussia for help. This step, which appeared highly politic at the moment, proved unfortunate in the result. The fate of the duchies was henceforward bound up with the indecisive and vacillating policy of Frederic William IV, whose weakness became daily more obvious; he was incapable of fulfilling any single one of the

many national duties of which he talked so glibly. His first steps in the Schleswig-Holstein complication displayed extraordinary vigour. On April 3, 1848, two Prussian regiments of the guard marched into Rendsburg, and their commander, General Eduard von Bonin, sent an ultimatum on the 16th to the Danish troops, ordering them to evacuate the duchy and the town of Schleswig, which they had seized after a victory at Bau (April 9) over the untrained Schleswig-Holstein troops. On April 12 the federal council at Frankfurt recognised the provisional government at Kiel, and mobilised the tenth federal army corps (Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Brunswick) for the protection of the federal frontier. The Prussian general Von Wrangel united this corps with his own troops, and fought the battle of Schleswig on the 23d, obliging the Danes to retreat to Alsen and Jutland.

Throughout Germany the struggle of the duchies for liberation met with enthusiastic support, and was regarded as a matter which affected the whole German race. There and in the duchies themselves Prussia's prompt action might well be considered as a token that Frederic William was ready to accomplish the national will as regarded the north frontier. Soon, however, it became plain that English and Russian influence was able to check the energy of Prussia, and to confine her action to the conclusion of a peace providing protection for the interests of the German duchies. The king was tormented with fears that he might be supporting some revolutionary movement. He doubted the morality of his action, and was induced by the threats of Nicholas I, his Russian brother-in-law, to begin negotiations with Denmark. These ended in the conclusion of a seven months' armistice at Malmö on August 26, 1848, Prussia agreeing to evacuate the duchy of Schleswig. The government of the duchies was to be undertaken by a commission of five members, nominated jointly by Denmark and Prussia. The Frankfurt parliament attempted to secure the rejection of the conditions, to which Prussia had assented without consulting the imperial commissioner, Max von Gagern, who had been despatched to the seat of war, and which were entirely opposed to German feeling; but the resolutions on the question were carried only by small majorities, the parliament was unable to ensure their realisation, and was eventually forced to acquiesce in the armistice.

Meanwhile the assembly of the estates of Schleswig-Holstein hastily passed a law declaring the universal liability of the population to military service, and retired in favour of a "constituent provincial assembly," which passed a new constitutional law on September 15. The connection of the duchies with the Danish crown was thereby affirmed to depend exclusively upon the person of the common ruler. The Danish members of the government commission declined to recognise the new constitution, and also demurred to the election of deputies from Schleswig to the Frankfurt parliament. Shortly afterward Denmark further withdrew her recognition of the government commission. The armistice expired without any success resulting from the attempts of Prussia to secure unanimity on the Schleswig-Holstein question among the great powers. War consequently broke out again in February, 1849. Victories were gained by Prussian and federal troops and by a Schleswig-Holstein corps, in which many Prussian officers on furlough from the king were serving, at Eckernförde (April 5; see the plate, "The Danish Line of Battleship 'Christian VIII' blown up at Eckernförde") and Kolding (April 23, 1849). On the other hand, the Schleswig-Holstein corps was defeated while besieging the Danish fortress of Fridericia, and forced to retreat

beyond the Eider. On July 10, 1849, Prussia concluded a further armistice with Denmark. The administration of the duchies was entrusted to a commission composed of a Dane, a Prussian, and an Englishman.

At the same time the government of Schleswig-Holstein was continued in Kiel in the name of the provincial assembly by Count Friedrich Reventlow and Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, a solicitor. They attempted to conclude some arrangement with the king-duke on the one hand, and on the other to stir up a fresh rising of the people against Danish oppression, which was continually increasing in severity in Schleswig. The devotion of the German population and the enthusiastic support of numerous volunteers from every part of Germany raised the available forces to thirty thousand men, and even made it possible to equip a Schleswig-Holstein fleet. In the summer of 1850 Prussia gave way to the representations of the powers, and concluded the "simple peace" with Denmark (July 2). Schleswig-Holstein then began the struggle for independence on their own resources. They would have had some hope of success with a better general than Wilhelm von Willisen, and if Prussia had not recalled her officers on furlough. Willisen retired from the battle of Idstedt (July 24) before the issue had been decided, and began a premature retreat. He failed to prosecute the advantage gained at Missunde (September 12), and retired from Friedrichstadt without making any impression, after sacrificing four hundred men in a useless attempt to storm the place.

The German federation which had been again convoked at Frankfurt revoked its previous decisions, in which it had recognised the rights of the duchies to determine their own existence, and assented to the peace concluded by Prussia. An Austrian army corps set out for the disarmament of the duchies. Though the provincial Assembly still possessed an unbeaten army of thirty-eight thousand men fully equipped, it was forced on January 11, 1851, to submit to the joint demands of Austria and Prussia, to disband the army, and acknowledge the Danish occupation of the two duchies. From 1852 Denmark did her utmost to undermine the prosperity of her German subjects and to crush their national aspirations. Such ignoble methods failed to produce the desired result. Neither the faithlessness of the Prussian government nor the arbitrary oppression of the Danes could break the national spirit of the North German marches. On the death of Frederic VII (November 15, 1863) they again asserted their national rights. Prussia had become convinced of their power and of the strength of their national feeling, and took the opportunity of atoning for her previous injustice.

D. PANSLAVISM AND THE POLES

(a) *The Slav Congress at Prague.*—Of the many quixotic enterprises called into life by the "nation's spring" of 1848, one of the wildest was certainly the Slav congress opened in Prague on June 2. Here the catchword of Slav solidarity was proclaimed and the idea of "Panslavism" discovered, which even now can raise forebodings in anxious hearts, although half a century has in no way contributed to the realisation of the idea. At a time when the nations of Europe were called upon to determine their different destinies, it was only natural that the Slavs should be anxious to assert their demands. There were Slav peoples which had long been deprived of their national rights, and others, such as the Slovaks and

EXPLANATION OF THE PICTURE OVERLEAF

In March, 1849, the German central power in Frankfort-on-Main gave Duke Ernst II of Saxe-Coburg command of a brigade of the imperial army in Schleswig-Holstein; he appointed Colonel Eduard v. Treitschke and two other Saxony officers to his staff (from the papers of the first-mentioned his son Henry edited a generally accurate account of the fight of Eckernförde, which he published in the 1896 volume of the "Historischen Zeitschrift"). On April 1 he reported himself to the commander-in-chief in Schleswig, Lieutenant-General K. L. W. E. von Prittwitz, and was placed in reserve with his brigade (5 battalions of infantry from Baden, Gotha, Meiningen, Reuss, and Würtemberg, 2 batteries of light artillery from Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, 2 squadrons of Hanseatic dragoons; in all 3,928 men, 12 guns, and 223 horses), with orders to protect the length of the east coast from the Schlei to Kiel bay against any landing that the Danes might attempt. Two Schleswig-Holstein reserve battalions were in process of formation at Kiel and Eckernförde, not under the Duke of Coburg, but commanded by General Eduard v. Bonin, the chief officer of the duchy; the Schleswig-Holstein heavy artillery was in position in Friedrichsort and in the shore batteries upon the two bays. On April 2 the Duke established his headquarters in Gettorf (between Eckernförde and Kiel), having on the spot only the Gotha, Meiningen, and Reuss battalions of his reserve brigade, the Nassau battery being in the Schnellmark wood (in all 2,150 men with 6 guns).

A good two miles to the east of Eckernförde, an unprotected town open to an attack in the rear by troops landed from the sea, lay the north earthwork on a small promontory, armed with 2 howitzers and 4 24-pounders, with 55 men, under the command of the Schleswig-Holstein Captain Eduard Jungmann (born April 3, 1815, at Lissa in Posen, gunnery instructor in Turkey 1845-1848, died March 25, 1862, in Hamburg). Straight opposite, somewhat within the bay and scarce a mile from the town, lay the southern earthwork, indifferently protected on the land side by a redoubt only available for infantry, and armed with 4 heavy guns and 37 men, under the command of the Schleswig-Holstein subaltern Ludwig Theodor Preusser (born May 11, 1822, in Rendsburg, cadet of Copenhagen, farmer in 1842, volunteer cavalry soldier in 1848, then skirmisher in Fehmarn and artillerist in October, bombardier in February, 1849; perished in the explosion of the burning "Christian VIII" with the Danish lieutenant Captain Krieger, while transporting the Danish prisoners from the vessel).

On April 3, after the expiration of the armistice hostilities were resumed, and on the afternoon of the 4th the Danish fleet ran into the bay of Eckernförde and anchored off the southern shore. The old captain, Christian Karl Paludan, had been ordered to advance upon the bay of Eckernförde by General Krogh, the Danish commander-in-chief; he had under his command the battleship "Christian VIII," of 84 guns, the fast-sailing frigate "Gesion" of 48 guns, the two steamers, "Hekla" and "Geyser," with 8 guns each, and a landing party 250 strong in 3 sloops.

The details of the brilliant German success in the fight of the 5th of April, 1849, may be read in Treitschke's account (op. cit., reprinted in Vol. IV of his "Historischen und Politischen Aufsätze," Leipzig, 1897). Towards one o'clock in the afternoon the "Christian VIII" hoisted a flag of truce; but the captains, Jungmann, Wigand (resident commander of Eckernförde), and Irminger (commander of the Schleswig-Holstein reserve battalion), replied that they would continue the fight; meanwhile the Duke of Coburg and Captain v. Stieglitz had been entangled in swampy ground and proceeded to Gettorf. After four o'clock the artillery duel was resumed, and was chiefly maintained by Jungmann, Preusser, and Müller, the Nassau captain. About six o'clock the "Gesion" surrendered, as did the battleship shortly afterwards. Paludan handed his sword between seven and eight to the Duke, who had hastened to the scene of

action; about 8.30 the "Christian VIII," which had been set on fire at six by a shell from the north battery, blew up.

The German loss was only 4 dead and 14 wounded, whereas the Danes lost 131 dead, 92 wounded, 44 officers, and 981 prisoners, besides their warships. Jungmann was promoted to major by v. Bonin, who placed Preusser's name upon the list of lieutenants after his death. The figure-head of the "Christian VIII," with the Danebrog flag taken from the "Gesion," and Paludan's sword, are still preserved in a trophy room of Coburg Castle; cf. the joyous epic "Geisterspuk, oder Das grosse Umgehen auf der Veste Koburg," by Fritz Hofmann (Leipsic. 1877).

"In the battle our flag is our glory and pride,
And its colours are black, gold, and red.
Black for death; red for blood; our freedom is gold,
And for it will we fight until dead."

(Johann Meyer in the "Gröndunnersdag bi Eckernför," Leipsic, 1873.)

The painter of the picture, Rudolf Hardorff of Hamburg (born March 8, 1815), hurried to the spot on April 6, 1849 (a large splinter from the "Christian VIII" is still in his possession), sketched the north and south batteries on the scene of the conflict, with any other visible memorials, and gained much detailed information from the Nassau contingent. Hence the picture (belonging to the Hamburg Art Gallery) may justly claim to be a historically faithful reproduction of the climax of that day.

part of the southern Slavs, who had never enjoyed the exercise of their rights. For these a period of severe trial had begun; it was for them to show whether they were capable of any internal development and able to rise to the level of national independence, or whether not even the gift of political freedom would help them to carry out that measure of social subordination which is indispensable to the uniform development of culture. The first attempts in this direction were somewhat of a failure; they proved to contemporaries and to posterity that the Slavs were still in the primary stages of political training; that the attainment of practical result was hindered by the extravagance of their demands, their overweening and almost comical self-conceit; and that for the creation of States they possessed little or no capacity. The differences existing in their relations with other peoples, the lack of uniformity in the economic conditions under which they lived, the want of political training and experience,—these were facts which they overlooked. They forgot the need of prestige and importance acquired by and within their own body, and considered of chief importance preparations on a large scale, which could never lead to any political success. Had their action been limited to forwarding the common interests of the Austrian Slavs, it might have been possible to produce a political programme dealing with this question; to demand a central parliament, and through opposition to the Hungarian supremacy to assert the rights of the Slav majority as against the Germans, Magyars, and Italians. But the participation of the Poles in the movement, the appearance of the Russian radical democrat Michael Bakunin, and of Turkish subjects, infinitely extended the range of the questions in dispute, and led to propositions of the most arbitrary nature, the accomplishment of which was entirely beyond the sphere of practical politics. Pan-Slavism, as a movement, was from the outset deprived of all importance by the inveterate failing of the Slav politicians, which was to set no limit to the measure of their claims, and to represent themselves as stronger than they really were.

Greatly to the disgust of its organisers, among whom were several Austrian conservative nobles, the Slav congress became an arena for the promulgation of democratic theories, while it waited for a congress of European nations to found Pan-Slavonic States. These States were to include Czechia (Bohemia and Moravia), a Galician-Silesian State, Posen under Prussian supremacy, until the fragments of Poland could be united into an independent Polish kingdom, and a kingdom of Slovenia which was to unite the Slav population of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the seaboard. The Slav States hitherto under Hapsburg supremacy were to form a federal State; the German hereditary domains were to be graciously accorded the option of entering the federation, or of joining the State which the Frankfurt parliament was to create. The attitude of the Slovaks, Croatians, and Servians would be determined by the readiness of the Magyars to grant them full independence. Should the grant be refused, it would be necessary to form a Slovak and a Croatian State. All these achievements the members of the congress considered practicable, though they were forced to admit that the Slavs, whom they assumed to be inspired by the strongest aspirations for freedom and justice, were continually attempting to aggrandise themselves at one another's expense; the Poles, the Ruthenians, and the Croatians respectively considered their most dangerous enemies to be the Russians, the Poles, and the Servians.

The Czech students in Prague had armed and organised a guard of honour for

the congress. They made not the smallest attempt to conceal their hatred of the Germans; Germanism to them was anathema, and they yearned for the chance of displaying their heroism in an anti-German struggle, as the Poles had done against Russia. They were supported by the middle-class citizens, and the working classes were easily induced to join in a noisy demonstration on June 12, 1848, against Prince Alfred Windisch-Graetz, the general commanding in Prague, as he had refused the students a grant of sixty thousand cartridges and a battery of horse artillery. The demonstration developed into a revolt, which the Czech leaders used as evidence for their cause, though it was to be referred rather to the disorderly character of the Czech mob, than to any degree of national enthusiasm. The members of the congress were very disagreeably surprised, and decamped with the utmost rapidity when they found themselves reputed to favour the scheme for advancing Slav solidarity by street fights. The Vienna government, then thoroughly cowed and trembling before the mob, made a wholly unnecessary attempt at intervention. Prince Windisch-Graetz, however, remained master of the situation, overpowered the rebels by force of arms, and secured the unconditional submission of Prague (cf. above, p. 199). He was speedily master of all Bohemia. The party of Franz Palacky, the Czech historian and politician, at once dropped the programme of the congress in its entirety, abandoned the ideal of Panslavism, and placed themselves at the disposal of the Austrian government. Czech democratism was an exploded idea; the conservative Czechs who survived its downfall readily co-operated in the campaign against the German democrats, and attempted to bring their national ideas into harmony with the continuance of Austria as dominant power. Palacky became influential at the imperial court in Olmütz and proposed the transference of the Reichstag to Kremsier, where his subordinate, Ladislaus Rieger, took an important share in the disruption of popular representation by the derision which he cast upon the German democrats.

The Austrian Slavs had acquired a highly favourable position by their victory over the revolutionary Magyars, an achievement in which the Croats had a very considerable share. They might the more easily have become paramount, as the Germans had injured their cause by their senseless radicalism. They were, however, lacking in the statesmanlike capacity necessary to carry out the reorganisation of the State in their own interests; they became the ladder by which the court nobility and clergy rose to unlimited power. They were rendered incapable of any permanent political achievement by their blind animosity for their German fellow subjects. Spite and malevolence were the chief causes of this feeling, which prevented them from securing allies who might have helped them to preserve the interests of the State. Their fruitless attempt to secure a paramount position in Bohemia gave them a share in the conduct of the State; this they could claim by reason of the strength and productive force of their race and of their undeniable capacity for administrative detail, had they conceded to the Germans the position to which these latter were entitled by the development of the Hapsburg monarchy and its destiny in the system of European States.

(b) *The Polish Revolt in Posen.* — The year 1848 might perhaps have afforded an opportunity for the restoration of Polish independence, had the leaders of the national policy been able to find the only path which could guide them to success. Any attempt in this direction ought to have been confined to the territory occu-

pied by Russia; any force that might have been raised for the cause of patriotism could have been best employed upon Russian soil. Russia was entirely isolated; it was inconceivable that any European power could have come to her help, as Prussia had come in 1831, if she had been at war with the Polish nation. Austria was unable to prevent Galicia from participation in a Polish revolt. Prussia had been won over as far as possible to the Polish side, for her possessions in Posen had been secured from any amalgamation with an independent Polish State. The approval of the German parliament was as firmly guaranteed to the Polish nationalists as was the support of the French republic, provided that German interests were not endangered.

Exactly the opposite course was pursued: the movement began with a rising in Posen, with threats against Prussia, with fire and slaughter in German communities, with the rejection of German culture, which could not have been more disastrous to Polish civilization than the arbitrary and cruel domination of Russian officials and police. Louis of Mieroslawski, a learned visionary, but no politician, calculated upon a victory of European democracy, and thought it advisable to forward the movement in Prussia, where the conservative power seemed most strongly rooted. He therefore began his revolutionary work in Posen, after the movement of March had set him free to act. On April 29, 1848, he fought an unsuccessful battle at the head of sixteen thousand rebels against Colonel Heinrich von Brandt at Xions; on the 30th he drove back a Prussian corps at Miloslaw. However, he gained no support from the Russian Poles, and democratic intrigue was unable to destroy the discipline of the Prussian army, so that the campaign in Posen was hopeless; by the close of May it had come to an end, the armed bands were dispersed, and Mieroslawski driven into exile. At a later date (spring, 1849), in Sicily and Baden, he placed his military knowledge at the disposal of the cause of revolution, and clung with extraordinary tenacity to his faith in the saving power of democratic principles, notwithstanding the misuse of them by foolish and unscrupulous radicals. He was the author of the admirable descriptions of the revolution of 1830-1831 (Paris, 1836-1838) and the revolt of Posen (Paris, 1853), in which he criticises his own nation.

9. THE RED AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN FRANCE

A. THE RADICALS IN MAY AND JUNE, 1848

THE European spirit of democracy which was desirous of overthrowing existing States, planting its banner upon the ruins and founding in its shadow new bodies politic of the nature of which no democrat had the remotest idea, had been utterly defeated in France at a time when Italy, Germany, and Austria were the scene of wild enthusiasm and bloody self-sacrifice. Democratic hopes ran the course of all political ideals. The process of realisation suddenly discloses the fact that every mind has its own conception of any ideal, which may assume the most varied forms when translated into practice. A nation desirous of asserting its supremacy may appear a unity while struggling against an incompetent government; but as soon as the question of establishing the national supremacy arises, numbers of different interests become prominent, which cannot be adequately satisfied by any one constitutional form. The simultaneous fulfilment of the hopes which are

common to all is rendered impossible not only by inequality of material wealth, but also by the contest for power, the exercise of which necessarily implies the accumulation of privileges on one side with a corresponding limitation on the other.

When the nine hundred representatives of the French nation declared France a republic on May 4, 1848 (cf. p. 179), the majority of the electors considered the revolution concluded, and demanded a public administration capable of maintaining peace and order and removing the burdens which oppressed the taxpayer. The executive committee chosen on May 10, the president's chair being occupied by the great physicist Dominique François Arago, fully recognised the importance of the duty with which the country had entrusted them, and was resolved honourably to carry out the task. But in the first days of its existence the committee found itself confronted by an organised opposition, which, though excluded from the government, claimed the right of performing its functions. Each party was composed of democrats, government and opposition alike; each entered the lists in the name of the sovereign people, those elected by the moneyed classes as well as the leaders of the idle or unemployed, who for two months had been in receipt of pay for worthless labour in the "national factories" of France.

On May 15 the attack on the dominant party was begun by the radicals, who were pursuing ideals of communism or political socialism, or were anxious merely for the possession of power which they might use to their own advantage. They found their excuse in the general sympathy for Poland. The leaders were Louis Blanc, L. A. Blanqui, P. J. Proudhon, Étienne Cabet (Vol. VII, p. 403), and François Vincent Raspail. Ledru-Rollin declined to join the party. They had no sooner gained possession of the Hôtel de Ville than a few battalions of the National Guard arrived opportunely and dispersed the assembled masses. The leaders of the conspiracy were arraigned before the court of Bourges, which proceeded against them with severity, while the national factories were closed. They had cost France two hundred and fifty thousand francs daily, and were nothing more than a meeting-ground for malcontents and sedition. This measure, coupled with an order to the workmen to report themselves for service in the provinces, produced the June revolt, a period of street fighting, in which the radical democrats who gathered round the red flag carried on a life and death struggle with the republican democrats, whose watchword was the "*République sans phrase*." The monarchists naturally sided with the republican government, to which the line troops and the National Guard were also faithful. The minister of war, General Louis Eugène Cavaignac, who had won distinction in Algiers, supported by the generals Lamoricière (p. 176), and Ed. Ad. Damesne, on June 23 successfully conducted the resistance to the bands advancing from the suburbs to the centre of Paris. The "reds," however, declined to yield, and on June 24 the national assembly gave Cavaignac the dictatorship. He declared Paris in a state of siege, and pursued the rebels, who were also charged with the murder of the archbishop Denis Auguste Affre (June 25), to the suburb of Sainte-Antoine, where a fearful massacre on June 27 made an end of the revolt.

B. THE PRESIDENCY OF LOUIS NAPOLEON

THE victory had been gained at heavy cost; thousands of wounded lay in the hospitals of Paris and its environs. The number of lives lost has never been

determined, but it equalled the carnage of many a great battle, and included nine generals and several deputies. An important reaction in public feeling had set in; the people's favour was now given to the conservative parties, and any compromise with the radicals was opposed. The democratic republic was based on the co-operation of the former "constitutionalists." Thiers, Montalembert, and Odilon Barrot (cf. pp. 129 f., 138, and 178) again became prominent figures. Cavaignac was certainly installed at the head of the executive committee; however, his popularity paled apace, as he did not possess the art of conciliating the bourgeois by brilliant speeches or promises of relief from taxation. The constitution, which was ratified after two months' discussion by the national assembly, preserved the fundamental principle of the people's sovereignty. The choice of a president of the republic was not left to the deputies, but was to be decided by a plebiscite. This provision opened the way to agitators capable of influencing the masses and prepared the path to supremacy to an ambitious member of the Bonaparte family, who had been repeatedly elected as a popular representative, and had held a seat in the national assembly since September 26, 1848.

From the date of his flight from Ham (p. 176) Charles Louis Napoléon had lived in England in close retirement. The outbreak of the February revolution inspired him with great hopes for his future; he had, however, learned too much from Strassburg and Boulogne to act as precipitately as his supporters in France desired. He remained strong in the conviction that his time would come, a thought which relieved the tedium of waiting for the moment when he might venture to act. He tendered his thanks to the republic for permission to return to his native land after thirty-three years of proscription and banishment; he assured the deputies who were his colleagues of the zeal and devotion which he would bring to their labours, which had hitherto been known to him only "by reading and meditation." His candidature for the president's chair was then accepted not only by his personal friends and by the adherents of the Bonapartist empire, but also by numerous members of conservative tendencies, who saw in uncompromising republicans like Cavaignac no hope of salvation from the terrors of anarchy. They were followed by ultramontanes, Orleanists, legitimists, and socialists, who objected to the republican doctrinaires, and used their influence in the election which took place on December 10, 1848. Against the one and a half millions who supported Cavaignac, an unexpectedly large majority of five and a half millions voted for the son of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense Beauharnais. As a politician no one considered him of any account, but every party hoped to be able to use him for their own purposes or for the special objects of their ambitious or office-seeking leaders. The behaviour of the national assembly was not very flattering when the result of the voting was announced on December 20. "Some, who were near Louis Bonaparte's seat," says Victor Hugo, "expressed approval; the rest of the assembly preserved a cold silence. Marrast, the president, invited the chosen candidate to take the oath. Louis Bonaparte, buttoned up in a black coat, the cross of the Legion of honour on his breast, passed through the door on the right, ascended the tribune, and calmly repeated the words after Marrast; he then read a speech, with the unpleasant accent peculiar to him, interrupted by a few cries of assent. He pleased his hearers by his unstinted praise of Cavaignac. In a few moments he had finished, and left the tribune amid a general shout of 'Long live the republic!' but with none of the cheers which had accompanied Cavaignac." Thus "the new

man" was received with much discontent and indifference, with scanty respect, and with no single spark of enthusiasm. He was indeed without genius or fire and of very moderate capacity; but he understood the effect of commonplaces and the baser motives of his political instruments, and was therefore able to attract both the interest of France and the general attention of the whole of Europe.

The president of the citizen republic was thus a member of the family of that great conqueror and subduer of the world whose remembrance aroused feelings of pride in every Frenchman, if his patriotism were not choked by legitimism: it was a problem difficult of explanation. No one knew whether the president was to be addressed as prince, highness, sir, monseigneur, or citizen. To something greater he was bound to grow, or a revolution would forthwith hurl him back into the obscurity whence he had so suddenly emerged. But of revolution France had had more than enough. "Gain and the enjoyment of it" was the watchword, and Louis Napoleon accepted it. Victor Hugo claims to have shown him the fundamental principles of the art of government at the first dinner in the *Élysée*. Ignorance of the people's desires, disregard of the national pride, had led to the downfall of Louis Philippe; the most important thing was to raise the standard of peace. "And how?" asked the prince. "By the triumphs of industry and progress, by great artistic, literary, and scientific efforts. The labour of the nation can create marvels. France is a nation of conquerors; if she does not conquer with the sword, she will conquer by her genius and talent. Keep that fact in view and you will advance; forget it, and you are lost." Louis did not possess this power of expression, but with the idea he had long been familiar. He now increased his grasp of it. He knew that men get tired of great movements, political convulsion, hypocritical posing. Most people are out of breath after they have puffed themselves like the frog in the fable, and need a rest to recover their wind. As long as this desire for quietude prevailed, Napoleon the *citoyen* was secure of the favour of France. The moment he appealed to "great feelings" his art had reached its limits and he became childish and insignificant. His political leanings favoured the liberalism for which the society of Paris had created the July kingdom. This tendency was shown in his appointment of Odilon Barrot as head of his ministry, and of Edouard Drouyn de l'Huys, one of his personal adherents, as first minister of foreign affairs.

Desire to secure the constituted authority against further attacks of the "reds" was the dominant feeling which influenced the elections to the national assembly. By the election law, which formed part of the constitution, these were held in May, 1849. The majority were former royalists and constitutionalists, who began of express purpose a reactionary policy after the revolt of the communists in June, 1848. Fearful of the Italian democracy, into the arms of which Piedmont had rushed, France let slip the favourable opportunity of fostering the Italian movement for unity and of taking Austria's place in the peninsula. Had she listened to Charles Albert's appeal for help, the defeat of Novara (p. 196) could have been avoided, and the Austrian government would not have gained strength enough to become the centre of a reactionary movement which speedily interfered both with the revolutionary desires of the radicals and the more modest demands of the moderate-minded friends of freedom. Louis Bonaparte fully appreciated the fact that the sentiments of the population at large were favourable to a revival of governmental energy throughout almost the whole

of Europe. He saw that the excesses of the mob, who were as passionately excited as they were morally degraded, had restored confidence among the moneyed classes and those who desired peace in the power of religious guidance and education. For these reasons he acquiesced in the restoration of the temporal supremacy of the pope, which the democracy had abolished, thereby rendering the greatest of all possible services to the ultramontanes.

C. THE RESTORATION OF THE TEMPORAL SUPREMACY OF THE POPE

In March, 1848, Pius IX, the "national pope," had assented to the introduction within the States of the Church of a constitutional form of government. At the same time he had publicly condemned the war of Piedmont and the share taken in it by the Roman troops, which he had been unable to prevent. This step had considerably damped public enthusiasm in his behalf. Roman feeling also declared against him when he refused his assent to the liberal legislation of the chambers and transferred the government to the hands of Count Pellegrino de Rossi. The count's murder (November 15, 1848) marked the beginning of a revolution in Rome which ended with the imprisonment of the pope in the Quirinal, his flight to the Neapolitan fortress of Gaeta (November 27), and the establishment of a provisional government. The pope was now inclined to avail himself of the services offered by Piedmont for the recovery of his power. However, the constituent national assembly at Rome, which was opened on February 5, 1849, voted for the restoration of the Roman republic by one hundred and twenty votes against twenty-three, and challenged the pope to request the armed interference of the Catholic powers in his favour. The Roman republic became the central point of the movement for Italian unity, and was joined by Venice, Tuscany, and Sicily. Mazzini (p. 180) was the head of the triumvirate which held the executive power; Giuseppe Garibaldi (p. 196) directed the forces for national defence, of which Rome was now made the headquarters.

The "democratic republic," which was being organised in France, would have no dealings with the descendants of the Carbonari, or with the chiefs of the revolutionary party in Europe. It considered alliance with the clericals absolutely indispensable to its own preservation. Hence came the agreement to co-operate with Austria, Spain, and Naples for the purpose of restoring the pope to his temporal power. Twenty thousand men were at once despatched under Marshal Oudinot, and occupied the harbour town of Civita Vecchia on April 25, 1849. The president, however, had no intention of reimposing upon the Romans papal absolutism, with all the scandals of such a government. He sent out his trusty agent, Ferdinand de Lesseps, to effect some compromise between the pope and the Romans which should result in the establishment of a moderate liberal government. Oudinot, however, made a premature appeal to force of arms. He suffered a reverse before the walls of Rome (April 30), and the military honour of France, which a descendant of Napoleon could not afford to disregard, demanded the conquest of the eternal city. Republican soldiers thus found themselves co-operating with the reactionary Austrians, who entered Boulogne on May 19, and reduced half of Ancona to ashes (p. 196). On June 20 the bombardment of Rome began, in the course of which many of the most splendid monuments of artistic skill were destroyed. The city was forced to surrender on July 3, 1849, after Garibaldi had marched away with three thousand volunteers.

D. THE COUP D'ÉTAT

By its attitude upon the Roman question, and by its refusal of support to the German democrats, who were making their last efforts in the autumn of 1849 for the establishment of republicanism in Germany, the French republic gradually lost touch with the democratic principles on which it was based. Its internal disruption was expedited by the clumsiness of its constitution. A chamber provided with full legislative power and indissoluble for three years confronted a president elected by the votes of the nation to an office tenable for only four years, on the expiration of which he was at once eligible for re-election. Honest republicans had foreseen that election by the nation would give the president a superfluous prestige and a dangerous amount of power; but the majority of the constituent assembly had been, as Treitschke explains, "inspired with hatred of the republic. They were anxious to have an independent power side by side with the assembly, perhaps with the object of afterward restoring the monarchy." This object Louis Bonaparte was busily prosecuting. On October 31, 1849, he issued a message to the country, in which he gave himself out to be the representative of the Napoleonic system, and explained the maintenance of peace and social order to be dependent upon his own position. Under pressure from public opinion, the chamber passed a new electoral law on May 31, 1850, which abolished about three millions out of ten million votes, chiefly those of town electors, and required the presence of a quarter of the electorate to form a quorum. The radicals were deeply incensed at this measure, and the conservatives by no means satisfied. The president attempted to impress his personality on the people by making numerous tours through the country, and to conciliate the original electorate, to whose decision alone he was ready to bow.

A whole year passed before he ventured upon any definite steps; at one time the chamber showed its power, at another it would display compliance. However, he could not secure the three-quarters majority necessary for determining a revision of the constitution, although seventy-nine out of eighty-five general councillors supported the proposal. There could be no doubt that the presidential election of May, 1852, would have forced on the revision, for the reason that Louis Napoleon would have been elected by an enormous majority, though the constitution did not permit immediate re-election. A revolt of this nature on the part of the whole population against the law would hardly have contributed to strengthen the social order which rests upon constitutionally established rights; the excitement of the elections might have produced a fresh outbreak of radicalism, which was especially strong in the south of France, at Marseilles and Bordeaux. The fear of some such movement was felt in cottage and palace alike, and was only to be obviated by a monarchical government. No hope of material improvement in the conditions of life could be drawn from the speeches delivered in the chamber, with their vain acrimony, their bombastic self-laudation, and their desire for immediate advantage. The childlike belief in the capacity and zeal of a national representative assembly was destroyed for ever by the experience of twenty years. The parliament was utterly incompetent to avert a *coup d'état*, a danger which had been forced upon its notice in the autumn of 1851. It had declined a proposal to secure its command of the army by legislation, although the growing popularity of the new

Cæsar with the army was perfectly obvious, and though General Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud had engaged to leave North Africa and conduct the armed interference which was the first step to a revision of the constitution without consulting the views of the parliament.

After long and serious deliberation the president had determined upon the *coup d'état*; the preparations were made by Napoleon's half-brother, his mother's son, Count Charles Auguste Louis Joseph de Morny, and by Count Aug. Ch. Flahault. He was supported by the faithful Jean Gilbert Victor Fialin de Persigny, while the management of the army was in the hands of Saint Arnaud. On December 2, 1851, the day of Austerlitz and of the coronation of his great-uncle, it was determined to make the nephew supreme over France. General Bernard Pierre Magnan, commander of the garrison at Paris, won over twenty generals to the cause of Bonaparte, in the event of conflict. Louis himself, when his resolve had been taken, watched the course of events with great coolness. Morny, a prominent stock-exchange speculator, bought up as much State paper as he could get, in the conviction that the *coup d'état* would cause a general rise of stock. The movement was begun by the director of police, Charlemagne Émile de Maupas, who surprised in their beds and took prisoner every member of importance in the chamber, about sixty captures being thus made, including the generals Cavaignac, Changarnier, and Lamoricière; at the same time the points of strategic importance round the meeting hall of the national assembly were occupied by the troops, which had been reinforced from the environs of Paris. The city awoke to find placards posted at the street corners containing three short appeals to the nation, the population of the capital, and the army, and a decree dissolving the national assembly, restoring the right of universal suffrage, and declaring Paris and the eleven adjacent departments in a state of siege. In the week December 14 to 21 ten millions of Frenchmen were summoned to the ballot-box to vote for or against the constitution proposed by the president. This constitution provided a responsible head of the State, elected for ten years, and threefold representation of the people through a State council, a legislative body, and a senate; the executive power being placed under the control of the sovereign people. On his appearance the president was warmly greeted by both people and troops, and no opposition was offered to the expulsion of the deputies who attempted to meet and protest against the breach of the constitution.

It was not until December 3 that the revolt of the radicals and socialists broke out; numerous barricades were erected in the heart of Paris, and were furiously contested. But the movement was not generally supported, and the majority of the citizens remained in their houses. The troops won a complete victory, which was stated to have secured the establishment of the "democratic republic," though unnecessary acts of cruelty made it appear an occasion of revenge upon the democrats. The sturdy exponents of barricade warfare were broken up and destroyed as a class for a long time to come, not only in Paris, but in the other great towns of France, where the last struggles of the Revolution were fought out.

The impression caused by this success, by the great promises which Louis Napoleon made to his adherents and by the rewards which he had begun to pay them, decided the result of the national vote upon the change in the constitution, or, more correctly, upon the elevation of Louis Napoleon to the dictatorship. By December 20, 1851, 7,439,246 votes were given in his favour, against 640,737.

Bonapartism in its new form became the governmental system of France. "The severest absolutism that the nineteenth century has seen was founded by the general demonstrations of a democracy. The new ruler, in the early years of his government, was opposed by all the best intellects in the nation; the most brilliant names in art and science, in politics and war, were united against him, and united with a unanimity almost unparalleled in the course of history. A time began in which wearied brains could find rest in the *nirvana* of mental vacuity, and in which nobler natures lost nearly all of the best that life could give. For a few years, however, the masses were undeniably prosperous and contented; so small is the significance of mental power in an age of democracy and popular administration" (Treitschke). It is the popular will which must bear the responsibility for the fate of France during the next two decades; the nation had voluntarily humbled itself and bowed its neck to an adroit adventurer.

10. LIBERALISM, RADICALISM, AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY

A. THE FRANKFURT PARLIAMENT

ON May 18, 1848, five hundred and eighty-six representatives of every German race met in the church of St. Paul at Frankfort-on-Main, to create a constitution corresponding to the national needs and desires. The great majority of the deputies belonging to the national assembly, in whose number were included many distinguished men, scholars, manufacturers, officials, lawyers, property owners of education and experience, were firmly convinced that the problem was capable of solution, and were honourably and openly determined to devote their best energies to the task. In the days of "the dawn of the new freedom," which illumined the countenances of politicians in the childhood of their experience, flushed with yearning and expectation (cf. p. 188) the power of conviction, the blessings that would be produced by immovable principles were believed as gospel. It was thought that the power of the government was broken, that the government, willing or unwilling, was in the people's hands, and could merely accommodate itself to the conclusions of the German constituents. Only a few were found to doubt the reliability of parliamentary institutions, and the possibility of discovering what the people wanted and of carrying out their wishes. No one suspected that the experience of half a century would show the futility of seeking for popular unanimity, the division of the nation into classes at variance with one another, the disregard of right and reason by parliamentary, political, social, religious, and national parties as well as by princes, and the inevitability of solving every question which man is called upon to decide, by the victory of the strong will over the weak.

A characteristic feature of all theoretical political systems is very prominent in liberalism which was evolved from theory and not developed in practice. This feature is the tendency to stigmatise all institutions which cannot find a place within the theoretical system as untenable, useless, and to be abolished in consequence; hence the first demand of the liberal politician is the destruction of all existing organisation, in order that no obstacle may impede the erection of the theoretical structure. Liberals, like socialists and anarchists, argue that States are formed by establishing a ready-made system, for which the ground must be cleared

as it is required. They are invariably the pioneers to open the way for the radicals, those impatient levellers who are ready to taste the sweets of destruction even before they have formed any plans for reconstruction, who are carried away by the glamour of idealism, though utterly incapable of realising any ideal, who at best are impelled only by a strong desire of "change," when they are not inspired by the greed which most usually appears as the leading motive of human action. Thus it was that the calculations of the German liberals neglected the existence of the federal assembly, of the federation of the States and of their respective governments; they took no account of those forms in which German political life had found expression for centuries, and their speeches harked back by preference to a tribal organisation which the nation had long ago outgrown, and which even the educated had never correctly appreciated. They fixed their choice upon a constitutional committee, which was to discover the form on which the future German State would be modelled; they created a central power for a State as yet non-existent, without clearly and intelligibly defining its relations to the ruling governments who were in actual possession of every road to power.

(a) *The German National Assembly from May to September, 1848.*— Discussion upon the "central power" speedily brought to light the insurmountable obstacles to the formation of a constitution acceptable to every party, and this without any interference on the part of the governments. The democrats declined to recognise anything but an executive committee of the sovereign national assembly; the liberals made various proposals for a triple committee in connection with the governments. The bold mind of the president, Heinrich von Gagern, eventually soothed the uproar. He invited the parliament to appoint, in virtue of its plenary powers, an imperial administrator who should undertake the business of the federal council, then on the point of dissolution, and act in concert with an imperial ministry. The archduke Johann of Austria was elected on June 24, 1848, by four hundred and thirty-six out of five hundred and forty-eight votes, and the law regarding the central power was passed on the 28th. Had the office of imperial administrator been regarded merely as a temporary expedient until the permanent forms were settled, the choice of the archduke would have been entirely happy; he was popular, entirely the man for the post, and ready to further progress in every department of intellectual and material life. But it was a grievous mistake to expect him to create substance out of shadow, to direct the development of the German State by a further use of the "bold grasp," and to contribute materially to the realisation of its being. The archduke Johann was a good-hearted man and a fine speaker, full of confidence in the "excellent fellows," and ever inclined to hold up the "bluff" inhabitants of the Alpine districts as examples to the other Germans, intellectually stimulating within his limits, and with a keen eye to economic advantage; but nature had not intended him for a politician. His political ideas were too misty and intangible; he used words with no ideas behind them, and though his own experience had not always been of the pleasantest, it had not taught him the feeling then prevalent in Austrian court circles. For the moment his election promised an escape from all manner of embarrassments. The governments could recognise his position without committing themselves to the approval of any revolutionary measure: they might even allow that his election was the beginning of an understanding with the reigning German houses.

This, however, was not the opinion of the leading party in the national assembly. The conservatives, the right, or the right centre, as they preferred to be called, were alone in their adherence to the sound principle that only by way of mutual agreement between the parliament and the governments could a constitutional German body politic be established. Every other party was agreed that the people must itself formulate its own constitution, as only so would it obtain complete recognition of its rights.

This fact alone excluded the possibility of success. The decision of the question was indefinitely deferred, the favourable period, in which the governments were inclined to consider the necessity of making concessions to the popular desires, was wasted in discussion, and opportunity was given to particularism to recover its strength. There was no desire for a federal union endowed with vital force and offering a strong front to other nations. Patriots were anxious only to invest doctrinaire liberalism and its extravagant claims with legal form, and to make the governments feel the weight of a vigorous national sentiment. The lessons of the French Revolution and its sad history were lost upon the Germans. Those who held the fate of Germany in their hands, many of them professional politicians, were unable to conceive that their constituents were justified in expecting avoidance on their part of the worst of all political errors.

The great majority, by which the central power had been constituted, soon broke up into groups, too insignificant to be called political parties and divided upon wholly immaterial points. The hereditary curse of the German, dogmatism and personal vanity with a consequent distaste for voluntary subordination, positively devastated monarchists and republicans alike. The inns were scarcely adequate in number to provide headquarters for the numerous societies which considered the promulgation of political programmes as their bounden duty. The "Landsberg," under the fiery young poet Wilhelm Jordan, soon seceded from the "Casino," where the moderate liberals met together under Fr. Ch. Dahlmann and Karl Mathy. Some fifty members of the left centre met at the "Augsburger Hof" under Robert v. Mohl, while the "Württembergischer Hof" was patronised by a similar number under the Heidelberg jurist Karl Anton Mittelmaier, a native of Munich, and Karl Giskra, professor of political philosophy at Vienna (cf. the upper half of the plate, p. 187). The left met in the "Westendhalle" under the presidency of two natives of Cologne, the journalist and cigar-dealer, Karl Raveaux and Jakob Venedey, formerly publisher of the "*Geächtete*" in Paris. Meetings were also held at the "Nürnberger Hof" under Wilhelm Löwe of Kalbe. The "Deutsche Haus" and the "Donnersberg" were the headquarters of the extreme left, the radicals; of these the moderate section included the Leipsic bookseller Robert Blum, and Karl Vogt, professor and colonel of the citizen guard of Giessen. The extremists, Arnold Ruge, who soon lost his importance and disappeared from the parliament, Ludwig Simon of Treves, Franz Hein. Zitz of Mayence, Julius Fröbel, the Swiss author and bookseller, elected in Reuss, approached the tenets of anarchism in their zeal for freedom, proclaiming the unlimited right of self-determination as the privilege not only of States, but of parishes and individuals. The "Steinernes Haus" was occupied by the Catholic conservatives, Professor Ignaz Döllinger of Munich, Prince Felix Lichnowski, General Joseph v. Radowitz, and others; while the Protestants met in the "Café Milani" and afterward in the "Englischer Hof," under Georg v. Vincke and

Count Maximilian of Schwerin. Further clubs were formed in the autumn of 1848, which saw the formation of the "Loge Socrates," the "Hôtel Schroeder," the "Weidenbusch," and others. Club formation did not altogether follow the broad line of division between monarchists and republicans; only the extreme left was pure republican. Numerous deputies were to be found in the left, who sympathised strongly with the scheme of a "republic with a doge at the head." The last discussion upon the imperial constitution produced a further cleavage of parties, producing the "Pan-Germans," who desired to place Austria on a footing of equality with the pure German States, and the "little Germans," who supported a closer federation under Prussian leadership and with the exclusion of Austria.

On July 14, 1848, the archduke Johann made his entry into Frankfurt, and the federal council was dissolved the same day. The imperial administrator established a provisional ministry to conduct the business of the central power till he had completed the work at Vienna which his imperial nephew had entrusted to his care. At the beginning of August, 1848, he established himself in Frankfurt, and appointed Prince Friedrich Karl von Leiningen as the head of his ministry, which also included the Austrian, Anton von Schmerling; the Hamburg lawyer, Moritz Heckscher; the Prussians, Hermann von Beckerath (cf. p. 175) and General Eduard von Peucker; the Bremen senator, Arnold Duckwitz; and the Wurtemberger, Robert von Mohl, professor of political science at Heidelberg. To ensure the prestige of the central power, the minister of war, von Peucker, had given orders on August 6 for a general review of contingents furnished by the German States, who were to give three cheers to the archduke Johann as imperial administrator. The mode in which this order was carried out plainly showed that the governments did not regard it as obligatory, and respected it only so far as they thought good. It was obeyed only in Saxony, Wurtemberg, and the smaller States. Prussia allowed only her garrisons in the federal fortresses to participate in the parade; Bavaria ordered her troops to cheer the king before the imperial administrator. In Austria no notice was taken of the order, except in Vienna, as it affected the archduke; the Italian army did not trouble itself about the imperial minister of war in the least.

At the same time, the relations of the governments and the central power were by no means unfriendly. The king of Prussia did not hide his high personal esteem of the imperial administrator, and showed him special tokens of regard at the festivities held at Cologne on August 14, 1848, in celebration of the six hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the cathedral. Most of the federal princes honoured him as a member of the Austrian house, and continued confidential relations with him for a considerable time. The German governments further appointed plenipotentiaries to represent their interests with the central power; these would have been ready to form a kind of monarchical council side by side with the national assembly, and would thus have been highly serviceable to the imperial administrator as a channel of communication with the governments. But the democratic pride of the body which met in the church of St. Paul had risen too high to tolerate so opportune a step toward a "system of mutual accommodation." On August 30 the central power was obliged to declare that the plenipotentiaries of the individual States possessed no competency to influence the decisions of the central power, or to conduct any systematic business.

The new European power had notified its existence by special embassies to various foreign States, and received recognition in full from the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States of North America; Russia ignored it, while the attitude of France and England was marked by distrust and doubt. Austria was in the throes of internal convulsion during the summer of 1848 and unable seriously to consider the German question; possessing a confidential agent of pre-eminent position in the person of the archduke Johann, she was able to reserve her decision. With Prussia, however, serious complications speedily arose from the war in Schleswig-Holstein. Parliament was aroused to great excitement by the armistice of Malmö, which Prussia concluded on August 26 (p. 209), without consulting Max von Gagern, the imperial State secretary commissioned to the duchies by the central power. The central power had declared the Schleswig-Holstein question a matter of national importance, and in virtue of the right which had formerly belonged to the federal council demanded a share in the settlement. On September 5 Dahlmann proposed to set on foot the necessary measures for carrying out the armistice; the proposal, when sent up by the ministry for confirmation, was rejected by two hundred and forty-four to two hundred and thirty votes. Dahlmann, who was now entrusted by the imperial administrator with the formation of a new ministry, was obliged to abandon the proposal after many days of fruitless effort. Ignoring the imperial ministry, the assembly proceeded to discuss the steps to be taken with reference to the armistice which was already in process of fulfilment. Meanwhile the democratic left lost their majority in the assembly, and the proposal of the committee to refuse acceptance of the armistice and to declare war on Denmark through the provisional central power was lost by two hundred and fifty-eight votes to two hundred and thirty-seven.

This result led to a revolt in Frankfurt, begun by the members of the extreme left under the leadership of Zitz of Mayence and their adherents in the town and in the neighbouring States of Hesse and Baden. The town senate was forced to apply to the garrison of Mayence for military protection and to guard the meeting of the national assembly on September 18, 1848, with an Austrian and a Prussian battalion of the line. The revolutionaries, here as in Paris, terrified the parliament by the invasion of an armed mob, and sought to intimidate the members to the passing of resolutions which would have brought on a civil war. Barricades were erected, and two deputies of the right, the prince Felix Lichnowsky and the general Hans Adolf Erdmann of Auerswald, were cruelly murdered. Even the long-suffering arch-ducal administrator of the empire was forced to renounce the hope of a pacific termination of the quarrel. The troops were ordered to attack the barricades, and the disturbance was put down in a few hours with no great loss of life. The citizens of Frankfurt had not fallen into the trap of the "reds," or given any support to the desperadoes with whose help the German republic was to be founded. A few days later the professional revolutionary, Gustav Struve (p. 181), met the fate he deserved; after invading Baden with an armed force from France, "to help the great cause of freedom to victory," he was captured at Lörrach on September 25, 1848, and thrown into prison.

(b) *Prussia during the last Six Months of 1848.*—The German national assembly was now able to resume its meetings, but the public confidence in its lofty

position and powers had been greatly shaken. Had the radical attempt at intimidation proved successful, the assembly would speedily have ceased to exist. It was now able to turn its attention to the question of "fundamental rights," while the governments in Vienna and Berlin were fighting for the right of the executive power. The suppression of the Vienna revolt by Windisch-Graetz had produced a marked impression in Prussia. The conviction was expressed that the claims of the democracy for a share in the executive power by the subjects of the State, and their interference in government affairs, were to be unconditionally rejected. Any attempt to coerce the executive authorities was to be crushed by the sternest measures, by force of arms, if need be; otherwise the maintenance of order was impossible, and without this there could be no peaceful enjoyment of constitutional rights. It was clear that compliance on the part of the government with the demands of the revolutionary leaders would endanger the freedom of the vast majority of the population; the latter were ready to secure peace and the stability of the existing order of things by renouncing in favour of a strong government some part of those rights which liberal theorists had assigned to them. In view of the abnormal excitement then prevailing, such a programme necessitated severity and self-assertion on the part of the government. This would be obvious in time of peace, but at the moment the fact was not likely to be appreciated.

The refusal to fire a salute upon the occasion of a popular demonstration in Schweidnitz (July 31, 1848) induced the Prussian national assembly to take steps which were calculated to diminish the consideration and the respect of armed force, which was a highly beneficial influence in those troublous times. The result was the retirement on September 7 of the Auerswald-Hansemanu ministry, which had been in office since June 25; it was followed on September 21 by a bureaucratic ministry under the presidency of the general Ernst von Pfiel, which was without influence either with the king or the national assembly. The left now obtained the upper hand. As president they chose a moderate, the railway engineer Hans Victor von Unruh, and as vice-president the leader of the extreme left, the doctrinaire lawyer Leo Waldeck. During the deliberations on the constitution they erased the phrase "by the grace of God" from the king's titles, and finally resolved on October 31, 1848, to request the imperial government in Frankfurt to send help to the revolted Viennese. This step led to long-continued communications between the assembly and the unemployed classes, who were collected by the democratic agitators, and surrounded the royal theatre where the deputies held their sessions.

On November 1, 1848, news arrived of the fall of Vienna (p. 205), and Frederic William IV determined to intervene in support of his kingdom. He dismissed Pfiel and placed Count William of Brandenburg, son of his grandfather Frederic William II and of the Countess Sophia Juliana Friederika of Dönhoff, at the head of a new ministry. He then despatched fifteen thousand troops, under General Friedrich von Wrangel, to Berlin, the city being shortly afterward punished by the declaration of martial law. The national assembly was transferred from Berlin to Brandenburg. The left, for the purpose of "undisturbed" deliberation, repeatedly met in the Berlin coffee-houses, despite the prohibition of the president of the ministry, but eventually gave way and followed the conservatives to Brandenburg, after being twice dispersed by the troops. Berlin and the Marks gave no support to the democracy. The majority of the population dreaded a reign of terror by

the "reds," and were delighted with the timely opposition. They also manifested their satisfaction at the dissolution of the national assembly, which had given few appreciable signs of legislative activity in Brandenburg; at the publication on December 5, 1848, of a constitutional scheme drafted by the government; and the issue of writs for the election of a Prussian Landtag which was to revise the law of suffrage. Some opposition was noticeable in the provinces, but was for the moment of a moderate nature. The interference of the Frankfurt parliament in the question of the Prussian constitution produced no effect whatever. The centres of the right and left had there united and taken the lead, then proceeding to pass resolutions which would not hinder the Prussian government in asserting its right to determine its own affairs.

(c) *Austria in the Winter of 1848-1849.*—Public opinion in Germany had thus changed: there was a feeling in favour of limiting the demands that might arise during the constitutional definition of the national rights; moreover, the majority of the nation had declined adherence to the tenets of radicalism. It seemed that these facts were producing a highly desirable change of direction in the energies of the German national assembly; the provisional central power was even able to pride itself upon a reserve of force, for the Prussian government had placed its united forces (three hundred and twenty-six thousand men) at its disposal, as was announced by Schmerling, the imperial minister, on October 23, 1848. None the less, an extraordinary degree of statesmanship and political capacity was required to cope with the obstacles which lay before the creation of a national federation organised as a State, with adequate power to deal with domestic and foreign policy. But not only was this supreme political insight required of the national representatives; theirs, too, must be the task of securing the support of the great powers, without which the desired federation was unattainable. This condition did not apply for the moment in the case of Austria, whose decision was of the highest importance. Here an instance recurred of the law constantly exemplified in the lives both of individuals and of nations, that a recovery of power stimulates to aggression instead of leading to discretion. True wisdom would have concentrated the national aims upon a clearly recognisable and attainable object, namely, the transformation of the old dynastic power of the Hapsburgs into a modern State. Such a change would of itself have determined the form of the federation with the new German State, which could well have been left to develop in its own way. Russian help for the suppression of the Hungarian revolt would have been unnecessary; it would have been enthusiastically given by the allied Prussian State under Frederic William IV. The only tasks of Austro-Hungary for the immediate future would have been the fostering of her civilization, the improvement of domestic prosperity, and the extension of her influence in the Balkan peninsula. Even her Italian paramountcy, had it been worth retaining, could hardly have been wrested from her. No thinking member of the House of Hapsburg could deny these facts at the present day. Possibly even certain representatives of that ecclesiastical power which has endeavoured for three centuries to make the Hapsburg dynasty the champion of its interests might be brought to admit that the efforts devoted to preserving the hereditary position of the Catholic dynasty in Germany led to a very injudicious expenditure of energy.

But such a degree of political foresight was sadly to seek in the winter of

1848-1849. The only man who had almost reached that standpoint, the old Freiherr von Wessenberg (p. 199), was deprived of his influence at the critical moment of decision. His place was taken by one whose morality was even lower than his capacity or previous training, and whose task was nothing less than the direction of a newly developed State and the invention of some *modus vivendi* between the outraged and insulted dynasty and the agitators, devoid alike of sense and conscience, who had plied the nationalities of the Austrian Empire with evil counsel. Prince Windisch-Graetz was quite able to overpower street rioters or to crush the "legions" of Vienna; but his vocation was not that of a general or a statesman. However, his word was all-powerful at the court in Olmütz. On November 21, 1848, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg became head of the Austrian government. His political views were those of Windisch-Graetz, whose intellectual superior he was, though his decisions were in consequence the more hasty and ill-considered. His policy upon German questions was modelled on that of Metternich. The only mode of action which commended itself to the emperor Franz Joseph I, now eighteen years of age (p. 205), was one promising a position of dignity, combining all the "splendour" of the throne of Charles the Great with the inherent force of a modern great power. A prince of chivalrous disposition, who had witnessed the heroic deeds of his army under Radetzky, with the courage to defend his fortunes and those of his State at the point of the sword, would never have voluntarily yielded his rights, his honourable position, and the family traditions of centuries, even if the defence of these had not been represented by his advisers as a ruler's inevitable task and as absolutely incumbent upon him.

(d) *Gagern's Programme and the Imperial Election in Frankfurt.*—The Frankfurt parliament had already discussed the "fundamental rights." It had determined by a large majority that personal union was the only possible form of alliance between any part of Germany and foreign countries; it had decided upon the use of the two-chamber system in the Reichstag, and had secured representation in the "chamber of the States" to the governments even of the smallest States; it had made provision for the customs union until May 18, 1849, at latest. Among the leaders of the centre the opinion then gained ground that union with Austria would be impossible in as close a sense as it was possible with the other German States, and that the only means of assuring the strength and unity of the pure German States was to confer the dignity of emperor upon the king of Prussia. The promulgation of this idea resulted in a new cleavage of parties. The majority of the moderate liberal Austrians seceded from their associates and joined the radicals, ultramontanes, and particularists, with the object of preventing the introduction of Prussia as an empire into the imperial constitution. Schmerling resigned the presidency of the imperial ministry. The imperial administrator was forced to replace him by Heinrich von Gagern, the first president of the parliament. His programme was announced on December 16, and proposed the foundation of a close federal alliance of the German States under Prussian leadership, while a looser federal connection was to exist with Austria, as arranged by the settlement of the Vienna congress. After three days' discussion (January 11-14, 1849) this programme was accepted by two hundred and sixty-one members of the German national assembly as against two hundred and twenty-four. Sixty Austrian deputies entered a protest against this resolution, denying the right of the

parliament to exclude the German Austrians from the German federal State. The Austrian government was greatly disturbed at the promulgation of the Gagern programme, and objected to the legislative powers of the Frankfurt assembly in general terms on February 7, declaring her readiness to co-operate in a union of the German States, and protesting against the "remodelling" of existing conditions. Thus she adopted a position corresponding to that of the federation of 1815.

The decision now remained with the king, Frederic William IV; he accepted the imperial constitution of March 28, 1849, and was forthwith elected emperor of the Germans by 290 of the 538 deputies present. The constitution in document form (see the plate, "Introduction, Middle, and Conclusion of the Constitution of the German Empire of March 28, 1849") was signed by only 366 deputies, as the majority of the Austrians and the ultramontanes declined to acknowledge the supremacy of a Protestant Prussia. The 290 electors who had voted for the king constituted, however, a respectable majority. Still, it was as representatives of the nation that they offered him the imperial crown, and they made their offer conditional upon his recognition of the imperial constitution which had been resolved upon in Frankfurt. It was therein provided that in all questions of legislation the decision should rest with the popular house in the Reichstag. The imperial veto was no longer unconditional, but could only defer discussion over three sittings. This the king of Prussia was unable to accept, if only for the reason that he was already involved in a warm discussion with Austria, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg upon the form of a German federal constitution which was to be laid before the parliament by the princes. The despatch of a parliamentary deputation to Berlin was premature, in view of the impossibility of that unconditional acceptance of the imperial title desired and expected by Dahlmann and the professor of Königsberg, Martin Eduard Simson, at that time president of the national assembly. The only answer that Frederic William could give on April 3, 1849, was a reply postponing his decision. This the delegation construed as a refusal, as it indicated hesitation on the king's part to recognise the Frankfurt constitution in its entirety. The king erred in believing that an arrangement with Austria still lay within the bounds of possibility; he failed to see that Schwarzenberg only desired to restore the old federal assembly, while securing greater power in it to Austria than she had had under Metternich. The royal statesman considered Hungary as already subjugated, and conceived as already in existence a united State to be formed of the Austrian and Hungarian territories together with Galicia and Dalmatia; he desired to secure the entrance of this State within the federation, which he intended to be not a German, but a central European federation under Austrian leadership.

(e) *The Conclusion of the Frankfurt Parliament.* — On the return of the parliamentary deputation to Frankfurt with the refusal of the king of Prussia, the work of constitution-building was brought to a standstill. The most important resolutions, those touching the head of the empire, had proved impracticable. The more far-sighted members of the parliament recognised this fact, and also saw that to remodel the constitution would be to play into the hands of the republicans. However, their eyes were blinded by the fact that twenty-four petty States of different sizes had accepted the constitution, and they ventured to hope for an

EXPLANATION OF THE FACSIMILE OVERLEAF

EXPLANATION is hardly necessary of this facsimile (reduced to $\frac{1}{4}$ of the actual size of the original German constitution document, consisting of three parts, — the introduction, middle part, and conclusion of the original. A reference may be given to part 16 of the “Imperial legislation” published at Frankfort-on-Main, April 23, 1849, where the “constitution of the German Empire” is printed in full. The document there begins on page 101, the middle part on page 112, and the conclusion on page 136 (the ratification by the chiefs of the constituent assembly summoned to promulgate a constitution, etc.).

improvement in the situation. The liberals were uncertain as to the extent of the power which could be assigned to the nation in contradistinction to the governments, without endangering the social fabric and the existence of civic society. To this lack of definite views is chiefly to be ascribed the fact that the German national assembly allowed the democrats to lead it into revolutionary tendencies, until it ended its existence in pitiable disruption.

The liberals, moreover, cannot be acquitted from the charge of playing the dangerous game of inciting national revolt with the object of carrying through the constitution which they had devised and drafted, — a constitution, too, which meant a breach with the continuity of German historical development. They fomented popular excitement and brought about armed risings of the illiterate mobs of Saxony, the Palatinate, and Baden. The royal family were expelled from Dresden by a revolt on May 3, and Prussian troops were obliged to reconquer the capital at the cost of severe fighting on May 7 and 8. It was necessary to send two Prussian corps to reinforce the imperial army drawn from Hesse, Mecklenburg, Nassau, and Wurtemberg, for the overthrow of the republican troops which had concentrated at Rastatt.

Heinrich von Gagern and his friends regarded the advance of the Prussians as a breach of the peace in the empire. The Gagern ministry resigned, as the archduke Johann could not be persuaded to oppose the Prussians. The imperial administrator had already hinted at his retirement after the imperial election; but the Austrian government had insisted upon his retention of his office, lest the king of Prussia should step into his place. He formed a conservative ministry under the presidency of the Prussian councillor of justice, Maxim. Karl Friedr. Wilh. Grävell, which was received with scorn and derision by the radicals, who were now the dominant party in the parliament. More than a hundred deputies of the centres then withdrew with Gagern, Dahlmann, Welcker, Simson, and Mathy from May 21 to 26, 1849. The Austrian government had recalled the Austrian deputies on April 4 from the national assembly, an example followed by Prussia on the 14th. On May 30, 71 of 135 voters who took part in the discussion supported Karl Vogt's proposal to transfer the parliament from Frankfurt to Stuttgart, where a victory for Suabian republicanism was expected. In the end 105 representatives of German stupidity and political ignorance, including, unfortunately, Ludwig Uhland, gave the world the ridiculous spectacle of the opening of the so-called Rump parliament at Stuttgart on June 6, 1849, which reached the crowning point of folly in the election of five "imperial regents." The arrogance of this company, which even presumed to direct the movements of the Wurtemberg troops, proved inconvenient to the government, which accordingly closed the meeting hall. The first German parliament then expired after a few gatherings in the Hôtel Marquardt.

The imperial government, the administrator and his ministry, retained their offices until December, 1849, notwithstanding repeated demands for their resignation. A committee of four members, appointed as a provisional central power by Austria and Prussia, then took over all business, documentary and financial. As an epilogue to the Frankfurt parliament, mention may be made of the gathering of 160 former deputies of the first German Reichstag, who had belonged to the "imperial party." The meeting was held in Gotha on June 26. Heinrich von Gagern designated the meeting as a private conference; however, he secured the assent of those present to a programme drawn up by himself which asserted the desirability

of a narrower ("little German") federation under the headship of Prussia, or of another central power in association with Prussia.

B. PRUSSIA'S ATTEMPT AT FEDERAL REFORM

(a) *The Policy of Union.* — Upon the recall of the Prussian deputies from the Frankfurt parliament the Prussian government issued a proclamation to the German people on May 15, 1849, declaring itself henceforward responsible for the work of securing the unity which was justly demanded for the vigorous representation of German interests abroad, and for common legislation in constitutional form; that is, with the co-operation of a national house of representatives. In the conferences of the ambassadors of the German States, which were opened at Berlin on May 17, the Prussian programme was explained to be the formation of a close federation exclusive of Austria, and the creation of a wider federation which should include the Hapsburg State. Thus in theory had been discovered the form which the transformation of Germany should take. On her side Prussia did not entirely appreciate the fact that this programme could not be realised by means of ministerial promises alone, and that the whole power of the Prussian State would be required to secure its acceptance. The nation, or rather the men to whom the nation had entrusted its future, also failed to perceive that this form was the only kind of unity practically attainable, and that to it must be sacrificed those "guarantees of freedom" which liberal doctrinaires declared indispensable. It now became a question of deciding between a radical democracy and a moderate constitutional monarchy, and German liberalism was precluded from coming to any honourable conclusion. Regardless of consequences, it exchanged amorous glances with the opposition in non-Prussian countries; it considered agreement with the government as treason to the cause of freedom, and saw reaction where nothing of the kind was to be found. It refused to give public support to aggressive republicanism, fearing lest the people, when in arms, would prove a menace to private property, and lose that respect for the growing wealth of individual enterprise which ought to limit their aspirations; at the same time, it declined to abate its pride, and continued to press wholly immoderate demands upon the authorities, to whom alone it owed the maintenance of the existing social order.

The Baden revolt had been suppressed by the Prussian troops under the command of Prince Wilhelm, afterward emperor, who invaded the land which the radicals had thrown into confusion, dispersed the republican army led by Mieroslawski and Hecker in a series of engagements, and reduced on July 23, 1849, the fortress of Rastatt, which had fallen into the hands of the republicans. The liberals at first hailed the Prussians as deliverers; the latter, however, proceeded by court-martial against the leaders, whose crimes had brought misery upon thousands, and had reduced a flourishing province to desolation. Seventeen death sentences were passed, and prosecutions were instituted against the mutinous officers and soldiers of Baden. The "free-thinking" party, which had recovered from its fear of the "reds," could then find no more pressing occupation than to rouse public feeling throughout South Germany against Prussia and "militarism," and to level unjustifiable reproaches against the prince in command, whose clever generalship merited the gratitude not only of Baden, but of every German patriot. Even then a solution of the German problem might have been possible, had the demo-

crats in South Germany laid aside their fear of Prussian "predominance," and considered their secret struggle against an energetic administration as less important than the establishment of a federal State commanding the respect of other nations. But the success of the Prussian programme could have been secured only by the joint action of the whole nation. Unanimity of this kind was a very remote possibility. Fearful of the Prussian "reaction," the nation abandoned the idea of German unity, to be driven into closer relations with the sovereign powers of the smaller and the petty States, and ultimately to fall under the heavier burden of a provincial reaction. Austria had recalled her ambassador, Anton, count of Prokesch-Osten, from the Berlin conference, declining all negotiation for the reconstitution of German interests upon the basis of the Prussian proposals; but she could not have despatched an army against Prussia in the summer of 1849. Even with the aid of her ally Bavaria, she was unable to cope with the three hundred thousand troops which Prussia alone could place in the field at that time: in Hungary, she had been obliged to call in the help of Russia. United action by Germany would probably have met with no opposition whatever. But Germany was not united, the people as little as the princes; consequently when Prussia, after the ignominious failure of the parliament and its high promise, intervened to secure at least some definite result from the national movement, her well-meaning proposals met with a rebuff as humiliating as it was undeserved.

The result of the Berlin conferences was the "alliance of the three kings" of Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony (May 26, 1849). Bavaria and Wurtemberg declined to join the alliance on account of the claims to leadership advanced by Prussia; but the majority of the other German States gave in their adherence in the course of the summer. A federal council of administration met on June 18, and made arrangements for the convocation of a Reichstag, to which was to be submitted the federal constitution when the agreement of the cabinets thereon had been secured. Hanover and Saxony then raised objections, and recalled their representatives on the administrative council on October 20. However, Prussia was able to fix the meeting of the Reichstag for March 20, 1850, at Erfurt.

Austria now advanced claims in support of the old federal constitution, and suddenly demanded that it should continue in full force. This action was supported by Bavaria, which advocated the formation of a federation of the smaller States, which was to prepare another constitution as a rival to the "union" for which Prussia was working. The Saxon minister Friedrich Ferdinand, Freiherr von Beust, afterward of mournful fame in Germany and Austria, who fought against the Saxon particularism, which almost surpassed that prevalent in Bavaria, and was guided by personal animosity to Prussia, became at that moment the most zealous supporter of the statesmanlike plans of his former colleague, L. R. Heinrich von der Pfordten, who had been appointed Bavarian minister of foreign affairs in April, 1849. Hanover was speedily won over, as Austria proposed to increase her territory with Oldenburg, in order to create a second North German power as a counterpoise to Prussia, while Wurtemberg declared her adherence to the "alliance of the four kings" with startling precipitancy. The chief attraction was the possibility of sharing on equal terms in a directory of seven members with Austria, Prussia, and the two Hesses, which were to have a vote in common. The directory was not to exercise the functions of a central power, but was to have merely powers of "superintendence," even in questions of taxation and commerce.

The claims of the chambers were to be met by the creation of a "Reichstag," to which they were to send deputies. Upon the secession of the kingdoms from Prussia, disinclination to the work of unification was also manifested by the electorate of Hesse, where the elector had again found a minister to his liking in the person of Daniel von Hassenpflug (p. 151).

It would, however, have been quite possible to make Prussia the centre of a considerable power by the conjunction of all the remaining federal provinces, had the Erfurt parliament been entrusted with the task of rapidly concluding the work of unification. In the meantime Frederic William, under the influence of friends who favoured feudalism, Ernst Ludwig of Gerlach and Professor Stahl,¹ had abandoned his design of forming a restricted federation, and was inspired with the invincible conviction that it was his duty as a Christian king to preserve peace with Austria at any price; for Austria, after her victorious struggle with the revolution, had become the prop and stay of all States where unlimited monarchy protected by the divine right of kings held sway. To guard this institution against liberal onslaughts remained the ideal of his life, Prussian theories of politics and the paroxysms of German patriotism notwithstanding. He therefore rejected the valuable help now readily offered to him in Erfurt by the old imperial party of Frankfurt, and clung to the utterly vain and unsupported hope that he could carry out the wider form of federation with Austria in some manner compatible with German interests. His hopes were forthwith shattered by Schwarzenberg's convocation of a congress of the German federal States at Frankfurt, and Prussia's position became daily more unfavourable, although a meeting of the princes desirous of union was held in Berlin in May, 1850, and accepted the temporary continuance until July 15, 1850, of the restricted federation under Prussian leadership. The Czar Nicholas I was urgently demanding the conclusion of the Schleswig-Holstein complication, which he considered as due to nothing but the intrigues of malevolent revolutionaries in Copenhagen and the duchies. In a meeting with Prince William of Prussia, which took place at Warsaw toward the end of May, 1850, the Czar clearly stated that, in the event of the German question resulting in war between Prussia and Austria, his neutrality would be conditional upon the restoration of Danish supremacy over the rebels in Schleswig-Holstein.

(b) *The Electorate of Hesse.* — Henceforward Russia stands between Austria and Prussia as arbitrator. Her intervention was not as unprejudiced as Berlin would have been glad to suppose; she was beforehand determined to support Austria, to protect the old federal constitution, the Danish supremacy over Schleswig-Holstein, and the elector of Hesse, Frederick William I, who had at that moment decided on a scandalous breach of faith with his people. This unhappy prince had already inflicted serious damage upon his country and its admirable population (cf. p. 151); he now proceeded to commit a crime against Germany by stirring up a fratricidal war, which was fed by a spirit of pettifogging selfishness and despicable jealousy. A liberal reaction had begun, and the spirit of national self-assertion was fading; no sooner had the elector perceived these facts than he proceeded to utilise them for the achievement of his desires. He dismissed the constitutional ministry, restored Hassenpflug to favour on February 22, 1850,

¹ Cf. p. 174; see also the lower half of the plate, p. 187.

and permitted him to raise taxes unauthorised by the chamber for the space of six months. The chamber raised objections to this proceeding, and thereby gave Hassenpflug a handle which enabled him to derange the whole constitution of the electorate of Hesse. On September 7 the country was declared subject to martial law. For this step there was not the smallest excuse; peace everywhere prevailed. The officials who had taken the oaths of obedience to the constitution declined to act in accordance with the declaration, and their refusal was construed as rebellion. On October 9 the officers of the Hessian army resigned, almost to a man, to avoid the necessity of turning their arms upon their fellow-citizens, who were entirely within their rights. The long-desired opportunity of calling in foreign help was thus provided; but the appeal was not made to the board of arbitration of the union, to which the electorate of Hesse properly belonged, but to the federal council which Austria had reopened in Frankfurt (October 15, 1850).

With the utmost readiness Count Schwarzenberg accepted the unexpected support of Hassenpflug, whose theories coincided with his own. The rump of the federal parliament, which was entirely under his influence, was summoned not only without the consent of Prussia, but without any intimation to the Prussian cabinet. This body at once determined to employ the federal power for the restoration of the elector to Hesse, though he had left Cassel of his own will and under no compulsion, fleeing to Wilhelmsbad with his ministers at the beginning of September. Schwarzenberg was well aware that his action would place the king of Prussia in a most embarrassing situation. Federation and union were now in mutual opposition. On the one side was Austria, with the kingdoms and the two Hesses; on the other was Prussia, with the united petty States, which were worthless for military purposes. Austria had no need to seek occasion to revenge herself for the result of the imperial election, which was ascribed to Prussian machinations; her opportunity was at hand in the appeal of a most valuable member of the federation, the worthy elector of Hesse, to his brother monarchs for protection against democratic presumption, against the insanities of constitutionalism, against a forsworn and mutinous army. Should Prussia now oppose the enforcement of the federal will in Hesse, she would be making common cause with rebels. The Czar would be forced to oppose the democratic tendencies of his degenerate brother-in-law, and to take the field with the conservative German States, and with Austria, who was crowding on full sail for the haven of absolutism. To have created this situation, and to have drawn the fullest advantage from it, was the master-stroke of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg's policy. Austria thereby reached the zenith of her power in Germany.

The fate of Frederic William IV now becomes tragical. The heavy punishment meted out to the overweening self-confidence of this ruler, the fearful disillusionment which he was forced to experience from one whom he had treated with full confidence and respect, cannot but evoke the sympathy of every spectator. He had himself declined that imperial crown which Austria so bitterly grudged him. He had rejected the overtures of the imperial party from dislike to their democratic theories. He had begun the work of overthrowing the constitutional principles of the constitution of the union. He had surrendered Schleswig-Holstein because his conscience would not allow him to support national against monarchical rights, and because he feared to expose Prussia to the anger of his brother-in-law. He had opposed the exclusion of Austria from the wider feder-

ation of the German States. He had always been prepared to act in conjunction with Austria in the solution of questions affecting Germany at large, while claiming for Prussia a right which was provided in the federal constitution,— the right of forming a close federation, the right which, far from diminishing, would strengthen the power of the whole organism. And now the sword was placed at his throat, equality of rights was denied to him, and he was requested to submit to the action of Austria as paramount in Germany, to submit to a federal executive, which had removed an imperial administrator, though he was an Austrian duke, which could only be reconstituted with the assent of every German government, and not by eleven votes out of seventeen!

For two months the king strove hard, amid the fiercest excitement, to maintain his position. At the beginning of October, 1850, he sent assurances to Vienna of his readiness "to settle all points of difference with the emperor of Austria from the standpoint of an old friend." He quietly swallowed the arrogant threats of Bavaria, and was not to be provoked by the warlike speeches delivered at Bregenz on the occasion of the meeting of the emperor Franz Joseph with the kings of South Germany, on October 11. He continued to rely upon the insight of the Czar, with whose ideas he was in full agreement, and sent Count Brandenburg to Warsaw to assure him of his pacific intentions, and to gain a promise that he would not allow the action of the federation in Hesse and Holstein to pass unnoticed. Prince Schwarzenberg also appeared in Warsaw, and it seemed that there might be some possibility of an understanding between Austria and Prussia upon the German question. Schwarzenberg admitted that the federal council might be replaced by free conferences of the German powers, as in 1819; he did not, however, explain whether these conferences were to be summoned for the purpose of appointing the new central power, or whether the federal council was to be convoked for that object. He insisted unconditionally upon the execution of the federal decision in Hesse, which implied the occupation of the whole electorate by German and Bavarian troops. This Prussia could not allow, for military reasons. The ruler of Prussia was therefore forced to occupy the main roads to the Rhine province, and had already sent forward several thousand men under Count Charles from the Gröben to the neighbourhood of Fulda for this purpose. The advance of the Bavarians in this direction would inevitably result in a collision with the Prussian troops, unless these latter were first withdrawn.

(c) *Olmütz*.—Heinrich von Sybel has definitely proved that Count Brandenburg returned to Berlin resolved to prevent a war, which offered no prospect of success in view of the Czar's attitude. Radowitz, who had been minister of foreign affairs since September 27, 1850, called for the mobilisation of the army, and was inclined to accept the challenge to combat; he considered the Austrian preparations comparatively innocuous, and was convinced that Russia would be unable to concentrate any considerable body of troops on the Prussian frontier before the summer. On November 2, 1850, the king also declared for the mobilisation, though with the intention of continuing negotiations with Austria, if possible; he was ready, however, to adopt Brandenburg's view of the situation, if a majority in the ministerial council could be found to support this policy. Brandenburg succumbed to a sudden attack of brain fever on November 6 (not, as was long supposed, to vexation at the rejection of his policy of resistance); his work was taken up and completed

by Otto, Freiherr von Manteuffel, after Radowitz had left the ministry. After the first shots had been exchanged between the Prussian and Bavarian troops at Bronzell (to the south of Fulda), on November 8, he entirely abandoned the constitution of the union, allowed the Bavarians to advance upon the condition that Austria permitted the simultaneous occupation of the high roads by Prussian troops, and started with an autograph letter from the king and Queen Elizabeth to meet the emperor Franz Joseph and his mother, the archduchess Sophie, sister of the queen of Prussia, in order to discuss conditions of peace with the Austrian prime minister. Prince Schwarzenberg was anxious to proceed to extremities; but the young emperor had no intention of beginning a war with his relatives, and obliged Schwarzenberg to yield. At the emperor's command he signed the stipulation of Olmütz on November 29, 1850, under which Prussia fully satisfied the Austrian demands, receiving one sole concession in return,—that the question of federal reform should be discussed in free conferences at Dresden.

Thus Prussia's German policy had ended in total failure. She was forced to abandon all hope of realising the Gagern programme by forming a narrower federation under her own leadership, exclusive of popular representation, direct or indirect. Prussia lost greatly in prestige; the enthusiasm aroused throughout the provinces by the prospect of war gave place to bitter condemnation of the vacillation imputed to the king after the "capitulation of Olmütz." Even his brother, Prince William, burst into righteous indignation during the cabinet council of December 2, 1850, at the stain with which he declared the white shield of Prussian honour to have been marred. Until his death, Frederic William IV was reproached with humiliating Prussia, and reducing her to a position among the German States which was wholly unworthy of her. Yet it is possible that the resolution which gave Austria a temporary victory was the most unselfish offering which the king could then have made to the German nation. He resisted the temptation of founding a North German federation with the help and alliance of France, which was offered by Persigny (p. 219), the confidential agent of Louis Napoleon. Fifty thousand French troops had been concentrated at Strassburg for the realisation of this project. They would have invaded South Germany and devastated Suabia and Bavaria in the cause of Prussia. But it was not by such methods that German unity was to be attained, or a German empire to be founded. Renunciation for the moment was a guarantee of success hereafter. In his "Reflections and Recollections" Prince Bismarck asserts that August von Stockhausen, the minister of war, considered the Prussian forces in November, 1850, inadequate to check the advance upon Berlin of the Austrian army concentrated in Bohemia. He had received this information from Stockhausen, and had defended the king's attitude in the chamber. He also thinks he has established the fact that Prince William, afterward his king and emperor, was convinced of the incapacity of Prussia to deal a decisive blow at that period. He made no mention of his conviction that such a blow must one day be delivered; but this assurance seems to have grown upon him from that date.

11. POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL RETROGRESSION, 1850-1853

A. THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT IN WESTERN POLICY AFTER 1850

THE victory of Schwarzenberg in Olmütz gave a predominating influence in Central Europe to the spirit of the Czar Nicholas I, the narrowness and bigotry of which is not to be paralleled in any of those periods of stagnation which have interrupted the social development of Europe. Rarely has a greater want of common sense been shown in the government of any Western civilized nation than was displayed during the years subsequent to 1850, a period which has attained in this respect a well-deserved notoriety. It is true that the preceding movement had found the nations immature, and therefore incapable of solving the problems with which they were confronted. The spirit was willing, but the flesh was unprepared. The miserable delusion that construction is a process as easy and rapid as destructive; that a few months can accomplish what centuries have failed to perfect; the delusion that an honest attempt to improve political institutions must of necessity effect the desired improvement, the severance of the theoretical from the practical, which was the ruin of every politician,—these were the obstacles which prevented the national leaders from making timely use of that tremendous power which was placed in their hands in the month of March, 1848. Precious time was squandered in the harangues of rival orators, in the formation of parties and clubs, in over-ambitious programmes and complacent self-laudation thereon, in displays of arrogance and malevolent onslaughts. Liberalism was forced to resign its claims; it was unable to effect a complete and unwavering severance from radicalism; it was unable to appreciate the fact that its mission was not to govern, but to secure recognition from the government. The peoples were unable to gain legal confirmation of their rights, because they had no clear ideas upon the extent of those rights, and had not been taught that self-restraint was the only road to success. Thus far all is sufficiently intelligible, and, upon a retrospect, one is almost inclined to think of stagnation as the inevitable result of a conflict of counterbalancing forces. But one phenomenon there is, which becomes the more astonishing in proportion as it is elucidated by that pure light of impartial criticism which the non-contemporary historian can throw upon it,—it is the fact that mental confusion was followed by a cessation of mental energy, that imperative vigour and interest were succeeded by blatant stupidity, that the excesses committed by nations in their struggle for the right of self-determination were expiated by yet more brutal exhibitions of the misuse of power, the blame of which rests upon the governments, who were the nominal guardians of right and morality in their higher forms.

In truth a very moderate degree of wisdom in a few leading statesmen would have drawn the proper conclusions from the facts of the case, and have discovered the formulæ expressing the relation between executive power and national strength. But the thinkers who would have been satisfied with moderate claims were not to be found; it seemed as if the very intensity of political action had exhausted the capacity for government, as if the conquerors had forgotten that they too had been struggling to preserve the State and to secure its internal consolidation and reconstitution, that the revolution had been caused simply by the fact that the corrupt

and degenerate State was unable to perform what its subjects had the right to demand. The nations were so utterly depressed by the sad experiences which they had brought upon themselves, as to show themselves immediately sensible to the smallest advances of kindness and confidence. Irritated by a surfeit of democratic theory, the political organism had lost its tone. A moderate allowance of rights and freedom would have acted as a stimulant, but the constitution had been too far lowered for hunger to act as a cure. Education and amelioration, not punishment, was now the mission of the governments which had recovered their unlimited power; but they were themselves both uninformed and unsympathetic. The punishment which they meted out was inflicted not from a sense of duty, but in revenge for the blows which they had been forced to endure in the course of the revolution.

(a) *Austria under Schwarzenberg's Ministry.* — Most fatal to Austria was the lack of creative power, of experienced statesmen with education and serious moral purpose. In this country an enlightened government could have attained its every desire. Opportunity was provided for effecting a fundamental change in the constitution; all opposition had been broken down, and the strong vitality of the State had been brilliantly demonstrated in one of the hardest struggles for existence in which the country had been engaged for three centuries. There was a new ruler (p. 227), strong, bold, and well informed, full of noble ambition and tender sentiment, too young to be hidebound by preconceived opinion and yet old enough to feel enthusiasm for his lofty mission; such a man would have been the strongest conceivable guarantee of success to a ministry capable of leading him in the path of steady progress and of respect for the national rights. The clumsy and disjointed Reichstag of Kremsier (cf. p. 204) was dissolved on March 7, and on March 4, 1849, a constitution (p. 206) had been voluntarily promulgated, in which the government had reserved to itself full scope for exercising an independent influence upon the development of the State. In this arrangement the kingdom of Hungary had been included after its subordinate provinces had severed their connection with the crown of the Stephans, obtaining special provincial rights of their own. The best administrative officials in the empire, Anton Ritter von Schmerling, Alexander (from 1854 Freiherr von) Bach, Count Leo Thun and Hohenstein, and Karl von Bruck, were at the disposition of the prime minister for the work of revivifying the economic and intellectual life of the monarchy. No objection would have been raised to a plan for dividing the non-Hungarian districts into bodies analogous to the English county, and thus laying the impregnable foundations of a centralised government which would develop as the education of the smaller national entities advanced. The fate of Austria was delivered into the hands of the emperor's advisers; but no personality of Radetzky's stamp was to be found among them. The leading figure was a haughty nobleman, whose object and pleasure was to sow discord between Austria and the Prussian king and people, Austria's most faithful allies since 1815. It was in Frankfurt, and not in Vienna or Budapest, that the Hapsburg State should have sought strength and protection against future storms.

Even at the present day the veil has not been wholly parted which then shrouded the change of political theory in the leading circles at the Vienna court. Certain, however, it is that this change was not the work of men anxious for progress, but

was due to the machinations of political parasites who plunged one of the best-intentioned of rulers into a series of entanglements which a life of sorrow and cruel disappointments was unable to unravel. The precious months of 1850, when the nation would thankfully have welcomed any cessation of the prevalent disturbance and terrorism, or any sign of confidence in its capacities, were allowed to pass by without an effort. In the following year the national enemies gained the upper hand; it was resolved to break with constitutionalism, and to reject the claims of the citizens to a share in the legislature and the administration. In September, 1851, the governments of Prussia and Sardinia were ordered to annul the existing constitutions. This was a step which surpassed even Metternich's zeal for absolutism. Schmerling and Bruck resigned their posts in the ministry (January 5 and May 23, 1851), feeling their inability to make head against the reactionary movement. On August 20, 1851, the imperial council for which provision had been made in the constitution of March 4, 1849, was deprived of its faculty of national representation. As the council had not yet been called into existence, the only interpretation to be laid upon this step was that the ministry desired to re-examine the desirability of ratifying the constitution. On December 31, 1851, the constitution was annulled, and the personal security of the citizens thereby endangered, known as they were to be in favour of constitutional measures. The police and a body of gendarmes who were accorded an unprecedented degree of license undertook the struggle, not against exaggerated and impracticable demands, but against liberalism as such, while the authorities plumed themselves in the fond delusion that this senseless struggle was a successful stroke of statesmanship. Enlightened centralisation would have found thousands of devoted coadjutors and have awakened many dormant forces; but the centralisation of the reactionary foes of freedom was bound to remain fruitless and to destroy the pure impulse which urged the people to national activity.

(b) *The Dresden Conferences.*—The successors in foreign policy, by which presumption had been fostered, now ceased. During the Dresden conferences, which had been held in Olmütz (p. 235), Schwarzenberg found that he had been bitterly deceived in his federal allies among the smaller States, and found that he had affronted Prussia to no purpose as far as Austria was concerned. His object had been to introduce such modifications in the act of federation as would enable Austria and the countries dependent on her to enter the German federation, which would then be forced to secure the inviolability of the whole Hapsburg power. England and France declined to accept these proposals. The German governments showed no desire to enter upon a struggle with two great powers to gain a federal reform which could only benefit Austria. Prussia was able calmly to await the collapse of Schwarzenberg's schemes. After wearisome negotiations (lasting from December, 1850, to May, 1851) it became clear that all attempts at reform were futile, as long as Austria declined to grant Prussia the equality which she desired in the presidency and in the formation of the proposed "directory." Schwarzenberg declined to yield, and all that could be done was to return to the old federal system, and thereby to make the discreditable avowal that the collective governments were as powerless as the disjointed parliament to amend the unsatisfactory political situation. In the federal palace at Frankfort-on-Main, where the sovereignty of that German national assembly had been organ-

ised a short time before (p. 182), the opinion again prevailed (from 1851) that there could be no more dangerous enemy to the State and to society than the popular representative. The unfortunate liberals, humiliated and depressed by their own incompetency, now paid the penalty for their democratic tendencies; they were branded as "destructive forces," and punished by imprisonment which should properly have fallen upon republican inconstancy.

(c) *The Smaller German States and Prussia under the Restored Paramountcy of the Federal Council.*—The majority of the liberal constitutions which the revolution of 1848 had brought into existence were in most cases annulled; this step was quickly carried out in Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Wurttemberg (June, September, and November, 1850), though the chamber continued an obstinate resistance until August, 1855, in Hanover, where the blind king George V had ascended the throne on November 18, 1851. The favor of the federation restored her beloved ruler to the electorate of Hesse. He positively revelled in the cruelty and oppression practised upon his subjects by the troops of occupation. His satellite, Hassenpflug, known as "Hessen-Fluch" (the curse of Hesse), zealously contributed to increase the severity of this despotism by his ferocity against the recalcitrant officials, who considered themselves bound by their obligations to the constitution.

In Prussia the reactionary party would very gladly have made an end of constitutionalism once and for all; but though the king entertained a deep-rooted objection to the modern theories of popular participation in the government, he declined to be a party to any breach of the oath which he had taken. Bunsen and Prince William supported his objections to a *coup d'état*, which seemed the more unnecessary as a constitutional change in the direction of conservatism had been successfully carried through (February 6, 1850). The system of three classes of direct representation was introduced (end of April, 1849), taxation thus becoming the measure of the political rights exercised by the second chamber. The possibility of a labour majority in this chamber was thus obviated. The upper chamber was entirely remodelled. Members were no longer elected, but were nominated by the crown; seats were made hereditary in the different noble families, and the preponderance of the nobility was thus secured. The institution of a full house of lords (October 12, 1854) was not so severe a blow to the State as the dissolution of the parish councils and the reinstitution of the provincial Landtags (1851), as in these latter the unbiassed expression of public opinion was a practical impossibility.

Schleswig-Holstein was handed over to the Danes; the constitution of September 15, 1848, and German "proprietary rights" were declared null and void by a supreme authority composed of Austrian, Prussian, and Danish commissioners. By the London protocol of May 8, 1852, the great powers recognised the succession of Prince Christian of Holstein-Glücksburg, who had married Princess Louise, a daughter of the Countess of Hesse, Louise Charlotte, sister of Christian VIII. However, the German federation did not favour this solution; the estates of the duchies, who had the best right to decide the question, were never even asked their opinion. On December 30, 1852, Duke Christian of Holstein-Augustenburg sold his Schleswig estates to the reigning house of Denmark for 2,250,000 thalers, renouncing his hereditary rights at the same time, though the other members of the family declined to accept the renunciation as binding upon themselves. Thus

the Danes gained but a temporary victory. It was even then clear that after the death of King Frederick VII the struggle would be renewed for the separation of the German districts from the "Danish United States."

A legacy of the national movement, the "German fleet" was put up to auction at this date. The German federation had no maritime interests to represent. It declined the trouble of extorting a recognition of the German flag from the maritime powers. Of the four frigates, five corvettes, and six gunboats, which had been fitted out at a cost of three million six hundred thousand thalers, Prussia bought the larger part, after Hanoverian machinations had induced the federal council to determine the dissolution of the fleet on April 2, 1852. Prussia acquired from Oldenburg a strip of territory on the Jade Bay, and in course of time constructed a naval arsenal and harbour (Wilhelmshaven), which enabled her to appear as a maritime power in the Baltic.

These facts were the more important as Prussia, in spite of violent opposition, had maintained her position as head of that economic unity which was now known as the "Zollverein" (p. 163). The convention expired on December 31, 1853. From 1849 Austria had been working to secure the position, and at the tariff conference held in Wiesbaden in June, 1851, had secured the support of every State of importance within the Zollverein with the exception of Prussia. Prussia was in consequence forced to renounce the preference for protective duties which she had evinced in the last few years, and, on September 7, 1851, to join the free trade "Steuerverein" which Hanover had formed with Oldenburg and Lippe (1834 and 1836). The danger of a separation between the eastern and western territorial groups was thus obviated; the Zollverein of Austria and the smaller German States was cut off from the sea and deprived of all the advantages which the original Prussian Zollverein had offered. Austria now thought it advisable to conclude a commercial treaty with Prussia on favourable terms on February 19, 1853, and to leave the smaller States to their fate. In any case their continual demands for compensation and damages had become wearisome. Nothing remained for them except to join Prussia. Thus on April 4, 1853, the Zollverein was renewed, to last until December 31, 1865. It was an association embracing an area of nine thousand and forty-six square (German) miles, with thirty-five million inhabitants.

B. ECCLESIASTICAL REACTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE STATE

As after the fall of Napoleon I, so now the lion's share of the plunder acquired in the struggle against the revolution fell to the Church. Liberalism had indeed rendered an important service to Catholicism by incorporating in its creed the phrase, "the free Church in the free State." The Jesuits were well able to turn this freedom to the best account. They demanded for the German bishops unlimited powers of communication with Rome and with the parochial clergy, together with full disciplinary powers over all priests without the necessity of an appeal to the State. Nothing was simpler than to construe ecclesiastical freedom as implying that right of supremacy for which the Church had yearned during the past eight centuries. This was now reformulated in the catch-word, church rights before territorial rights. Hermann von Vicari, the archbishop of Freiburg, pushed the theory with such brazen effrontery that even the reactionary government was forced to imprison him. However, in Darmstadt and Stuttgart the governments submitted to the

demands of Rome. Parties in the Prussian chamber were increased by the addition of a new Catholic party, led by the brothers August and Peter Franz Reichensperger, to which high favour was shown by the "Catholic contingent" in the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs,—a party created by the ecclesiastical minister Joh. Albr. Friedr. Eichhorn in 1841 (cf. Vol. VII, p. 348).

There was no actual collision in Prussia between ultramontaniam and the temporal power. The government favoured the reaction in the evangelical Church which took the form of an unmistakable *rapprochement* to Catholicism. The powers were committed to a policy of mutual counsel and support, their ultimate aim being the suppression of independent thought, so far even as to prevent believers from satisfying the inmost needs of their spiritual life. Friedr. Jul. Stahl, Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg, and Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, who had gained complete ascendancy over Frederic William IV since the revolution (cf. pp. 158 and 174), were undermining the foundations of the evangelical creed, especially the respect accorded to inward conviction, on which the whole of Protestantism was based. In the "regulations" of October, 1854, the schools were placed under Church supervision, and in the "Church councils" hypocrisy was made supreme. When a Bunsen advanced to champion the cause of spiritual freedom, he gained only the honourable title of "devastator of the Church."

In Austria the rights of the human understanding were flouted even more completely than in Prussia by the conclusion of the notorious concordat of August 18, 1855. This agreement was the expression of an alliance between ultramontaniam and the new centralising absolutism. The hierarchy undertook for a short period to oppose the national parties and to commend the refusal of constitutional rights. In return the absolutist State placed the whole of its administration at the disposal of the Church, and gave the bishops unconditional supremacy over the clergy, who had hitherto used the position assigned to them by Joseph II for the benefit of the people, and certainly not for the injury of the Church. The Church thus gained a spiritual preponderance which was used to secure her paramountcy. It was but a further step in the course of development which the Jesuit order had imposed upon the Catholic Church. The suppression of the Christian congregation was necessarily succeeded by the disestablishment of the spiritual pastor. When this process had been completed and the local clergy deprived of State protection, the episcopacy might be reduced to impotence, and the papacy transformed into an Oriental despotism, under which the Jesuit leaders would become permanent grand viziers. All this, too, in the name of a religion which taught the equality of all men as made in the image of God, which insisted on morality based upon spiritual freedom as the ideal of life, which had once given mankind joy and strength for the struggle against oppression, selfishness, and intolerance! A new epoch in religious history was thereby inaugurated; now was to be tested the true value of the religion, upon a perversion of which Jesuitism was attempting to found a new scheme of organisation, which could only end in the victory of Catholic influence over the orders, or in the dissolution of the Church.

The example of Austria was imitated in the Italian States which owed their existence to her. Piedmont alone gathered the opponents of the Roman hierarchy under her banner, for this government at least was determined that no patriot should be led astray by the great fiction of a national pope. In Spain the Jesuits joined the Carlists (p. 169, above), and helped them to carry on a hopeless campaign,

marked by a series of defeats. In Belgium, on the other hand (p. 146, above), they secured an almost impregnable position in 1855, and fought the liberals with their own weapons. Only Portugal, whence they had first been expelled in the eighteenth century (cf. Vol. IV, p. 551), kept herself free from their influence in the nineteenth, and showed that even a Catholic government had no need to fear the threats of the papacy. Rome had set great hopes upon France, since Louis Napoleon's "plebiscites" had been successfully carried out with the help of the clergy. But the Curia found France a very prudent friend, and one not to be caught off her guard. The diplomatic skill of Napoleon III was never seen to better advantage than in his delimitation of the spheres respectively assigned to the temporal and the spiritual powers. Even the Jesuits were unable to fathom his intentions, and never knew how far he was inclined to compromise himself with them.

12. THE FLUCTUATIONS OF POWER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE TO THE YEAR 1859

IN the realm of the blind the one-eyed man is king; above the reactionary governments rose the "saviour of order," who had been carried to the throne by the Revolution. The presidential chair, which had gained security and permanence from the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851 (p. 218), was made a new imperial throne within the space of a year by the adroit and not wholly untalented heir to the great name of Bonaparte. On January 14, 1852, he had brought out a constitution to give France a breathing space, exhausted as she was by the passionate struggle for freedom, and to soothe the extravagance of her imaginings. But this constitution needed a monarchy to complete it. The basis of a national imperial government was there in detail: a legislative body elected by national suffrage; a senate to guarantee the constitutional legality of legislation; an "appeal to the people" on every proposal which could be construed as an alteration of the constitution; a strong and wise executive to conduct State business, whose "resolutions" were examined in camera, undertaking the preparation and execution of everything which could conduce to the welfare of the people. The twelve million francs which the energetic senate had voted as the president's yearly income might equally well be applied to the maintenance of an emperor. When the question was brought forward, the country replied with seven million eight hundred and forty thousand votes in the affirmative, while the two hundred and fifty-four thousand dissentients appeared merely as a protest in behalf of the right of independent judgment. On December 2, 1852, Napoleon III was added to the number of crowned heads in Europe as Emperor of France by the grace of God and the will of the people. No power attempted to refuse recognition of his position. The democratic origin of the new ruler was forgotten in view of his services in the struggle against the Revolution, and in view of his respect for considerations of religion and armed force. Unfortunately the youthful monarch could not gain time to convince other powers of his equality with themselves. The old reigning houses were not as yet sufficiently intimate with him to seek a permanent union through a marriage alliance; yet he was bound to give France and himself an heir, for a throne without heirs speedily becomes uninteresting. Born on April 20, 1808, he was nearly forty-five years of age, and dared not risk the failure of a

courtship which might expose him to the general sympathy or ridicule. Without delay he therefore married, on January 29, 1853, the beautiful Countess Eugénie of Teba, of the noble Spanish house of Guzman, who was then twenty-six years of age. She was eminently capable, not only of pleasing the Parisians, but also of fixing their attention and of raising their spirits by a never-ending series of fresh devices. No woman was ever better fitted to be a queen of fashion, and fashion has always been venerated as a goddess by the French.

A. THE CRIMEAN WAR

NOTHING but a brilliant foreign policy was now lacking to secure the permanence of the Second Empire. It was not enough that Napoleon should be tolerated by his fellow sovereigns; prestige was essential to him. There was no surer road to the hearts of his subjects than that of making himself a power whose favour the other States of Europe would be ready to solicit. For this end it would have been the most natural policy to interest himself in the affairs of Italy, considering that he had old connections with the Carbonari, with Mazzini, and with Garibaldi. But it so happened that the Czar Nicholas was obliging enough at this juncture to furnish the heir of Bonaparte with a plausible pretext for interfering in the affairs of Eastern Europe. Napoleon III cannot be regarded as primarily responsible for the differences which arose in 1853 between England and Russia. But there can be no doubt that he seized the opportunity afforded by the quarrel of these two powers, and hurried the English government into an aggressive line of policy which, however welcome to the electorates of English constituencies, was viewed with misgiving by many English statesmen, and was destined to be of little advantage to any power but the Second Empire.

The Czar Nicholas has for a long time past regarded the partition of the Turkish Empire in favour of Russia as a step for which the European situation was now ripe. England and Austria were the powers whose interests were most obviously threatened by such a scheme. But he thought that Austria could be disregarded if the assent of England were secured; and as early as 1844 he had sounded the English government, suggesting that, in the event of partition, an understanding between England and Russia might be formulated with equal advantage to both powers. His overtures had met with no definite reply; but he appears to have assumed that England would not stand in his way. In 1852, feeling secure from further insurrections in Poland, he unmasked his batteries against the Porte. There was an old-standing feud between the Greek and Latin Christians living in Palestine under the sovereignty of the Sultan; by a strange coincidence this feud entered upon a new and more virulent phase at the very moment when the Czar was able and willing to insist upon his protectorate over the whole Greek Church. As a matter of course he found himself upon this question in opposition to France. The temptation to reassert the French protectorate over the Latin Christians of the East was increased by the annoyance which Napoleon felt at the arrogant demeanour of the Russian court toward himself. But Napoleon, busied as he was with preparing for the re-establishment of the empire, could not afford to push his resistance to extremes, and it would have been the wisest course for Nicholas to make sure of the prey which he had in view, by occupying the Danube principalities in force, before

Austria and Prussia had finished quarrelling over the question of federal reforms. The fact was that the development of his plans was checked for a moment by the unexpected submissiveness of the Sublime Porte, which agreed to guarantee the Greek Christians of the Holy Land in the possession of the coveted privileges. New pretexts for aggression were, however, easily discovered; and on May 11, 1853, Prince Menschikoff despatched an ultimatum, demanding for Russia a protectorate over the fourteen millions of Greek Christians who inhabited the various countries under Turkish rule. Submission to such a demand was equivalent to accepting a partition of the Turkish dominions between Russia and the Sultan. Even without allies the Sultan might be expected to make a stand; and allies were forthcoming. Though Napoleon had been first in the field against Russia, it was from England that Abdul Medjid now received the strongest encouragement. Some months before the ultimatum Nicholas had confessed his cherished object to the English ambassador; and though the shock of this disclosure had been tempered by a proposal that England should take Egypt and Candia as her share of the spoil, the English government was clear that, in one way or another, the integrity of the Turkish Empire must be secured. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the English representative at Constantinople, advised that no concession whatever should be made to Russia. The advice was taken.

Although the Czar had probably not counted upon war as a serious probability, nothing now remained but to face the consequences of his precipitation, to recall his ambassador, and to send his troops into the Danube principalities. They were invaded on July 2, 1853, the Czar protesting "that it was not his intention to commence war, but to have such security as would ensure the restoration of the rights of Russia."

Unprepared as he was, he had every prospect of success if he could secure the co-operation of Austria. Had these two powers agreed to deliver a joint attack upon Turkey, inducing Prussia, by means of suitable concessions, to protect their rear, the fleets of the Western powers could not have saved Constantinople, and their armies would certainly not have ventured to take the field against the combined forces of the two Eastern emperors. But the Czar overrated his own powers and underrated the capacity of the Sultan for resistance. All that Nicholas desired from Austria was neutrality; and this he thought that he might confidently expect after the signal service which Russian armies had rendered in the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion. No advance was made on his part toward an understanding with Austria until the two Western powers had definitely appeared on the scene. This happened immediately after the Black Sea squadron of the Turkish fleet had been destroyed in the harbour of Sinope by Admiral Nakimoff (November 30, 1853). The allied French and English fleets had been in the Bosphorus for a month past with the object of protecting Constantinople; they now, at the suggestion of Napoleon, entered the Black Sea (January, 1854). At this juncture Prince Orloff was despatched to Vienna, without authority to offer any concessions, but merely to appeal to Austrian gratitude. It would have needed a statesman of unusual penetration to grasp the fact that Austrian interests would really be served by a friendly response to this dilatory and unskilfully managed application; and such a statesman was not to be found at the Hofburg. Schwarzenberg had died very suddenly on April 5, 1852, and his mantle had fallen upon the shoulders of Count Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein, who had no other

qualifications for his responsible position beyond rigid orthodoxy and some small experience acquired in a subordinate capacity during the brief ministry of Schwarzenberg. Buol confirmed his master, Franz Joseph, in the erroneous idea that the interests of Austria and Russia in the East were diametrically opposed. Accordingly Prince Orloff was rebuffed, and Austria supported a demand for the evacuation of the Danubian principalities which was issued by the Western powers on February 27, 1854. France and England were encouraged by this measure of Austrian support to conclude a defensive treaty with the Sultan on March 12 and to declare war on Russia on March 27. In the first stages of hostilities they had the support of the Austrian forces. Austria accepted from Turkey a formal commission to hold the Danube principalities during the course of the war, and co-operated with a Turkish army in compelling the Russian troops to withdraw. And on August 8 Austria joined with France and England in demanding that Russia should abandon her protectorate over Servia and the Danubian principalities, should allow free navigation of the Danube, should submit to a revision of the "Convention of the Straits" (of July, 1841) in the interests of the balance of power, and should renounce the claim to a protectorate over the Greek Christians of the Turkish dominions.

When these demands were rejected by Russia, and the war passed into its second stage, with France and England acting on the offensive in order to provide for the peace of the future by crippling Russian power in the East, it might have been expected that Austria would go on as she had begun. But at this point a fifth power made its influence felt in the already complicated situation. Frederic William IV did not go to the lengths advised by Bismarck, who proposed that Prussia should restore peace by concentrating an army on the Silesian frontier, and threatening to attack whichever of the two neighbouring empires should refuse a peaceful settlement. But the king of Prussia was by no means inclined to make capital out of Russian necessities, and turned a deaf ear to the suggestions of Austria for an armed coalition against the Czar. The result was that Austria, though she concluded, in December, 1854, an offensive alliance with France and England, did not actually take part in the Crimean war.

The plan of an attack upon Sebastopol, the headquarters of Russian naval and military power in the Black Sea, had been suggested to England by Napoleon III at an early stage of the war. It was set aside for a time in favour of naval warfare in the Black Sea and the Baltic. But the English government, on finding that little good came of a blockade of Odessa, and that Cronstadt was proof against attack, turned its gaze toward Sebastopol, and overruled Napoleon, who had come to prefer the idea of raising rebellion against Russia in the Caucasus. In the autumn of 1854 operations against Sebastopol were commenced by a joint French and English force, which, under the command of Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, landed at Eupatoria on September 14, and on September 20 cleared the road to Sebastopol by a battle at the river Alma, in which the brunt of the fighting and the heaviest loss fell upon the English. On September 26, Balaclava, to the south of Sebastopol, was occupied by the allies as a naval base, and on October 9 the siege of Sebastopol itself was commenced, a siege which was to last for more than twelve months.

Several desperate attempts on the part of the Russian field army to bring relief to the garrison were unavailing. On October 25 Prince Menschikoff brought

against the allied position at Balaklava a force of twenty-two thousand infantry, thirty-four thousand cavalry, and seventy-eight guns; but the battle which ensued, though memorable for the charges of the Heavy Brigade and the Light Brigade, was of an indecisive character. On November 5 the position south of the harbour of Sebastopol, which is known (but incorrectly) as Mount Inkerman, was attacked simultaneously by the garrison and the field army under Menschikoff's direction; but after a hard day's fighting against inferior numbers the Russians retired with a loss of twelve thousand men, more than twelve times that which the allies had sustained. On the other hand, the allies failed to break the communications of the garrison with the outer world, and little was done in the course of the winter owing to the terrible privations which the besiegers suffered in consequence of a wretched commissariat system. In the course of the four winter months the English alone lost nine thousand men by sickness. In January, 1855, the allies were constrained to apply for assistance to the kingdom of Sardinia, from which in the month of May they received a contingent of fifteen thousand men. Help would have come more naturally from Austria, but Buol-Schauenstein had not the determination to proceed without Prussian countenance on the path which he had entered in the previous year, and Austria missed the golden opportunity for strengthening her position in Eastern Europe.

The Czar Nicholas died, worn out with chagrin and anxiety, on March 2, 1855. His policy had cost Russia a loss which was officially calculated at two hundred and forty thousand men; and "Generals January and February" had treated him even more severely than the allied force which he had expected them to annihilate. Negotiations were opened by his son Alexander II, who declined, however, to limit the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. The allies therefore proceeded with the attack upon Sebastopol; and after a third unsuccessful attack upon their position (battle of the Tchernaya, August 16, 1855), the Russians were compelled, by a fearful cannonade and the loss of the Malakoff (September 8), which was stormed by the French in the face of an appalling fire, to evacuate the city. The capture of the Armenian fortress of Kars by General Muravieff in November enabled the Russians to claim more moderate terms of peace than would otherwise have been possible. On February 6, 1856, a congress opened at Paris to settle the Eastern question,¹ and peace was signed on March 30 of the same year.

By the terms of the peace of Paris the Black Sea was declared neutral and open to the merchant ships of every nation. It was to be closed against the war ships of all nations, except that Russia and Turkey were permitted to equip not more than ten light vessels apiece for coastguard service, and that any State interested in the navigation of the Danube might station two light vessels at the mouth of that river. The integrity of Turkey was guaranteed by the powers, all of whom renounced the right of interfering in the internal affairs of that State, nothing beyond certain promises of reforms being demanded from the Sultan in return for these favours. For the regulation of the navigation of the Danube a standing commission of the interested powers was appointed (cf. Vol. VII, p. 124). Moldavia and Wallachia were left in dependence on the Sultan, but with complete autonomy so far as their internal administration was concerned. They were to pay a tribute, and their foreign relations were to be controlled by the Porte. Mol-

See the plate, "The Congress of Paris in the Year 1856."

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS IN THE YEAR 1856

Edouard Dubufe has depicted the Paris Congress in the persons of the following fifteen Representatives of the five Great Powers and the two smaller Powers of Europe, who were involved in the Eastern question in connection with the Crimean War :

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| I. FRANCE : | 1. Florian Alexandre Joseph, Count Colonna Walewski (1810-1868). |
| | 2. François Adolphe, Baron de Bourqueney (1799-1869). |
| | 3. Vincent, Count Benedetti (1817-1900), as recorder. |
| II. ENGLAND : | 4. George William Frederick Villiers, Earl of Clarendon, Baron Hyde of Hindon (1800-1870). |
| | 5. Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, Baron Cowley (1804-1884). |
| III. AUSTRIA : | 6. Karl Ferdinand, Count von Buol-Schauenstein (1797-1865). |
| | 7. Joseph Alexander Hafenedl, known as Freiherr von Hübnér (1811-1892). |
| IV. TURKEY : | 8. Mohammed Emin A(3)li Pascha (1815-1871). |
| | 9. Mehemed Djemil Bei (1825-1872). |
| V. SARDINIA : | 10. Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810-1861). |
| | 11. Salvator Pes Marchese de Villamarina. |
| VI. RUSSIA : | 12. Alexej Fedorowitsch, Count Orlov (1797-1861). |
| | 13. Philipp, Baron von Brunnów (1797-1875). |
| VII. PRUSSIA : | 14. Otto Theodor, Baron von Manteuffel (1805-1882). |
| | 15. Maximilian Friedrich Karl Franz, Count von Hatzfeldt Wildenburg-Schönstein (1813-1859). |

(The two last named did not take their seats in the Council until the 18th March, 1856.)

Aug. Blanchard's engraving, from a proof-print of which our reproduction is taken, was published in 1859 by Goupil & Co., in Berlin, Paris, and New York. Among the publications of this firm is Jentzen's lithograph of 1854, representing in full detail "The Champions of the Orthodox Faith" (Nicholas I. and his Court).

In a lithograph by C. Schultz, published by Wild, Count Walewski again appears in the centre as president, the other figures, from Bourqueney to Clarendon, being on the left, and from Villamarina to Buol, on the right; the Prussian representatives and the recorder Benedetti are missing. In a third picture of this Congress, the representatives of the Powers are represented sitting side by side in pairs, while Benedetti stands modestly in the background on the left.

Cf. Edouard Gourdon, "Histoire de Congrès de Paris" (Paris, 1857).

davia recovered that part of Bessarabia which had been taken from her by Russia, and in this way the latter power was pushed back from the Danube. In Asia Minor the action of France and England restored the frontier to the *status quo ante*.

Thus the jealousy and the mutual distrust of the Christian empires and nations of Europe, together with their fear of self-aggrandisement on the part of any one power, had induced them to take under their special protection and to prolong the existence of a State founded on rapine and incapable of fulfilling its duties either to its Christian or to its Mussulman subjects. Henceforward Turkey could be nothing more than an obstacle to the natural development of these peoples, and to the ultimate decision of the destiny of the Balkan States.

B. THE DOWNFALL OF AUSTRIA IN ITALY

(a) *The Domestic Policy of Napoleon III.*—For a short time Napoleon III had undertaken to play the part of a second Metternich. He concealed his actual position and succeeded in inspiring Europe with a wholly unfounded belief in the strength of his country and himself. The world's exhibition of 1855, and the congress which immediately followed, had restored Paris to her former prestige as the centre of Europe. Pilgrims flocked to the city of pleasure and good taste, upon the adornment of which the prefect of the Seine, Georges Eugène Haussmann, was permitted to expend a hundred millions of francs per annum. The sound governmental principle laid down by the first Napoleon, of keeping the fourth estate contented by high wages, and thus securing its good behaviour and silent approval of an absolute monarchy, was followed with entire success for the moment in the "restored" empire (cf. Vol. VII, p. 408). However, Napoleon III, like Metternich, was penetrated with the conviction that the ruler must of necessity be absolute. His greatest mistake consisted in the fact that he refrained from giving a material content to the constitutional forms under which his government was established. By this means he might have united to himself that section of the population which is not subject to the influence of caprice, and values the recognition of its modest but actual rights, however scanty in number, more highly than the Jesuitical bombast about the sovereignty of the people, by which nations are too often befooled. The "legislative body" should have been made representative, and should have been given control of the finances and right of initiating legislative proposals. Such a change would have been far more profitable to the heir who was born to the emperor on March 16, 1856, than the illusory refinements which gained the second empire the exaggerated approbation of all the useless epicures in existence.

(b) *The Relations of France to Russia and Austria, Prussia and England.*—Russia seemed to have been reduced to impotency for a long time to come, and her power to be now inferior to that of Turkey. She proceeded to accommodate herself to the changed conditions. Alexander II assured his subjects that the war begun by his father had improved and secured the position of Christianity in the East, and proceeded with magnificent dispassionateness to make overtures to the French ruler, who had just given him so severe a lesson. The Russian politicians were correct in their opinion that Napoleon was relieved to have come so well out

of his enterprises in the East, and that they need fear no immediate disturbance from that quarter. Napoleon III showed himself worthy of this confidence. He met Russia half way, respected her desires whenever he could do so, and received a tacit assurance that Russia would place no obstacle in the way of his designs against any other power. Though Austria had not fired a shot against the Prussian troops, she proved far less accommodating than France, whose troops had triumphantly entered Sebastopol. Austria had declined to repay the help given her in Hungary; she had also appeared as a rival in the Balkans, and had only been restrained by Prussia from dealing Russia a fatal blow. Thus Austria's weakness would imply Russia's strength, and would enable her the more easily to pursue her Eastern policy.

Prussia had fallen so low that no interference was to be feared from her in the event of any great European complication, though there was no immediate apprehension of any such difficulty. In a fit of mental weakness which foreshadowed his ultimate collapse, Frederic William IV had concentrated his thoughts upon the possibility of recovering his principality of Neuenberg. Success was denied him. After the ill-timed attempt at revolution, set on foot by the Prussian party in that province on September 3, 1856, he was forced to renounce definitely all claim to the province on May 26, 1857. The fact that the principality was of no value to Prussia did not remove the impression that the German State had again suffered a defeat. Napoleon was one of the few statesmen who estimated the power of Prussia at a higher rate than did the majority of his contemporaries; in a conversation with Bismarck in March, 1857, he had already secured Prussia's neutrality in the event of a war in Italy, and had brought forward proposals of more importance than the programme of the union. With the incorporation of Hanover and Holstein a northern sea power was to be founded strong enough, in alliance with France, to oppose England. All that he asked in return was a "small delimitation" of the Rhine frontier; this, naturally, was not to affect the left bank, the possession of which would oblige France to extend her territory and would rouse a new coalition against her. Bismarck declined to consider any further projects in this direction, and sought to extract an undertaking from the emperor, that Prussia should not be involved in any great political combination. England's resources were strained to the utmost in Persia, India, and China, and she needed not only the goodwill but the friendly offices of France. For these reasons the Tory ministry, which came into power in 1858 upon the fall of Palmerston, could not venture to disturb the good understanding with Napoleon, however strongly inclined to this course.

(c) *The Realisation of the National Idea.* — Napoleon was thus free to confront the apparently feasible task of increasing his influence in Europe and conciliating the goodwill of his subjects to the empire. It was now necessary to apply the second fundamental principle of the Bonapartist rulers, to avoid any thorough investigation of internal difficulties by turning attention to foreign affairs, by assuming a commanding position among the great powers, and by acquiring military fame when possible. Polignac had already made a similar attempt (p. 138). He had failed through want of adroitness; the capture of Algiers came too late to prevent the July revolution. Napoleon did not propose to fail thus, and for once, at least, his attempt proved successful. Naturally the methods by which

ministers had begun war under the "old régime" were impossible for a popular emperor. Moreover, Napoleon III was no soldier; he could not merely wave his sword, like his great uncle, and announce to Europe that this or that dynasty must be deposed. Principles must be followed out, modern ideas must be made triumphant; at the least, the subject nation must be made to believe that the individual was merely the implement of the great forces of activity latent in peoples. He had turned constitutionalism to excellent account; the struggles of the liberal party to obtain a share in the government had ended by raising him to the throne. Another idea with which modern Europe was fully penetrated, that of nationality, might now be exploited by an adroit statesman. Napoleon neither exaggerated nor underestimated its potency; only he had not realised how deeply it was rooted in the hearts of the people. He knew that it was constantly founded upon folly and presumption, and that the participation of the people in the task of solving State problems fostered the theory that the concentration of the national strength was ever a more important matter than the maintenance of the State; hence he inferred the value of the national idea as a means of opening the struggle against existing political institutions. But of its moral power he had no conception; he never imagined that, in the fulness of time, it would become a constructive force capable of bending statecraft to its will. Here lay the cause of his tragic downfall: he was like the apprentice of some political magician, unable to dismiss the spirits whom he had evoked when they became dangerous.

His gaze had long been directed toward Italy; the dreams of his youth returned upon him in new guise and lured him to make that country the scene of his exploits. It was, however, in the East, which had already proved so favourable to Napoleon's enterprises, that he was to make his first attempt to introduce the principle of nationality into the concert of Europe. Turkey was forced to recognise the rights of the Roumanian nation, of which she had hardly so much as heard when the question arose of the regulation of the government in the Danube principalities. She could offer no opposition when Moldavia and Wallachia, each of which could elect a hospodar tributary to the Sultan, united in their choice of one and the same personality, the colonel Alexander Johann Cusa, and appointed him their prince at the outset of 1859 (January 29 and February 17).

By this date a new rising of the kingdom of Sardinia against Austria had already been arranged for the purpose of overthrowing the foreign government in Italy. The victorious progress of the national idea in the Danube principalities, which not only destroyed Austria's hopes of extending her territory on the Black Sea, but also became a permanent cause of disturbance in her Eastern possessions, was now to justify its application in Italy. The *attentat* of the Italian Felice, Count Orsini, and his three associates, who threw bombs at the imperial couple in Paris on January 14, 1858, wounding both of them and one hundred and forty-one others, is said to have materially contributed to determine Napoleon's decision for the Italian war. He was intimidated by the weapons which the nationalist and radical party now began to employ, for Orsini in the very face of death appealed to him to help his oppressed fatherland, and it became manifest that this outrage was merely the expression of national excitement.

A similar state of tension existed in the Sardinian State, its dynasty, and its leader, Count Camillo Cavour (p. 171), who had been the prime minister of King Victor Emanuel since November 4, 1852. At first of moderate views, he had

joined the liberals under Urbano Rattazzi and Giovanni Lanza, and had entered into relations with the revolutionary party throughout the peninsula. He had succeeded in inspiring their leaders with the conviction that the movement for Italian unity must proceed from Piedmont. Vincenzo Gioberti, Daniele Manin (pp. 192 and 197), and Giuseppe Garibaldi adopted Cavour's programme, and promised support if he would organise a new rising against Austria. Cavour, with the king's entire approval, now made this rising his primary object; he was confident that Napoleon would not permit Austria to aggrandise herself by reducing Italy a second time. The Austrian government played into his hands by declining to continue the arrangements for introducing an entirely autonomous and national form of administration into Lombardy and Venice, and by the severity with which the aristocratic participants in the Milan revolt of February 6, 1853, were punished. Sardinia sheltered the fugitives, raised them to honourable positions, and used every means to provoke a breach with Austria. The schemes of the House of Savoy and its adherents were discovered by the Viennese government, but too late; they were too late in recognising that Lombardy and Venice must be reconciled to the Austrian supremacy, by relaxing the severity of the military occupation. Too late, again, was the archduke Maximilian, the enlightened and popular brother of the emperor, despatched as viceroy to Milan, to concentrate and strengthen the Austrian party. Cavour gave the Lombards no rest; by means of the national union he spread the fire throughout Italy, and continually incited the press against Austria. The Austrian government was soon forced to recall its ambassador from Turin, and Piedmont at once made the counter move.

(d) *The War of 1859.* — In July, 1858, Napoleon came to an agreement with Cavour at Plombières; France was to receive Savoy if Sardinia acquired Lombardy and Venice, while the county of Nizza was to be the price of the annexation of Parma and Modena. The House of Savoy thus sacrificed its ancestral territories to gain the paramouncy in Italy. The term "Italy" then implied a federal State which might include the Pope, the grand duke of Tuscany, and the king of Naples. Sardinia at once began the task of mobilisation, for which preparation had been already made by the construction of two hundred and fifty miles of railway lines. On January 1, 1859, at the reception on New Year's day, Napoleon plainly announced to the Austrian ambassador, Freiherr von Hübner, his intention of helping the Italian cause. On January 17 the community of interests between France and Sardinia was reaffirmed by the engagement of Prince Joseph Napoleon (Plon-Plon), son of Jérôme of Westphalia, to Clotilde, the daughter of Victor Emanuel. Even then the war might have been avoided had Austria accepted England's intervention and the condition of mutual disarmament. Napoleon dared not provoke England, and informed Cavour on April 20 that it was advisable to fall in with England's proposals. But the cabinet of Vienna had in the meantime been so ill advised as to send an ultimatum to Sardinia threatening an invasion within thirty days, if Sardinia did not forthwith and unconditionally promise to disarm. This action was the more ill-timed, as Austria was herself by no means prepared to throw the whole of her forces into Italy. By accepting English intervention Cavour evaded the necessity of replying to the ultimatum. France declared that the crossing of the Ticino by the Austrians would be regarded as a *casus belli*. The crossing was none the less effected on April 30, 1859.

The war which then began brought no special honour to any of the combatants, though it materially altered the balance of power in Europe. In the first place, the Austrian army showed itself entirely unequal to the performance of its new tasks; in respect of equipment it was far behind the times, and much of its innate capacity had disappeared since the campaigns of 1848 and 1849; leadership and administrative energy were alike sadly to seek. Half-trained and often wholly uneducated officers were placed in highly responsible positions. High birth, irrespective of capacity, was a passport to promotion; a fine presence and a kind of dandified indifference to knowledge and experience were more esteemed than any military virtues. There was loud clashing of weapons, but general ignorance as to their proper use. The general staff was in an unusually benighted condition; there were few competent men available, and these had no chance of employment, unless they belonged to one of the groups and coteries which made the distribution of offices their special business. At the end of April, 1859, the army in Italy amounted to little more than one hundred thousand men, although Austria was said to have at command five hundred and twenty thousand infantry, sixty thousand cavalry, and fifteen hundred guns. The commander-in-chief, Count Franz Gyulay, was an honourable and fairly competent officer, but no general. His chief of the staff, Colonel Franz Kuhn, Freiherr von Kuhnfeld, had been sent to the seat of war from his professional chair in the military academy, and while he displayed the highest ingenuity in the invention of combinations, was unable to formulate or execute any definite plan of campaign.

With his one hundred thousand troops Gyulay might easily have overpowered the seventy thousand Piedmontese and Italian volunteers who had concentrated on the Po. The retreat from that position could hardly have been prevented even by the French generals and a division of French troops, which had arrived at Turin on April 26, 1859; however, the Austrian leaders were apprehensive of being outflanked on the Po by a disembarkation of the French troops at Genoa. Gyulay remained for a month in purposeless inaction in the Lomellina, the district between Ticino and Sesia; it was not until May 23 that he ventured upon a reconnaissance to Montebello, which produced no practical result. The conflict at Palestro on May 30 deceived him as to Napoleon's real object; the latter was following the suggestions of General Adolphe Niel, and had resolved to march round the Austrian right wing. Garibaldi with three or four thousand ill-armed guerilla troops had crossed the Ticino at the south of Lake Maggiore. This route was followed by a division under General Marie Edme Patrice Maurice de MacMahon, and Niel reached Novara on the day of Palestro and proceeded to threaten Gyulay's line of retreat, who accordingly retired behind the Ticino on June 1. He had learned nothing of MacMahon's movement on his left, and thought his right wing sufficiently covered by the division of Count Edward of Clam-Gallas, who was advancing from the Tyrol. The battle on the Naviglio followed on June 3, and Gyulay maintained his position with fifty thousand men against the fifty-eight thousand under the immediate command of the emperor Napoleon in person.

MacMahon had crossed the Ticino at Turbigo, driven back Clam-Gallas, and found himself by evening on the Austrian left flank at Magenta (June 4, 1859). Unable to rely on his subordinates for a continuance of the struggle, Gyulay abandoned his position on the following day, evacuated Milan, and led his army to the Mincio. At this point the emperor Franz Joseph assumed the command in per-

son; reinforcements to the number of one hundred and forty thousand troops had arrived, together with reserve and occupation troops amounting to one hundred thousand men. With these the emperor determined to advance again to the Chiese on the advice of General Wilhelm, Freiherr Ramming von Riedkirchen, who presided over the council of war in association with the old quartermaster-general Heinrich, Freiherr von Hess. On June 24 they encountered the enemy advancing in five columns upon the Mincio, and to the surprise of the combatants the battle of Solferino was begun, one of the bloodiest conflicts of the century, which ended in the retreat of the Austrians, notwithstanding the victory of Lieutenant Field-Marshal Ludwig von Benedek over the Piedmontese on the right wing. Three hundred thousand men with nearly eight hundred guns were opposed on that day, and rarely have such large masses of troops been handled in an important battle with so little intelligence or generalship. The French had no definite plan of action, and might have been defeated without great difficulty had the Austrian leaders been able to avoid a similar series of blunders. The losses were very heavy on either side. Twelve thousand Austrians and nearly seventeen thousand allies were killed or wounded; on the other hand, nine thousand Austrian prisoners were taken as against twelve hundred Italians.

The emperor Napoleon had not yet brought the campaign to a successful conclusion; his weakened army was now confronted by the "quadrilateral" formed by the fortresses of Peschiera, Mantua, Verona, Legnago, which was covered by two hundred thousand Austrians. Moreover, Austria could despatch reinforcements more rapidly and in greater numbers than France. Austrian sympathies were also very powerful in South Germany, and exerted so strong a pressure upon the German federation and on Prussia, that a movement might be expected at any moment from that direction. Frederic William IV had retired from the government since October, 1857, in consequence of an affection of the brain; since October 7, 1858, his brother William had governed Prussia as prince-regent. He had too much sympathy with the Austrian dynasty and too much respect for the fidelity of the German federal princes to attempt to make capital out of his neighbour's misfortunes; he had even transferred Herr von Bismarck from Frankfurt to St. Petersburg, to remove the influence upon the federation of one who was an avowed opponent of Austrian paramountcy. But he awaited some definite proposal from the Vienna government. Six army corps were in readiness to advance upon the Rhine on receipt of the order for mobilisation. The emperor Franz Joseph sent Prince Windisch-Graetz to Berlin, to call on Prussia for help as a member of the federation, although the terms of the federal agreement did not apply to the Lombard-Venetian kingdom; but he could not persuade himself to grant Prussia the leadership of the narrower union, or even to permit the foundation of a North German union. A politician of the school of Felix Schwarzenberg was not likely to formulate a practicable compromise. Austria thus threw away her chance of defeating France and Bonapartism with the help of her German brethren, and of remaining a permanent and honoured member of the federation which had endured a thousand years, merely because she declined an even smaller sacrifice than was demanded in 1866.

During the progress of these federal negotiations at Berlin the combatants had themselves been occupied in bringing the war to a conclusion. The emperor Napoleon was well aware that the temper of the federation was highly dangerous

to himself, and that England and Prussia would approach him with offers of intervention. He therefore seized the opportunity of extricating himself by proffering an armistice and a provisional peace to the emperor Franz Joseph. After two victories his action bore the appearance of extreme moderation. Austria was to cede Lombardy to France, the province then to become Sardinian territory; the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were to be permitted to return to their States, but were to be left to arrange their governments for themselves, without the interference of either of the powers; Austria was to permit the foundation of an Italian federation; the desire of the emperor Franz Joseph to retain Peschiera and Mantua was granted. On these terms the armistice was concluded on July 8, and the provisional peace of Villafranca on July 11. The official account of the war of 1859 by the Austrian general staff attempts to account for the emperor's conclusion of peace on military grounds, emphasising the difficulty of continuing hostilities and the impossibility of placing an army on the Upper Rhine, in accordance with the probable demands of the federation. This is an entirely superficial view of the question. Had Prussia declared war on France on the ground of her agreement with Austria, without consulting the federation, and sent one hundred and fifty thousand men within a month from the Rhine to the French frontier, the anxieties of the Austrian army in Italy would have been entirely relieved. Napoleon would certainly have left Verona if the Prussians had been marching on Paris by routes perfectly well known to him.

Count Cavour resigned on learning the conditions of peace, and expressed his fear that the liberation of Italy "as far as Adria" had been indefinitely postponed. Victor Emanuel calmly appended his signature to the peace. He had seen too much of Napoleon III, his cousin by marriage, to desire any permanent military association with him. He was a better officer than Louis, and had convinced himself that the nephew had inherited nothing of his uncle's military genius. His incapacity was likely to cause many mistakes unavoidable on his part. Bismarck had passed an anxious time in St. Petersburg, fearing lest "Prussia would gradually be drawn into the wake of Austrian policy," and was greatly relieved when Austria spared Prussia the necessity of a declaration of war. To his far-sighted eye the possibility revived of "healing the breach in Prussia's relations with the federation *ferro et igni* (by sword and fire)," a remedy which he had already predicted in his memorable note to the minister of foreign affairs, Count Alexander von Schleinitz, on May 12, 1859.

In the general course of history, the Italian war of 1859 is an episode of no particular account. The conditions which it brought about were materially changed by November 11, when the peace of Zürich was concluded. Sardinia herself had refused to join the Italian federation. The "Emilian provinces," Romagna, Parma, and Modena, together with the grand duchy of Tuscany, were under a government created by the independent party, and ready for incorporation with the kingdom of the House of Savoy. On January 20, 1860, Cavour reappeared as prime minister. Full preparation was thus made for the victory of the national idea in Italy; the decision as to the ultimate form of the German body politic was only temporarily postponed.

Another and yet more important question had, however, been decided,—the problem of political and ecclesiastical reactionism. Scarce ten years had passed

since Felix Schwarzenberg turned the Austrian State from its natural path of development, refused to show any consideration for national rights, and attempted to replace the counsel of the nation's representatives by the insinuations of Jesuits. Already proof had been given that not thus can States rise to power. The Austria which in 1849 had renewed its youth and justified its existence to an astonished world, had relapsed into impotency and disgrace. The help of heaven, through heaven's self-styled representative, the Pope of Rome, had been withheld, and must be sought through the strength of the nations which declared themselves of age to act in their own behalf.

III

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY AND GERMANY
(1859-1866)

By DR. HEINRICH FRIEDJUNG

1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

THE greatest political event of the nineteenth century is the simultaneous establishment of the national unity of the German and Italian peoples. The aspect of Europe was more permanently changed by this than by any event since the creation of an empire by Charles the Great. The feeling of nationality is as old as the nations themselves, and the history of the two nations with their divisions and subdivisions records in almost every generation proud exhortations or plaintive appeals to assert their unity by force of arms. From Dante and Petrarch, from Machiavelli and Julius II ("out with the barbarians from Italy!"), down to Alfieri and Ugo Foscolo, the line is almost unbroken. The Germans show the same sequence. But the appeals of the writers of the German Renaissance, from Hutten to Puffendorf and Klopstock, never had such a passionate ring, since the nation, even when most divided, was always strong enough to ward off the foreign yoke. At last the intellectual activity of the eighteenth century raised the spirit of nationality, and the German people became conscious that its branches were closely connected. The intellectual culture of the Germans would, as David Strauss says in a letter to Ernest Renan, have remained an empty shell, if it had not finally produced the national state. We must carefully notice that the supporters of the movement for unification both in Germany and Italy were drawn exclusively from the educated classes; but their efforts were powerfully supported by the establishment and expansion of foreign trade, and by the construction of roads and railways, since the separate elements of the nation were thus brought closer together. The scholar and the author were joined by the manufacturer, who produced goods for a market outside his own small country, and by the merchant, who was cramped by custom-house restrictions. Civil servants and military men did not respond to that appeal until much later. The majority of the prominent officials and officers in Germany long remained particularists, until Prussia declared for the unity of the nation.

In Italy the course of affairs was somewhat different. There the generals and officers of the Italian army created by Napoleon were from the first filled with the conviction that a strong political will was most important for the training of their people; the revolution of 1821 (see p. 118) was greatly due to them. Similarly the officers of the smaller Italian armies between 1859 and 1861 joined in large

numbers the side of King Victor Emmanuel. The movement reached the masses last of all. But they, even at the present day in Italy, are indifferent towards the new régime; while in South Germany and Hanover, and occasionally even on the Rhine, they are still keenly alive to their own interests. When Garibaldi marched against the army of the king of Naples, the soldiers of the latter were ready and willing to strike for his cause, and felt themselves betrayed by generals and officers. It is an undoubted fact that the Neapolitan Bourbons had no inconsiderable following among the lower classes. The Catholic clergy of Italy were divided; the leaders supported the old régime, while the inferior clergy favoured the movement. The mendicant friars of Sicily were enthusiastic for Garibaldi, and the Neapolitan general Bosco, when he marched against the patriot leader, was forced to warn his soldiers in a general order not to allow themselves at confession to be shaken in their loyalty to their king. Pius IX endured the mortification of seeing that in 1862 no less than 8,493 priests signed a petition praying him to place no obstacles in the way of the unification of Italy.

It was from Germany, the mother of so many ideas, that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the modern movement, of which the watchword is national and political unity, took its start. But the impulse was not given by the current of internal development; it came from outside, through the tyranny of Napoleon. The nation recognised that it could only attain independence by union, and keep it by unity. The conception of emperor and empire found its most powerful advocate in Baron vom Stein. But he and his friends, as was natural, considered the overthrow of the foreign tyranny more important at first than formal unity. In his memorial addressed to the Czar in 1812 he pointed out how desirable it was that Germany, since the old monarchy of the Ottos and the Hohenstauffen could not be revived, should be divided between the two great powers, Prussia and Austria, on a line corresponding to the course of the Main. He would, however, have regarded this solution only as an expedient required by existing circumstances. "I have only one fatherland," he wrote to Count Münster at London on December 1, 1812, — "that is called Germany; and since I, according to the old constitution, belong to it and to no particular part of it, I am devoted, heart and soul, to it alone, and not to one particular part of it. At this moment of great developments the dynasties are a matter of absolute indifference to me. They are merely instruments." Stein's efforts at the Congress of Vienna, where he vainly stood out for the emperor and the imperial diet, remained as noble examples to the next generation. The thought of nationality radiated from Germany, where Arndt, Uhland, Körner, and Rückert had written in its spirit. But Napoleon had roused also the Italians and the Poles, the former by uniting at least Central and Upper Italy (with the exception of Piedmont) into the Kingdom of Italy; the latter by holding out to them the bait of a restored constitution. It is significant that the first summons to unity was uttered by Murat, who, when he marched against the Austrians in 1815, wished to win the nation for himself, and employed Professor de Rossi of Bologna, who was murdered in 1848 when a liberal minister of the Pope (p. 217), to compose a proclamation embodying the principle of Italian unity. The peoples of the Austrian monarchy were subsequently roused by Germany to similar efforts.

There was this distinction between Germany and Italy: in the former the Holy Roman Empire had served to keep alive the tradition of unity, while in Italy

no political unity had existed since Roman times. In Italy the movement towards unity had no historical foundation, and the "municipal spirit" was everywhere predominant until the middle of the nineteenth century. When in 1848 a number of officers, who were not natives, were enrolled in the Piedmontese army, the soldiers long made a sharp distinction between their "Piedmontese" and their "Italian" superiors. So again in the Crimean war, when fifteen thousand Piedmontese were sent to fight on the side of the French and English, most of them heard for the first time that the foreign nations termed them Italians. In Germany, again, it was a question of uniting prosperous States, but in Italy of overthrowing unstable ones (for example, the States of the Church and Naples). In Germany it was necessary to reckon with superabundant forces and the jealousy of two great powers; and by the side of them stood a number of prosperous petty States where culture flourished. Italy, on the other hand, was dependent on the Austrians, who were termed *Tedeschi*, or Germans; in this connection, however, the Italians were forced to admit that an organised government and a legislature, which in comparison with Piedmont itself showed considerable advance, existed only in the Austrian districts; that is to say, under the rule of the Hapsburgs. And in addition the Italians had to struggle against the great difficulty that the papacy, as a spiritual empire, opposed their unification.

2. THE UNION OF ITALY

A. RETROSPECT OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(a) *The Age of the Conspiracies.* — The risings of 1821 in Naples and Piedmont as well as that of 1831 in the Romagna (p. 150) aimed far more at the introduction of parliamentary forms than at the attainment of national unity. The thought of liberty was stronger then than that of nationality. Only in the background did the secret society of the Carbonari entertain the vague idea of the union of Italy. The followers of the Genoese, Joseph Mazzini (1805–1872; cf. p. 180), claim for him the honour of being the first to follow out the idea of unity to its logical conclusion. Certain it is that Mazzini, borne on by fiery enthusiasm and undeterred by failures, devoted his whole life to the realisation of this idea. "I have just taught the Italians," he said, on one occasion after the war of 1859, "to lisp the word 'unity.'" It was after his arrest in 1830 by the Piedmontese government as a member of the Carbonari, when he spent several months as a prisoner in the fortress of Savona, that he formed the plan of founding a league under the name of "Young Italy," with the object of creating an Italian republic. Animated by a faith which amounted to fanaticism, he took as his watchword "God and the People!" He described later his feelings as a prisoner: "I saw how Rome, in the name of God and of a republican Italy, offered the nations a common goal and the foundation of a new religion. And I saw how Europe, wearied of scepticism, egoism, and anarchy, received the new faith with enthusiastic acclamations. These were my thoughts in my cell at Savona." He did not shrink from employing all the weapons of conspiracy, including even assassination. All the rebellions and conspiracies which he plotted proved failures; but even under the stress of conscientious scruples as to the right he had to drive so many highly gifted colleagues to death and long years of captivity, he was supported by the

thought that only thus could the ideal of nationality be kept before the eyes of the people. In the oath which he administered to the members of his secret league they vowed "by the blush which reddens my face when I stand before the citizens of other countries and convince myself that I possess no civic rights, no country, no national flag . . . by the tears of Italian mothers for their sons who have perished on the scaffold, in the dungeon, or in exile . . . I swear to devote myself entirely and always to the common object of creating one free independent and republican Italy by every means within my power."

The league spread over Italy and every country where Italians lived. Giuseppe Garibaldi heard for the first time of Mazzini in 1833, when as captain of a small trading-vessel he was sitting in an inn at Taganrog on the Black Sea, and listened to the conversation at the next table of some Italian captains and merchants with whom he was unacquainted. "Columbus," he wrote in 1871, "certainly never felt such satisfaction at the discovery of America as I felt when I found a man who was endeavouring to liberate his country." He eagerly joined the fiery orator of that dinner-party, whose name was Cuneo, and, armed with an introduction from him, hastened to Mazzini, who was then plotting his conspiracies at Marseilles. Garibaldi took part in one of the futile risings of February, 1834, was condemned to death, and escaped to Argentina, where he gathered his first experiences of war. He long followed the leadership of Mazzini, although the natures of the two men were too different to permit any very intimate relations between them. Garibaldi called Mazzini the "second of the Infallibles;" but he esteemed him so highly, that at a banquet given in his honour at London in 1864 he toasted him as his master.

(b) *The Beginnings of the Constitutional Movement in Favour of Union.* — Mazzini was the central figure of the Italian movement only up to the middle of the fifties. After that an amelioration was traceable in the life of his nation. When the middle classes took up the cause of freedom as one man, the importance of the conspiracies disappeared and the entire system of secret societies (for the Carbonari and the Young Italy were opposed by the Sanfedists, the league of the reaction; cf. p. 149) became discredited. Public life was now more instinct with vitality. A blind and biassed republicanism was no longer the only cry; the leaders of the movement began to take the actual conditions into account, and the Piedmontese, in particular, worked in the cause of constitutional monarchy. Mazzini, on the other hand, hated the house of Savoy equally with every other dynasty. Two of his conspiracies were aimed against Piedmont, so that sentence of death was pronounced on him by the courts of that kingdom.

The new ideas started from Piedmont. The noble priest Vincenzo Gioberti proposed the plan that all Italy should rally round the Pope, and follow him as leader in the war of independence. A number of Piedmontese nobles, Count Cesare Balbo, Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio, and the greatest of them, Count Camillo Cavour, were filled with the conviction that the government of Italy belonged by right to the constitutional monarchy of Piedmont. They had all grown up in an atmosphere of conservative ideas, respectful towards the monarchy, and filled with admiration for the army and the civil service of Piedmont. The revolutionists of 1848 were united only in their hatred of the foreign yoke; their views for the future were of the most conflicting character, and must have led to

dissension if they had been clearly formulated. The hope that Pope Pius would be permanently won for the great thought soon faded away. In the whole agitation the idea of federalism was still widely predominant. Venice and Rome under Daniele Manin and Mazzini declared for independent republics; even Lombardy felt some reluctance to unite with Sardinia. De Rossi, the papal minister, wished merely for a league of the sovereign princes of Italy, not a united parliament. In Piedmont the middle-class citizens opposed with suspicion the representatives of the monarchical military State, and Cavour, who defended the royal authority, was in 1849 one of the most unpopular of politicians. Even then he was opposed to Urbano Rattazzi, who was soon destined to become the leader of the bourgeois circles. Italy thus succumbed to the sword of Radetzky (p. 195); Napoleon, as President of the French Republic, put an end to the Roman Republic, since he did not wish to allow all Italy to be subjugated by the Austrians. The heroic and, for some time, successful defence of Rome by Garibaldi (cf. p. 217; on the scene of this memorable fight, at the summit of the Janiculus, a colossal monument has been erected in his honour) raised him to be the popular hero of the nation, while Mazzini's republican phrases began to seem vapid to the intelligent Italians.

The wars of 1848 and 1849 left the Italians with the definitive impression that only Piedmont could have ventured to face the Austrian arms in the open field. King Charles Albert was clearly a martyr to the cause of Italian unity; he died soon after his abdication, a broken-hearted man, in a Portuguese monastery. Since his son Victor Emmanuel alone among the Italian princes maintained the constitution granted in 1848, the hopes of Italy were centred in him. In the year 1852 Cavour reached the immediate goal of his burning but justifiable ambition; for after he had allied himself with Rattazzi and the liberal middle class, he was intrusted with the direction of the government. He soon ventured openly to indicate Piedmont, which had been overthrown so recently, as the champion in the next war of liberation. He drew his weapons from the arsenal of the clever ministers who, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had helped the dukes of Savoy to hold their own between France and Austria. He was the heir of the old dynastic policy of Savoy, but in a greater age, dominated by the thought of nationality. He sought and obtained an alliance with the man whom the republicans of Italy hated intensely, and against whose life they plotted more than one conspiracy.

(c) *The Encroachment of Napoleon III and the Resignation of Cavour.* — The question may well be asked whether the Italian blood was stirred in the veins of the Bonapartes when, in 1805, the first Napoleon created the kingdom of Italy, and when, in 1830, his nephew entered into a secret Italian alliance, and finally, as Napoleon III, allied himself with Cavour for the liberation of Italy. It is not an unlikely supposition, although diplomatic reasons and the lust of power were the primary motives which actuated the nephew of the great conqueror in forming this alliance; for he considered that his uncle had bequeathed to him the duty of destroying the work of the Congress of Vienna, especially in Italy, where Austria had entered on the inheritance of France. Napoleon won friends for France on all sides when he came forward as the advocate for the idea of nationality. While he did so, there lay in the bottom of his heart the intention of

increasing the territory of France, on the basis of this idea, by the annexation of Belgium and Savoy, and of thus uniting all French-speaking peoples under the empire. On the other side, he thought it dangerous to stretch out his hand to the Rhine, where the Germans, whom he called the coming race, might oppose him. He wished to free Italy from the Austrian rule, but only in order to govern it as suzerain. For this reason he declined from the outset to entertain the idea of giving political unity to the peninsula. He only agreed with Cavour at Plombières (p. 250) that Sardinia should be enlarged into a North Italian kingdom with from ten to twelve millions of inhabitants. There was to be a Central Italian kingdom, consisting of Tuscany and the greater part of the States of the Church. Naples was to be left untouched. The Pope was to be restricted to the territory of the city of Rome and its vicinity, and in compensation was to be raised to the headship of the Italian confederacy. Napoleon reserved to himself the nomination of his cousin Joseph, called Jérôme, to the throne of Central Italy, but concealed his intention from Cavour, while he hinted to him that he wished to place the son of King Murat on the throne at Naples. In return for his armed assistance the emperor stipulated for the cession of Savoy and Nice.

The campaign of 1859 was successfully conducted by the allies; but it was a terrible blow to Italy when Napoleon, principally from anxiety at the preparations of Prussia, concluded with the emperor Francis Joseph, on July 11, 1859, the preliminary peace of Villafranca. His promises therefore were only partially fulfilled. By allowing Venetia to remain Austrian he belied the proclamation announcing that "Italy shall be free from the Alps to the Adriatic," with which he had opened the war on May 3. Cavour felt himself deceived and exposed. His old opponent, Mazzini, had derided his policy before the war, and had warned the Italians not to exchange the rule of Austria for that of France. However unwise this attitude of the old conspirator might be, he now seemed to be correct in the prediction that Napoleon would deceive the Italians. The passionate nature of Cavour, which slumbered behind his half good-natured, half mockingly-diplomatic exterior, burst out in him with overwhelming force. He hurried to the headquarters of Victor Emmanuel and required him to lay down his crown, as his father, Charles Albert, had done, in order to show clearly to the world the injustice perpetrated by Napoleon. Cavour displayed such violence that the two men parted in downright anger. But Cavour, without further demur, resigned his office. That was the wisest step he could take to turn aside the reproach of treachery, which the republican party was already bringing against him. In the course of a conversation with the senator Joachim Pietri, an intimate friend of Napoleon, he gave vent to his displeasure in the most forcible terms, and threw in the teeth of the emperor the charge of deceit. "Your emperor has insulted me," he cried; "yes, sir, insulted me. He gave me his word, and promised me to relax no efforts until the Austrians were completely driven out of Italy. As his reward for so doing he stipulated for Nice and Savoy. I induced my sovereign to consent to make this sacrifice for Italy. My king, my good and honourable king, trusted me and consented. Your emperor now pockets his reward and lets us shift for ourselves. . . . I am dishonoured before my king. But," added Cavour, "this peace will lead to nothing; this treaty will not be carried out."

One of the causes which led Napoleon to conclude peace so rapidly was the fear that the Italians would go far beyond his original intention and win complete

political independence for themselves. Cavour, in spite of his proud words about the integrity of the Piedmontese policy, had really wished on his side to outwit the emperor. For, at his instigation and in consequence of the agitations of the National Union, which he had secretly organised, not merely had Parma, Modena, and the Romagna risen against the Pope, but even in Central Italy, in Tuscany, in the Marches and in Umbria, the authorities had been driven out, and everywhere there was an outcry for United Italy. Victor Emmanuel had certainly, at the wish of Napoleon, refused this request, and had only accepted the supreme command of the volunteer corps which were forming everywhere. Napoleon wished to preclude any further extension of this movement. Hence the hasty conclusion of the armistice, and the provisions of the peace of Zürich (November 10, 1859) that Sardinia might retain Lombardy, but not extend her territory further. In Tuscany, Parma, and Modena the old order of things was to be restored, if the people agreed to accept it; and the States of the Church (and this condition was taken as obvious) must once more be subject to the Pope. All Italian States were to form a confederation, which Austria, as representing Venice, wished to join. Cavour, incensed at these fetters imposed on the Italians, said as he left the ministry, "So be it! they will force me to spend the rest of my life in conspiracies." And in the last letters before his retirement he secretly urged the leaders of the movement in Central Italy to collect money and arms, to wait their time loyally, and resist the wishes of Napoleon.

B. THE MINISTRY OF RATTAZZI

RATTAZZI, Cavour's successor, was an eloquent and practised advocate, of a tractable disposition, and therefore more acceptable to the king than Cavour; he possessed a mind more capable of words and schemes than of action. Cavour, speaking of him, said that he was the first among the politicians of the second class. In accordance with the popular feeling Giuseppe Dabormida, the new minister of foreign affairs, declared on July 23 that Sardinia would never enter into an Italian confederation in which Austria took any part. This policy was absolutely essential for self-preservation, since Piedmont, in a league with Austria, the Pope, and Naples, would always have been in the minority.

The new cabinet was wavering and insecure, and so dependent on the will of Napoleon that it did not venture to take any forward step without his consent. But at this point the fact became evident that the work of unification was not dependent on the ability of individuals, but on the attitude of the whole nation. It is astonishing with what political tact the several Italian countries struggled for union with Sardinia. The Sardinian government was compelled to recall, immediately after the preliminary peace, the men it had sent to Bologna, Florence, Modena, and Parma to lead the agitation. These districts were consequently thrown upon their own resources; but Tuscany found, on August 1, 1859, in Baron Bettino Ricasoli, and the Romagna and the duchies in Luigi Carlo, a retired physician, leaders who governed the provisional commonwealths with sagacity, and guided the public voting which declared for submission to Victor Emmanuel. Only in quite exceptional cases was any violence used against the hated tools of the former governments; otherwise order prevailed generally, and a childlike, almost touching, enthusiasm for the unity of Italy. The Pope attempted a counter-blow, and suc-

ceeded in conquering Perugia on July 20, 1859, by means of his Swiss mercenaries who did not shrink from outrage and plunder. Thereupon the Romagna, Tuscany and Modena concluded a defensive alliance. General Manfredo Fanti organised in October, 1859, a force of forty thousand men; so that the Pope desisted from further attacks. Since the treaty of Villafranca left the return of the former governments open, so long as foreign interference was excluded, the Pope and the dukes calculated upon an outbreak of anarchy, which would provoke a counter-blow. They centred their hopes on the Mazzinists; and Walewski, the minister of Napoleon who was unfavourable to the Italians, said that he preferred them to a party which styled itself a government. But this hope faded away before the wise attitude of the Central Italians.

The emperor Napoleon now saw himself confronted by the unpleasant alternative of allowing the Italians full liberty, or of restoring the old régime by force. But ought the liberator of Italy to declare war on the country? And it was still more out of the question to allow the interference of the defeated Austrians. He repeatedly assured the Italians that he persisted in his intention to carry out his programme of federation. Doubt has been felt whether the letter to this effect which he addressed on October 20, 1859, to Victor Emmanuel really expressed his true intention. In that letter he repeated his demand for the restoration of the old régime in Central Italy and for the formation of an Italian confederation with the Pope at its head. But it is clear that this was really his own and his final scheme; for he was too wise not to foresee that a united and powerful Italy might one day turn against France. With this idea, therefore, he said to Marquis Napoleone di Pepoli, "If the movement of incorporation crosses the Apennines, the union of Italy is finished, and I do not wish for any union, — I wish simply and solely for independence." His programme would have proved the most favourable solution for France, since it would then always have had a hand in the affairs of Italy, from the simple reason that the North Italian kingdom, which owed its existence to him, would have had no other support against Austria and the remaining sovereigns of Italy. That was the precise contingency which Cavour most feared; and for that reason he secretly urged the leaders of Central Italy not to comply with the intentions of Napoleon. In fact, deputations from the Romagna, Tuscany, and the duchies offered the sovereignty to King Victor Emmanuel. He did not dare to accept the offer against the wish of Napoleon, and merely promised in his reply that he would represent to Europe the wishes of the Central Italians.

It is a remarkable fact that Victor Emmanuel, in these complications, entertained for a moment the idea of joining hands with Mazzini and raising the standard of revolt against Napoleon. By the agency of Angelo Brofferio, the leader of the democratic opposition in the Piedmontese parliament and the opponent of Cavour's diplomacy, the king negotiated with the old republican conspirator on whom first his father and later he himself, in 1857, had caused sentence of death to be passed on account of his organisation of a revolt in Piedmont. Mazzini showed at this crisis how greatly the welfare of his country outweighed with him all other considerations. He sent a message to that effect to the king, and only asked him to break off entirely with Napoleon, whom the republicans regarded as Antichrist. In return for that concession Mazzini offered to raise the whole of Italy, including Rome and Naples, after which would follow the promotion of Victor Emmanuel to be king of the peninsula. But then — for Mazzini expressly

made this proviso — he intended to fight, as previously, for the republic and for the expulsion of the house of Savoy. The king is reported to have said to Brofferio, "Try to come to an understanding; but take care that the public prosecutor hears nothing of it." The negotiations, however, did not lead to the desired goal, for the game seemed to the king to be too dangerous. Mazzini certainly promised on that occasion more than he could perform; his schemes could not have been carried into execution against the express wishes of Napoleon, who would not have abandoned the Pope and Rome. Italy had only obtained the support of the emperor against Austria, because the monarchical policy of Cavour offered a guarantee that in Italy at least the revolutionaries, who threatened his rule in France, were kept in restraint. The emperor, as his action in the year 1867 clearly proves, would have certainly employed force against Italy, even though Rome had been raised in rebellion; for since the French democrats were implacably hostile to him, he was bound at least to have the clerical party on his side.

Garibaldi, who then was intrusted by the provisional government with the command of the Tuscan troops, overlooked all these considerations, and was already determined to advance on Rome. But Farini, the dictator of the Romagna and of the duchies, thought his enterprise dangerous, and, going to meet him, induced him to withdraw from Central Italy. Having returned to Turin, Garibaldi was received with consideration by Victor Emmanuel, who was privy to this plot; he then addressed a manifesto to Italy, in which he condemned the miserable, fox-like politicians, and called upon the Italians to place their hopes exclusively on Victor Emmanuel. That monarch, under his outward simplicity, possessed natural shrewdness enough to remain on good terms with all who wished to further the unity of Italy. In this consist mostly his inestimable services in the cause of the unification of Italy.

C. THE SECOND MINISTRY OF CAVOUR

TOWARDS the end of the year 1859 Napoleon was forced to admit that he could not carry out his programme in Central Italy by peaceful methods. He thus ran the risk of losing Savoy and Nice, which had been promised him as a reward before the war. His own interests and his predilection for the Italian cause combined to induce him to leave a part, at any rate, of Central Italy to Victor Emmanuel. In order to carry out this change of policy Walewski was dismissed and Edouard Antoine Thouvenel, a liberal, who shared Napoleon's preference for Italy, was nominated foreign minister on January 5, 1860. But the new policy was not possible with the cabinet of Rattazzi, since that minister did not possess the courage to assume the responsibility for the cession of Savoy and Nice. A bold and broad policy could only be carried out with the assistance of Cavour. The latter was already thirsting for power, while Rattazzi was vainly trying to block his road. It is true that the king was not pleased with the exchange of ministers; he still cherished some rancour against Cavour for the "scene" which the latter had made with him after the peace of Villafranca (see p. 260). Public opinion, on the other hand, more especially in Central Italy, looked to Cavour alone for the realisation of its wishes. Since his ambition was fired by the prospect of new and grand exploits, he induced his friends to work vigorously on his behalf, so that the cabinet

of Rattazzi was compelled to make way for him on January 16, 1860. Rattazzi and his colleagues were not all so candid in their views as Dabormida, the foreign minister, who felt he could not compare with Cavour, and wrote at the time: "I was impatient to give up my place to him. But he was still more impatient than I was. I am sorry that he expended so much trouble in bursting the doors that stood open to him. But he has the right to be ambitious."

Napoleon, although not disposed to a grand and sweeping policy, had the astuteness requisite to disguise his frequent changes of front, and to veil his machinations with a semblance of magnanimity. Since he knew that the English distrusted him, and foresaw that the annexation of Savoy and Nice would appear to them the prelude to an extensive policy of aggrandisement, he lulled their suspicions by concluding a commercial treaty on free-trade principles (January 23, 1860). At the same time he informed the Pope that France no longer wished to insist on the restoration of the legations of the Romagna, Bologna, and Ferrara to the States of the Church.

This change in the policy of Napoleon could not have been more unwelcome to any one than to the Pope. After all, Pius IX had himself to blame for it, since he opposed the sensible counsels of Napoleon. The emperor had requested him in a letter of July 14, 1859, to grant to the already rebellious legations a separate administration and a lay government nominated by the Pope. "I humbly conjure your Holiness," so the letter ran, "to listen to the voice of a devoted son of the Church, who in this matter grasps the needs of his time, and knows that force is not sufficient to solve such difficult problems. In the decision of your Holiness I see either the germs of a peaceful and tranquil future, or the continuation of a period of violence and distress." But the Curia continued obstinate, and declared that it could not break with the principles on which the States of the Church had been governed hitherto. The Pope, in fact, protested against the concession of religious liberty which had been granted by the provisional government at Bologna. Napoleon now adopted a severer tone. He published in December, 1859, a pamphlet, "The Pope and the Congress," in which it was stated that a restoration of papal rule in Central Italy had become impossible. Granted that a secular kingdom was necessary for the Pope in order to maintain his independence, a smaller territory would be sufficient for that purpose. Shortly afterwards Napoleon addressed a second letter to Pius IX, in which he called upon the Pope on his side also to make some sacrifice for the union of Italy, which was slowly and surely progressing.

Cavour, meantime, had not reached his goal. On February 17, 1860, Italy learnt the latest of the constantly changing programmes of Napoleon. According to this, only Parma and Modena were to be incorporated with Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel would rule the legations as vicar of the Pope; but Tuscany must remain independent; at most a prince of the house of Savoy might be placed on the throne. Cavour, however, met the refusal of Napoleon by a bold move, on which Rattazzi would never have ventured. Without asking the emperor, and against his will, a *plébiscite* was taken in March, 1860, in all the provinces of Central Italy, including Tuscany, on the question whether they wished for incorporation in the kingdom of Italy. The elections for the parliament of Upper Italy proceeded at the same time with equal enthusiasm. All the capitals intrusted Cavour with full powers in order to express their confidence. It

was no rhetorical figure when Napoleon, in a speech delivered on March 1, expressed his dissatisfaction at the arbitrary action of Italy. Cavour, however, had cleverly secured the good will of England, which had quite agreed to the proposal that Italy should withdraw from the influence of Napoleon. Palmerston was malicious enough to praise Cavour in the British parliament for the boldness of his action.

Now at length Cavour opened regular negotiations about the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had been promised by the treaty of January, 1858. What was the emperor to do? Was he, on his side, to risk the loss of the two provinces by his obstinacy? Perhaps even at the eleventh hour he might have prevented the incorporation of Tuscany, if he had declared that under these conditions he would be contented with Savoy; but now the expectations and the covetousness of the French had been whetted, and he could not draw back. There is no question that Napoleon then abandoned the real interests of France, and was vanquished by Cavour. It had often been said, and subsequent events have proved the truth of the statement, that Cavour exercised a positively magical influence on Napoleon's vacillating mind. The Italian had probed the soul of the French emperor, and knew how far he might go. Having correctly gauged on the one hand the selfish interests of Napoleon, and on the other his sympathetic attitude toward the Italian question, Cavour could venture to play with him up to a certain point.

But there were limits to this policy. Cavour in vain tried all the arts of his diplomacy, and every expedient which his subtle mind suggested, to save Nice at least for the Italians. But here he was confronted by the definite resolution of the emperor, who would have exposed himself in the face of France, had he given in. Cavour and Benedetti (see the explanation of the plate on page 246) signed the treaty on March 24, 1860. When this was done, the Italian minister, with a flash of humour, turned round suddenly and whispered in the ear of Benedetti, "We are partners in guilt now, are we not?"

But an anxious time was in store for Cavour, — the debate in the Italian parliament. The great majority of the people, certainly, understood that King Victor Emmanuel and Cavour could not have acted otherwise. Rattazzi, however, the old rival of Cavour, placed himself at the head of the opposition; and he had a strong supporter in Garibaldi, who took his seat in parliament with the express object of opposing the cession of Nice, his native town, to France. Henceforth he hated Cavour, who, as he said, had made him an alien in his own country. Garibaldi was not so indignant at the fact itself as he was that Cavour had deceived him; since a year previously, in answer to a direct question, the minister had denied the cession of Nice. In no other way could the crafty statesman have secured Garibaldi's sword for the war of liberation. On the other hand, Garibaldi esteemed the king highly, because some months later to the question, "Yes or no," he had returned the true answer. Victor Emmanuel then added that, if he as king submitted to cede Savoy, the country of his ancestors, to France, Garibaldi must be prepared to make equal sacrifices for the sake of the union of Italy.

We are told that Cavour, at this critical time, in order to soothe Garibaldi's feelings, sent him a note with the brief question, "Nice or Sicily?" He is thus said to have incited the enthusiastic patriot to conquer the island. The story is quite improbable; for Cavour would certainly have preferred to mark time for the

present, and consolidate the internal and economic conditions of the kingdom of North Italy, which consisted of 4,000,000 Piedmontese, 2,500,000 Lombards, and 4,000,000 Central Italians. This State, without the States of the Church, which were in an impoverished condition through bad administration, and without the pauper population of Naples, would certainly have risen to considerable prosperity. It would have been well for North Italy not to have been burdened with the task of drawing the semi-civilized districts of the South into the sphere of its higher culture and its greater prosperity. "We must first organise ourselves," Cavour said at this time, "and form a powerful army; then we can turn our eyes to Venetia and further to the south, and to Rome." It was certainly, therefore, no hypocrisy when, up to March, 1860, he repeatedly sent envoys to Naples, in order to induce the Bourbons to follow a national policy and enter into an alliance with the kingdom of North Italy.

D. GARIBALDI

(a) *The Sicilian Enterprise.* — But here the genius of the Italian people took other paths. The wary statesman soon saw himself carried onward by the party of action farther than he himself had wished; for Mazzini and his partisans were incessantly scheming the revolt of Sicily. Under their instructions Francesco Crispi, who had long before been condemned to death by the Neapolitan courts, travelled through the island at great personal risk, collecting on all sides sympathisers with the cause, and preparing for the day of rebellion. The Sicilians did indeed rise in various places, but their attempts were hopeless if Garibaldi could not be induced to invade Sicily. He declared to the Mazzinists from the very first that he would only join the struggle under the standard of "Italy and Victor Emmanuel;" in spite of his republican leanings he saw with unerring perception that Italy could only be united by means of the Piedmontese monarchy. Mazzini also declared, as in the previous year, that he wished first and foremost to conform to the expressed will of the people.

But the conscientious Garibaldi still hesitated; he was weighed down by the enormous responsibility of leading the fiery youth of Italy to danger and to death, since all former plots against the Bourbons had miscarried and been drowned in the blood of their promoters. King Ferdinand II of Naples (called "Rè Bomba" since the savage bombardment of Messina in September, 1848) understood how to attach the soldiers of his army to his person; he was hard-hearted but cunning, and by his affectation of native customs won himself some popularity with the lower classes on the mainland. The Sicilians, indeed, hated their Neapolitan rulers from of old; and the people gladly recalled the memory of the Sicilian Vespers, by which they had wrested their freedom from Naples in 1282. King Ferdinand died on May 22, 1859, and was succeeded by his weak son Francis II, a feeble, religious nature, with no mind of his own. Since the outbreak in Sicily was suppressed, and seemed to die away, Cavour urgently dissuaded Garibaldi from his enterprise, even though he later secretly aided it by the supply of arms and ammunition. It was Cavour's business then to decline any responsibility in the eyes of the diplomatists of Europe for the unconstitutional proposal of the general.

Garibaldi finally took the bold resolution of sailing for Sicily on May 5, 1860, with a thousand or so of volunteers. This marks the beginning of his heroic

expedition, and also of the incomparable game of intrigue played by Cavour; for the whole body of European diplomatists raised their voices in protest against the conduct of the Italian government which had allowed a warlike expedition against a neighbouring State in time of peace. Cavour, assailed by all the ambassadors, declared, with some reason, that Garibaldi had acted against the wishes of the government, and informed the French emperor that the government was too weak to hinder the expedition by force, since otherwise there was the fear of a republican rising against the king. At the same time Cavour adopted measures to avert all danger from Garibaldi. Admiral Count Carlo Pellion di Persano received commands from him to place his ships between Garibaldi's transports and the Neapolitan fleet which was watching for them. To this intentionally cryptic order Persano replied that he believed he understood; if need arose, Cavour might send him to the fortress at Fenestrelles. He must have made up his mind to be repudiated, like Garibaldi, in event of the failure of the expedition.

Garibaldi landed at Marsala, the Lilybræum of the ancients, on May 11, 1860. He obtained but little help from the Sicilians; when he attacked on May 15, near Calatafimi, the royal troops, the twenty-four hundred Sicilians who had joined him ran away at the first shot, while he won a splendid victory with his volunteers. At Palermo, however, all was ready for the insurrection. In concert with his friends there Garibaldi, notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the Bourbon troops, ventured on a bold attack during the night of the 27th-28th May. The people sided with him; the troops of the king were fired upon from the houses and withdrew to the citadel, whence they bombarded Palermo. Rebellion blazed up through the whole island, and the scattered garrisons retired to the strong places on the coast, especially to Messina.

(b) *The Expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples.* — Alarmed at the revolt of the island, King Francis of Naples changed his tone; in his dire necessity he summoned liberal ministers to his counsels, and promised the Neapolitans a free constitution. He sent an embassy to Napoleon III with a petition for help. The attitude of the latter was significant. He explained to the envoys that he desired the continuance of the kingdom of Naples, but that it did not lie in his power to check the popular movement. The Italians, he said, were keen-witted, and knew that, after having once shed the blood of the French for their liberation, he could not proceed against them with armed force. He added, "The power stands on the national side, and is irresistible. We stand defenceless before it." He advised, however, the king of Naples to abandon Sicily, and to offer an alliance to King Victor Emmanuel. Napoleon promised to support this proposal. This was done, and all the great powers assented to the wishes of France, — even England, which, with all its inclination to Italy, still wished that the peninsula should be divided into two kingdoms. Cavour was in the most difficult position; it was impossible, in defiance to Europe, to refuse negotiations with Naples, but he could not but fear to risk his whole work if he offered his hand to the hated Bourbons. He therefore consented to negotiations, for form's sake, and even induced King Victor Emmanuel to write a letter to Garibaldi, calling upon the latter to discontinue landing troops on the mainland of Naples. Garibaldi thereupon replied to the king on June 27, "Your Majesty knows the high respect and affection which I entertain for your person; but the state of affairs in Italy does not allow me to

obey you as I should wish. Allow me, then, this time to be disobedient to you. So soon as I have accomplished my duty and the peoples are freed from the detested yoke, I will lay down my sword at your feet, and obey you for the rest of my life."

But Cavour was harassed by a still further anxiety. Garibaldi, on his march through Sicily, surrounded himself almost exclusively with partisans of Mazzini, and was resolved, so soon as Naples was liberated, to march on Rome. If then the republican party of action in this way did their best for the liberation of Italy, the fate of the monarchy was sealed. Cavour, therefore, concurrently with the negotiations with Naples, staked everything to provoke a revolution on the mainland, by which not Garibaldi, but Persano or the king himself, should be proclaimed dictator. He entered into a compact with one of the ministers of the king of Naples, Liborio Romano, who equally with Alessandro Nunziante, duke of Majano, adjutant-general of Ferdinand II, was ready for treachery. Cavour hoped by aid of the latter to rouse to revolt a part of the Neapolitan army. He wrote to Persano, "Do not lose sight of the fact, Admiral, that the moment is critical. It is a question of carrying out the greatest enterprise of modern times, by protecting Italy from foreigners, pernicious principles, and fools." But Nunziante, awakening the suspicion of the Bourbon government, was obliged to take refuge on board the Piedmontese fleet. The king's uncle, Prince Louis, Count Aquila, who seemed to have been won for the Italian cause, was ordered by his nephew to quit the kingdom.

It was thus evident that Garibaldi's services must once more be utilised in order to overthrow the Bourbons. He landed on August 19, 1860, on the coast of the peninsula near Melito, and marched directly on Naples. The generals who were sent against him were unreliable, since their hearts were in the Italian cause. The soldiers who supported the Bourbons thought themselves betrayed, and murdered General Fileno Briganti at Mileto (August 25) after he had concluded terms of capitulation with Garibaldi. The latter was received everywhere with enthusiasm; the common people regarded him as an invulnerable hero. When he entered Naples on September 7, 1860, with his 18,000 volunteers, he was greeted by Liborio Romano as liberator; the king withdrew with his army of 60,000 men into a strong fortress on the Volturno. A momentous crisis had arrived. For the adherents of Mazzini in the train of Garibaldi it was of vital importance to prevent the people of Naples from being called upon to vote whether they wished Victor Emmanuel to be king. They confirmed Garibaldi in the idea of marching immediately on Rome, of driving out the French troops, and of putting an end to the hierarchy. Garibaldi's breast swelled with his previous successes; he was susceptible to flattery, and firmly persuaded himself that it was merely Cavour's jealousy, if Victor Emmanuel did not follow the noble impulses of his heart and throw open to him the road to Rome and Venice. When Cavour sent his trusted envoy, the Sicilian Giuseppe La Fariua, in order to put himself in communication with Garibaldi, the latter insulted him by ordering his expulsion from Sicily. At first Garibaldi acquiesced in the dictatorship of Agostino Depretis, who was sent by the king; but on September 18 he replaced him, from suspicion of his connection with Cavour, by Antonio Mordini, an intimate friend of Mazzini. In this way Garibaldi succeeded in involving Italy simultaneously in a war with France and Austria. The emperor Napoleon looked sullenly at Naples, where a revolutionary focus was forming that threatened his throne with destruction.

E. CAVOUR'S END

(a) *Castelfidardo*. — Once more Cavour faced the situation with the boldest determination. He was firmly convinced that the monarchy and the constitutional government of North Italy must contribute as much to the union of the peninsula as Garibaldi; he therefore counselled the king to advance with his army into the papal territory and to occupy it, — with the exception of Rome, which was protected by Napoleon, — to march on Naples and to defeat the army of the Bourbon king, which was encamped on the Volturno. Matters had come to such a crisis that, when Victor Emmanuel sent his minister Luigi Farini (1859–1860 dictator of the Emilia) and General Enrico Cialdini to Napoleon III, in order to expound his plan, the emperor gave a reply which showed that he was not blind to the necessity of the action taken by Victor Emmanuel.

The Pope, in order not to be entirely dependent on the help of France, which was intended merely to protect Rome itself and its immediate vicinity, had surrounded himself with an army of 20,000 enlisted soldiers, at whose head he placed General L. L. Juchault de Lamoricière, one of the leaders of the Legitimist party in France. The mercenaries consisted of French, Austrians, Belgians, and Swiss; their officers were partly the flower of the Legitimist nobility of France, — a fact which could not be very pleasant to Napoleon. But King Victor Emmanuel sent 40,000 men, under the command of General Manfredo Fanti, against the States of the Church; and Lamoricière, who was obliged to leave half his troops to suppress the inhabitants of the States of the Church, was attacked by a greatly superior force. He was so completely defeated at Castelfidardo on September 18, 1860, that he was only able to escape to Ancona with 130 men, while almost the entire papal army was taken prisoner. Persano received orders to bombard Ancona; it surrendered on September 29.

(b) *On the Volturno*. — The troops of Garibaldi had in the meantime attacked the Bourbon army on the Volturno, but without any success. The Bourbon troops crossed the Volturno in order, in their turn, to attack. Garibaldi boldly held his ground with his men, and the Neapolitans, although three to one, could not gain a victory; but Garibaldi was far from being able to calculate upon a rapid success. Under these circumstances public opinion was strongly impressed when the army of Victor Emmanuel appeared on the bank of the Volturno; the Neapolitans withdrew behind the Garigliano.

It was high time that King Victor Emmanuel appeared in Naples; for Garibaldi was now so completely under the influence of the opponents of Cavour that he flatly refused to allow the incorporation of Naples and Sicily in the kingdom of Italy to be carried out. Mordini, his representative in Sicily, worked at his side, with the object that independent parliaments should be summoned in Naples and Palermo, which should settle the matter. Garibaldi actually informed the king he would not agree to the union, unless Cavour and his intimate friends were first dismissed from the ministry. By this demand, however, he ran counter to almost the entire public opinion of Italy. In Naples especially and in Sicily all prudent men wished for a rapid union with Italy, since the break-up of the old régime, in Sicily especially, had brought in its train confusion, horrors, and politi-

cal murders. Garibaldi long debated with himself whether he should yield; but when the Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino-Trivulzio (who had fretted away the years of his manhood as a prisoner in the Spielberg at Brünn and was now the leader of the party of action), and with him virtually the whole population of Naples, went over to the other side, the patriot general mastered himself and ordered the voting on the union with Italy to be arranged (October 21). The king would have been prepared to grant his wish and to nominate him lieutenant-general of the districts conquered by him, had not Garibaldi attached the condition to it that he should be allowed to march on Rome in the coming spring. As this could not be granted, he withdrew in dignified pride, although deeply mortified and implacably hostile to Cavour, to his rocky island of Caprera. In his farewell proclamation he called upon the Italians to rally round "Il Rè galantuomo;" but he foretold his hope that in March, 1861, he would find a million Italians under arms, hinting in this way that he wished by their means to liberate Rome and Venice. But a fact, which many years later was disclosed in the memoirs of Thouvenel and Beust, shows how correct the judgment of Cavour was when he kept the Italians at this time away from Rome. When Garibaldi wished to march against Rome, Napoleon told the Vienna cabinet that he had no objection if it wished to draw the sword against Italy to uphold the treaty of Zürich, — that is to say, for the papacy; only, it could not be allowed to disturb Lombardy again. It is conceivable that Count Rechberg (p. 284), the foreign minister, dissuaded the emperor Francis Joseph from a war which could bring no gain to Austria even in case of victory.

(c) *The Fall of Gaeta; Death of Cavour.* — The Bourbon army could not hold its ground against the troops of Victor Emmanuel, and King Francis threw himself into the fortress of Gaeta. When he surrendered there with eight thousand men on February 13, 1861, the union of Italy was almost won. Cavour himself was not fated to see the further accomplishment of his wishes. He was attacked by a deadly illness not long after an exciting session of parliament, in which Garibaldi heaped bitter reproaches on his head. In his delirium he dreamed of the future of his country. He spoke of Garibaldi with great respect; he said that he longed, as much as the general, to go to Rome and Venice. He spoke with animation of the desirability of reconciling the Pope with Italy. When his confessor Giacompo handed him the sacrament on June 6, 1861, he said to him, "Brother, brother, a free Church in a free State" ("Frate, frate, libera chiesa in libero stato"). These were his last words.

F. THE ROMAN QUESTION: THE FALL OF RICASOLI AND GARIBALDI

No problem had engrossed the maker of Italy in the last months of his life so much as the Roman question. There was a section of his friends who considered it necessary to yield Rome to the Pope, in order that the secular power of the papacy might remain undisturbed. Such was the idea of D'Azeglio. Stefano Jacini thought that Rome, on the model of the Hanse towns, might be turned into a free State, where the Pope might maintain his residence in the character of a protector and suzerain. Cavour, on the contrary, was convinced that Italy without its natural capital was an incomplete structure. He would have granted the Pope

the most favourable conditions if the latter would have met the wishes of the Italians. The throne of Peter, which so many able statesmen had filled in the past, was now held by Pius IX, a childlike, religious nature, who allowed himself to be enmeshed by the irreconcilable ideas of Giacomo Antonelli and the Jesuits, and by his obstinacy proved the greatest obstacle to the union of Italy. In spite of repeated pressure from the emperor Napoleon, he refused to admit the introduction of reforms in the administration of the papal States, or to conciliate the national feelings of the Italians. Victor Emmanuel, even before his march into the States of the Church, professed his readiness to recognise the papal sovereignty within the old territorial limits, provided that the Curia transferred to him the vicariate over the provinces taken from it. It was an equally beneficial circumstance for the infant State that the Pope, by repudiating liberty of conscience and free political institutions in his Encyclical of December 8, 1864, and in the Syllabus (*Syllabus complectens præcipuos nostræ ætatis errores*), outraged the sensibilities even of those Catholics who wished for the maintenance of the temporal power, but did not wish to plunge back into mediævalism. Liberal ideas would not have been able to continue their victorious progress between 1860 and 1870 in the Catholic countries of Austria, Italy, and France if the papal chair had not involuntarily proved their best ally.

Baron Bettino Ricasoli, the successor of Cavour, thought that he acted in his predecessor's spirit when he made dazzling proposals to the Pope, on condition that the latter should recognise the *status quo*. Ricasoli proposed a treaty, which not merely assured all the rights of the papal primacy, but offered Pius, as a reward for his conciliatoriness, the renunciation by the king of all his rights as patron, especially that of the appointment of the bishops. By this the Pope would have completely ruled the Church of Italy; and that State would have been deprived of a sovereign right, which not merely Louis XIV, but Philip II of Spain and Ferdinand II of Austria, would never have allowed themselves to lose. In place of any answer the cardinal secretary, Antonelli, declared, in the official "Giornale di Roma," that the proposal of Ricasoli was an unparalleled effrontery.

This unfortunate attempt overthrew the ministry of Ricasoli, and under his successor, Rattazzi, Garibaldi hoped to be able to carry out his design against Rome. He mustered his volunteers in Sicily, and landed with two thousand men on the coast of Calabria; but the government was in earnest when it announced that it would oppose his enterprise by arms. Garibaldi, wounded by a bullet in the right foot, was forced to lay down his arms after a short battle at Aspromonte on August 29, 1862. The road to Rome was not opened to the Italians until the power of France was overthrown by the victories of Germany.

3. THE FAILURES OF EMPEROR NAPOLEON III

ALTHOUGH the Italian policy of Napoleon III seemed vague and contradictory, even to his contemporaries, yet he was still in their eyes entitled to the credit of being the creator of the kingdom of Italy; so that in the year 1860 he stood at the zenith of his influence in Europe. He successfully concealed from public opinion how much had really been done contrary to his wishes. It was discovered that his character was sphinx-like, and what was really weakness seemed to be Machiavellian calculation. Cavour indeed saw through him and made full use of

his vacillation; and years later the story was told how Bismarck, even in those days, called the French emperor *une incapacité méconnue* (an overestimated incapable). But as against this unauthenticated verdict we must remember that the emperor possessed a wide range of intellectual interests and a keen comprehension of the needs of his age. On the other hand, he was lacking in firmness; natures like Cavour and Bismarck easily thwarted his plans, and could lead him towards the goal which they had in view.

Outside France, Napoleon's advocacy of the national wishes of the smaller nations of Europe made him popular. When Moldavia and Wallachia, contrary to the tenor of the treaties, chose a common sovereign, Alexander Cusa (p. 249), Napoleon III, with the help of Russia, induced the great powers to recognise him, and protected the Roumanians when their principalities were united into a national State. Cusa, it is true, was deposed by a revolution on February 23, 1866. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, who was chosen on April 20, obtained for the youthful State, by the force of his personality, complete independence on May 21, 1877, and the title of a kingdom on March 26, 1881.

(a) *Poland*. — It was Napoleon's purpose to perform equal services for the Poles. The Czar Alexander II, in order to conciliate them, placed, in June, 1862, their countryman, the Marquis of Wielopolski, at the side of his brother Constantine, the viceroy of Poland. Wielopolski endeavoured to reconcile his people to Russia, in order to help his countrymen to win some share, however modest, of self-government. But the passionate fury of the Poles frustrated his purpose, and he was unable to prevent the outbreak of the insurrection (January, 1863). He thereupon gave up his post, and the Russian government adopted the sternest measures. In February Prussia put the Russian emperor under an obligation by granting permission to Russian troops to follow Polish insurgents into Prussian territory. This compact, it is true, did not come into force, since it aroused the indignation of Europe; but it showed the good will of Prussia, and Bismarck, by this and other services in the Polish question, won the Czar over so completely that Russia's neutrality was assured in the event of a quarrel in Germany. Napoleon now induced England, and, after long hesitation, Austria also, to tender to Russia a request that the Poles should be granted a complete amnesty; but Russia refused this request. The support of Prussia was peculiarly valuable to Russia, because France, England, and Austria resolved to intercede further for the Poles. In a note of June 27, 1863, the three powers recommended to Russia the grant of six demands, of which the most important were a Polish parliament and a complete amnesty. Palmerston supported these first steps of Napoleon, in the interests of English rule in India. In Poland he saw a wound to Russian power, which he determined to keep open. But he refused his assent to more serious measures which Napoleon pressed on his consideration, because the Polish question was not so important for the English that they would embark on a war for this sole reason; still less could Austria, since it was one of the participatory powers, follow Napoleon on his path. The Czar, however, was so enraged at Austria's vacillating attitude that he thereupon immediately proposed to King William an alliance against France and Austria. Bismarck advised his sovereign not to accept the Czar's proposal, because in a war against France and Austria the brunt of the burden would have devolved on Prussia. Napoleon then proposed to the Austrian

emperor, through the Duc de Gramont, that he should cede Galicia to Poland, which was to be emancipated, but in return take possession of the Danubian principalities. Count Rechberg answered that it was strange to suggest to Austria to wage a war with Russia for the purpose of losing a province, when it was customary to draw the sword only to win a fresh one. Napoleon thus saw himself completely left in the lurch, and Russia suppressed the rebellion with bloodshed and severity; the governor-general of Wilna, Michael Muravjev, was conspicuous by the remorseless rigour with which he exercised his power.

(b) *Mexico*. — It would be a mistake to consider Napoleon as a sympathetic politician, who, if free to make his choice, would have devoted the resources of his country to the liberation of oppressed nations. His selfishness was revealed in the expedition against Mexico; and there too he tried to veil his intention by specious phrases. He announced to the world that he wished to strengthen the Latin races in America as opposed to the Anglo-Saxons, who were striving for the dominion over the New World. He had originally started on the expedition in concert with England and Spain, in order to urge upon the Mexican government the pecuniary claims of European creditors. The two allies withdrew when Mexico conceded their request; the French general, Count Lorencez, thereupon, in violation of the treaty, seized the healthy tableland above the fever-stricken coast of Vera Cruz, where the French had landed. General Forey then conquered the greatest part of the land, and an assembly of notables, on July 11, 1863, elected as emperor the archduke Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph. He long hesitated to accept the crown, because Francis Joseph gave his assent only on the terms that Maximilian first unconditionally renounce all claim to the succession in Austria. After Napoleon had promised, in the treaty of March 12, 1864, to leave at least twenty thousand French soldiers in the country until 1867, the archduke finally consented to be emperor; he did not shut his eyes to the fact that monarchy would be slow to strike root in the land. Napoleon, by placing the emperor Maximilian on the throne, pursued his object of gradually withdrawing from the Mexican affair, since the United States protested against the continuance of the French in Mexico. When, then, war between Prussia and Austria threatened ominously, Napoleon felt his Mexican pledges increasingly burdensome; since the president, Benito Juarez, with growing success, was trying to emancipate the country from the foreigners. The reader is referred to Vol. I, p. 523, for the history of the way in which Napoleon finally deserted the unhappy emperor, and thus incurred a partial responsibility for his execution at Queretaro.

The restless ambition of Napoleon's policy aroused universal distrust in Europe. When the war of 1866 broke out, after his failures in the Polish and Mexican affair, his star was already setting; and a growing republican opposition, supported by the younger generation, was raising its head menacingly in France.

4. MILITARY REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE IN PRUSSIA

A. THE MINISTRY OF HOHENZOLLERN-SCHWERIN

CAVOUR on his death-bed spoke unceasingly of the future of his country, and thus expressed himself about Germany: "This German Federation is an absurdity;

it will break up, and the union of Germany will be established. But the house of Hapsburg cannot alter itself. What will the Prussians do, who are so slow in coming to any conclusions? They will need fifty years to effect what we have created in three years." This was the idea of the future which the dying statesman, to whom the name of Bismarck was still probably unknown, pictured to himself. It is quite possible that Germany, notwithstanding its efficiency and its culture, would have required, without Bismarck, another half-century for its union. King Frederick William I had possessed an efficient army, without being able to turn it to account, as his great son did. Twice the tools were procured and ready before the master workman appeared on the scene who knew how to use them.

We know precisely the goal which King William I put before himself in the German question before Bismarck became his minister. The plans which, as prince regent, he unfolded to the emperor Francis Joseph at the conference at Teplitz, toward the end of July, 1860, were modest. He was prepared to form an alliance with Austria which would have guaranteed to that country its existing dominions, thus including Venice. In return he required a change in the presidency of the German Federation as well as the command in the field over the troops of North Germany in future federal wars; the supreme command in South Germany was to fall to Austria. Thus for the future there would be no possibility of the Federation choosing a general for itself, as Austria had desired on June 6, 1859, when Germany armed against Napoleon III. Prussia was bound to prevent a majority in the Federation deciding the question of the supreme command of its army. Neither William I nor his ministers then aimed at the subjugation of Germany. But even those claims were rejected by Austria. Francis Joseph declared that the presidency in the Federation was an old prerogative of his house, and therefore unassailable. On the other matter no negative answer was returned, and negotiations were opened with the federal diet; but Austria was certain that the assembly would reject the proposition.

If we leave out of sight the army reforms, the inestimable work of William I, we shall observe, until the appearance of Bismarck on the scene, serious vacillation in the home policy no less than in the foreign policy of Prussia. When the prince regent became the representative of King Frederick William IV (p. 252), he issued on October 9, 1858, a programme which announced in cautious language the breach with the reactionary method of government. The avoidance of all canting piety produced a beneficial impression; but there were only platitudes on the German question, among others the phrase, "Prussia must make moral conquests in Germany." When the prince regent soon afterwards summoned a ministry of moderate liberals, with Prince Anton of Hohenzollern at its head, public opinion breathed more freely, and the dawn of a "new era" was expected. The name of Count Maximilian von Schwerin, minister of the interior, seemed to guarantee a broad-minded policy of reform. Count Alexander von Schleinitz, the minister of foreign affairs, was, on the contrary, still firmly attached to the old system. The Prussian people meantime understood the good intention, and the new elections to the chamber brought a majority of moderate liberals which was prepared to support the government. A number of liberal leaders intentionally refrained, from standing, in order not to arouse the misgivings of the prince regent that a repetition of the state of things in 1848 was intended. The leading figure in the chamber which met in January, 1859, was Georg von Vincke (p. 175), whose

loyalty was beyond suspicion. Commendable political wisdom was shown in this moderation on the part of the constituencies. As a matter of fact the new government introduced schemes of reform touching the abolition of the land-tax privileges of the nobility and the abolition of the police powers of the owners of knight-estates. Great efforts were expended to induce the upper house, where the conservatives possessed a majority, to accept the reforms. In a matter of German politics, where the conscience of the people chimed in, the new era fulfilled the expectations formed of it. Prussia spoke boldly in the federal diet on behalf of the restoration of the constitution of Electoral Hesse (cf. pp. 232, 239), which had been meanly curtailed.

The government could not rise superior to these attacks. The prince regent was unable to bring himself to make a clean sweep of a set of unpopular high officials, who had been much to blame in the reactionary period for open violations of the laws. The revolt of Italy had a great and immediate effect on the German people. The founding of the National Society, with Rudolf von Bennigsen at its head, in July, 1859, was a direct consequence of the Italian war. The society aimed at the union of all German-speaking races outside the Austrian Empire under the leadership of a liberal Prussia. The regent, far from being encouraged, felt alarmed by the events in Italy; the revolutionary rising in Naples and Garibaldi's march repelled him. He could not convince himself that the national will was entitled to override legitimist rights. His whole policy, both at home and abroad, was thus stamped by conservatism and uncertainty. The Austrian minister Rechberg, at the conferences of the emperor Francis Joseph with the prince regent and with the Czar at Teplitz and Warsaw, succeeded in confirming these two monarchs in the conviction that they too were threatened by the national and liberal tendencies. Austria was no longer isolated in that respect as in 1859 (p. 253).

B. THE ARMY REFORM

(a) *The Alteration in the Laws of Compulsory Military Service.*—All these circumstances co-operated to close the ears of the Prussian people when the king, who succeeded his brother on the throne on January 2, 1861, came before the chamber with the plan of army reform. William I was superior to the majority of his German contemporaries in recognising that a comprehensive Prussian policy could only be carried out with a strong army. Leopold von Ranke says of a conversation which he had with the king on June 13, 1860: "The sum of his resolutions was . . . to leave the German princes undisturbed in their sovereignty, but to effect a union in military matters which would conduce to a great and general efficiency. He fully grasped the idea that the military power comprised in itself the sovereignty." As long before as the preparations, which might have led to a war with Austria in 1850, the prince was convinced that the Prussian army, which nominally, on a war footing, numbered 200,000 men with the colours, and 400,000 in the Landwehr, was not sufficient for protracted campaigns. The existing organisation had been formed in the critical times when the distrust of Napoleon I and vexatious treaty obligations compelled Prussia to keep up a small peace army. Under the financial stress of the period subsequent to 1815, she was forced to continue with this defensive army, which in comparison with that of other military

states was much weaker than the army which Frederick II had raised in his far smaller kingdom. The mobilisation of 1859 had shown serious deficiencies in every direction. Besides this the prince regent even then, in order to remedy the most crying evils, had instituted an important reform on his own authority. Hitherto there had been few or no permanent staffs for the Landwehr regiments; so that on a fresh mobilisation the troops could not be placed in the ranks as soon as they were called out, but had first to be formed into regiments. Such a state of things seems incredible at the present day. At the demobilisation of 1859 the prince regent directed that the recently formed staffs of the Landwehr regiments should be kept up. This change could not, however, go far enough; for since the members of the Landwehr were bound to be dismissed, those staffs consisted mostly of officers only, and were not sufficient to form the basis of a powerful new organisation. The attention of William I was now directed to this point. But the war minister of the day, Eduard von Bonin, was too timid to undertake the responsibility of the necessary measures, and on December 5, 1859, Albrecht von Roon had to be summoned in his place.

The new proposal came before the Prussian diet on February 10, 1860. One of the great drawbacks of the existing constitution of the army lay in the fact that, while annually on the average 155,650 men reached their twentieth year, only 20,000 men were enrolled in the army. Thus twenty-six per cent of the young men capable of bearing arms bore the whole burden of military service, which was especially heavy, since the obligation to serve in the Landwehr lasted to the thirty-ninth year. The consequence of this was that in the first levy of the Landwehr one-half of the total numbers, and in the second levy five-sixths, were married men. The number of men liable to serve had remained the same for more than forty years, although the population of the country had increased from ten to eighteen millions. The obligatory period of service in the standing army (three years with the colours, two years in the reserve) was too short for the body of the army. The government therefore proposed to levy annually, instead of 40,000 men, 60,000 men,—forty per cent, that is, of all those liable to serve; while in return the obligation to serve in the Landwehr was to last only to the age of thirty-five years. Besides this, the three years' service in the reserve was to be raised to five years. This change signified a considerable strengthening of the standing army and a reduction of the Landwehr. This is shown by the figures of the full war footing which it was hoped to reach. The army was intended henceforth to consist of 371,000 men with the colours, 126,000 men in the reserve, and 163,000 in the Landwehr. The scheme demanded the attention of the diet in two respects. On the one side a money grant was necessary, since it was impossible to enrol the numerous new corps in the old regiments, and thirty-nine new line regiments had to be raised. An annual sum, £1,350,000 sterling, was required for the purpose. Besides this, the existing law as to military service required to be considerably modified. This applied not merely to the division of the period of service between the standing army and the Landwehr, but also concerned the length of compulsory active service. At that time, in order to spare the finances, the soldiers were often dismissed after serving two or two and a half years. King William did not consider this period sufficient, and demanded the extension of the period of service to three, and in the case of the cavalry to four, years.

(b) *The Infantry Tactics.* — Measures of no less importance had then been taken with regard to the tactics of the infantry. After the war of 1859 there arose the question of the conclusions to be drawn from the experiences of the Italian campaign. The defensive methods of the Austrians had proved inferior to the offensive tactics of the more dashing French. The French had often succeeded, in infantry combats, in rushing with an impetuous charge under the Austrian bullets, which had a very curved trajectory, and in thus winning the day. For this reason it was the ordinary belief in the Austrian army that defensive tactics must once for all be given up. The successes of the French were overestimated, and there was a return in the years 1859 to 1866 to "shock tactics;" these attached little importance to the preliminary musketry engagement, and consisted in firing a few volleys and then charging with the bayonet. Many voices even in the Prussian army advocated a similar plan. Lieutenant-Colonel Karl Rudolf Ollech was sent by the Prussian general staff to France in August, 1859, in order to investigate the condition of the French army. He returned strongly prejudiced in favour of the system of shock tactics, and advised the king to issue an order, in connection with a similar order issued by Frederick the Great for the cavalry, that "every infantry commander would be brought before a court-martial who lost a position without having met the attack of the enemy by a counter attack." King William was at all times clever in discovering prominent men for leading positions.¹ The chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-General Helmuth von Moltke, clearly saw the risk of this advice. In his remarks on Ollech's report he laid great weight on the attacking spirit in an army; but he recognised correctly that the needle-gun, introduced in 1847, secured the Prussians the advantage in the musketry fighting, and that in the reorganisation of the army stress should be laid on that point. Moltke's principle was that the infantry should make the fullest use of their superior firing power at the beginning of the battle, and should for that purpose select open country, where the effect of fire is the greatest. An advance should not be made before the enemy's infantry were shattered, and in this movement attacks on the enemy's flank were preferable. The Prussians fought in 1866 with these superior tactics, and they owed to them a great part of the successes which they achieved.

C. THE ATTITUDE OF THE LANDTAG

(a) *The Increase of the Army Budget.* — The Prussian Landtag did not mistake the value of the proposals made by the government, but raised weighty objections. The majority agreed to the extension of the annual recruiting, to the increase of the officers and under-officers, and to the discharge of the older members of the Landwehr. On the other hand, the great diminution in the number of the Landwehr on a war footing, and the resulting reduction of their importance, but especially the three-years compulsory service, aroused vigorous opposition. General Friedrich Stavenhagen, who gave evidence for the proposal, characterised the two-years

¹ On one occasion, after the war of 1870, he playfully related how he first called attention to the young Lieutenant von Moltke. The officers had been given by him, as an exercise, some plans of fortification to work out. Moltke's work attracted him; he called his superiors' attention to him, saying laughingly that the young officer was as thin as a pencil, but showed splendid promise. He chose this officer to be the military adviser of his son (the subsequent Emperor Frederick III) in 1855, just as he had wished Roon in 1847 to undertake the prince's education.

service as sufficient. The government recognised that it could not carry the bill relating to compulsory service, and therefore withdrew it. It was content to demand an increase of nine million thalers (£1,300,000 sterling) in the war budget, in order to carry out the increase of the regiments. The finance minister, Baron von Patow, explained in the name of the government that the organisation thus created was provisional, and would not assume a definite character until the government and the popular representatives had agreed about the law itself. The Old Liberal majority of the Chamber of Representatives adopted this middle course, and sanctioned the required increase. Thus the yearly budget for the army was raised to 32,800,000 thalers (£4,920,000 sterling), or, roughly, a quarter of the entire revenue of 130,000,000 thalers (£19,500,000).

This expedient was manifestly illusory. The king at once ordered the disbanding of thirty-six regiments of Landwehr, whose place was taken by an equal number of line regiments. Altogether one hundred and seventeen new battalions and twelve new squadrons were formed. Obviously the king, who presented colours and badges to the new regiments on January 18, 1861, in front of the monument of Frederick the Great, could not disband these newly formed units or dismiss their officers. The Chamber of Representatives became in fact suspicious, but agreed to the increased army budget once more for the next year. Since the elections to the Landtag were imminent, the final decision stood over for the new house.

(b) *The Struggle.* — It would be a mistake to treat the events which followed in the ordinary manner, relating how the king was prudent, but the Chamber was petty in the army question, and how in this struggle the wisdom of the regent fortunately prevailed over the meddlesomeness of the professional politicians. The state of affairs was quite otherwise. The dispute in the matter itself was not indeed beyond settlement. In case of necessity it would have been possible to arrive at a compromise as to the amount of compulsory service, and the Prussian army would hardly have been less effective, if the two-years military service had been introduced then and not postponed until after the death of Emperor William I. This consideration does not lessen the credit due to the king. But, as the new elections showed, there was another and greater issue at stake. The influence of liberal ideas in Europe was precisely then at its height, and public opinion tended toward the view that the royal power in Prussia must be checked, exactly as it had been in that model parliamentary state, England. The citizen class had then, it was thought, come to years of maturity, and it possessed a right to take the place of the monarchy and nobility in the power hitherto enjoyed by them. At the new elections (December 6, 1861) the Progressive party, in which the members of the movement of 1848 assumed the lead, was formed in opposition to the Old Liberals, who had left their stamp on the former chamber; this political group had not yet the whole electorate on its side; it won one hundred seats, barely a third of the whole assembly. The Old Liberals felt themselves meanwhile outstripped, especially since the king no longer extended his confidence to the liberal ministers, who were defeated on the army question.

While this change was being effected among the citizen class, the nobility and the conservative party on the other hand, who had been greatly chagrined at being dismissed from the helm of State after the assumption of the regency by the

prince, put forward their claim not less resolutely. The great services of the Prussian nobility to the army and the civil service, to which both before and after it supplied first-class men, could not of course be disputed. But to justifiable pride at this fact was joined such intense class prejudice that even a man like Roon could not for a long time bring himself to recognise the justification of an elected representation of the people. General Edwin von Manteuffel, as chief of the royal military cabinet, worked with him in the same spirit. Ernst von Gerlach and Hermann Wagener represented in the "*Kreuzzeitung*" similar views (cf. the explanation of the illustration at p. 187). Karl Twisten, one of the most prominent members of the Liberal party, called General Manteuffel a mischievous man in a mischievous position,—a taunt which Manteuffel answered by a challenge to a duel, in which Twisten was wounded. The liberal ministers saw with concern how the king inclined more and more toward the paths of the conservative party. They counselled him, in view of the impending struggle over the military question, to conciliate public opinion by undertaking reforms in various departments of the legislature. Roon vigorously opposed this advice, which he saw to be derogatory to the crown. He induced the king on March 1, 1861, to adjourn these bills, which had already been settled upon. He unceasingly urged the king to dismiss his liberal colleagues and to adopt strong measures. In a memorial laid before the king, dated April, 1861, he wrote of the Hohenzollern-Schwerin cabinet, in which, nevertheless, he himself had accepted a seat, that "it is only compatible with the pseudo-monarchy of Belgium, England, or of Louis Philippe,—not with a genuinely Prussian monarchy by the grace of God, with a monarchy according to your ideas. People have tried to intimidate your Majesty by the loud outcry of the day. All the unfortunate monarchs, of whom history tells, have so fared; the phantom ruined them, simply because they believed in it."

D. THE SUMMONS OF BISMARCK

(a) *The Hohenlohe Ministry.*—The opposition was apparent as soon as the new chamber assembled (January 14, 1862). Opponents of the proposal were elected on the commission for discussing the army bill in a large majority. When the budget was discussed, the motion of A. H. W. Hagen, one of the representatives, was accepted, which called for more precise details of the State finances. This was a reasonable demand, and was soon afterwards conceded by Bismarck. But the conservative advisers of the king stigmatised the wish then as an encroachment on the rights of the crown, and the Chamber of Representatives was dissolved on March 18, 1862, after a short term of life. At the same time the liberal ministry was dismissed. Its place was taken by a cabinet in which officials preponderated, but which on the whole bore a conservative character. The president was Prince Adolf von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen; Gust. W. von Jagow, Count Leopold zur Lippe, Count H. von Itzenplitz, and Heinr. von Mühler were partisans of the conservatives.

It is certainly to the credit of Roon and Manteuffel that their influence on the king paved the way for Bismarck. But they made the commencement of his term of office more difficult for the great minister, since he was at once drawn into the most violent antagonism to popular representation. The question must be raised

whether Prussia, with her great military and intellectual superiority, would not have obtained the same results if there had been no such rupture with public opinion. The crown prince Frederick William held this view, and it was shared not only by Albert, the English prince consort, but also the king's son-in-law, the grand duke Frederick of Baden, who just then was reforming his country with the help of the liberal ministers Baron Franz von Roggenbach and Karl Mathy. Men of a similar type would have gladly co-operated to help King William to gain the imperial crown. King William himself felt that, in consequence of his quarrel with the chamber, many sincere friends of Prussia were mistaken as to his country's German mission. This point was emphasised even in the national assembly.

In order to counteract this tendency, the king had appointed Count Albrecht von Bernstorff, who advocated the union of Germany under the leadership of Prussia, to be Minister of Foreign Affairs in the place of Schleinitz, who held legitimist views. Bernstorff adopted in fact most vigorous measures, when several States of the German Zollverein, on the conclusion of the free-trade commercial treaty with France, threatened they would in consequence withdraw from the Zollverein. They found a supporter in Austria, who would gladly have broken up the Zollverein; but they were forced to yield to Prussia, since their own economic interests dictated their continuance in the Zollverein. Bernstorff furthermore, in a note addressed to the German courts on December 20, 1861, announced as a programme the claim of Prussia to the leadership of Lesser Germany. By this step the Berlin Cabinet reverted to the policy of union which had been given up in 1850 (cf. p. 231). The party of Greater Germany collected its forces in opposition. Austria resolved to anticipate Prussia by a tangible proposition to the diet, and proposed federal reforms: that a directory with corresponding central authority should be established, and by its side an assembly of delegates from the popular representatives of the several States. But, before this proposal should be agreed to, steps were to be taken to elaborate a common system of civil procedure and contract law for the whole of Germany. Both the Prussian note and the Austrian proposal met with opposition and a dissentient majority in the federal diet at Frankfurt; for the secondary States did not wish to relinquish any part of their sovereignty in favour of either the Prussian or the Austrian government. The necessary condition for the success of the Prussian policy would have been a majority in a German parliament on the side of Prussia, as in 1849. But Bernstorff, although in his heart he favoured the plan, could not advise the king to summon a national assembly, because, as things then stood, its majority would have approved of the opposition of the Prussian progressive party.

(b) *Monarchy and Parliament.* — In the new elections to the Chamber of Representatives radical liberalism gained the greatest number of seats. The two sections of this party numbered together 235 members, two-thirds, that is, of the 352 representatives of the Landtag; the Old Liberals under the leadership of Vincke had dwindled to 23 votes. The new majority gladly accepted the challenge flung to them; for the idea, which Roon had erroneously termed the ultimate goal even of the moderate liberals, was actively dominant among them. They wished for no compromise, but aimed at the subordination of the king to the parliament. The examples of England and Belgium dominated their plans in every

detail. The army question became the outward pretext on which the two constitutional theories came into conflict with each other. Since the king did not concede the two-years compulsory service, which the chamber demanded as a condition of the army reform, the house resolved on September 23, 1862, to strike out entirely the costs of the reform, which was tantamount to disbanding the new regiments. In this way a humiliation was laid on the king, which was intended to bend or break him.

King William was resolved rather to lay down the crown than to submit to a compulsion by which, according to his feelings, he would have been degraded to the position of a puppet ruler. He seriously contemplated this step, when the ministry of Hohenlohe, seeing no way out of the difficulty, asked to be dismissed. The king doubted whether men would be found bold enough to confront the Chamber of Representatives. Whenever Roon and Manteuffel had formerly spoken of Bismarck (see his portrait at p. 331), the king had hesitated to intrust the government to a man whom he considered to be a hot-head. Now, he told Roon, Bismarck would no longer entertain any wish to be at the head of affairs; besides that, he happened to be on leave, travelling in Southern France. Roon, however, could assure the king that Bismarck, who had been already recalled, was prepared to enter the service of the king. Soon afterwards the latter learned that Bismarck had immediately on his return paid a visit, by invitation, to the crown prince. King William's suspicions were aroused by this, and he thought, "There is nothing to be done with him; he has already been to my son." All doubts, however, were dissipated when Bismarck appeared before him and unfolded his scheme of government. The king showed him the deed of abdication, which he had already drafted, because, so he said, he could not find another ministry. Bismarck encouraged him by the assurance that he intended to stand by him in the struggle between the supremacy of the crown and of parliament. On the day when the Chamber of Representatives passed the resolution by which the monarch felt himself most deeply wounded, on the 23d of September, 1862, the nomination of Bismarck as President of the Ministry was published.

5. BISMARCK'S FIRST FIGHTS

A. HIS ANTAGONISM TO THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES AND TO THE CROWN PRINCE

BISMARCK'S work is the establishment of the unity of Germany no less than the revival of the power of the monarchy and of all conservative forces in that country. His contemporaries have passed judgment upon him according to their political attitudes. Those who regarded the advancing-democratisation of England and France as equally desirable for Germany, and as the ultimate goal of its development, were bound to see an opponent in the powerful statesman. A difficult legal question was put before Bismarck at the very outset of his activity. He counselled the king to disregard the budget rights of the Chamber of Representatives. For the historical estimate of Bismarck it is not of primary importance whether the constitutional arguments which he employed on this occasion are tenable or not; this legal question must certainly be decided against Bismarck. He

took his stand on the ground that the budget was, according to the constitution, a law on which the Crown, the Upper Chamber, and the Chamber of Representatives must agree; and that the authors of the Prussian constitution had on this point reversed the practice of England, where money grants are exclusively the province of the lower house. They had not provided for the event that the three might not be able to agree and the law could thus not be passed; there was therefore an omission. But since the State could not stand still, a constitutional deadlock had resulted, which would be fatal in its consequences unless the budget for the year were provided by the arbitrary action of the crown. The consequence of this theory was that the crown could enforce all the larger budget demands, even though the two chambers had pronounced in favour of the smaller sum. From this point of view every theory turned on the exercise of the powers of the constitutional authorities. In the great speech in which the Prussian Minister-President explained his views, he confronted the chamber with his political principles: "The Prussian monarchy has not yet fulfilled its mission; it is not yet ripe to form a purely ornamental decoration of the fabric of your constitution, nor to be incorporated into the mechanism of parliamentary rule as an inanimate piece of the machinery." Even the king wavered for a moment when Bismarck in the budget commission of the Chamber of Representatives (September 30, 1862) made his famous assertion that "the union of Germany could not be effected by speeches, societies, and the resolutions of majorities; a grave struggle was necessary, a struggle that could only be carried through by blood and iron." Even Roon considered this phrase as dangerous.

The State was administered for four years without a constitutionally settled budget. The Chamber of Representatives declared this procedure illegal, and great excitement prevailed throughout the country. In order to suppress the opposition, strict enactments were published on June 1, 1863, which were directed against the freedom of the press and of the societies. At this period the crown prince Frederick William joined the opponents of Bismarck, because he thought the procedure of the ministers might provoke a new revolution in Prussia. He made a speech on June 5, in the town hall at Danzig when receiving the municipal authorities, which was directed against the government: "I too regret that I have come here at a time when a quarrel, of which I have been in the highest degree surprised to hear, has broken out between the government and the people. I know nothing of the enactments which have brought about this result." The crown prince at the same time sent a memorandum to the king to the same effect; but on June 30 he wrote to the Minister-President a letter full of indignation and contempt, which would have shaken the resolution of any other man than Bismarck: "Do you believe that you can calm men's minds by continual outrages on the feeling of legality? I regard the men who lead his Majesty the King, my most gracious father, into such paths, as the most dangerous counsellors for crown and country." The king was deeply hurt at the public appearances of his son; he contemplated harsh measures against him, and Bismarck was compelled to dissuade him from his purpose. The minister reminded the king that in the quarrel between Frederick William I and his son the sympathy of the times, as well as of posterity, had been with the heir to the throne; and he showed the inadvisability of making the crown prince a martyr. Thus the situation in Prussia seemed to be strained to the breaking point. The Representative Chamber adopted in 1863, by a large

majority, the resolution that ministers should be liable out of their private fortune for any expenditure beyond the budget.

B. THE GERMAN QUESTION

It is marvellous with what independence and intellectual vigour Bismarck guided foreign policy in the midst of these commotions. We need only examine the pages of history from 1850 to 1862 to find clearly how little Prussia counted as a European power. It played, in consequence of the vacillation of Frederick William IV, a feeble rôle, especially at the time of the Crimean war. Even later, when William I was governing the country as prince regent and as king, Cavour (cf. above, p. 263), who was continually forced to rack his brains with the possibilities which might effect a change in the policy of France and Austria, England and Russia, hardly took Prussia into consideration. That State, during the Italian crisis of 1860, had little more weight than a power of the second rank,—only about as much as Spain, of which it was occasionally said that it would strengthen or relieve the French garrison in Rome with its troops. Great as are the services of King William to the army and the State of Prussia, he could not have attained such great successes without a man like Bismarck.

Considering the feebleness of Prussia, which had been the object of ridicule for years, every one was, at first, surprised by the vigorous language of Bismarck. When, in one of the earliest cabinet councils, he broached the idea that Prussia must watch for an opportunity of acquiring Schleswig-Holstein, the crown prince raised his hands to heaven, as if the orator had uttered some perfectly foolish thing, and the clerk who recorded the proceedings thought he would be doing a favour to Bismarck if he omitted the words; the latter was obliged to make the additional entry in his own writing. The newspapers and political tracts of that time almost entirely ridicule the attitude of the new minister, whom no one credited with either the serious intention or the strength to carry out his programme. His contemporaries were therefore only confirmed in their contempt for him when, on November 26, 1882, he suddenly ended the constitutional struggle in Electoral Hesse, which had lasted several decades, by sending an order to the elector Frederick William, with the peremptory order that he should give back to the country the constitution of 1831. And now came his amazing conversation with the Austrian ambassador, Count Aloys Károlyi! Austria, shortly before, without coming to terms with Prussia, had brought before the assembly in Frankfurt the proposal already mentioned (p. 279) for federal reform. Bismarck, in that conversation, taunted Austria with having deviated from the method of Prince Metternich, who came to a previous arrangement with Prussia as to all measures concerning German affairs; and he declared to the count that Austria would soon have to choose between the alternatives of vacating Germany and shifting its political centre to the east, or of finding Prussia in the next war on the side of its opponents. This assertion fell like a bombshell on Vienna. Count Rechberg was not so wrong when he talked of the "terrible" Bismarck, who was capable of doing anything that might conduce to the greatness of Prussia.

C. AUSTRIA AS A CONSTITUTIONAL STATE

THE two great parties in Germany were organised at the precise moment when Bismarck entered upon office. A diet of representatives from the different German parliaments, which was attended by some two hundred members, met at Weimar on September 28, 1862. This assembly demanded the summons of a German parliament by free popular election, and the preliminary concentration of non-Austrian Germany; for the first, at any rate, Austria would have to remain outside the more restricted confederation. This assembly and the activity of the National Society led on the other side to the formation of the Greater Germany Reform Society, which came into existence at Frankfort. It demanded a stricter consolidation of the German states under the leadership of Austria. The narrow particularism of the princes and their immediate followers, who were unwilling to sacrifice for the welfare of the whole body any of the sovereignty of the individual States, kept aloof from these efforts. Their underlying thought was expressed by the Hanoverian minister, Otto Count Borries, who, when opposing the efforts of the National Society on May 1, 1860, went so far as to threaten that the secondary states would be forced into non-German alliances in order to safeguard their independence.

The Greater Germany movement gained adherents not merely by the constitutional struggle in Prussia, but also by the movement towards liberalism in Austria. The absolute monarchy, which had ruled in Austria since 1849, ended with a defeat on the battle-field and the most complete financial disorder. The pressure of the harsh police regulations weighed all the more heavily, as the State organs, since the conclusion of the concordat with Rome (p. 241), were put equally at the service of ecclesiastical purposes. The discontent of every nationality in the empire impelled the emperor after Solferino (June 24, 1859) to make a complete change. It would have been the natural course of proceedings if the emperor had at once resolved to consolidate the unity of the empire, which had been regained in 1849, by summoning a general parliament. But the crown, and still more the aristocracy, were afraid that in this imperial representation the German *bourgeoisie* would come forward with excessive claims. For this reason an aristocratic interlude followed. Count Goluchowski, a Pole, hitherto governor of Galicia, became minister of the interior on August 21, 1859; while Count Rechberg, who had already succeeded Count Buol-Schauenstein as Minister of the Exterior and of the Imperial House on May 17, was given the post of president. The administrative business of the entire monarchy was, by the imperial manifesto of October 20, 1860, concentrated in a new body, the National Ministry, at whose head Goluchowski was placed, while the conduct of Hungarian affairs was intrusted to Baron Nikolaus Bay and Count Nikolaus Szécsen; at the same time orders were issued that the provincial councils (*Landtage*) and a council of the empire elected from them (*Reichsrat*) should be summoned. These bodies were, however, only to have a deliberative voice; and besides that, a preponderant influence in the provincial bodies was assigned to the nobility and the clergy. It was a still more decisive step that the members of the conservative Hungarian *haute noblesse*, in their aversion to German officialism, induced the emperor once more to intrust the administration of Hungary and the choice of officials to the county courts (assemblies of

nobles), as had been the case before the year 1848. These measures produced a totally different result from that anticipated by Bay and Szécsen. The meetings of the county courts, which had not been convened since 1849, were filled with a revolutionary spirit, and, while offering at once the most intense opposition, refused to carry out the enactments of the ministers, because, so they alleged, the constitutionally elected *Reichstag* was alone entitled to sanction taxation; and they chose officials who either absolutely refused to collect taxes, or only did so in a dilatory fashion. The country in a few months bordered on a state of rebellion.

As the Hungarian ministers of the emperor had plunged the empire into this confusion, they were compelled to advise him to intrust a powerful personality from the ranks of the high German officials with the conduct of affairs. Anton von Schmerling (p. 237) was nominated minister of finance on December 17, 1860, in the place of Goluchowski. He won over the emperor to his view, which was unfavourable to the Hungarians, and carried his point as to maintaining one united constitution and the summoning of a central parliament. He proposed at the same time that a limited scope should be conceded to the diets of the individual provinces. These were the fundamental principles of the constitution granted on February 26, 1861. Schmerling deserves credit for having restored the prestige of the constitution in Hungary without bloodshed, even if severe measures were used. The county assemblies were dissolved, and trustworthy native officials substituted for them. The vacillation of the emperor in 1860 strengthened, however, the conviction of the Magyars that in the end the crown would yield to their opposition, and once more concede the independence of Hungary in the form in which it was won by the constitution of April, 1848. The leadership of this opposition in the Landtag summoned in 1861 was taken by Franz Deák (p. 168); the Landtag, in the address which was agreed upon, refused to send representatives to the central parliament, and complete independence was demanded for Hungary.

D. THE DIET OF PRINCES AT FRANKFURT

SCHMERLING advanced unhesitatingly on the road which he had taken. At the same time he won great influence over the management of German affairs, and for some period was more powerful in that sphere than the minister of the exterior, Count Rechberg. The latter considered it prudent to remain on good terms with Prussia, and not to unroll the German question. Schmerling, on the other hand, put higher aims before himself, and wished to give Germany the desired federal reform, and to strengthen Austria's influence in Germany by the establishment of a strong central power in Frankfurt. He hoped to overcome the resistance of Prussia by help of the popular feeling in non-Prussian Germany. He enlisted confidence in Germany also by the introduction of constitutional forms in Austria. Austria tried to sweep the German princes along with her in one bold rush. The emperor, in deference to a suggestion of his brother-in-law, Maximilian, the hereditary prince of Thurn and Taxis, resolved to summon all German princes to a conference at Frankfort-on-Main, and to lay before them his plan of reform. The king of Prussia in this matter was not treated differently from the pettiest and weakest of the federal princes. The emperor communicated his intention to King William at their meeting in Gastein on August 2, 1863, and, without waiting for

the stipulated written decision of the king, handed him by an adjutant on August 3 the formal invitation to the Diet of Princes summoned for August 16.

The blow aimed by Austria led to a temporary success. Public opinion in South Germany was aroused, and in some places became enthusiastic; the sovereigns and princes gave their services to the Austrian reform. All this made a deep impression on King William; the Bavarian queen Marie and his sister-in-law, the widow of King Frederick William IV, urged him on his journey from Gastein to Baden-Baden to show a conciliatory attitude towards the Austrian proposal. Nevertheless he followed Bismarck's advice and kept away from the meeting at Frankfurt. The emperor Francis Joseph made his entry into the free town amid the pealing of the bells and the acclamations of the inhabitants who favoured the Austrian cause. He skilfully presided over the debate of the princes, and King John of Saxony (1854–1873), an experienced man of business and an eloquent speaker, confuted the protests which were preferred by a small minority. The grand duke Frederick Francis II of Mecklenburg-Schwerin proposed to invite King William to make the journey to Frankfurt. King John assented, but made two additional proposals, which were not quite friendly to Prussia. He first induced the meeting to declare that it considered the Austrian proposals suitable as a basis for reform; and it was also soon settled that the refusal of the king of Prussia was no obstacle to further deliberation. After these resolutions, which were taken on August 18, King John went to Baden-Baden, in order to take the invitation to the king of Prussia.

King William did not seem disinclined to accept the invitation, and said to Bismarck, "Thirty princes sending the invitation, and a king as cabinet messenger, how can there be any refusal?" But Bismarck saw that this surprise, planned by Austria, was a blow aimed at Prussia, and he would have felt deeply humiliated by the appearance of his monarch at Frankfurt. Germany was to see that any alteration of the German constitution must prove abortive, from the mere opposition of Prussia. Bismarck required all his strength of will to induce William to refuse; he declared that if the king commanded him, he would go with him to Frankfurt, but that when the business was ended he would never return with him to Berlin as minister. The king, therefore, took his advice. What Bismarck had foreseen now occurred. It is true that the Austrian proposal was in the end discussed, and accepted against the votes of Baden, Schwerin, Weimar, Luxemburg, Waldeck, and the younger line of Reuss. But since the meeting only pledged itself in the event of an agreement with Prussia as the basis of these resolutions, Austria had not achieved the main result at which she aimed.

6. THE STRUGGLE FOR SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

A. THE HEREDITARY RIGHT TO THE DUCHIES

ALL these debates and intrigues sank into the background when the fate of Schleswig-Holstein was destined to be decided by arms. The occasion for this was given by the death of the Danish king Frederick VII on November 15, 1863, with whom the main line of the royal house became extinct. The collateral line of Holstein-Glücksberg possessed the hereditary right to Denmark, while the

house of Augustenburg raised claims to Schleswig-Holstein. All Germany thought that the moment had come to free Schleswig-Holstein from the Danish rule by supporting the Duke of Augustenburg. The two great German powers were, however, pledged in another direction by the treaty of London (p. 239). Denmark had expressly engaged by that arrangement to grant Schleswig-Holstein an independent government; on this basis the great powers on their side guaranteed the possession of the duchies to the king of Denmark and all his successors. The two great German powers were to blame for having compelled the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein in 1850 to submit to Denmark (cf. p. 210). From hatred of liberalism and all the mistakes it was supposed to have made in 1848, they destroyed any hopes which the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein might have formed for the future, after the royal house should have become extinct. Duke Christian of Augustenburg sold his hereditary rights to Denmark for two and one-quarter million thalers (£500,000), although his son Frederick protested. But Denmark did not think of fulfilling her promise. The German Federation was content for years to remonstrate and propose a court of arbitration. Finally, the Federal Council resolved on armed intervention against Denmark. Hanoverian and Saxon troops occupied Holstein, but they were compelled to halt on the Eider, since Schleswig did not belong to the Federation.

In Copenhagen the Eider-Danish party (p. 210) drew peculiar conclusions from these circumstances; since, they said, Schleswig did not belong to the Federation, the treaty of London might be disregarded, the bond between Schleswig and Holstein dissolved, and Schleswig at any rate amalgamated into the unified State of Denmark. Threatening crowds forced the new monarch Christian VIII, in spite of his superior insight, to consent to the united constitution. The treaty of London was to all intents and purposes broken. The claim of Duke Frederick of Augustenburg to Schleswig-Holstein thus was unanimously applauded by the popular voice of Germany. He declared himself ready to follow loyally the democratic constitution which the duchies had given themselves in 1848, and surrounded his person with liberal counsellors. A large proportion of the governments of the petty German states recognized the duke as the heir, and the majority of the Federal Council decided in his favour.

Prussia and Austria, indeed, as signatories of the treaty of London, felt themselves bound by it toward Europe. They possessed, according to it, the right to compel Denmark to grant to the duchies independence and union under one sovereign; but they could exempt themselves from recognising the hereditary right of King Christian VIII. Austria in particular, whose stability rested on European treaties, did not venture to admit that the right of nationality could undo those treaties. Was Prussia able to confront the other great powers with her unaided resources? Bismarck with all his determination thought such a move too dangerous. The stake in such a struggle would have been too trivial; for, as Bismarck showed the Prussian House of Representatives, Prussia would have lent its arms to establish the claims of a duke who, like the other petty States, would have mostly voted with Austria at Frankfurt. "The signing of the treaty of London," so Bismarck said on December 1, 1863, in the Prussian House of Representatives, "may be deplored; but it has been done, and honour as well as prudence commands that our loyal observance of the treaty be beyond all doubt." These reasons did not, however, convince the House. It pronounced in favour of the

hereditary right of the Duke of Augustenburg. Bismarck vainly put before the opposition that, as soon as Prussia abandoned the basis of the treaty of London, no pretext could be found for interfering in Schleswig, which stood outside the German Confederation.

The violent opposition of the House of Representatives to Bismarck's methods was due to the fact that the conservative party, to which Bismarck had belonged, had in 1849 and 1850 condemned the rebellion of Schleswig-Holstein against Denmark; and there was the fear that the supporters of legitimacy would once more in the end make the duchies subject to Denmark. As a matter of fact the two great German powers had tolerated the infringements of the treaty of London by Denmark since 1852, and had not contributed at all to preserve the rights of the duchies. This explains the blame laid upon the two great powers by the committee of an assembly of representatives at Frankfurt on December 21, 1863, in an address to the German people. For twelve years, it said, the Danes had been allowed to trample under foot the treaty of London. Now with the extinction of the royal house, and the revival of the hereditary right of Augustenburg, the possibility had come of getting rid of the shameful treaty. "Now, when the execution of that treaty would be fatal to the cause of the duchies, armies were being put into the field in order to enforce its execution."

This reproach against the Prussian policy would have been justified if Bismarck had still been, as he was in 1848, a man of exclusively conservative party politics. The German people could not know that he had become a far greater man. He had now fixed his eye on the acquisition of the duchies by Prussia, and steered steadily toward that goal which King William still considered unattainable. Just now he won a great diplomatic triumph; Austria on the question of the duchies was divided from the German minor States, her allies, and Bismarck widened the breach. He explained to the Vienna cabinet that Prussia was resolved to compel Denmark to respect the treaty of London by force of arms, and if necessary single-handed. Austria now could not and dared not leave the liberation of Schleswig to her rival alone, otherwise she would have voluntarily abdicated her position in Germany. Rechberg, who in any case was favourably disposed to the alliance with Prussia, induced his master, under the circumstances, to conclude the armed alliance with Prussia; Francis Joseph was, however, disappointed that the diet at Frankfurt and the anti-Prussian policy had borne no fruits. The two great powers pledged themselves in the treaty of January 16, 1864, to attack Denmark, and settled that after the liberation of the duchies no decision should be taken about them except by the agreement of the two powers. Austria thus felt protected against surprises on the part of Prussia. The treaty met with the most violent opposition both in the Prussian and the Austrian representative assemblies. The money for the conduct of the war was actually refused in Berlin. The Austrian chamber did not proceed to such extreme measures, but the majority held it to be a mistake that Austria adopted a hostile position against the minor States and neglected the opportunity to make a friend of the future Duke of Schleswig-Holstein.

B. THE WAR WITH DENMARK

THE army to conquer Schleswig consisted of 37,000 Prussians and 23,000 Austrians, who were opposed by 40,000 Danes. The supreme command of the invad-

ing force was held by Field-Marshal Count Friedrich von Wrangel, under whom stood the Austrian Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Baron Ludwig von Gablenz. The Danes hoped to the last for foreign help, but the threats of England to the German powers were smoke without a fire. The Danes first attempted resistance along the Danewerk. But the Austrians in the battles of Jagel and Overselk, on February 3, stormed the outposts in front of the redoubts and pursued the Danes right under the cannons of the Danewerk. Since there was the fear that the strong position would be turned by the Prussians below Missunde, the Danish general De Meza evacuated the Danewerk on February 5 and withdrew northwards. The Austrians followed quickly and came up with the Danes the very next day at Översee, and compelled them to fight for their retreat. Schleswig was thus conquered with the exception of a small peninsula on the east, where the lines of Düppel were raised, which were in touch with the island of Alsen and the powerful Danish fleet. Prussia proposed then to force the Danes to conclude peace by an investment of Jutland. The Austrian cabinet could not at first entertain this plan. General Manteuffel (p. 279), who was sent to Vienna, only carried his point when Prussia gave a promise that Schleswig-Holstein should not be wrested from the suzerainty of the Danish crown; on the contrary, the independent duchies were to be united with Denmark by a personal union. The allies thereupon conquered Jutland as far as the Liim Fiord, and by storming the lines of Düppel, on April 18, the Prussian arms won a brilliant success. Since also the blockade of the mouths of the Elbe was relieved by the sea-fight of Heligoland on May 9, 1864, where Austrian and Prussian ships fought under the Austrian Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, Germany had finally shown that she no longer allowed herself to be humiliated by the petty state of Denmark.

C. THE TREATY OF GASTEIN

THE future fate of the duchies was now the question. Popular opinion in Germany protested loudly against their restoration to the Danish king, and Bismarck now fed the flame of indignation, since he wished to release Prussia from the promise she had made. But he would not have attained this object had not the Danes, fortunately for Germany, remained obstinate. A conference of the powers concerned met in London on April 25, 1864. The Danish plenipotentiaries, still hoping for the support of England, rejected on May 17 the proposal of Prussia and Austria for the constitutional independence of the duchies, even in the event of their possession being intended for their king Christian. The matter was thus definitely decided. Austria was now compelled to retire from the agreement last made with Prussia. The Vienna cabinet, making a virtue of necessity, resolved to prevent Schleswig-Holstein from falling to Prussia by nominating the Duke of Augustenburg. King William had long been inclined to this course, if only Duke Frederick was willing to make some arrangement with Prussia about his army, as Coburg had already made; if he would grant Prussia a naval station and allow the North Sea canal to be constructed; and if the duchies entered the Zollverein. The duke would certainly have agreed to these terms in order to obtain the sovereignty, had not Austria on its side made more favourable promises. There was a strong wish at Vienna to prevent Schleswig-Holstein becoming a vassal state of Prussia. The duke, encouraged by this, promised the king indeed to observe those

conditions, but he added the qualification that he could not know whether the Estates of Schleswig-Holstein would assent to the treaty. If this did not happen he was ready to withdraw in favour of his son. This additional proviso filled Bismarck with misgivings; for the farce might be repeated which had been played before, when Duke Christian of Augustenburg sold his claims to Denmark, and his son Frederick then came forward with his hereditary right to Schleswig-Holstein. The determination of the Prussian prime minister, not to give in until the countries were incorporated into Prussia, grew stronger day by day. The first step in that direction was the conclusion of peace with Denmark on October 30, 1864; the two duchies were unconditionally resigned to Austria and Prussia, without any consideration being paid to the hereditary claims of the houses of Augustenburg and Oldenburg.

Bismarck did not want to break with Austria yet. He therefore was sorry to see that Count Rechberg retired on October 27, 1864, from his office as minister of the exterior; the charge was brought against him in Austria that the policy of alliance with Prussia which he followed was to the advantage of the latter State only. His successor, Count Alexander Mensdorff-Pouilly, had, it is true, the same aims as Rechberg; but since he was less experienced in affairs, the opponents of Prussia, especially Hofrat Baron Ludwig von Biegeleben, gained more and more influence among his higher officials. This circumstance was the more mischievous since the two great powers were administering the duchies jointly,—an arrangement which in any case led to friction. In February, 1865, Prussia came forward with the conditions under which she was willing to nominate the Duke of Augustenburg to Schleswig-Holstein. They contained in substance what had already been communicated to the duke. But Austria did not agree to them. Weight was laid in Vienna on the argument that the German Confederation was a union of sovereign princes, and no vassal state of Prussia could be allowed to take its place in it. Prussia thereupon adopted stricter measures and shifted her naval base from Danzig to Kiel. Bismarck then openly declared, "If Austria wishes to remain our ally, she must make room for us."

The war cloud even then loomed ominously. The Berlin cabinet inquired at Florence whether Italy was prepared to join the alliance. The two German powers still, however, shrank from a passage at arms immediately after a jointly conducted campaign. The result of prolonged negotiations was the treaty of Gastein on August 14, 1865. The administration of the duchies, hitherto carried on in common, was divided, so that Nearer Holstein (see the map facing p. 304) was left to Austria, and Further Schleswig to Prussia. Lauenburg was ceded absolutely to Prussia for two and a quarter million thalers (£650,000). Prussia was clearly advancing on a victorious career, and the acquisition of the duchies was in near prospect. The Prussian Representative Chamber, which eighteen months previously had spoken distinctly for the hereditary right of the Duke of Augustenburg, once more in the summer of 1865 debated the affair. But now the friends of the scheme of incorporation were already so numerous that it could no longer agree to a resolution by a majority. It was seen that the foreign policy of the Progressives in Prussia had been wrecked. The king, as a recognition of his services, raised Bismarck to the rank of count (September 15), and thus proclaimed to the outside world that he had absolute confidence in his conduct of affairs.

D. THE RUPTURE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA

BISMARCK called the treaty of Gastein a patching of the crack in the building. In reality the premier, as appears from his "*Gedanken und Erinnerungen*" ("*Thoughts and Reminiscences*"), had long determined on a war with Austria. Since Austria favoured the partisans of the Duke of Augustenburg as much as ever, and afforded opportunity for their agitations against Prussia, the Prussian note of January 26, 1866, complained of the "means of rebellion" which Austria employed. It was announced in this document that Prussia claimed henceforward complete liberty for her policy. This was the formal notice of abandoning the alliance which had existed for two years. Even before this Bismarck entered into communication with Napoleon III, and had visited him for that purpose in October, 1865, at Biarritz. He wanted to assure himself of the neutrality of France in the event of a war of Prussia with Austria. Napoleon however, was not roused from his dreamy reserve by the disclosures of the Prussian minister; he waited for an offer from Prussia as the price of his neutrality, encouraged Bismarck to bolder steps, but pledged himself at first to nothing. More serious negotiations were to be postponed until the hostility to Austria grew acute.

There was not long to wait. Bismarck still kept the door of peace open to himself, in case Austria was willing to withdraw from Schleswig-Holstein. But the course of proceedings at the Prussian cabinet council of February 28, 1866, shows that the king was familiar with the idea of war. The Minister-President developed at this council the thought that no war was to be kindled for the sake of Schleswig-Holstein only; a greater goal, the union of Germany, must be contemplated. It was resolved, first of all, to open negotiations with Italy for a defensive and offensive alliance. In this council of war, Moltke gave his unqualified vote for the war, while the crown prince uttered an emphatic warning against such a policy, for the reason that it rendered probable the interference of foreigners.

When General Giuseppe Govone was sent in the name of the Italian government to Berlin in March, 1866, the impending danger of war was recognised in Vienna. An important change had occurred in Austria in July, 1865. Schmerling had failed to win the emperor over permanently to his political views. Francis Joseph was dissatisfied because the parliament summoned at Schmerling's advice raised excessive claims to a share in the government, and went too far in reducing the war budget. The Austrian and Hungarian aristocracy joined the opponents of the united constitution, and Count Moritz Esterházy, minister without portfolio since July 19, 1861, used the dissatisfaction of the emperor to undermine the German cabinet. On July 30, 1865, the "Counts' Ministry," under the presidency of Count Richard Belcredi, was nominated in the place of Schmerling; an imperial manifesto on September 20, 1865, proclaimed the suspension of the constitution and adjournment of the Imperial Council. The high nobility was favoured in every branch of the government, Slavism pitted against Germanism, and the way prepared for the settlement with Hungary. Esterházy in this cabinet was the dominant figure in foreign policy; he was influenced in an anti-Prussian direction by Hofrat Biegeleben of the foreign office, while the weak minister of the exterior, Count Mensdorff, vainly spoke for the maintenance of peace.

E. THE WAR PREPARATIONS OF THE TWO NATIONS

ALARMED by the warlike intentions of the Prussian government, the Austrians thought it advisable in March, 1866, to take measures for arming. Some ten battalions were transferred to Bohemia, in order to strengthen the corps stationed there, and several cavalry regiments from Hungary and Transylvania were ordered to move into the province which was first menaced. Count Károlyi (p. 283), the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, was at the same time commissioned to ask if Prussia really intended to attack Austria. This precipitate procedure of Austria rendered it easier for Bismarck and the generals, who were advising war, to induce King William also to make preparations. The measures taken by the cabinet council of March 28 comprised the supply of horses for the artillery, the repair of the fortresses, and the strengthening of the divisions quartered in the south of the country. Bismarck answered the really objectless inquiry of Count Károlyi in the negative, but at the same time sent a circular to the German courts, in which he accused Austria of wishing to intimidate Prussia by her preparations, as she had done in 1850. He further announced that Prussia would soon come forward with a plan for the reform of the German federal constitution.

But more important than these measures and notes, which caused so much public uneasiness, were the secret negotiations for the conclusion of the alliance with Italy. These did not proceed smoothly at first, since Italy was afraid of being made a tool; for Prussia might use the threat of an Italian alliance to induce Austria to give way. The Italian government, in order to avoid this, declared it could only consent to a formal and offensive alliance for the purpose of attacking Austria-Hungary. King William could not agree to this, since he did not contemplate an invasion of Austria, for which indeed there was no pretext. The Prussian government was only prepared for a friendly alliance, which should prevent either party forming a separate convention with Austria and leaving the other in the lurch. The result was the compromise of a defensive and offensive alliance, to be valid for three months only, in case war was not declared by Prussia before that date. Italy hesitated to agree to it, and applied to Napoleon III for advice. The French emperor desired nothing more ardently than a war in Germany, in order, during its continuance, to pursue his schemes on Belgium and the Rhine districts. He knew that William I would not be persuaded by Bismarck to fight, unless he was previously assured of the alliance of Italy; otherwise the king thought the campaign would be dangerous, since nearly the whole remaining part of Germany stood on the side of Austria. It may be ascribed to the advice of Napoleon that the hesitating Italian premier Alfonso de La Marmora concluded a treaty, to hold for three months, on April 8, 1866.

Bismarck wished to employ this period in pushing on the German question. He intended to show the nation that it must look to Prussia alone for the fulfilment of its wishes for union. Prussia proposed on April 10, in the diet of Frankfurt, to summon a German parliament on the basis of universal suffrage. In order to separate Bavaria from Austria, a proposal was made to the former State that the supreme command of the German federal troops should be divided; Prussia should command in the north, Bavaria in the south. But Bismarck's intention,

sincere as it was, did not meet with the approval of the majority of the German people. The liberals asserted that the conversion of Bismarck to the idea of a German parliament with universal suffrage was not genuine, and derided the idea that a government which did not respect the right of popular representation in its own country would unite Germany under a parliamentary constitution. So rooted was the distrust of Prussia that Bavaria refused this favourable proposal. Baron von der Pfordten, the minister (p. 231), was in his heart not averse to the plan; but the court, especially Prince Charles, the uncle of the young king Louis II, urged an alliance with Austria.

When Austria saw that her prospects of winning over to her side the minor German States had improved, the war party in Vienna gained the ascendancy, and the cautious counsels of Mensdorff were disregarded. During the course of April, however, negotiations were begun between Vienna and Berlin for a simultaneous disarmament on both sides; and, as the result of a conciliatory note of Austria, prospects of peace were temporarily disclosed. King William thought that Prussia ought not to be obstinate in resisting all attempts at an understanding. This more peaceful tendency was nullified by the preparations of Italy, which watched with uneasiness the inauguration of better relations between Prussia and Austria. By command of King Victor Emmanuel some one hundred thousand men were enrolled in the army during the month of April. The Austrian head of the general staff, Alfred, Baron von Henikstein, represented to the emperor in a memorandum of April 20 that Austria was seriously threatened; for, if Prussia also armed, Austria would be defenceless for nearly a month, because the regiments were not stationed, as in Prussia, in their own recruiting districts, and the network of railways was not complete. As a result of this, the emperor Francis Joseph, disregarding the warnings of Count Mensdorff, ordered the mobilisation of the southern army on April 21, and that of the northern army on the 27th.

The counsellors of King William, who were urging war, thus were given weighty reasons why Prussia could not remain behind in her preparations. The king, as his letter of April 23, 1866 (published in the appendix to Bismarck's "*Gedanken und Erinnerungen*"), shows, was in any case already convinced of the necessity of crossing swords with Austria, since he contemplated even in April a sudden attack on the still unprepared imperial capital. But since he was unwilling to appear in the eyes of Europe as the breaker of the peace, he had waited for the mobilisation of Austria. Now the same steps were taken by him between the 5th and 12th of May.

F. THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

WAR was thus almost inevitable. The Vienna cabinet, which did not underestimate the dangers of an attack from two sides simultaneously, resolved at the eleventh hour on a complete change of policy toward Italy. Of late years the sale of the province of Venetia had been refused, as detrimental to the honour of Austria; she was now willing to relinquish the province, in order to have a free hand for a war of conquest against Prussia. Prince Metternich, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, was commissioned to call in the mediation of Napoleon III.

The Vienna cabinet was willing to pledge itself to cede Venetia, on condition that Italy remain neutral in the coming war and that Austria was then able to conquer Silesia. Napoleon thought it a stroke of good fortune to have received simultaneous proposals from Prussia and Austria. By a skilful employment of the situation the aggrandisement of France in the north or east was virtually assured. When he communicated the offer of Austria to the Italian government, the latter justly retorted that the conditional promise of a cession of Venetia did not present the slightest certainty; the conquest of Silesia by Austria was doubtful, and if it did succeed, Austria's position would be so much improved that she would certainly not feel disposed to redeem her pledge. Thereupon Austria professed readiness to sign a treaty which should secure Venetia unconditionally to the Italians. This offer presented a great temptation to Italy, but could only be accepted at the expense of a flagrant breach of faith towards Prussia. The Italian cabinet, after a debate of several hours, resolved on May 14 to refuse the offer, since the wish for war was already kindled in Italy, and the acceptance of the gift would certainly have been attributed by the republican portion of the population to the craven and dishonourable policy of the house of Savoy.

The negotiations nevertheless were so far profitable to Austria that Italy was no longer arming for a war to the knife, since she was almost certain to gain Venetia even if the result of the war was less favourable. Austrian diplomacy further succeeded in establishing closer relations with France. Napoleon once more attempted to induce Prussia to give a distinct undertaking with reference to cessions of territory on the Rhine. Bismarck, however, put him off with general promises; his "dilatatory" diplomacy, as he afterward expressed himself, aimed at rousing in Napoleon the belief that he was quite ready to be somewhat of a traitor to his country, but that the king would not hear a word of any cession of German territory to France. His policy was both bold and astute; he secured the neutrality of the emperor, without giving him the slightest pledge which compromised Prussia.

Napoleon, like almost all Frenchmen of that time, was convinced that Austria in the struggle with Prussia had the military superiority; the former in 1859 had often nearly gained a victory, and even after the battle of Solferino the Austrian army was far from being conquered (p. 252). The French, proud of their own military efficiency, believed that so redoubtable an opponent could not be beaten by any other army than that of France. For that reason their emperor had induced Italy to form an alliance with Prussia, in order to restore the balance of power; and similarly, he wished to secure his position for the probable event of an Austrian victory. Napoleon therefore concluded a secret treaty with the Vienna cabinet on June 12, in which Austria undertook to cede Venice, even in event of a victory, to Italy, which the emperor always favoured. The scheme which he had now made the goal of his policy was as follows: Venetia was to be ceded to Italy, Silesia to Austria, Schleswig-Holstein and other North German districts to Prussia, which in turn would have to give up considerable territory on the Rhine to France. But instead of arming in order to carry out this desirable solution, Napoleon thought he would pose as arbitrator of Europe after the exhaustion of his rivals. That was his mistake. The Italy of 1860, unprepared and poorly armed, had been easily forced to give up Nice and Savoy; but Napoleon never suspected that Prussia after the war would be strong enough to refuse the claims

of France. His mistake lay in adopting one and the same line of policy with Cavour and Bismarck, with Italians and Germans.

The nearer the war came, the more unfavourable became the diplomatic situation of Prussia. The ambassador at Paris, Count Goltz, warned his countrymen not to depend on the neutrality of Napoleon. The governments of the German secondary States felt themselves menaced by the propositions for federal reform (p. 293), and public opinion in South and West Germany was averse to Prussia. Any hope that Bavaria and Hanover would remain neutral disappeared; Saxony was closely united with Austria. It was peculiarly painful to King William that he was besieged with petitions from Prussian towns and communities praying for the maintenance of peace. Intense aversion to the war prevailed, especially in the Catholic districts on the Rhine; when the members of the Landwehr were called up, there was actual insubordination shown in some places. The king, therefore, considered it advisable to entertain the proposals for mediation which were now being mooted. When Anton von Gablenz, a Saxon landowner and brother of the Austrian general, came to Berlin to recommend a partition of Germany between the two powers, he received full authority to place this proposal before the Vienna cabinet. But the Austrian ministry rejected that mediation, obviously because his government had already decided for a war, and because Austria could no longer desert the minor German States, with which she practically had come to terms, and let them be partitioned at the last moment. It was Austria now who urged on the war and rendered Bismarck's steps easier. The Vienna cabinet thus refused the proposal, emanating from Napoleon, to send representatives to a congress, on the ground that the fate of Venetia would form the object of the negotiations; one great power could not allow other States to decide on its rights of ownership.

King William still hesitated to give the signal for war. By the 5th of June all Prussian army divisions on the southern frontier had taken up their posts. Moltke thought that the Prussian corps should advance concentrically into Saxony and Bohemia and attack the Austrians, who could hardly be ready to fight for another three weeks. But the king preferred to await the progress of the hostile measures which the Vienna cabinet was already taking in Schleswig-Holstein and Frankfurt. As a matter of fact, great impetuosity was shown at Vienna. The Austrian government summoned the Estates of Holstein to discuss the fate of the country, although by the terms of the treaty the duty was incumbent on them of exercising no control over Holstein without the assent of Prussia. When Prussia retorted by marching troops into Holstein, the Vienna cabinet called upon the German Confederation to order the mobilisation of the federal army against the violation of the federal treaty by Prussia. The decisive sitting of the federal diet was held on June 14. Prussia had explained to the minor States that she would regard the resolution to mobilise as a declaration of war. Nevertheless a motion of Bavaria was voted on, which, even if not expressly aimed against Prussia, still had for its object the formation of a federal army. When the motion was carried by 9 to 6 votes, the Prussian plenipotentiary, Karl Fried. von Savigny, announced the withdrawal of Prussia from the Confederation. King William immediately afterwards gave the order for the invasion of Saxony, Hanover, and Electoral Hesse.

7. THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE

A. HANOVER

AT the outbreak of the war some two hundred and ninety thousand Prussians were ready to march into Austria and Saxony; only forty-eight thousand were intended to fight the minor States. The latter indeed could put about one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers in the field; but Moltke went on the principle that the decisive blow must be struck on the chief scene of war with superior forces. The first blow was aimed at Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Nassau, whose sovereigns had refused to promise neutrality. The blind king George V of Hanover declared to the Prussian ambassador, Prince Gustav von Isenburg-Büdingen, that compliance with the demand of Prussia was equivalent to his being mediatised; but that he would never allow himself to be mediatised,—he would rather die an honourable death. Manteuffel thereupon advanced with his division into Hanover from Holstein, while Goeben and Beyer advanced from the west. General Vogel von Falckenstein held the supreme command of these troops. The Hanoverians, eighteen thousand strong, retreated before this superior force toward the south, and were successful in escaping the first plan, which calculated that they would still be at Göttingen; so that Falckenstein actually believed they had slipped from him. He abandoned the pursuit for a time; the troops of King George might have thus reached the forest of Thuringia by way of Gotha and Eisenach, and escaped to Bavaria in safety. It was only on Moltke's urgent warnings that Falckenstein finally sent Goeben's division to Eisenach; the road by way of Gotha was barred to them by General von Flies. King George thus saw himself surrounded. Flies, who was nearest to him, attacked him on June 27 with nine thousand men at Langensalza. The outnumbered Hanoverians bravely held the field; but immediately afterwards the net was drawn closer round them, and King George was forced to surrender on June 29.

B. THE WAR IN BOHEMIA

(a) *The First Movements of the Opposing Forces.*—The Prussian main army was faced by 248,000 Austrians, who were joined by 23,000 Saxons. The Austrian commander was Ludwig von Benedek, who had reaped a rich harvest of honours in the campaigns of 1848, 1849, and 1859; in the battle of Solferino he held the field on the right wing, and did not retire until the rest of the army had left the scene of action. He had been commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Italy, which he expected to command in the next war. He was imperturbable, experienced, and high-minded, but he recognised the limitations of his abilities. He knew that he was only adapted to be a general under less important conditions, such as on the scene of war in Upper Italy; he was lacking in the far-sighted intellect and thorough military education requisite for the leader of a large army. When finally against his will he accepted the supreme command against Prussia, he had to receive lectures from one of his officers on the military geography of Germany. Since popular opinion not merely in Austria, but also in South Germany, expected his nomination to the command of the northern army, the

emperor Francis Joseph begged him to overcome his scruples. He refused, and only gave way after the emperor had represented to him that he could not be allowed to desert the dynasty at a crisis. Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Baron Henikstein, as chief of the general staff, nominally stood at his side, but in reality Major-General Gideon von Krismanich conducted the operations. At his advice the army was stationed in Moravia, resting on Olmütz, and Bohemia occupied only by a small number of troops. In this latter country barely one army corps was stationed, under Count Eduard von Clam-Gallas (p. 251); the Saxons thereupon retreated.

Moltke's original plan to open the war by an attack, and by June 6 to invade Bohemia from all sides, had not been put into practice for diplomatic reasons. The divisions of the Prussian army were at this time posted in a long line of 400 kilometers (250 miles) from Halle to Neisse. According to Moltke's plan they were to unite their forces in the enemy's country. But when the attack had to be postponed, and it was reported at the Prussian headquarters that the Austrians were in Moravia, it was thought that Benedek was aiming a blow at Silesia. The divisions of the Prussian army therefore, which were stationed to the east, pushed toward the left and took up a strong position on the Neisse.

(b) *The Advance of the Prussians ; Benedek's Plan of Attack.* — This delay in taking the offensive was turned to account as soon as war was determined upon. On June 15 the advance guard of the army of the Elbe under General Karl Eberhard Herwarth von Bittenfeld, one and one-half army corps (48,800 men), marched into Saxony. The first army, consisting of three corps (97,000 men), assembled in Lusatia under Prince Frederick Charles; the second army finally, three and one-half corps (121,000 men) strong, was stationed in Silesia under the crown prince Frederick William. The corps of Von der Mülbe (25,000 men, mostly militia) followed as a reserve. All the divisions were ordered to enter Bohemia on June 21, and the district of Jitschin (Gitschin) was fixed as the rendezvous, where they were to meet on June 28. In consequence of the shifting of the Silesian corps toward the southeast on the Neisse, the distance which the army of the crown prince had to traverse to Jitschin was longer than the lines of march of Prince Frederick Charles and of the army of the Elbe. The separate advance of the Prussian divisions into Bohemia was thus attended with considerable danger. Moltke, whose hands had been hitherto tied by diplomatic considerations, knew this; and, remaining behind at first with the king in Berlin, he directed the movements of the three armies with marvellous foresight.

The Austrians received the order on June 20 to march out of their quarters in Moravia. Benedek, accurately informed by his intelligence department of the detached position of the Prussians, wished to lead his army opportunely between the advancing divisions and to defeat one after the other before they combined. The first army reached Reichenberg on June 23 and pressed on toward the Iser; the army of the Elbe marched parallel to it. The second army was still on Silesian soil, advancing toward the passes of the Riesengebirge (the Giant Mountains). As Benedek established his headquarters at Josefstadt in Bohemia on June 26, and Prince Frederick Charles had already traversed northern Bohemia, the Austrian leader selected him for his first opponent. He ordered the two

corps which he had stationed in Bohemia — the Austrian under Clam-Gallas, and the Saxon, 60,000 men in all — to face Prince Frederick Charles on the Iser in order to detain him. He himself put the main body of his army in movement toward the Iser.

(c) *The Battles of Trautenau, Nachod, and Skalitz (June 27 and 28).* — The troops of the crown prince crossed the Bohemian frontier in the passes of the Riesengebirge on June 26; Benedek, therefore, while wishing to attack Prince Frederick Charles with six army corps in all, sent back two corps under Gablenz (p. 289) and Ramming (p. 252) to guard the mountain passes against the second army. Since the movements of the Prussians were admirably combined, and one army was eager to relieve the other, these two Austrian corps were vigorously attacked on the 27th of June. Thus the Prussian I corps under General Adolf von Bonin was pitted against the Austrian corps of Gablenz at Trautenau, while General Karl Friedr. von Steinmetz met Ramming's force at Nachod. These sanguinary encounters resulted in a defeat of the Austrians at the latter place, and a victory at the other. Nevertheless it was already clear that the Prussian tactics were far superior to those of Austria. The Prussian needle-gun fired three times as fast as the Austrian muzzle-loader; and apart from this the "shock tactics" of the Austrians (p. 277), who tried to storm heights and belts of forest with the bayonet, were to a high degree disastrous. The Prussians brought the enemy's attack to a standstill by rapid firing; they then threw themselves in smaller divisions on the flanks of their adversary, and completed his overthrow. Hence the terrible losses of the Austrians even after a successful charge. At Trautenau, although victors, they lost 183 officers and 4,231 men killed and wounded, the Prussians only 56 officers and 1,282 men; at Nachod 5,700 Austrians fell, and only 1,122 Prussians. The superiority of the Prussians was manifest everywhere, — in the preparations for the war, in tactics, and in the better education of the officers and men.

On the evening of June 27 the gravity of these facts was not yet realised in the Austrian headquarters. Benedek therefore adhered to his plan of continuing his advance against Frederick Charles. This was, however, dangerous, because the nearer enemy, the crown prince, would certainly put himself more *en évidence* on the next day. Veteran officers advised Krismanić, under the circumstances, to abandon the attack on the first army and to hurl himself with all available troops against the second army. If this had been done, the crown prince would have had to contend against an attack by superior numbers. This was known at the Prussian headquarters, and Frederick William and his chief of the general staff, Leonhard von Blumenthal, made up their minds that they would have hard fighting on their further advance through the mountain passes. Bonin, after his reverse of June 27, had returned to Prussian territory, whereas the Guards advanced on the road to Eipel, and Steinmetz from Nachod towards Skalitz. The crown prince waited with his staff in the middle between these two columns, ready to hasten to the post of danger. The coolness and caution of the generalship, considering the difficult position, could not be surpassed. Benedek still obstinately held to his original plan. He actually inspected on the morning of June 28 the three corps concentrated against Steinmetz, without, however, striking a blow at him with these superior numbers. On the contrary,

he ordered the greater part of these troops to march against Frederick Charles, and commissioned the archduke Leopold in particular to take up a strong position behind the Elbe. By so doing he abandoned a favourable chance and made a miscalculation, for that very day the troops of the crown prince came up with the combined Austrian forces both at Skalitz and Trautenau. Archduke Leopold, contrary to Benedek's orders, offered battle at Skalitz, and brought a complete defeat on himself; out of the twenty thousand Austrians, five thousand were left on the field of battle. At the same time Gablenz, who had been victorious on the previous day at Trautenau, was defeated by the Guards under Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg near Trautenau. The crown prince had thus forced his way through the passes on June 28, and the way to the Elbe was free. It was now clear that in the duel between Prussia and Austria the Protestant power was superior strategically and intellectually.

(d) *Münchengrätz and Jitschin (June 28 and 29).* — The other Prussian commander had not pursued his object so vigorously as the crown prince. The advance guard of Prince Frederick Charles, whose chief of the general staff was General Konst. Bernh. von Voigts-Rhetz, reached the Iser on the 26th of June. The army of the Austrians and Saxons tried unsuccessfully to dispute the passage in a sanguinary night encounter at Podol. But the prince followed up his victory somewhat slowly, and allowed his advance to be checked by the rear-guard action, unfavorable indeed to the Austrians, at Münchengrätz on June 28. Moltke, who was carefully watching over the movements of the two armies, sent the prince the following telegram from Berlin on June 29: "His Majesty expects the first army, by a rapid advance, to relieve the second army, which, in spite of a series of successful engagements, finds itself now in a difficult position." In consequence of these orders the prince continued to advance with incomparable energy.

Benedek had meantime learnt with deep inward perturbation that his three corps, which had been moved against the crown prince, were defeated. This news produced such an effect on him that he gave up the offensive which he had intended to assume against Prince Frederick Charles. He resolved, at the advice of Krismanič, the "strategist of positions," to take up a naturally strong defensive position on the hills above the Elbe, and to await there subsequent attacks. He also sent to the combined Austrian-Saxon army an order to retire on to the main army. But unfortunately the intelligence department at his headquarters was so dilatory that this order had not arrived, when the troops of Prince Frederick Charles attacked the Saxons and the corps of Clam-Gallas on the afternoon of the 29th of June, at Jitschin. The commanders of the allies must have thought that the main army was near at hand, and that they ought therefore to defend Jitschin, the junction of the roads. They accepted the battle, and at first successfully resisted. Then about seven o'clock the Austrian officer arrived and handed in the order to retreat. The Austrians now wished to discontinue the battle, but were involved in disastrous engagements by the keen advance of the Prussians and were completely beaten. The Saxons of the crown prince Albert withdrew in good order; but the corps of Clam-Gallas broke up on the retreat, which lasted the whole night and the following day, and reached the main army in a deplorable condition.

(e) *The Retreat of the Austrians.*—The strong position occupied in the meantime by the Austrian main army was thus rendered untenable, for the two army corps, which were supposed to form the left wing, were defeated, and Prince Frederick Charles could attack the Austrians in flank and rear. Benedek was therefore forced to give the order for retreat in the night of June 30–July 1. Since the Prussians did not follow him at once, they did not know how far he had led his army back. King William and Moltke had meanwhile reached the army of Prince Frederick Charles on July 1. Moltke believed that the Austrians had occupied a strong position behind the Elbe, and were waiting behind the fortresses of Josefstadt and Königgrätz for the attack. They were, however, already halting behind the Bistritz, a tributary of the Elbe, where they had come exhausted by a disorderly night march. Benedek, through these events, had lost all hope of victory; and when, on the morning of July 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich von Beck came into his camp with instructions from the emperor Francis Joseph to report on the condition of the army, a council of war had decided on a further retreat behind the Elbe, and, if necessary, even to Olmütz or toward Vienna. This gloomy state of affairs was expressed in a telegram which was sent immediately afterwards by the Austrian commander to the emperor, urgently advising him to conclude peace at any price. A disaster for the army was inevitable. Francis Joseph believed, however, he could not declare himself conquered without a pitched battle. He therefore answered, "Peace is impossible. We must retreat if necessary. Has any battle taken place?" This expression of the emperor's will seems to have determined Benedek to accept a pitched battle, and as the Prussians were rapidly advancing he made instant preparations for it.

Late in the evening of July 2 the news was brought to the Prussian headquarters that the Austrians were still in front of the Elbe, ready to accept the challenge. It was determined by King William and Moltke, after deliberation, to attack the enemy at once in full force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Count Reinhold Finck von Finckenstein (killed at Mars-la-Tours, 1870) was sent, while it was still night, to the crown prince to summon him to start at once. Major-General von Blumenthal had lately advised the two Prussian armies, who were no longer prevented from joining forces, to concentrate tactically to the west of the Elbe, in order thus to obviate the danger of being separated in a pitched battle. Moltke, however, ordered that the plan of separating the armies should still be observed, but in such a way that the armies on the day of battle might join forces by a rapid march. He wanted to be able to attack the Austrians in the front with one army, and on the flank with another. The greatness of Moltke lies in this bold strategy, which aims at the complete annihilation of the enemy by enclosing him between broad advancing masses; the application of this method enabled him in 1870 to capture entire armies.

(f) *The Battle of Königgrätz.*—The Austrians and Saxons on the morning of the battle of Königgrätz, July 3, were two hundred and fifteen thousand men strong, drawn up in close formation. The great disadvantage of their position was that they had the Elbe in their rear; but, of course, several bridges had been thrown across it. The centre and the left wing pointed west, and awaited the attack of Prince Frederick Charles; the right wing, consisting of the fourth and second

corps, was ordered to face north, since the advance of the second army might be expected from that quarter.

The crown prince, following the orders given him, started immediately at early morning, but he did not reach the battlefield before noon. In the meantime the first army attacked the centre; the Elbe army, the right wing of the Austrian army. The Elbe army made good progress; on the other hand, Prince Frederick Charles vainly exhausted his efforts against the strong centre of the Austrians. The Austrian artillery was planted in tiers on the hills of Chlum, Lipa, and Langenhof, and at once precluded any attempt at an infantry attack. Since Prince Frederick Charles was compelled to wait until the crown prince joined his left wing, the weak spot in his line was there, for the Austrians, temporarily superior in numbers, might outflank him. It was fortunate for the Prussians that the seventh division was stationed there under the brave Major-General Eduard Friedr. von Fransecky, who covered the weakness of his position by a determined and splendid offensive. He advanced into the Swiepwald, drove out the Austrians, and from that position harassed their right wing, which was ordered to hold its ground against the expected attack of the crown prince. The Austrian generals, Count Thassilo Festetics and Count Karl von Thun-Hohenstein, feeling themselves attacked by Fransecky, intended to beat this enemy first at any cost. Lured on by the hope of military fame, they left their position, which faced north; the fourth corps, under the command of General Anton Ritter Mollinary von Monte Pastello, after Festetics was wounded, tried to deprive the Prussians of the Swiepwald. This attack was at first repelled with loss, and the wood could not be captured by the Austrians until a part of the second corps turned against Fransecky. Hitherto eleven Prussian battalions had held their ground against fifty-nine Austrian battalions.

The battle, however, at noon was extremely favourable to the Austrians. King William looked anxiously toward the north, where the crown prince had long been vainly expected. Benedek deliberated whether he ought not now to bring up his strong reserves and win a victory by a vigorous assault on the Prussian centre. But he felt himself crippled by the news, which reached him three hours earlier than King William and Moltke, that the crown prince was approaching. Benedek saw also, with uneasiness, how his right wing, intent upon the struggle in the Swiepwald, left great gaps toward the north. It thus happened that the second army, when it came on the scene at noon, was able at the first onset to overlap the Austrian right wing. The Prussian Guards and the sixth corps were in the first line; the corps of Bonin and Steinmetz followed after. The Guards pressed on victoriously, conquered, after a short fight, the key of the Austrian position, the village of Chlum, and soon afterwards Lipa also. Startling as was this onslaught of the Prussians, and great as was its success, Benedek still thought it possible to retrieve the day. He brought up his reserves in order to retake Chlum. The Austrians, charging bravely, actually drove back the Guards by their superior force. They were on the point of entering Chlum when, rather late, the Prussian corps under Bonin appeared, repulsed the Austrians, and soon afterwards their defeat was decided. The army of Prince Frederick Charles, hitherto kept in check, now advanced, and the Prussian cavalry was called upon to complete the victory. Although the Austrian cavalry stopped this pursuit in the battle of Streschewitz, the masses of infantry, abandoning all order, poured down on the

Elbe, looking for the bridges over the river. It was fortunate for them that they were not pursued by the Prussian infantry. The Austrians, although terrible disorder prevailed in places among them while crossing the Elbe, were able to reach the left bank of the Elbe in the night of July 4. Their losses were terrible; they amounted in killed, wounded, and prisoners to more than 44,000 men, some half of whom, wounded or unwounded, were taken prisoners. The Prussians had 1,335 killed and 9,200 wounded. Most of the Austrians had fallen during their fruitless attacks in dense masses on the Prussian needle-guns.

C. THE BATTLE OF CUSTOZA

THIS crushing disaster was only slightly compensated by the victory which the Austrians won on June 24, 1866, over the Italians at Custoza. The Italians were twice as strong as the army of 74,000 men under Archduke Albert; but they made the mistake of dividing their army, and of crossing the Mincio with the larger part, while the smaller part, under Enrico Cialdini, Duke of Gaeta, was intended to cross the Po. Archduke Albert, who was supported by Major-General Franz Freiherr von John as chief of the general staff, threw himself with an irresistible attack on the army advancing from the west under the king and La Marmora, and unexpectedly attacking its left wing gained the victory (see the inset on the map facing page 297).

8. THE LAST STRUGGLES AND THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

A. THE ADVANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN TO THE DANUBE; THE STRUGGLES IN WESTERN AND SOUTHERN GERMANY

FRANCIS JOSEPH thought it necessary after the battle of Königgrätz to call in the mediation of France. The official Paris journal announced on July 5, 1866, that Venetia had been ceded by Austria to the emperor Napoleon. Austria counted confidently that the French emperor would urge Italy to neutrality, and would check the victorious career of Prussia by stationing an army on the Rhine. Advice to this effect was given to the emperor by his minister of the exterior, Drouyn de l'Huys (p. 216). But France was not prepared for war; the emperor was at that time incapacitated by a torturing disease, and he therefore allowed himself to be persuaded by Prince Jérôme (originally Joseph; p. 250), as well as by his ministers, the Marquis de Lavalette and Eugène Rouher, to abandon the idea of hostilities against Prussia, in order to win territorial concessions from King William by negotiations. The Prussian ambassador Count Goltz (p. 295) adroitly represented to him how much more favourable an amicable arrangement with Prussia would be for him. From this moment onwards France had played for the last time her rôle as leading power in Europe.

Prussia was energetic in reaping the fruits of her victory. Goltz kept Napoleon in suspense by courteous hints, without pledging the Prussian government in any matter. When the French diplomatist Benedetti (see explanation of plate on page 246) appeared at the Prussian headquarters in Moravia, with a commission from

Napoleon, the circumstance aroused fear in Bismarck that Napoleon would now come forward with his claims; but it appeared that Benedetti had none but vague orders, and was only intended to hinder the entry of the Prussians into the Austrian capital. Meantime Benedek in his rapid retreat had reached Olmütz with his army. The second army was ordered to watch and follow him, while the first marched southward on Vienna. Since Austria thought its southern frontier was secured by the cession of Venetia, the larger part of the field army stationed in Italy, fifty-seven thousand men, was ordered to the northern theatre of war. Archduke Albert assumed the supreme command. Benedek was instructed to withdraw from Olmütz to the Danube, in order that the newly collected army might be on the defensive behind the river. But the defeated general loitered so long in Olmütz that detachments of the army of the crown prince were able to get in front of his army. Benedek's marching columns were attacked on July 15 near Tobitschau, south of Olmütz, and suffered a serious reverse; eighteen cannon fell into the hands of the Prussians. Benedek was thus forced to abandon his march southward and withdrew toward Hungary, in order to reach the Danube by a *détour* along the Waag. In consequence of this, the Prussians were able to appear on the Danube earlier than he could.

Meantime the Prussians were fighting successfully against the minor States. General Vogel von Falckenstein, after the capture of the Hanoverians (p. 296), had orders to force himself at Fulda between the Bavarian army and the eighth federal corps (Württemberg, Hesse, Baden), in order to attack first the one and then the other. The Bavarian general, Prince Charles, ordered the commander of the eighth corps, Prince Alexander of Hesse, to join forces with him; but the federal diet wished that Alexander should first protect Frankfurt, and induced him to postpone the junction. This made it possible for the Bavarians to be attacked and defeated by Goeben's division at Kissingen on July 10, 1866. Although Moltke now ordered General Falckenstein to pursue at once the main body of the enemy, the Bavarians, and crush them, Falckenstein thought it better to capture Frankfurt first. He defeated the federal corps in the engagements of Laufach and Aschaffenburg and entered the Free City victoriously. But, since by so doing he had disobeyed the orders from the king's headquarters, he was deprived of the supreme command; and on July 19 General Manteuffel (p. 289) took his place. Once more the Prussians were enabled to attack individually their disunited opponents, and to defeat, first the federal corps at Bischofsheim and Wertheim, and then the Bavarians at Neubrunn and Rossbrunn. The brave German troops, who were destined to cover themselves with glory in 1870, were forced to yield then, because there was no unity or clear plan among their commanders.

B. NICHOLSBURG; LISSA.

GOLTZ, yielding to the pressure of Napoleon, had concluded with him on July 14 preliminary agreements as a basis for peace. The withdrawal of Austria from the German Confederation was fixed as the first condition; but the dominions of the Austrian monarchy were not to suffer any loss except that of Venetia. Prussia; in addition, stipulated for the right to form a North-German confederation

under her own military supremacy, and to annex Schleswig-Holstein. A South-German confederation was to be organised, with an independent position on every side. Napoleon intervened with these proposals between the two belligerent States. Bismarck would have been glad if he could have concluded peace with Austria alone, without Napoleon, since there was always the fear that France would come forward during the negotiations with demands of territory for herself. Bismarck explained this to the Vienna cabinet, and added that Prussia in this case would renounce any claim for indemnification of the costs of the war. But Austria made the mistake of regarding France as a friend and declined the offer. This was a serious error, since Napoleon was solely animated by the wish to win, through good offices to Prussia, the consent of the latter to his designs on Belgium and the Rhenish provinces. Napoleon therefore, when King William declared that the terms agreed upon by his ambassador in Paris on July 14 were insufficient and demanded the annexation of extensive districts of North Germany, lost no time in giving his assent to the demand; he would have sacrificed even Saxony on these grounds without compunction. Prussia had now secured the prize of victory and concluded an armistice with Austria. Immediately before that, Moltke wished to make another successful *coup*. General Fransecky was ordered to occupy Pressburg, in order that on any outbreak of war the Prussian army might secure the passage of the Danube. An engagement was fought at Blumenau on July 22; but it was left undecided, since at noon both sides received the news that an armistice had been concluded.

The preliminary peace was signed in Nicholsburg. The parties were soon agreed, since Austria, after her severe defeat, was forced to consent that Prussia should have a free hand in Germany. King William would indeed gladly have acquired for Prussia some Austrian territory, especially Austrian Silesia and parts of Northern Bohemia. He only gave way at the earnest representations of Bismarck, that if he pressed his claims too much he would risk what he had already won. The last difficulty disappeared when Prussia consented to a condition laid down by Austria and recognised the inviolability of the kingdom of Saxony. The preliminary peace was concluded on this basis (July 26). The treaty of Prague followed on August 23.

The convention between Austria and Italy presented more difficulties. The Italian admiral Persano at the outset of the war received orders to secure a pledge for Italy by occupying the Dalmatian island of Lissa. During the bombardment of the capital of the island the Austrian admiral Tegetthoff (p. 289) appeared on the scene, attacked the Italian fleet on July 20, 1866, sank the "*Rè d' Italia*" with his own flagship, and forced the Italian fleet to retire. Since Garibaldi also, on invading the Italian Tyrol, was defeated by the Austrian general Kuhn in several engagements, Italy was compelled to be satisfied with the treaty concluded on October 3, by which Venetia was ceded.

C. BISMARCK'S DIPLOMACY

THE superior diplomacy of Bismarck was now able, under the impression caused by the Prussian victories, to unite non-Austrian Germany, hitherto torn by factions, at any rate against the contingency of a war. Above all, he induced the

Prussia in XIX. Century.



king to terminate the conflict with the Prussian House of Representatives by offering the hand of friendship to it in his speech from the throne on August 5, 1866. There were irreconcilable conservatives who urged the king to use the foreign victory for the complete overthrow of the liberal party; but the royal speech expressly recognised that the expenditure incurred for military purposes would have subsequently to be sanctioned by the Landtag, and therefore asked an indemnity for such expenses. In this point the king followed, not without hesitation, the advice of Bismarck. In the conversation with the president of the House of Representatives he declared that in a similar case he would not be able to act otherwise than he had done before; but this statement, for which Bismarck declined responsibility, was fortunately not made public until later.

Not less clever was his treatment of the conquered secondary States. Bismarck set up the principle that full incorporation or a complete amnesty to the individual States was the just course; the entry of those who were chosen members of the new federation ought not to be burdened with hard conditions. Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort-on-Main were fully incorporated, by which means the Prussian territory was enlarged by thirteen hundred square miles (German). On the other hand, the demands for a war indemnity imposed by Prussia on the remaining States were moderate. The greatest triumph of his negotiations was that Würtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria concluded, between the 13th and 21st of August, 1866, a defensive and offensive alliance, on the basis of which their military forces were, in case of war, to be under the command of Prussia. These provisions, which were kept secret for the moment, constitute the foundation of the union of Germany.

This favourable event had been chiefly effected by the action of Napoleon, who had unwisely let the right time slip past, and only now stretched out his hands to German territory. Bismarck, with the most subtle diplomatic skill, had fed the king with false hopes until the war was decided. The emperor now demanded the price of his neutrality. His ambassador, Benedetti, in an interview with Bismarck on August 5 demanded the Rhenish Palatinate with Mainz, as well as the district on the Saar. Bismarck then haughtily opposed him. He threatened that, if France insisted upon these claims, he would at once, and at any cost, make peace with the South Germans and advance in alliance with them to conquer Alsace and Lorraine. Napoleon was alarmed, since his forces were no match for the gigantic war equipment of Germany. Prussia alone had 660,000 men with the colours. But Bismarck took care that the demands of France were published in a Paris journal, so that the national feeling of the Germans was intensely aroused. On the strength of these impressions, the above-mentioned alliances with the South German States were brought about. Germany was thus put in a sufficiently strong position to defend every inch of national soil against East and West. Napoleon III was diplomatically defeated before he was conquered on the field of battle. Drouyn de l'Huys, since the emperor would not listen to his proposals for forcing on a war, took farewell, and said, "I have seen three dynasties come and go. I know the signs of approaching disaster, and I withdraw."

IV

WESTERN EUROPE IN THE YEARS 1866-1902

By PROFESSOR DR. GOTTLÖB EGELHAAF

1. WESTERN EUROPE, 1866-1871

A. THE AMALGAMATION OF THE NEW PROVINCES WITH THE KINGDOM
OF PRUSSIA

ON October 3, 1866, King William formally took possession by letters-patent of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort-on-Main, which the peace of Prague (p. 304) had assigned to him by the law of nations, and whose incorporation into Prussia had been sanctioned by the Landtag of the monarchy in September. The king declared in his speech to the Hanoverians on the same day that he honoured the grief which they experienced in tearing themselves from earlier and endeared connections, but that the interests of the nation dictated the firm and lasting union of Hanover with Prussia, and that Germany should be the gainer by the acquisitions of Prussia. However correct these principles were, a large part of the Hanoverians were little inclined to recognise them and to submit to the inevitable. Devotion to the Guelfic house, above all to the king George V, whose blindness made him an object of universal pity, and his spouse, the universally beloved Queen Mary; the consideration that the gentry of the country would be ousted from the exclusive possession of the high offices of state; that the capital would be severely injured by the loss of the court; that antiquated but familiar methods of business would be broken down on all sides by the Prussian freedom of trade and freedom of movement; the traditional dislike of the Hanoverians for the Prussians, especially for the Berliners, who were decried as supercilious and empty-headed; in short, personal feeling and practical interests, — combined in producing the result that the Prussian rule was only endured by the nobility, the clergy, and a large part of the citizens and peasants, with a silent indignation. The king, who had fled to the Castle of Hietzing, near Vienna, added fuel to the discontent by a manifesto to his people on October 5, in which he declared, in opposition to the warrant of William I, that the incorporation of his land into Prussia was null and void, and expressed his confidence in the Almighty that He would restore Hanover to the Guelfic house "as He had done sixty years ago, when the same injustice from the same quarter was not allowed to continue." Societies were secretly formed throughout the country whose aim was this restoration, and it was proposed to hold a "Hanoverian Legion" in readiness, which, should a crisis arise, might be on the spot sword in

hand. The hatred of the people toward Prussia was shown in the abuse showered on individuals, especially on Prussian soldiers.

It is interesting to hear that Bismarck entertained the idea, which had once been successfully realised by Cleisthenes at Athens (cf. Vol. IV, p. 279), of breaking up the existing combinations, and creating out of them new forms of political life, which should facilitate the fusion of the old and new parts of the country. According to his speech in the House of Representatives on February 5, 1867, he wished to redivide all the country west of the Elbe into four large provinces, which should correspond to the mediæval tribes, and be called Old Franconia, Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Thuringia. Old and New Prussia were to be merged in these provinces as a means of softening the contrast between them and the rest of the Prussian State. Bismarck did not succeed in carrying out this idea; "the States, gradually created by political events, showed themselves stronger than the original tribes."

No course was left but to govern the province of Hanover, which remained unaltered in itself, with a benevolent but firm hand, and to trust in the all-effacing power of time. Dictatorial powers in the new territorial divisions had been granted to the government until September 30, 1867, and the Prussian constitution was to come into force in those parts on October 1, 1867. Advantage was taken of this circumstance to send an order to the governor-general, Von Voigts-Rhetz (p. 299), that all officials on whose implicit co-operation no reliance could be placed should without further delay be removed from their posts; a number of Guelf agitators also were confined in the fortress of Minden. This measure was so far effective that outward tranquillity was restored; but there were indications that among the people loyalty to the Guelfs was by no means predominant. On October 1 thirty-nine representatives to the Second Chamber, and seventy delegates from the communes, declared that they accepted the annexation as an unalterable fact brought on by the obstinacy of the former government itself; and when on October 11 a special Hanoverian corps, the tenth, was raised, four hundred and twenty-five out of six hundred and sixty Hanoverian officers, that is to say, almost two-thirds, at once went into the Prussian service, — a circumstance which, it may be well understood, caused a bitter disappointment to the banished king.

Things went far more smoothly in Electoral Hesse and Nassau than in Hanover; in the former the despotic rule of Elector Frederick William I, and in the latter the inconsiderate exercise of forest rights and the refusal to grant the liberal constitution of 1849, whose restoration the Landtag vainly demanded, had caused the subjects to dislike their sovereigns so that the end of the system of petty States was universally felt to be a release from unendurable conditions. The feeling in Frankfurt was very bitter, since the town where the ancient emperors were elected, one of the most important commercial capitals of South Germany, was reduced from a free city to a provincial Prussian town; even the immediate and enormous development of the city, which, as soon as it was freed from its isolation, outstripped all the other South German towns except Munich, could not banish the mortification felt at the loss of independence.

Bismarck and the king were indefatigably busy in meeting, so far as was feasible, the wishes of the annexed districts in order to win them over to the new order of things. Electoral Hesse owed to the personal intervention of the monarch the fact that half of its State treasure was left in 1867 as a provincial fund, to

provide for workhouses, the maintenance of the poor, and for the national library; and the province of Hanover received in February, 1868, the yearly grant of a sum of five hundred thousand thalers for purposes of local administration. Ample pecuniary compensation was also made to the deposed sovereigns. The elector of Hesse received in September, 1867, the other moiety of the State treasure, which had accumulated from the subsidies paid by England in 1776 for the troops sent to America. The Duke of Nassau was assigned, in September, 1867, some castles and fifteen million gulden (= twenty-seven million marks), and King George received in the same month a capital sum of sixteen million thalers, the income of which was to be paid him in half-yearly instalments, though the sum itself remained in the hands of trustees until an agreement had been made with his relations as to its administration. It was naturally supposed in view of these friendly concessions, which were only sanctioned by the Prussian Landtag after a hard contest, that the three princes would tacitly, if not expressly, waive all claims to their former territories. But since King George in February, 1868, and Elector Frederick William in September, 1868, publicly made violent attacks upon Prussia, the sums due to the two sovereigns in March and September, 1868, were sequestrated. Since George brought his Guelf legion to seven hundred and fifty men, and kept them in France unarmed (as "fugitives"), a law of spring, 1869, provided that the interest of the sequestrated sixteen million thalers should be applied to warding off the schemes devised by the king and his emissaries to disturb the peace of Prussia. From Bismarck's saying, "We will pursue these obnoxious reptiles into their holes," the sum of money in question was soon universally called the Reptile fund; it was mostly employed on newspaper articles in support of the new order of things. It was not until 1892 that the sequestration was ended in favour of Duke Ernest Augustus of Cumberland, son of George V.

In Schleswig-Holstein (p. 291) the feeling in favour of Duke Frederick still continued; but the certainty that the Prussian eagle would once for all protect the duchies against the detested Danish yoke, and the propaganda of a Danish nationality which was now awakening in the Danish border districts of Schleswig, contributed slowly but surely to the end that the largely predominant German population learnt to adapt itself to the new conditions. The brave spirit of the duke, who saw his fondest hopes blighted, and scorned to foment a useless resistance to the detriment of the duchies, helped much to tranquillize men's minds and prepared them for the day when his daughter Augusta Victoria should wear the imperial crown.

B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

PRUSSIA, at the moment when it withdrew from the German Confederation and began the war against Austria, had invited all the North German States to conclude a new league. In August, 1866, nineteen governments, which had fought on Prussia's side in the war, professed their readiness to take that step. Meiningen and the elder line of Reuss, which had stood on the side of Austria, did the same after some hesitation, and the old anti-Prussian Duke Bernhard of Meiningen abdicated in favour of his son George. Ministerial conferences were opened in

Berlin on December 15, under the presidency of Bismarck, to which representatives were sent by all the North German governments, and by Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt for their territory right of the Main. The fundamental principles of a new federal constitution were settled in these conferences. According to it the presidency of the confederation should belong to the king of Prussia in so far that he should represent the confederation in foreign politics, declare peace and war in its name, superintend the execution of the federal resolutions, nominate all officials of the confederation, and command its army and fleet. The Federal Council was to represent the governments, and in it (on the basis of the voting conditions in the former German Confederation) seventeen votes should be given by Prussia, four by Saxony, two each by Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick, one by each of the remaining eighteen States, — making forty-three votes in all. The Federal Council shared in the whole work of legislation, and represented the sovereigns of the confederation. The people were to share in the legislation by means of a Reichstag springing from the direct universal suffrage. This Reichstag possessed also initiative rights; it was not proposed to pay the deputies. The following were declared to be federal matters: the army and navy, in which connection (by article 56) the peace strength of the army was fixed at one per cent of the population of 1867, and the right of increasing it every ten years was reserved; then foreign policy, posts and telegraphs, tolls and trade. The finances were to be based on the tolls, the compulsory taxes, and the profits of the posts and telegraphs. To supply any deficit in the revenue the individual States were pledged to "register contributions" in proportion to the numbers of their population. The federal budget was to be sanctioned for periods of three years; the expenses of the army were estimated at the rate of two hundred and twenty-five thalers a head in perpetuity. After different objections had been successfully raised against certain of these provisions, they were finally approved on February 2, 1867, and in that form submitted to the constituent Reichstag elected on February 12.

It was a matter of the greatest importance for the party conditions in this Reichstag that in the autumn of 1866, when an effort was being made to get rid of the Prussian dispute, two new parties appeared on the scene. The National Liberal party had been founded on October 24, by men like Max von Forckenbeck, Friedr. Hammacher, Ed. Lasker, Otto Michaelis, Karl Twesten, Hans Viktor von Unruh; it shook itself free from the Progressive party, which was sinking more and more into a policy of barren negotiations, and aimed at a confidential and vigorous association with the great statesman who had shown by his actions that he was not the bigoted country squire (*Junker*) which, according to the outcry of the Progressives, he always had been and still was. "We are united," said the National Liberal programme of June 13, 1867, "by the thought that national unity cannot be attained and permanently established without the complete satisfaction of the liberal claims of the people." While the assenting members of the Left thus took up a position of their own, the moderate Conservatives took an identical step and founded the Free Conservative party (since 1871 called also the "German Empire party"), which proposed to unite the observance of sound Conservative principles, respect for authority and support of the monarchy, with wise progress and the maintenance of civil liberty. In the constituent Reichstag the Conservatives numbered 59 deputies; the Free Conservatives, 36; the Old Lib-

erals, who stood near them, 27; the National Liberals, 79; Progressives, only 19. In addition there were 18 Particularists, 12 Poles, 2 Danes, 1 Social Democrat (Aug. Bebel), and a number of "wild" politicians. The decision lay with the two parties whose principles brought them into touch, and who, in the phrase of the day, were termed the Right and Left Centre, the Free Conservatives and the National Liberals.

The Reichstag chose for president Eduard Simson, who had presided at the National Assembly in Frankfurt 1848-1849, and thus was outwardly connected with the traditions of the Hereditary Imperial party. The feeling prevailed in the debates that, whatever might be the private views of the representatives, it was impossible to disregard the wishes of the State governments, and that, under all the circumstances, something must be effected by mutual concessions. Bismarck gave vigorous expression to his feeling in his speech of March 11, 1867, one of the most powerful which he ever made, when he appealed to those who would not sanction any diminution of the Prussian budget rights in the case of army estimates. "The mighty movements, which last year induced the nations from the Belt to the Adriatic, from the Rhine to the Carpathians, to play that iron game of dice where royal and imperial crowns are the stake, the thousands and thousands of victims of the sword and of disease, who by their death sealed the national decision, cannot be reconciled with a resolution *ad acta*. Gentlemen, if you believe that, you are not masters of the situation! . . . How would you answer a veteran of Königgrätz if he asked after the results of these mighty efforts? You would say to him, perhaps, 'Yes, indeed, nothing has been done about German union; that will come in time. But we have saved the budget right of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, the right of endangering every year the existence of the Prussian army; for this we have fought with the emperor under the walls of Pressburg. Console yourself with that, brave soldier, and let the widow, too, who has buried her husband, find consolation there.' Gentlemen, this position is an impossibility! Let us work quickly, let us put Germany in the saddle, and she will soon learn to ride."

In the course of the conferences some forty amendments to the bill were discussed by the Reichstag. Thus the confederation acquired the right of levying not only indirect but direct taxes; every alteration in the army and the fleet was made dependent on the express sanction of the president. Criminal jurisdiction, legal procedure, and in private law contract rights at least were transferred to the confederation. The federal chancellor was to accept by his signature the moral, not legal, responsibility for the enactments of the president. The voting for the Reichstag was to be secret; the eligibility of officials as candidates was to be recognised. Accurate reports of the public sittings of the Reichstag were to be secure against prosecution. The deputies were to be paid. The federal budget was to be passed for one year only, instead of three. In military matters the proviso that one hundredth of the population of 1867 should serve with the colours in peace time, and the rate of two hundred and twenty-five thalers per head were only to be in force until December 31, 1871. The confederation was given the right to raise loans in urgent cases; in the case of denial of justice in any State the confederation was bound (if a remedy could not be obtained by legal methods) to interfere and afford lawful help. As regarded the entry of one or more of the South German States into the confederation, it was settled that this should be

effected, on the motion of the president, by means of a legislative act. Finally, alterations of the constitution were treated in the same way, but a two-thirds majority in the federal council was requisite.

The federal governments accepted nearly all of these resolutions; Bismarck, in their name, lodged protests against two of them in the Reichstag on April 15. First, against the grant of daily pay to the representatives in the Reichstag. In the eyes of the governments the limitation of eligibility imposed by the non-granting of allowances was an indispensable counterpoise to universal suffrage. The Reichstag accordingly abandoned the daily allowances. Secondly, the governments regarded it as thoroughly inadmissible that the existence of the army after December 31, 1871, should be dependent on the annual votes of fluctuating majorities, while the expenditure on the civil administration was legally fixed. Rudolf Gneist, a deputy, called attention to the fact that the lower house might well refuse the expenses of a mercenary army, such as existed in England, but that a national army, like the German, must be regarded as a permanent institution. The governments would have preferred that, according to the original scheme, the minimum strength of the army should have been settled once for all, and a permanent provision voted for maintaining it. They finally (April 17) declared their agreement to the proposal introduced by Prince Hugo von Hohenlohe-Ohringen, Duke of Ujest, in the name of the Free Conservatives, and in the name of the National Liberals by their Hanoverian leader Rudolf von Bennigsen. This, which was accepted on April 15, provided that the present peace strength of the army, fixed in article 56 (henceforward 60), of the constitution on the second reading until December 31, 1871, at one hundredth of the population, and the lump sum of two hundred and twenty-five thalers per head of the army, should be kept in force beyond the 31st of December, 1871, but only so long as they should not be altered by federal laws; but the disbursement of sums for the entire national army was to be annually fixed by State law. On April 17, 1867, the king closed the constituent Reichstag with a speech from the throne, which expressed his satisfaction that the federal power had obtained its necessary authority, and that the members of the confederation had retained freedom of movement in every department where it might be advantageous for them.

After the Landtags of the individual States had declared their assent, the constitution became a reality on July 1, 1867. Only about four-fifths of the German people were now united in the "North German Confederation;" but this union was closer, and hence more powerful, than any previous one in Germany; and for the first time in their history the German people possessed the assured right of co-operating in the framing of their fortunes by the mouths of freely elected representatives. The South Germans, indeed, still held aloof; but the universal feeling was, as Johannes Miquel, a Hanoverian National Liberal, expressed it, "The line of the Main is no longer a spectre, but only a halting-place for us, where we can take water and coal on board, and can recover our breath in order soon to proceed further on our route."

C. THE DIFFICULTIES AND EXPEDIENTS OF NAPOLEON

(a) *The Luxemburg Affair.*—During the deliberations of the Reichstag a heavy storm-cloud had gathered, but had happily been dispersed. The French

emperor Napoleon III had attempted on August 5, 1866 (cf. p. 305), to obtain "compensations" for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the union of Northern Germany, by demanding Rhenish Hesse with Mainz and the Bavarian Rhenish Palatinate. Having met with a flat refusal, he had claimed, as his reward for leaving Germany to Prussia, both Belgium and Luxemburg; the latter, which was ruled by William III of the Netherlands under the title of Grand Duke, contained some two hundred thousand inhabitants on an area of twenty-six hundred square kilometers. Bismarck prolonged the negotiations in this matter, since he did not wish to irritate France beyond endurance, and so drive her into the arms of the enemies of Prussia. He did not return any definite answer to the offer which he simultaneously received of an offensive and defensive alliance with the French Empire; but, so far as Luxemburg was concerned, left no doubt in the mind of Count Benedetti, the French ambassador, that King William would decline to give France any active assistance in acquiring it, and at most would passively tolerate the proceeding.

But in order to give a timely intimation to friend and foe that any outbreak of war would find Germany united, Bismarck published on March 19, 1867, the offensive and defensive alliances which Prussia had concluded in August, 1866, with Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden (p. 305), and which were joined also by Hesse-Darmstadt on April 11, 1867. Three points were established by these treaties. (1) North and South Germany supported each other in case of war with their entire military force; (2) this force stood under the single and supreme command of the king of Prussia; (3) all the States guaranteed to each other the integrity of their respective territories. Napoleon, indeed, persuaded King William III of the Netherlands to conclude a treaty, in virtue of which the latter ceded to the emperor his right to Luxemburg, in return for a compensation of five million francs; but the king, who very reluctantly surrendered Luxemburg, insisted on Prussia's formal assent to the treaty, and, as already mentioned, this assent was not forthcoming. On April 1 Rudolph von Bennigsen, according to a previous agreement with the government, put a question to Bismarck on the subject of Luxemburg, and the result was to show that the whole nation was unanimously resolved to prevent at all hazards the smallest encroachment on German territory, even on territory which was only connected with the body of the nation by the bond of the Zollverein (as had been the case with Luxemburg after the dissolution of the German Confederation). "If we fail to do this," exclaimed Bennigsen, "the stamp of an un-German weakness will mark our policy." Napoleon, whose military resources were not ready for a collision with Germany, finally recoiled before this determined declaration, and all the more so because Austria, where, since October 30, 1866, the Saxon Baron von Beust presided at the Foreign Office, was not induced even by the offer of Silesia to form an armed alliance against Prussia. Austria had felt, too recently and too acutely, the military superiority of Prussia to venture on a new war especially one against the entire German nation.

On the proposal of the Czar Alexander II a conference of all the great powers was summoned at London, and this decided that Luxemburg should be left to the house of Nassau-Orange, but be declared neutral. Prussia accordingly had to withdraw her garrison from the former federal fortress, Luxemburg, and to allow the destruction of its fortifications. But Luxemburg remained in the Zollverein as before. The inglorious termination of a matter far from glorious in itself was

very detrimental to Napoleon's reputation; the victories of Prussia and the formation of the North German Confederation (just as the creation of the kingdom of Italy some few years before) were reckoned by all supporters of the doctrine of France's natural and "legitimate" hegemony in Europe as severe defeats to France. "Now," exclaimed Thiers, half in menace half in warning, before the Chamber in March, 1867, "no further blunders may be committed." The emperor felt himself deeply injured that Prussia had refused the enlargement of France, which he so ardently desired. "Bismarck has attempted to deceive me," he afterwards said to Heinrich von Sybel, "but an emperor of France may not let himself be deceived." Even the Catholic party was indignant with him, because he had allowed the revolution a free hand and had left the Pope to be despoiled (p. 271). The Republican opposition completely outdid itself in most venomous attacks on the emperor, of which Victor Hugo and A. Rogeard made themselves the mouthpieces.

And now, to crown all, there came the crash of the Mexican expedition. The emperor gave way before the threat of the United States that they would treat the continued presence of a French army on American soil as a *casus belli*. The desperate entreaties of the empress Charlotte, who came to Europe in July, 1866, to plead her husband's cause, were useless; when she realised her position, her reason gave way. Between the end of January and the middle of March, 1867, the French troops, under François Achille Bazaine (cf. p. 338), withdrew from Mexico, and Maximilian, who was too proud to desert his followers in the hour of danger, and still hoped to strengthen the fading influence of his party by liberal concessions, was taken prisoner at Querétaro, together with Generals Miguel Miramon and Tomas Mejia, brought before a court-martial, and shot as a rebel, on the 19th of June, 1867 (cf. p. 273 and Vol. I. p. 523).

(b) *The Liberal Movement in France and the Closer Relations of France and Austria.*—In order to conciliate French public opinion, Napoleon determined upon liberal measures which ran counter to the despotic traditions of the Second Empire (cf. p. 247). He granted to the senate and the legislative body in January, 1867, the right to interpellate the government, and gave permission that not merely the "minister of state," *i. e.* the hitherto all powerful premier, but every minister, might present the case for his policy before the Chamber, only, of course, under "instructions from the emperor." This concession was regarded, however, as a fundamentally important step, by which the emperor wished to introduce, in the place of his own exclusive irresponsibility, ministerial responsibility; that is to say, he wished to pass from a despotic to a constitutional, or even parliamentary, method of government. That was not indeed Napoleon's intention; but one step leads to another, and the emperor's failing health made it more and more incumbent on him to relieve himself of the business of government. The politicians, who thought they must contest a change of system on political or personal grounds, now combined together into a reactionary club under the name of the "*Cercle de la rue de l'Arcade*." The intellectual leader of these "Arcadians" was the "vice-emperor," the minister of state Eug. Rouher (p. 302), while the liberalising party, *le tiers parti*, which grew up in 1866 between the "Arcadians" and the Republicans, was led by the former Republican, but now "freethinking Imperialist," Emil Ollivier, a talented but ambitious and weak character.

The Paris International Exhibition of the summer of 1867 shed a transitory brilliance over France and the emperor; but the murderous attempt of a Pole, Anton Bereszowski, on the life of the emperor Alexander II (June 6) struck a discordant note in the midst of the festivities, and comments were made on the absence of the emperor Francis Joseph, who was in mourning for his brother Maximilian, the victim of Napoleon's bad faith, and kept away from the French capital. Napoleon and his consort, therefore, journeyed, in August, 1867, to Salzburg to express their sympathy to Francis Joseph; they stayed there from the 18th to the 23d of August, and although Napoleon had only come accompanied by General Fleury, yet through him and Beust a better understanding was brought about between the two empires,—a step which was universally regarded in Germany as aimed at Prussia. But although the two parties had merely agreed that Prussia should be prevented from crossing the Main, and Russia from crossing the Pruth, yet now two camps were formed in Europe: Prussia and Russia stood in the one, Austria and France in the other. Francis Joseph paid his return visit to Paris on October 23. On his way there he had exchanged a "flying and formal" greeting with the king of Prussia, at the latter's wish, in Oos; but he said to General Ducrot in Strassburg, "I hope that we shall some day march side by side."

D. THE CONSOLIDATION OF GERMANY

(a) *The Relations between North and South Germany.*—The treaty of Prague, according to the French conception of it, implied that Prussia by its terms was restricted to North Germany, and might not venture to form any union with the South German States, unless the assent of every power participating in the treaty was obtained. France reckoned herself one of these powers, because she had intervened in July, 1866; but she had not in any way signed the treaty,—indeed, she could not have been allowed to do so, since she had taken no share in the war,—and therefore possessed properly no right to superintend the execution of the treaty. Bismarck adhered strictly to the principle that Austria alone was entitled to take any action in this matter, but that even Austria might not raise any objections, if *all* the States of the South, combined into a union, wished to form a national bond with the North. The only doubtful point was whether any single State was competent to join the North German Confederation. But it very soon became clear that the "Southern Confederation," planned at Prague in 1866, would not come to pass. Bavaria, as by far the largest State, would naturally have obtained the predominant position; but King Charles of Würtemberg was still less willing to acknowledge the superiority of King Louis II than that of the king of Prussia. The grand duke Frederick of Baden, son-in-law of the king of Prussia, a liberal and patriotic prince, was resolved to enter the North German Confederation at the next opportunity, and his views were shared by the majority of his subjects. His ministers, Karl Mathy (p. 280) and Rudolph von Freydorf, were staunch German patriots like himself. Mathy had written to Bismarck on November 18, 1867, asking for Baden's entrance into the federation, but was put off with hopes for the future, and died before attaining his object (February 4, 1868).

In spite of all democratic and ultramontane opposition, the South and North were drawing closer to each other. Agreeably to the spirit of the treaties, all the states south of the Main introduced in 1868 universal conscription and armed their infantry with the Prussian needle-gun; in consequence of this they obtained Prussian instructors for their troops, and Hesse-Darmstadt concluded, in April, 1867, a military treaty with Prussia, by the terms of which its troops were completely incorporated into the army of the North German Confederation as a part of the Eleventh Army Corps (p. 307). The royal Saxon army, however, by virtue of the convention of February 7, 1867, constituted from the 1st of July onwards the Twelfth North German Army Corps, under its own administration (General Fabrice, minister of war), and was commanded by Prince Albert. In Würtemberg the new war minister, Rudolf von Wagner, with his able and fiery chief of the general staff, Albert von Suckow, proceeded to reform the army on the Prussian model; and the example was followed in Bavaria, despite the particularism of that kingdom by the war minister, Sigmund von Prankh. The preparation for a united German army proceeded without interruption. The treaty of federation with Prussia was accepted by the Chambers in the autumn of 1867, in Baden without any struggle, but in Würtemberg after violent parliamentary disputes, although the democratic party of Würtemberg foretold that the new policy of "militarism" would impose an intolerable burden on the people without securing them against France. The treaty, according to the Bavarian constitution, did not require the approval of the estates.

Owing to this union of all German races in a common system of defence with such safeguards, the Zollverein, which had been renounced by Prussia, was once more established on a new basis. First of all, the so-called *liberum veto* of each particular State (the right to repudiate any resolution of the majority as not legally binding on the non-assenting State) was abolished; in its place was introduced the principle that resolutions passed by the majority were binding on the minority. The work of legislating for the Zollverein was to be carried out by the Federal Council and Reichstag according to this principle. The former was brought up to 58 votes by the accession of 6 Bavarian votes, 4 from Würtemberg, 3 from Baden, and 2 further votes from Hesse; 48 deputies from Bavaria, 17 from Würtemberg, 14 from Baden, and 6 additional deputies from Hesse were to enter the Reichstag, so that the number of its members grew to 384. These South German deputies were naturally entitled and bound to appear in the Reichstag, only when the Reichstag was changed into the "Customs Parliament" for transacting the business of the customs laws. Besides matters connected with customs, the taxation of the salt obtained within the Zollverein and of the tobacco produced or imported into the Zollverein fell within that body's competence. The duration of the customs treaty was once more (cf. p. 240) fixed for twelve years, with the proviso that, if notice was not given, it would continue as a matter of course for another twelve years. These treaties also met with opposition in Würtemberg and Bavaria from the protectionists and the particularists, who not only feared heavy economic loss from the free-trade principles prevailing in Prussia, but also disliked the customs union with the North as a preliminary step to political amalgamation. Yet the interests of trades and industries, which obviously could not exist without the Zollverein, were so important that in the Bavarian Representative Chamber, on the 22d of October, 1867, 117 votes against 17, and on the 31st in the Würtemberg

Chamber, 73 against 16, were given for the customs union. The First Chamber in Bavaria, that of the Imperial Councillors, made a futile attempt to preserve the Bavarian "*liberum veto*;" the minister-president, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, went for that purpose to Berlin. Since Bismarck declared that he would sooner renounce the customs treaty itself than allow this limitation on it, the lords gave way.

The elections to the Customs Parliament held in February and March, 1868, produced no encouraging results for the national cause. Out of 85 South German representatives, 50 were strongly averse to entering the North German Confederation; and of the 35 others, 9 Bavarian representatives might be reckoned as lukewarm in the cause. In Bavaria 27 Particularists in all, and in Würtemberg none but Particularists, had been elected, and the Varnbüler-Mittnacht ministry had made in the elections common cause with the Democrats and Ultramontanes against the "German party." In Hesse, on the other hand, only National Liberals, and in Baden 8 (against 6 Particularists), were elected. The South German Particularists constituted in the Customs Parliament the "South German Fraction," and the attempt of the National Liberals to pass a parliamentary decree in favour of "the complete national union," failed on May 7 to obtain a majority. But when on May 18, in reference to proposals for altering the existing duties upon wine in Hesse, a Würtemberg deputy, Rudolf Probst, called attention to the fact that the European situation made it advisable to avoid any undue influence on a South German State, since otherwise the avalanche hanging on the mountain might be set in movement, Count Bismarck exclaimed, "An appeal to the fear of foreign countries finds no response in German hearts;" and the representative of the Bavarian Allgäu, the excellent Joseph Völk, uttered the words, so hopeful for the future, "Now has the springtime of Germany begun." The legislative results of the Customs Parliament were small enough; the petroleum tax, which was demanded owing to the financial distress of the individual States, and a considerable increase of the tobacco duty, were refused, and also the tariff reform, of which both proposals were parts. In the second session, in June, 1869, the course of affairs was similar. The tariff was only finally completed in the third session, in May, 1870, when, in place of the duty on petroleum, which was unpopular in the Parliament as increasing the expense of lights, an increase of the coffee duty was proposed by the governments and accepted by the Parliament. In this way the Customs Parliament had shown itself not entirely barren in results.

(b) *The Liberal Legislation of the North German Confederation.*—All the more favourable must our verdict be on the first and only regular Reichstag of the North German Confederation, which had been elected after the constitution had come into force on August 31, 1867. It showed an even stronger majority, ready for effective action and co-operation with the government, than had appeared the constituent Reichstag; and although there were cases of friction between the Liberal as well as the Conservative side of the house and Bismarck, the results of the three parliamentary sessions of 1868, 1869, and 1870 were extraordinarily significant. In the first place, by the postal reform the entire North German postal system of January 1, 1868, became a federal concern, and a uniform rate of postage was introduced for all letters in the whole federal territory. The North

German post soon became, under the management of the clever Postmaster-General Heinrich Stephan, a model for the whole world. Important features — in spite of many drawbacks — were the introduction of internal free trade, freedom of migration, and new rules as to domicile in cases where poor relief was claimed; the abolition of all legal restrictions on interest; the organisation of a scheme for forming a fleet, according to which in the course of ten years, 1868-1878, a fleet of sixteen ironclads and fifty-five other war vessels was to be built; the removal of all bars to freedom of marriage; finally, the promulgation of a code of criminal law in May, 1870, in which all penalties were lowered agreeably to the prevalent spirit of mercy, and ample discretion left to the judge in awarding penalties. If the death penalty was still retained, at least for murder and murderous plots against sovereigns, this was only due to the determined way in which Bismarck, in a weighty and thoughtful speech, advocated this punishment. The efforts of the Liberals to make the responsibility of the imperial Chancellor a legal and not a merely moral one, were defeated in April, 1868, since Bismarck declared it inadmissible "to make the federal Chancellor subordinate to a provincial judge." The law as to the federal debt, which caused this dispute to blaze up, was also defeated. On the proposal of the new Prussian Finance Minister, Otto Camphausen, who converted the Prussian state debt in December, 1869, into an irredeemable stock at four and one-half per cent, and thus restored the equilibrium of Prussian finance, the control of the federal debt was intrusted to the Prussian audit office, a measure which at least had the merit of satisfying practical requirements. The question which arose in the period of conflicts whether the freedom of speech belonging to the deputies should be unconditionally protected against legal prosecution was decided not indeed by law, but by actual result, in so far that the government, since that time, has never made an attempt to take legal measures against a deputy for any utterance in Parliament.

Bismarck's endeavour to meet the wishes of the Liberals was shown in this point as well as in the radical economic legislation which gave to commerce a wide and perhaps excessive degree of liberty from state control. This displeased the Conservatives, a part of whom regarded the great statesman as an undisguised deserter; but the coalition of the government with Liberalism was for the newly founded and essentially progressive State a historical necessity, from which no statesman could escape. On the other hand, Bismarck once more, in February, 1870, opposed the wishes expressed for the admission of Baden into the North German Confederation, since by such a concession the kingdoms of Würtemberg and Bavaria, which then alone remained outside the national union, would have been surrendered completely to the influence of Austria, and constantly pledged to maintain the frontier of the Main. Bismarck "did not wish to skim the cream from the milk," but to let Baden do its work as an advocate of national unity in the South by the side of the particularist kingdoms. Besides this, a closer connection with the Grand Duchy would have made the North responsible for the defence of its long frontier line against the attacks of France. A strategic task of such difficulty was not one to be taken except under the pressure of necessity.

E. AUSTRO-HUNGARY AFTER 1866

(a) *The Dualism.* — Hungary, after the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion of the year 1849, was deprived of independence, and was, as far as possible, reduced to the constitutional status of a crown demesne, which in the last resort was governed from Vienna. The proud Magyar people had not resigned itself in silence to this lot, but continuously demanded the restoration of its independence. It absolutely refused to send representatives to the *Reichsrat* in Vienna, the central parliament of the monarchy created by the constitution of February 26, 1861 (p. 285). The leader of the opposition was Francis Déak (1803–1876), originally a lawyer and judicial assessor in his own county of Szala. He had been Minister of Justice in 1848 (cf. p. 201), and became later a parliamentary politician by profession; he was a man of shrewdness, determination, and integrity, of temperate views, resolute in advocating the rights of his people and yet unwilling to interfere with the undoubted rights of the crown. He was opposed to the feudal abuse of serf labour no less than to the communistic views, rife among the Hungarian peasantry, whose supporters would have most gladly divided the property of the nobles among themselves. Some reputation and influence was also enjoyed by Count Julius Andrassy, whose inclinations and capabilities led him by preference into the region of foreign policy.

The defeat of Austria in the year 1859 broke the ice both in the western and eastern half of the empire. Schmerling, the creator of the February constitution, consented in April, 1861, to summon once more the Hungarian *Landtag*, which had been dissolved in 1849. But since Déak demanded a return to the state of things which had existed before 1848, no understanding was reached, and in the year 1866 General Klapka (p. 206), with Bismarck's support, organised a "Hungarian legion" to fight on the side of Prussia against the house of Hapsburg-Lorraine. The defeat of 1866 convinced the emperor Francis Joseph that a reconciliation with Hungary was absolutely essential, if Austria was not to be completely crippled by internal feuds and prevented from maintaining its already tottering position as a great power. "In the East," said Andrassy, "no power is less important than Austria, and yet it ought, in the interests of civilization, to have great influence there." The Germans in Austria came to the help of the Magyars when they declared at a meeting in Aussee on the 10th of September, 1866: "Dualism, but not Federalism! no joint monarchy, still less a mere federation, but two halves of the empire, compact in themselves and closely united together against the outside world."

The new foreign minister, Friedrich Ferdinand, Baron Beust (1809–1886), an excessively energetic statesman, whose pride did not blind him to the needs of the time, worked toward the same end. He wished to restore Austria to its old position by settling the dissensions and by modern legislation, and to leave its forces free for a strong foreign policy, which might limit the encroachments of Prussia and Russia. The circumstance that Beust was a foreigner and a Protestant enabled him to act with a greater impartiality toward the affairs of Austria than a native statesman engaged in party struggles could usually manifest, but it roused much prejudice and distrust against him. When he had already declared to the reassembled Hungarian Reichstag on November 19, 1866, his willingness to

conform with the wishes of the nation, having been nominated on February 7, 1867, Prime Minister of Austria in place of Count Belcredi, he succeeded in obtaining the imperial decrees of February, 1867. According to these Hungary recovered its independence, receiving a responsible ministry of its own under Andrassy. Croatia, the military frontier, and Transylvania were united with it; the "Court Chancery," which existed for Hungary and Transylvania in Vienna as well as the office of Hungarian Viceroy, were abolished from the moment the new ministry began its official activity. The western half of the empire (for which, unofficially the name of Cis-Leithania, or the country west of the border-river Leitha, was soon adopted) naturally also received its special government.

It was proposed that foreign policy, the army (the German language to be used for words of command), the excise, and the national debt should be regarded as joint concerns of the "Austrian-Hungarian monarchy," as the official title ran. According to this agreement three imperial ministers were created for foreign affairs, the army, and the finances. The imperial minister for foreign affairs was to preside in the imperial ministry and bear the title of Imperial Chancellor; this office was conferred on Baron Beust, as the promoter of the *Ausgleich* (compromise) with Hungary. The imperial ministers were responsible to the so-called Delegations for their measures; these Delegations were bodies of thirty-six deputies each, which were elected by the parliaments of the two halves of the kingdom (on a fixed proportion to the First and Second Chambers), and met alternately at Vienna and Pesth. They discussed the governmental proposals separately and independently; valid resolutions could therefore only come into force by the agreement of the Delegations. The share of Hungary in the joint expenditure was fixed in 1867 at thirty per cent, that of Austria at seventy per cent. The *Ausgleich*, and also the Customs and Commerce Treaty of the two halves of the Empire, were to be valid for ten years.¹ On June 8, 1867, the solemn coronation of Francis Joseph and his consort Elizabeth took place in Pressburg.

The Magyars felt themselves victors and masters in their own country. The Roumanians and the Saxons in Transylvania were destined soon to feel the heavy hand of the ruling people, which wished by conciliation or by force to make Magyars of the whole population of Hungary. The Croats, on the other hand, who formed a compact nation of two millions, and were inveterate enemies of the Hungarians, received from the Hungarians on June 21, 1868, the concession that a special Croat minister should sit in the ministry at Pesth, and that forty-five per cent of the revenues of the country should remain reserved for the country itself. Accordingly on December 29, 1868, the twenty-nine Croat deputies appeared in the Hungarian Reichstag, from which they had been absent for fully twenty years.

(b) *The Liberal Transformation of Austria.*—The disputes between parties and nationalities in Austria were strained to the utmost. The Germans defended

¹ The *Ausgleich* was renewed in 1877 and 1887. But in 1897 the renewal met with great difficulties, so that the *Ausgleich* was first of all temporarily put into force by an imperial order, according to the rule laid down by the constitution for the event of the disagreement of the delegations. The "quotas" were fixed on June 10, 1899, with regard to the great growth since 1867 of the economic resources of Hungary, at 34.4 for Hungary and at 65.6 for Austria; and on December 31, 1902, the governments agreed upon the new *Ausgleich*; cf. p. 375.

the centralised constitution of February 25, 1861, and with it the predominance of their race, for which they claimed superiority to other nationalities in intellectual gifts and achievements; politically, the majority of them were Liberals. The Slavs, on the other hand, but above all the Czechs, were for a form of federalism, which would guarantee more liberty of action to the several crown lands; and the Feudals and Clericals supported the same view. But Beust induced the Poles, by concessions at the cost of the Galician Ruthenians (who compose forty-three per cent of the seven millions of Galician population) and of the other crown lands, to take their seats in the *Reichsrat*; and he also succeeded in procuring a German majority in the *Landtags* of Bohemia and Moravia. Thus on May 22, 1867, the regular "inner" *Reichsrat* (composed of deputies of the several *Landtags*) could be opened; but the Czechs refused to sit in it. The ministry of Beust, in conformity with the universal change in opinion, piloted through the two houses of the *Reichsrat* a series of laws during the course of the year 1867 which received the force of statutes by the imperial sanction given on December 21, 1867. By this means Austria, once the promised land of despotism, was changed into a modern constitutional State. Thus ministerial responsibility was introduced and a state court of twenty-five members was created for the trial of impeached ministers; equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, equal eligibility to all offices, freedom of migration, liberty of the press and of association, liberty of conscience and religion, the inviolability of private houses, and the secrecy of letters, freedom of religion, freedom of education, the separation of the administration of justice from the government, in short, all the blessings of a modern State, were bestowed at one blow on a people which a few months before had been governed like a herd of cattle. The House of Representatives received the right of electing a President, the right of voting taxes and recruits, the right of legislation in all important matters; it was to be summoned annually, and its debates were to be public. The powers of the *Landtags* were proportionately limited.

These achievements were accompanied by a law, based on the eleventh article of the law as to the representation of the empire, dealing with the supervision of the primary schools (*Volksschule*), by which local, district, and national school-boards were constituted, and to all three of them not merely representatives of the Church, but also of the State and of education, were nominated. The Concordat of the year 1855 (p. 241) had enslaved education and given the Church full power over the schools, but, by one of the few invariable laws of history, the reaction was only the more violent. It was useless that twenty-five archbishops and bishops, assembled in Vienna on September 28, 1867, raised a solemn protest against the agitation "which imperilled the most sacred property of mankind, threatened the salvation of the souls of seventeen million Christians, and proposed to create marriages without permanence and divine sanction, and schools without religion and morality." The emperor, in a letter to the archbishop of Vienna, Jos. Othmar Ritter von Rauscher, blamed the bishops because, instead of being conciliatory, they had roused intense animosity, and thus rendered the task of the government more arduous. On the 30th of December he nominated the so-called *Bürgerministerium* (bourgeois cabinet), whose head was the liberal Prince Carlos Auersperg, and in which the liberal leaders, Eduard Herbst, Karl Giskra, and Leopold Ritter von Hasner administered the law department,

the home office, and the department of religious worship and education respectively. This ministry, under the especial support of Beust (who in this connection assured the papal nuncio that according to his conviction the Austrian monarchy and the Catholic Church were sisters, who must mutually help each other), carried in the Upper House in March, 1868, the laws which had been determined upon by the Lower House in 1867. By these laws (1) civil marriage was granted in the case where a priest, for reasons not recognised by the State, refused to put up the banns of an engaged couple; (2) the supreme management of a school (with exception of the religious instruction) was reserved to the State, and the post of teacher was open to every citizen of the State without distinction of denomination; (3) in mixed marriages the sons were to accept the religion of the father, the daughters that of the mother, and every citizen should have the right to change his religion on completing his fourteenth year. The emperor signed the laws on May 25, 1868. But when Pius IX on the 22d of June denounced them in the most bitter terms as abominable, absolutely null, and once for all invalid, the feud between Church and State became most acute. The Pope, in view of the legislation directed against the omnipotence of the Church, felt himself only strengthened in his long-cherished intention of claiming doctrinal infallibility for the papal chair. When, however, on July 18, 1870, this attribute was awarded him by the Vatican Council, Austria, although the *Bürgerministerium* had been dissolved on April 11, 1870, in consequence of the internal disunion which had appeared in it as far back as December, 1869, replied by a revocation of the Concordat on July 30, and the restoration of the *placitum regium* (royal consent) as an essential condition for the validity of any papal enactment in Austria.

During these struggles the finances of Austria were reorganised by a somewhat violent measure. The proposal of Ignaz Edlen von Plener, Minister of Commerce, was accepted by a large majority in the Lower House in June, 1868; by this the entire public debt was to be transformed into one unified five per cent stock, but as the interest was to pay a tax of twenty per cent, the rate of interest payable by the State was in fact reduced to four per cent. The army was reorganised in December, 1868, on the basis of universal conscription, and the war strength fixed for ten years at eight hundred thousand men. The *Landwehr* was to comprise not merely the older members of the line troops, but also those persons who, though available, had been rejected as superfluous, and had thus not enjoyed any training in the ranks.

F. GREAT BRITAIN; PARLIAMENTARY REFORM; IRELAND; ABYSSINIA

IN England, in the year 1866 (cf. Vol. VI) the Liberal ministry brought defeat on themselves by a new Reform Bill to reduce the qualification for the franchise. They resigned without appealing to the country, and were succeeded by a Tory cabinet. The office of Prime Minister fell to Lord Derby, but the moving spirit was Mr. Disraeli, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. Early in 1868 Lord Derby, owing to ill health, resigned, and the ministry was reconstituted under Mr. Disraeli. Already, before this change had occurred, the latter had succeeded in carrying the measure upon which the repu-

tation of this administration principally depends. He understood very clearly that he could not postpone electoral reform if he wished to keep in power. He resolved therefore to prove, by solving the problem, that the Conservatives knew how to satisfy the necessary requirements of the country as well as, if not better than, the Liberals, and introduced a bill in March, 1867, which was carried after long discussions in both Houses, and received the signature of Queen Victoria on August 15. According to this second Reform Act the county franchise was conferred on every man who had been for one year in occupation of premises of the annual value of £12 and rated for the relief of the poor. In the boroughs every householder, after one year's residence and payment of poor-rate, received the suffrage; and it was also conferred, subject to the same conditions, upon those occupying lodgings of the annual value of £10. Borough constituencies which contained less than seven thousand souls retained only one member apiece. On the other hand, the larger towns were given several; for instance, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, and Leeds had four members each. This Act was followed, in 1868, by others for Scotland and Ireland, which, while differing from the English Act in many details, were framed on the same principle. If the first electoral reform of 1832 (cf. Vol. VII, p. 377) placed the aristocracy of capital by the side of the aristocracy of birth, the reform of 1867 created a third body of electors, which was made up of labouring men and the representatives of intellectual training. From both of these classes the suffrage had hitherto been practically withheld. England by this reform took a long step toward democracy. One result, which soon appeared, was an agitation for abolishing the House of Lords, the aristocratic nature of which was in sharp contrast to the continually swelling tide of public opinion.

The discontent of the Irish with the English rule, which was based on a system by which absentee landlords extracted profits from the mass of poor inhabitants, brought about the formation of the Fenian Society (Vol. VII, p. 395), which, with headquarters in the United States, tried to break down the English rule by every means, including revolvers and dynamite. The conspiracies for which the society was responsible were sternly punished. But it was generally felt that something must be done to remove the legitimate grievances of the Irish people. The disestablishment of the Irish Church was moved by the Liberal opposition, and the government were defeated on this question. After some delay, during which the reform legislation of the cabinet was successfully completed, Disraeli took the issue of a general election. He was defeated at the polls, and a Liberal government was called to power, under Mr. Gladstone, in the last month of 1868. A bill for Irish disestablishment was moved without delay, and in July, 1869, passed into law. The Established Church of Ireland, to which hardly one-sixth of the Irish population belonged, was converted into a Free Church, with a capital of £12,000,000, and a notable step was thus taken towards diminishing "the scandal and calamity of the relations between England and Ireland," to use the words of Mr. Gladstone, himself the most enthusiastic of churchmen.

In the year 1868 England found herself involved in a military expedition in Africa. A certain Kasai had raised himself to be emperor of the whole of Abyssinia (cf. Vol. III, p. 567); he assumed the name of Theodore II, exterminated brigandage, improved the administration of justice, and broke the power of the

clergy by confiscating the property of the Church. Since, however, he imprisoned English missionaries, by whom he considered himself to have been slandered in Europe, and would only set them free in exchange for skilled engineers, England sent to Abyssinia an army of sixteen thousand men and forty-five guns, under the command of Sir Robert Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala). The latter defeated the Abyssinians, who were only armed with flintlocks, at Magdala and stormed the fortress, built on three rocky summits, on the 13th of April, 1868; Theodore II thereupon shot himself in despair. With him died his bold scheme to extirpate Islam in Egypt and to set up there the rule of Christianity and of the Abyssinians. Islam, on the contrary, soon acquired fresh life in the South (Vol. III, pp. 556 *et seq.*). The English left Abyssinia after freeing the missionaries.

G. THE ROMAN QUESTION; THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF
SEPTEMBER, 1864

THE Roman question was one of the most difficult with which Napoleon III had to deal. The emperor had withdrawn his troops from Rome in September, 1864, after the Italian government had pledged itself to remove the seat of the monarchy from Turin to Florence (which promise implied a certain abandonment of claim to the capital, Rome), and neither to attack Rome itself nor to allow it to be attacked by any other power. The Ultramontanes in France were beside themselves at this agreement; they saw in it the withdrawal of French protection from the still existing fragment of the temporal power of the Pope, the beginning, therefore, of its end; and if they regarded this end as a heavy blow to the Church, the Chauvinist party, headed by Adolphe Thiers, which held the French leadership in Europe to be part of the order of the universe, regarded a complete victory of the Italian national State as an irrevocable hindrance to that leadership on the south side of the Alps, just as the establishment of the German national State seemed to be the end of that predominance on the east bank of the Rhine. In February, 1866, the French Chamber under these two influences adopted the resolution that the secular sovereignty of the Pope was essential for his spiritual reputation; and after the reversion of Venice to Italy ultramontane attacks were showered upon liberal conceptions in general and Italy in particular. The radical Minister of Public Instruction, Victor Duruy, who brought the Orders which concerned themselves with education under the common law, claimed for the State the education of girls, and founded national libraries of a liberal character; but he had to guard against the pronounced hostility of the clericals, and could not prevent, in July, 1867, the temporary closure of the *École Normale*, the teachers' training institution, in which liberal views were active.

The effect of these occurrences was, on the Italian side, that the democratic minister Rattazzi, a friend to the French, hoped for a revolution in Rome itself, in the course of which Victor Emmanuel might come forward, as in 1859, to restore order. If his troops occupied Rome in this way, the Roman question might be solved very simply, without direct violation of the September treaty. But the thoughtless Garibaldi, overflowing with fiery zeal, tore in pieces this delicate web

of statecraft by entering the States of the Church in September, 1867, at the head of a band of volunteers, in order to overthrow the Pope. When Rattazzi, on being required by Napoleon III to take counter measures in virtue of the treaty, preferred to tender his resignation, the emperor sent an army from Toulon to Rome under General P. L. Ch. de Failly. This, together with the papal soldiers under General Hermann Kanzler, overtook the Garibaldians, who had immediately begun to retreat, on Monte Rotondo near Mentana, northeast of Rome, and dealt them a crushing blow (November 3). "The chassepots have done wonders," Failly wrote to the king. The French army was now compelled to remain in Rome, since otherwise the rule of the Pope would have immediately collapsed. A part of Napoleon's power was again firmly planted in Italy, the indignation of all opponents of the Papacy against the guardian of the Pope was once again unloosed, and the dislike of the Italians for the man who prevented the completion of their unity was accentuated. The emperor vainly tried to submit the Roman question to the decision of a European congress, which he proposed to call for this purpose. No other great power wished to burn its fingers in this difficult affair.

H. NEW COMPLICATIONS

(a) *The French Army-Reform.*—Napoleon, meantime, conscious that France, from the military point of view, was far behind Prussia, had devised all sorts of plans to equalise this disproportion. The first scheme, which really effected some result and went to the root of the evil, simply aimed at the introduction of a universal conscription after the Prussian model; but the emperor encountered in this the opposition, both of his generals—who for the most part were sufficiently prejudiced to consider a professional army as more efficient than a national army—and of the politicians, who, partly out of regard for the popular dislike of universal military service, partly on political grounds, would hear nothing of such a measure. All radicals shrank from "militarism" and every measure which might strengthen the monarchy. Thus the keen-sighted and energetic War Minister, Marshal Adolphe Niel, was forced in the end, against his better judgment, to be content with a law proclaiming, it is true, in principle, universal military service, and fixing its duration at nine years, but as a matter of fact, at once neutralised this reform, since each individual had the admitted right to buy himself off from service in the line. Only the duty of forming part of the militia, or *garde mobile*, was incumbent on every one; but from considerations of economy, this *garde mobile* was allowed to exist on paper only, without any attempt to call it into existence beyond the form of nominating the officers; the men were not organised or even called out for training. It thus happened that the North German Confederation, with 30,000,000 souls and an annual levy of 90,000, could put an army of 540,000 into the field, but France, with 36,000,000 inhabitants, raised only 330,000 men. In armament, however, the French infantry enjoyed a considerable advantage, since it was equipped with the Chassepot rifle, which had a range of 1,200 paces, compared with which the needle-gun, with a range of 400 paces only, became at long distances as useless as a stick; in addition to this, the French was superior to the German weapon by reason of a

smaller bore (11 mm.), a better breech, and by its handiness. On the other hand, the North German artillery, whose shells only burst on striking, was superior to the French, whose missiles burst after a certain time, often difficult to calculate exactly, and sometimes exploded in the air before reaching their mark. The mitrailleuse, on which the French founded great hopes, proved itself in 1870 to be by no means a serviceable weapon, and it was not considered necessary on the German side to adopt it.

The necessity of again finding stronger support in the nation suggested to the emperor in January, 1869, the plan of securing the purchase and management by the French Eastern Railway of the Belgian private railways to Brussels and Rotterdam. In this way Belgium would become first economically, and subsequently politically dependent on France. But the Belgian Liberal government, under Hub. Jos. Frère-Orban, refused assent to the treaty for sale; and since in this question they were backed by their otherwise deadly enemies, the ultramontane party, this attempt also of the emperor to restore his prestige proved a failure.

Although Prussia had entirely kept away from any share in the whole matter, she was accused by several French papers of having instigated the Belgian government to opposition. Even the treaty with Baden, by which Badenese were allowed to pass their terms of military service in Prussia, and Prussians in Baden, could not successfully be represented as an infringement of the Treaty of Prague. Nevertheless, France, Austria, and Italy, since the summer of 1868, had vigorously prosecuted the negotiations for a Triple Alliance directed against Prussia. But Beust was restrained by several considerations: the embarrassed condition of Austrian finances; the incompleteness of the army-reform; the thousand and one difficulties of the domestic situation; the reluctance of ten million Germans in Austria to make war on their compatriots; the aversion of Hungary to every project for restoring the Austrian predominance in Germany. He saw himself quite unable to undertake a war immediately, however much a war might have suited his inveterate hatred of Prussia. Such a war, according to his view, ought to arise from a non-German cause, some collision of Austria and Russia in the East, when Prussia would go over to the Russian side, and thus any appearance of the war being waged against German union would be avoided; otherwise, war was the best method of effecting an immediate reconciliation between North and South.

A war against German unity was unacceptable to the Italians also, since in all probability it would have been followed by a war against their own unity; and this they did not wish to see destroyed, but completed; and probably a portion of the Conservative party would only have been induced to fight against Prussia by the surrender of Rome. But the emperor, who did not venture to inflict a further wound upon the susceptibilities of his Catholic subjects, could not in any case fulfil this condition; and the majority of the Italians stood on the side of the ministers, who declared to King Victor Emmanuel in July, 1869, that they could not be parties to obliterating the events of the year 1866. Light is thrown on the situation by the anxiety of Beust lest Napoleon should not be playing an honorable game, but in the last instance, if Prussia, intimidated by the Triple Alliance, was inclined to concessions, should make an agreement with Prussia at the cost of Austria. Since the negotiations thus met insuperable difficulties everywhere, their continuance was, in September, 1869, indefinitely postponed, to

use Napoleon's words to Francis Joseph. No terms (according to Beust's statements) had yet been signed, but a verbal agreement had been made on three points: (1) That the aim of the alliance, if ever it was concluded, should be protection and peace; (2) that the parties should support each other in all negotiations between the Great Powers; and (3) that Austria, in a war between France and Prussia should remain at least neutral.

(b) *The Ministry of Ollivier and the Plébiscite (1870).* — At the moment when these negotiations had come to a standstill, a great change had taken place in the internal affairs of France. At the new elections to the Legislative Body on May 23, 1869, a great shrinkage of the Royalist votes was apparent; while the opposition in 1857 had received only 810,000, and in 1863 had reached 1,800,000, it now swelled to 3,300,000, and the figures of the government party receded from 5,300,000 in the year 1863 to 4,600,000. Ollivier's "Third Party" obtained 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and combined with the 40 votes of the Republican Left formed a majority against the followers of Rouher. Napoleon III need not have regarded the result of the elections as a sign of popular hostility to himself; even the Third Party was imperialist; but the result was bound to endanger his position, if he declared his agreement with Rouher and the "Arcadians" (cf. p. 313). He therefore veered round, dissolved the "National Ministry" on July 17 (Rouher was compensated by the Presidency in the Senate, which on the second of August, in a solemn session, accepted the scheme of Reform settled by the Cabinet), and submitted on September 6, 1869, comprehensive constitutional reforms to the approval of the Senate. By these, the Legislative Body acquired the rights of electing all its officials, of initiating legislation, of demanding inquiries, and of appropriating the supplies which it voted to specific branches of the public service. Although the constitutional responsibility of the emperor himself was not given up, yet the principle of ministerial responsibility was introduced, and provision made for impeachment of ministers before the Senate. The emperor himself, when speaking to the Italian ambassador, Constantin Nigra, characterised the scope of these reforms as follows: "I had the choice between war and personal rule on one side, and peace with liberal reforms on the other side. I decided for the latter." The circumstance that his experienced War Minister, Niel, died on August 14, 1869, had, at first the effect of making every warlike expedition seem doubly hazardous; it was destined to be seen that his successor, Marshal Lebœuf, possessed neither the experience nor the foresight of Niel.

The emperor summoned on January 2, 1870, the Ministry, which, in virtue of the decree of the Senate, was to undertake the responsible conduct of business. Its head was Émile Ollivier, who became Minister of Justice and Public Worship; Count Daru, a clever and cautious man of marked personality, received the Foreign Office; the Home Office went to Chevandier de Valdrôme, the Finances to Buffet. But since the Left demanded that the Chamber should receive the right of co-operating in any future alteration of the constitution, as otherwise a resolution of the Senate might recall one day what it had granted the previous day, the emperor without demur submitted the constitutional changes to a plébiscite on the ground that the nation had in his time (1852; cf. p. 242) approved the constitution of the empire, and had therefore a claim to say if this constitution was to be altered.

The question put to the people was whether it approved of the decree of the Senate on September 6, 1869, and whether it wished by this means to facilitate the future transmission of the crown from the emperor to his son. The answer of 7,350,142 electors was in the affirmative, that of 1,538,825 in the negative; in the army, which was also allowed to vote, 285,000 answered "Yes," 48,000, "No." Although opposition was considerable, yet it was split up into an absolutist part, for which the decree of the Senate went much too far, and a republican, for which the decree did not go far enough, since it not only allowed the empire to stand, but even assisted Napoleon to consolidate his power. Against this divided opposition the majority, which in any case was five times as large, showed to prodigious advantage, and the emperor was justified in seeing in the Plébiscite of the 8th of May, 1870, a strong proof of the confidence of quite five-sixths of the French in his person, in his dynasty and his rule.

(c) *The Vatican Council in its Relation to European Politics.* — Soon afterwards the Ministry underwent an important change by the substitution of the Duc de Gramont for Daru. The latter had two motives for resignation. In the first place he had not been able to carry his point that not merely the emperor alone was entitled to order any future plébiscites, but that the Legislative Body must also be first heard on the matter. Secondly, Daru was much concerned about the Vatican Council, which Pius IX had opened in Rome on the 8th of December, 1869, in order that, at the very moment when the temporal power of the papacy was diminished and even threatened with complete destruction, the spiritual power might be made unlimited through the proclamation of the Pope's infallibility in matters of the faith and morals. The Bavarian prime minister, Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1819-1901) faced, as far back as April 9, 1869, the serious danger which threatened the independence of States if this doctrine of the papal infallibility was received, and called upon all States which had Catholic subjects to adopt a common policy towards the papal claim; but from various reasons he only found support in Russia, which forbade its Catholic bishops to attend the Council, and he was defeated by the ultramontane and particularist majority of the Bavarian Landtag on February 15, 1870. Daru fared no better with his warnings; his own colleague Ollivier declared that the infallibility affected only the internal administration of the Church and did not concern the State — as if the Church on her side would recognise any sphere of human action as entirely belonging to the State! — and put him off with the dubious assurances of the papal Secretary of State, Count Giacomo Antonelli: "In theory we soar as high as Gregory VII, and Innocent III; in practice we are yielding and patient." No effect was produced by the warnings of the noble Montalembert, once so extolled by the Ultramontanes. He blamed the oppression of the State by the Church no less than that of the Church by the State. "We ought," he said, "to stem in time the stream of flattery, deceit, and servility which threatens to flood the Church." He died before his warning cry was justified by events, and Daru's successor, Gramont, was a thoroughgoing Ultramontane and as such hated heretical Prussia.

(d) *The Rise of the Social Democratic Party.* — In the efforts of the Curia to make the papal chair the guiding influence of every nation, there was an ele-

ment of hostility to the nationalist principle in its political application; and the same is true of other efforts, which then first showed themselves in greater force, the effort, that is, of the Social Democrats.¹ The career of Ferdinand Lassalle as an agitator falls in the years 1862-1864. Lassalle wished to make the working-class, which was being bled by capital, master in the State by means of universal suffrage, and more than that, to make it a capitalist by the institution of State-supported co-operative societies with yearly division of the profits. The "International" (planned in London in 1864) was founded at Geneva in September, 1866, as a union intended to comprise the workmen of every nation. These efforts were not, however, completely developed until later (cf. below, p. 361); the nationalist movement had first to run its course in Central Europe.

J. THE OUTBREAK OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

(a) *France's Relations with Austria.* — The peace of Europe seemed, on June 30, 1870, to be absolutely assured; Ollivier could declare in the Chamber that no disturbance threatened it from any quarter, and Lebœuf, the War Minister, proposed to enlist in the army for 1871 only 90,000 instead of 100,000 recruits. The Deputies of the Left committed themselves to the statement that the 40,000,000 Germans who had united under the leadership of Prussia were no menace to France, and Ollivier himself can almost be described as a friend of German unity. Archduke Albert of Austria, however, had visited Paris in April, 1870, on the pretext of an educational journey to the south of France, and, in view of the possible admission of Baden to the North German Confederation (p. 314), had spoken of the necessity of common measures for the observance of the treaty of Prague. He unfolded, in this connection, the plan that if war became necessary, a French army should push on past Stuttgart to Nuremberg, in order to unite there with the Italians, who would advance by way of Munich, and with the Austrians, who would come from Bohemia; they would then fight the Prussians in the region of Leipsic. The archduke was therefore playing with the fire; but he declared that the transformation of the Austrian army would not be completed for one or two years, and emphasised the necessity that, since Austria required six weeks to mobilise, France should strike the first blow alone, at any rate in the spring, in order that the Prussians might be settled with before autumn came with long, cold nights and before Russia could interfere. A council of war which Napoleon held on May 17 declared that the demand that France should first make the effort single-handed could not be entertained. General Lebrun, who was then sent to Vienna, did not find Francis Joseph inclined to waive the demand which Prince Albert had made. The emperor held it to be essential not merely from the military, but also from the political standpoint, since if he declared war simultaneously with France, the Prussians would make full use of the "new German idea" and sweep on the South with them. He would have to wait for the course of the war, and then, when the French had advanced into South Germany and were welcomed as liberators from the Prussian yoke, he would take the opportunity and join in the war.

¹ See more fully on this subject, in Vol. VII, p. 113.

The course of events in South Germany gave France room to hope for a change in popular opinion. In Bavaria, Hohenlohe had been turned out in February, and had been replaced by Count Otto Bray-Steinburg, a staunch Particularist. In Württemberg the most inveterate Democrats gave out the watchword, "French rather than Prussian," and a mass-petition, which received one hundred and fifty thousand signatures, demanded the introduction of a militia army on the Swiss model. King Charles replied in March, 1870, by the dismissal of Ernst Gessler, Minister of the Interior, who was accused of weakness, and by summoning Suckow (p. 315) to the War Ministry. The latter declared his readiness to make a reduction of half a million of gulden in the war-budget (a step to which his predecessor, Wagner, had not consented), but in other respects to maintain the army organisation on the Prussian system, which had only been introduced in 1868. A keen-sighted French observer, the military plenipotentiary, Colonel Eug. G. Stoffel, himself warned the emperor Napoleon against overestimating the particularist forces. In any case it was very dubious whether the French could and would fulfil the conditions on which Austria made its co-operation depend,—in the event, that is, of its being forced into war by the breach of the treaty of Prague, which it postulated as the preliminary condition for any military action. The impression thus won ground even there, that, in spite of the tension in the European situation, in spite of the passions and personal influences which were making toward a war, the maintenance of peace, for the year 1870 at least, still seemed probable at the beginning of July.

(b) *The Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne.*—The government of Queen Isabella II of Spain (cf. Vol. IV, p. 559) had long fallen into complete disrepute owing to the unworthy character of the queen, who had openly broken her marriage vows. Since Isabella abandoned herself entirely to the reactionary party, the Liberals rose, under the leadership of Francisco Serrano and Juan Prim, on September 20, 1868. After the defeat of the royal army at the bridge of Alcolea on the Guadalquivir, in which the commander-in-chief, General Pavia, was severely wounded (September 28), the queen, who was just then staying at the seaside watering-place, San Sebastian, was obliged to fly with her family and her "intendant," Carlos Marfori, to France. The idea which the bigoted queen had still been entertaining of sending Spanish troops to Rome in place of the French was thus destroyed. The victorious Liberals did not contemplate relieving the emperor of France from the burden of protecting the Pope.

They held fast to the monarchy, nevertheless; and as all attempts to obtain as king either Duke Thomas of Genoa, the nephew of the king of Italy, who was still a minor, or the clever Ferdinand of Coburg-Gotha (the titular king of Portugal, a widower since 1853), were abortive, they offered the throne to the latter's son-in-law, the hereditary prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (born 1835), who was a Catholic, happily married, the father of sons, an upright and energetic man in the prime of life. A preliminary offer was made, according to Heinrich von Sybel, in April, 1869, but in the first place privately by a letter of Marshal Prim to Karl Anton, the father of the hereditary prince; but the latter hesitated to accept so hazardous a crown. It is certain that the Spaniard, J. Allende Salazar, brought an offer, with the greatest secrecy, in September, 1869, to the castle of Weinburg in Switzerland, where the Hohenzollerns then

resided; but he received a refusal, since the undertaking appeared far too rash.

The state of affairs was not altered until Salazar made a new attempt, in February, 1870. He was sent with letters of Prim's to the prince, the hereditary prince, King William, and Bismarck. He went first to Berlin. King William thought the offer should not be accepted; but he recognised that, according to the family laws applying to the whole house of Hohenzollern, he had, as head of the house, no right of prohibition in this case. Bismarck behaved differently. He did not, indeed, promise himself any direct military assistance from Spain if a Hohenzollern wore the Spanish crown, but closer friendly relations between the two countries, and, as a result, a strengthening of the position of Germany by "one if not two army corps," and more especially improved commercial intercourse. He therefore advised the hereditary prince "to abandon all scruples and to accept the candidature in the interests of Germany." But the prince could not even yet make up his mind. It was only natural to consider the effect of such a candidature on France. Robert von Keudell, one of Bismarck's trusted followers, expressly states that Bismarck did not foresee any danger of an outbreak of war on this ground, since Napoleon would sooner see the Hohenzollern in Madrid than Isabella's brother-in-law, Duke Anton of Montpensier of the house of Orléans, or a republic. Napoleon also, who had been informed of the matter by Karl Anton in the autumn of 1869, had said neither "yes" nor "no," and therefore seemed to raise no objection. A renewed inquiry in Paris itself was impossible, since Prim had urgently begged for secrecy in the matter, in order that it might not be at once frustrated by the efforts of the opposition. And, again, the house of Sigmaringen was so closely connected with the Bonapartes by Karl Anton's mother, a Murat, and his wife, a Beauharnais, that the possibility was not excluded that Napoleon III would actually consent. Bismarck now secretly sent to Spain two trusty agents, the clever Lothar Bucher and Max von Versen, who brought back satisfactory news; but all this was done in a personal and private way, and the Prussian government was not implicated. Finally, in order to escape from the candidature of the Duke of Montpelier, which was naturally unpalatable to the Spanish authorities, Salazar was once more sent to Sigmaringen at the beginning of June, 1870, and this time received the consent of Karl Anton and of Leopold. A great moment seemed to have arrived for the house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and Leopold felt it a heavy responsibility to withdraw from a people "which, after a long period of weakness, was making manly efforts to raise its national civilization to a higher plane;" that is to say, to free itself from the dominion of the Ultramontanes. The candidature of Leopold was thereupon officially proclaimed in Madrid on July 4, and the Cortes was summoned for the 20th of July to elect a king.

(c) *The Pretensions of Gramont and the Telegram from Ems.*—Throughout the whole affair the point at issue was a matter which in the first instance was a completely private concern of the Spanish nation. The Spaniards could clearly elect any person they wished to be king, and if they looked for such a person among the scions of sovereign or formerly sovereign houses, all that could be demanded was that the elected king should renounce all hereditary right to another throne, in order that a union of the Spanish with another monarchy, and the consequent



OTTO VON BISMARCK AT FOUR STAGES OF HIS CAREER

EXPLANATION OF THE PORTRAITS OF BISMARCK OVERLEAF

1. Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen as *Deichhauptmann* (Inspector of dykes) and Conservative Deputy in 1850. (Lithograph from a picture painted from life by M. Berendt.)
2. Bismarck as Envoy at the German Diet in 1858. (After an oil painting by Jacob Becker at Friedrichsruh.)
3. Prince Bismarck as Chancellor of the newly united German Empire, July 3, 1871. (From a photograph.)
4. Bismarck in his seventieth year. (April 12, 1885; from a photograph.)

danger to the balance of power in Europe, might be avoided for all time to come. In the case in point no such renunciation was necessary, since the Swabian line of the Hohenzollerns possessed no hereditary rights, and the hereditary prince Leopold accordingly could not be called a *Prussian* prince. The Prussian government, therefore, as such took absolutely no share in the question, since it could claim no right to influence the decision; the king, the crown prince, and Bismarck had given their opinion merely as private individuals. Nevertheless the official news of the proposed candidature of Leopold fell like a thunderbolt on Paris, and Gramont was at once convinced that he had once more to do with a diabolical stratagem of Bismarck's against the interests and honour of France. Although the French representative in Madrid, Baron H. Mercier de Lostende, telegraphed that Prim declared every charge against Bismarck to be groundless, and asseverated that the candidature was the exclusive work of the Spanish nation, Gramont allowed a question to be asked him on the point by a deputy, L. Cockery, in the legislative body, on July 6. He explained defiantly that France, with all respect for the wishes of the Spanish nation, would not allow a foreign power to place one of its princes on the throne of Charles V, and thus disturb the equilibrium of Europe; as if, indeed, Spain, which had so long sunk to a second-rate power, was still the empire which, three centuries before, held the leading position in Europe, and as if Leopold would be proclaimed king simultaneously in Berlin and in Madrid! The impression was widespread that such senseless and inconsiderate language must inevitably lead to war.

The further procedure of Gramont confirmed this fear. He ordered Count Benedetti (born 1817; cf. p. 302), who was taking the cure in Wildbad, to put the request before King William in Ems that, since he had allowed Leopold's candidature and thus mortified France, he would now impress upon the prince the duty of withdrawing his assent. But the king obviously could not be persuaded to do that; what, according to the family laws, he could not have sanctioned, he was also unable to forbid, especially after Gramont's behaviour on July 6. He sent, however, an intimation to Sigmaringen that he would personally have no objection to any renunciation which the prince might choose to make. Faced by the danger of plunging Germany and Spain into war if he persevered in his candidature, Leopold actually withdrew from his candidature on July 12. King William sent the telegram of the "*Kölnische Zeitung*," which contained this news, by the hand of his adjutant Prince Anton Radziwill, to the French ambassador on the promenade at Ems on the morning of July 13. The king considered the incident closed, and that was the view of the whole world, as it was the wish of Napoleon and Ollivier. Gramont thought differently; he insisted that the king must be brought into the affair, and therefore pledge himself never to grant his approval, should the candidature be renewed. Benedetti received telegraphic orders from his superior to tell the king this on that very morning of the 13th July. He did so, and met with a refusal, but repeated it and "at last very pressingly," as the king telegraphed to Bismarck at Berlin; so that the king finally, in order to get rid of him, sent him a message by his aide-de-camp to the effect that he had no further communications to make to him. The king, in a telegram worded by Heinr. Abeken, the Privy Councillor of Legation, left it to Bismarck's discretion whether he would or would not communicate at once this new demand of Benedetti's and its rejection to the North German ambassadors among foreign

powers and to the press. But he distinctly did not command this communication to be made.

Bismarck, who had returned from Varzin in deep distress at the king's long-suffering patience toward the French, conferred with Roon and Moltke in Berlin and was resolved to remain minister no longer unless some satisfaction was obtained for the audacious behaviour of the French; and he deserves all credit for having never flinched for a moment. To force a war, which he regarded as a terrible calamity, if Keudell may be believed, and as likely to be the first in a long series of racial conflicts, was a policy which Bismarck would never have adopted merely for the sake of hastening that union between North and South which was certain to come sooner or later. But now, when the war was forced upon him, when it could not be avoided without the "cankering sore" of a deep humiliation to a people just struggling into national life, he knew no scruples, and no hesitation. At eleven o'clock at night, on July 13, the celebrated telegram from Ems was sent to the editor of the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" and to the embassies. The message reproduced verbatim the telegram, composed by Abeken, which the king sent from Ems, with the omission of any irrelevant matter and ran as follows: "After the news of the resignation of Prince Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to the imperial French Government by the royal Spanish Government, the French ambassador in Ems further requested His Majesty the king to authorise him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty pledged himself for the future never to give his assent, if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. His Majesty thereupon declined to grant another audience to the French ambassador, and informed the latter through his aide-de-camp that His Majesty had no further communication to make to the ambassador."

This telegram, which was known throughout Germany on the 14th of July, evoked on all sides the deepest satisfaction that a clear and well-merited rebuff had been given to French presumption; and this satisfaction was increased when it was learnt that Gramont had made a further demand of the ambassador Baron Karl von Werther in Paris, namely, that the king of Prussia should write a letter to the emperor Napoleon, in which he should declare that he had no intention of insulting France when he agreed to the candidature of Leopold. The telegram from Ems in no way compelled the war; that was rather done by the French arrogance toward Germany; it was as Strauss wrote to Renan: "We are fighting again with Louis XIV." Any insult to France in the person of its representative in Ems was carefully avoided; Benedetti himself testified "there was neither an insulting nor insulted party there,"—or if there was one, then Hans Delbrück is right when he says: "The insulting party was the French nation, the insulted the German."¹ Every one read from the telegram this truth and the repulse of French insolence. Since the message left out all the diplomatic considerations, which neither the king nor Benedetti had omitted, and merely presented the kernel of the matter, Abeken's despatch became Bismarck's, or, as Moltke said, "out of the chamade came the fanfare," and out of the judicial report came the trumpet-call which summoned Germany to the breach.

¹ According to Seignobos, *L'Europe Contemporaine*, II, p. 810 (Eng. tr.), the real grievance of France may have been a personal insult offered by King William to Napoleon III. — Ed.

(d) *The Decision to Mobilise, and the French Declaration of War.* — The acerbity of King William's refusal to pledge himself permanently was fully felt in Paris; but the fact could not be disguised that, in view of the withdrawal of a candidature described by France as unendurable, no one in Europe would approve of the conduct of the imperial government if it declared itself dissatisfied. The majority, therefore, of the ministers rejected Gramont's demand that the reserves should be called out; it was left to Gramont to put up with this reprimand for his officious procedure or to resign. This was in the morning of July 14. The emperor himself also was for peace, since he knew the military strength of the Germans and considered the pretext for the war inappropriate. Even the Empress Eugénie seems to have been unjustly accused of having urged on the war from hatred of heretical Germany and from anxiety as to her son's prospects. If, however, the feeling in the Cabinet Council veered round in the course of the 14th of July, and late at night the resolution to mobilise was taken, the English ambassador, Lord Lyons, aptly suggested the reason in the following words: "The agitation in the army and in the nation was so strong that no government which advocated peace could remain in office." The emperor, his heart full of evil forebodings, yielded to this tide of public opinion; Ollivier and the entire ministry could not resist it. On the plea of a freshly arrived telegram, which in spite of the wishes of the opposition was not produced (it cannot have been the telegram from Ems, which was already known), a motion was brought forward on July 15 in the legislative body for the calling out of the Garde Mobile and for the grant of sixty-six millions for the army and the fleet; after a stormy discussion it was carried by two hundred and forty-five votes against ten votes of the extreme Left. The French nation had forced its government into war; its representatives almost unanimously approved.

The official declaration of war against Prussia by Napoleon was announced in Berlin by the *chargé d'affaires*, Georges Le Sourd, on July 19. The situation had developed with such rapidity through Gramont's impetuosity and Benedetti's mission to Ems that this declaration of war is the only official document which came to the Prussian government from Paris. To judge by the official records the war seems to have commenced like a pistol-shot, whereas in reality it was due to causes stretching back over past centuries. The relations of the German and the French nations, which had been speedily changing since 1552 (cf. Vol. VII, p. 266) to the disadvantage of the former, were destined to be definitely readjusted by the war, and the absolute independence of Germany from the "preponderance" of France was to be once for all established.

(e) *The Effect of the Declaration of War on Germany.* — The whole of Germany felt at once that this was so. The declaration of war was like the stroke of a magician's wand in its effect upon the internal feuds and racial animosities by which the German nation had been hitherto divided. They vanished, and, with them, the mistaken hope of France that now, as on so many former occasions, Germany might be defeated with the help of Germans. The spokesmen of the anti-Prussian party in the South remained as perverse and obstinate as ever; but they no longer had behind them the masses, who, at the moment when the national honour and security seemed menaced, obeyed the call of patriotism with a gratifying determination, and felt that, not merely by virtue of the treaties to which

they had sworn, but also by virtue of unwritten right, the cause of Germany was to be found in the camp of Prussia (p. 191). When the king travelled on July 15 from Ems *via* Coblenz to Berlin, his journey became a triumphal progress through Germany. Being informed, at the Berlin railway station of the resolutions of the French Chambers, he decided to mobilise the whole Northern army, and not merely some army corps, as he had originally intended. He fixed the 16th of July as the first day for all preparations to be completed. That same day King Lewis II of Bavaria, since the *casus fœderis* had occurred and Bavaria by the treaty had to furnish help, ordered the Bavarian army to be put on a war footing. On July 17 the same order was given by King Charles I of Würtemberg, who had hastened back from St. Moritz to Stuttgart.

The North German Reichstag assembled on July 19. It was greeted with a speech from the throne, which in its dignified strength and simplicity is a model of patriotic eloquence such as could only flow from the classic pen of Bismarck. "If Germany silently endured in past centuries the violation of her rights and her honour, she only endured it because in her distraction she did not know her strength. . . . To-day, when her armour shows no flaw to the enemy, she possesses the will and the power to resist the renewed violence of the French. . . . God will be with us as with our fathers." The Reichstag unanimously, except for the two Social Democrats, granted one hundred and twenty million thalers for the conduct of the war; the South German Landtags did the same. The enthusiasm and self-devotion with which the German nation, excepting naturally the Guelf legion (p. 308) and the great financial houses, which even at this epoch-making moment thought only of themselves, rose up in every district to fight for honour, freedom, and unity, was, in one respect, more remarkable than that which the great days of 1813 had brought to light; for the first time in German history Germany arose as a united whole.

(f) *The Attitude of the other Nations.* — While the armies were collecting, Bismarck published in the "Times" the offer, which France had made him through Benedetti in August, 1866, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance between Prussia and France; by it Luxemburg and Belgium were to be assigned to France, which in return would allow Prussia a free hand in Germany. The English ex-minister Lord Malmesbury called this scheme a "detestable document," because it, in spite of Benedetti's embarrassed attempts at denial, furnished a proof that the French government had been prepared to annihilate its neighbours, who were only protected by the law of nations, without any just claim. It was solely due to Prussia's sense of justice and astuteness that Napoleon's purpose was not successfully accomplished. Such revelations contributed their share to the result that no arm was raised in Europe for France. England at once declared her neutrality, and English merchants derived large profits from the war by supplying coal and munitions of war to the French. Russia was favourably disposed to Prussia; it feared that an insurrection of the Poles might break out on any advance of the French to Berlin, and hoped to obtain during the war an opportunity to cancel the treaty of Paris of 1856. In Italy King Victor Emmanuel was indeed personally inclined to support the French, on whose side he had fought in 1855 and 1859; but his ministers were opposed to a war, which was waged against the growing unity of Germany. Any hindrance to this growth must signify a defeat

of the principle of nationality, and thus become dangerous to the unity of Italy. The lowest price at which Italy could be won was in any case the surrender of Rome; but Napoleon III stood in awe of the clerical party, and could not make up his mind to a step which would incense them.

The policy of Austria was at least transparent. Hitherto, as it appears, she had not pledged herself to anything. Beust sent on July 11 a harsh remonstrance to Paris, that the nation had plunged headlong into a difficult undertaking, in which Austria could promise nothing except to look on as a well-wishing spectator. But on the 20th of July, although a *Kronrat* on July 18 had resolved on neutrality, and had sanctioned for its maintenance war preparations at a cost of twenty million gulden, Beust composed a second letter to the ambassador, Prince Metternich, which explained every misunderstanding that might have arisen from the unexpectedness of this war, and in which Austria promised to regard the cause of France as her own, and to contribute to the success of the French arms within all possible limits. Austria intended to complete her preparations under the cloak of neutrality, without exposing herself to a premature attack from the side of Russia. On the completion of these preparations, Austria and Italy were jointly to offer unacceptable terms to Prussia, and then war might be openly waged by all three powers. How this crafty document can be reconciled with the previous attitude of Austria and the note of July 11 is a riddle, the solution of which must await further explanations from the secret history of those days. But since Italy's accession was not bought by Napoleon, the plan of the Triple Alliance at the decisive hour was still unrealised. The rapidity with which the French army was crushed by the Germans soon stifled any wish to take part in the war, which had been felt at Vienna.

(g) *The Vote of the Vatican Council on the Infallibility of the Pope.* — On the eve of the declaration of war, on July 18, an event involving grave issues occurred at Rome. The Vatican Council, assembled since December 8, 1869, was oppressed from the outset by the sense of an inevitable destiny. The opposition reckoned some 150 bishops and abbots, and among them many of the first names of Catholic Christendom; for example, the Frenchmen Georges Darboy and Fel. Ant. Dupanloup, the Austrians Friedr. Cöl. Prince Schwarzenberg, Rauscher (p. 320), and Jos. Georg. Strossmayer, and Karl Jos. von Hefele of Würtemberg. But it was outvoted in the ratio of three to one by the supporters of infallibility, and was itself divided, since one part alone was opposed to the dogma itself, the other part only did not wish to see it proclaimed just then. Besides this the papal plenipotentiaries conducted the proceedings in such a way as to preclude any notion of freedom in the expression of opinions or in voting. After a trial vote of July 13 had shown the result that 451 ayes and 88 noes were recorded, and a deputation of the opposition to the Pope had produced no effect, most of the opposition left Rome, since they did not wish to defy the Pope to his face. Thus on July 18, 1870 (cf. Vol. VII, p. 348), amid the crashes of a terrible storm which shrouded the council hall in darkness, the dogma was accepted, by 533 votes against 2, that the Pope of Rome, when he speaks *ex cathedra* to settle some point of faith and morals, is infallible, and that such decisions are in themselves unalterable even by the common consent of the Church.

K. THE WAR OF GERMANY AGAINST THE FRENCH EMPIRE

(a) *The Mobilisation; the Advance; Moltke's Plan of Campaign.* — It was to be expected, from the rapidity with which France had brought on the outbreak of the war, that she would have the start of the Germans in its preparations, and would bring the war as soon as possible into Germany. Lebœuf, the Minister of War, certainly used the phrase "we are absolutely ready to the last gaiter-button," and possibly the emperor hoped to break the spirit of Prussia by rapid blows, and then to incorporate Belgium. But it was soon shown that France was not ready. "There was a deficiency," so the French historian Arthur Chuquet says, "in money, in food, in camp-kettles, cooking utensils, tents, harness, medicine, stretchers, everything, in short;" the existing railways were inadequate to convey to the frontiers the 300,000 men whom France had at her disposal for the war, so that half of them were obliged to march on foot. The regiments were not constructed according to definite and compact geographical districts: Alsatians had to travel to Bayonne in order to join the ranks of their regiments, and southerners to Brittany. The result, under the stress of circumstances, was an irremediable confusion and an unusual delay in the advance. On the other hand, the mobilisation proceeded quickly and easily among the Germans, where everything had been prepared as far as could be beforehand, and every day was assigned its proper task. Moltke made the suggestive remark that the fourteen days of the mobilisation, during which there was nothing to carry out that had not been long foreseen, were some of the most tranquil days of his life.

The French, according to the original and proper intention, formed one single army, the army of the Rhine, whose commander-in-chief was to be the emperor, with Lebœuf as chief of the General Staff; but when it came to the point, this army was divided into two forces, one of 200,000 men under Marshal Bazaine in Metz, and one of 100,000 men under Marshal MacMahon in Strassburg. The German troops were divided into three armies (see the sketch on the map at p. 340). The first was posted under General Steinmetz northeast of Trier, round Wittlich, and was made up of the 7th and the 8th corps, from the Rhine districts and Westphalia; it numbered some 60,000 men. Next to it came the second army, under Prince Frederick Charles, which consisted of the 3d, 4th, and 10th corps, that is to say, of Brandenburgers, Saxons from the province, and Hanoverians, and of the Guards; it took up its position round Neunkirchen and Homburg, and was 134,000 men strong. Finally, the third army (130,000 men) was placed under the command of the Crown Prince Frederick William; to it belonged the 5th and 11th corps, from Posen, Hesse, and Thuringia, as well as the Bavarians, Würtembergers, and Badeners; they were stationed at Rastatt and Landau. The Crown Prince, before going to the front, visited the South German courts and quickly won the hearts of his soldiers by his chivalrous and kindly nature. Strong reserves stood behind the three armies, namely, the 9th and 12th corps (the Schleswig-Holsteiners and the Saxons from the kingdom) at Mainz, and the 1st, 2d, and 6th corps, the East Prussians, Pomeranians, and Silesians, who on account of the railway conditions could not be sent to the front until the twentieth day, and were also intended to be kept in readiness for all emergencies against Austria. The sea-coast was to be guarded against the expected attacks of the French fleet by the 17th division (Magdeburg and the Hanse towns) and by the Landwehr.

Moltke (p. 277), as chief of the Prussian General Staff, disclaimed all idea of a minutely elaborated plan, since the execution of such a plan cannot be guaranteed; for every battle creates a new situation, which must be treated and regarded by itself. Moltke therefore laid down three points only as of paramount importance. First, when the enemy is met, he must be attacked with full strength; secondly, the goal of all efforts is the enemy's capital, the possession of which, owing to the strict centralisation of French government, is of paramount importance in a war against France; thirdly, the enemy's forces are, if possible, to be driven, not toward the rich south of France, but toward the north, which is poorer in resources and bounded by the sea.

(b) *The Skirmishes and Battles at the Beginning of the Month of August.*—Since no blow was intended to be struck before the advance of the entire army was completed and the full weight of a combined attack was assured, the French had for a few days apparently a free hand, and with three army corps drove back out of Saarbrücken on August 2 the three battalions of Lieut.-Colonel Eduard von Pestel. During the operations the emperor took his son, a boy of fourteen, under fire; according to the official telegram "some soldiers shed tears of joy when they saw the prince so calm." But the satisfaction was soon turned into chagrin, when the third army, in order to cover the left flank of the second army, which was advancing towards the Saar, marched closer to it, and on August 4th attacked the French division of General Abel Douay, which occupied the town of Weissenburg, and the Gaisberg lying south of it, and utterly defeated it. Among the prisoners were a number of Turcos or Arab soldiers from Algiers, whom Napoleon, though they could not be reckoned as civilized soldiers, had no scruples in employing in the war against the Germans; but they could not resist the impetuous valour of the Bavarians and Poseners.

The cheers at this first victory had hardly died away when new and glorious tidings resounded. On the 6th of August the third army on its advance into Alsace encountered the army of Marshal MacMahon, which occupied a strong position near the small town of Wörth on the right bank of the Sauerbach, a tributary of the Rhine. The Bavarians attacked on the right, the Prussians on the left, and in the last period of the protracted and bloody battle the Würtembergers had also the chance of interfering with success. The end was that the French, whose numerical inferiority was counterbalanced by their formidable positions on heights and vineyards, were completely defeated, and with a loss of 16,000 men and 33 cannons they poured into the passes of the Vosges in headlong flight. "After they had fought like lions," says Arthur Chuquet, "they fled like hares." The Germans paid for the brilliant victory, which gave to them Lower Alsace with the exception of Strassburg, by a loss of 10,000 men, among whom were nearly 500 officers.

On the same day the disgrace of Saarbrücken was wiped out. The 7th corps under General Heinr. von Zastrow, supported by the 8th and 3d, took the apparently impregnable heights of Spicheren near Saarbrücken, although only twenty-seven German battalions were on the spot against thirty-nine of the French. General Charles Aug. Frossard, since he did not wish to be cut off from Metz, saw himself compelled to make a hasty retreat, which abandoned eastern Lorraine to the Germans. This victory, on account of the unqualified tactical superiority which the French had over the Germans, surpassed even that of

Wörth; it was won, because the German troops did not shirk the most difficult task, and because they hastened to help each other wherever the thunder of cannons announced that brothers were standing in the fight. "My motto is, a coward he who does not help where help he can," thus August Karl von Goeben, the general then commanding the 6th corps, wrote home; and every German corps acted throughout the war according to this principle of true comradeship in arms.

The news from the scene of war produced in Paris, where for weeks the inhabitants had deluded themselves with infatuated hopes of victory, and had shouted themselves hoarse with the cry "à Berlin!" a terrible disillusionment, and then intense bitterness against the government, on whose shoulders all the blame for the defeats was laid, since that was the most convenient thing to do. The Ollivier ministry was overthrown by a vote of want of confidence in the Chambers, which declared it incapable to organise the defence of the country; but the Republicans did not succeed in their intention to place an executive committee of the Chambers at the head of the country, and so to supersede the empire offhand. On the contrary, the empress transferred the premiership to General Palikao (cf. Vol. II, p. 109), who took the Ministry of War from Lebœuf and gave him the command of a corps.

(c) *The Battles before Metz.*—The emperor wished at first to retire with his whole army to the camp of Châlons-sur-Marne, where MacMahon was collecting the fragments of his army and gathering fresh troops round him. But since the abandonment of the whole of eastern France to its fate would have been a political mistake, Napoleon remained for the moment stationary in Metz, against which the first and second armies now were put into movement, while the third advanced through the Vosges toward Châlons. Since this latter had the longer way to march, the king issued orders that the two other armies should advance more slowly, in order that the combined German forces might compose an unbroken and continuous mass with a front of equal depth, and that the enemy might not find any opportunity to throw himself in overwhelming numbers on any one part. On the 14th of August the advance guard of the first army under Karl Friedr. von der Goltz had almost reached the gates of Metz, when they found the French main army preparing to retreat. In order to check them on the right bank of the Moselle and to bring on a pitched battle at Metz, Goltz, in spite of his inferior numbers, attacked the enemy. The French, eager at last to chastise the bold assailant, immediately wheeled round; but just as at Spicheren the nearest German regiments, so soon as they heard the thunder of the cannons, hurried to the assistance of Goltz, freed him from great danger, and drove the French back under the fort of St. Julien, which with its heavy guns took part at nightfall in the fierce engagement. Thus the retreat of the French was delayed by one day, and in the meantime the main body of the Germans had reached the Moselle. Napoleon, yielding to public opinion, now resigned the supreme command to Marshal Bazaine, in whom the army and navy reposed unfounded confidence, left Metz with precipitate haste on August 14, and entered Châlons with MacMahon on the 17th.

The main army itself did not leave Metz until August 15, and then only advanced five miles in a whole day, since the baggage train blocked all the roads. Meantime the 3d army corps, that of the Brandenburgers, under Constantin von

Alvensleben, had reached the road which leads from Metz past Vionville and Mars-la-Tour to Verdun and the valley of the Meuse, and the general determined at all hazards to block the further march of the enemy in that direction, although he was well aware that he would have four French corps opposed to him, and for a considerable time could count on no support being brought him. A desperate struggle began (August 16); at two o'clock in the afternoon Alvensleben had not a single infantry battalion or any artillery in reserve; when, then, Marshal Canrobert, with sound judgment, pressed on in order to break up the exhausted German line, the 12th cavalry brigade, comprising the Magdeburg cuirassiers and the Altmark uhlans under General Adalbert von Bredow († March 3, 1890), was compelled to attack the enemy, notwithstanding all the difficulties of a cavalry attack on infantry armed with chassepots. The brave horsemen, charging fearlessly, broke through two divisions of French infantry, and put the artillery stationed behind them to flight, but were then attacked by two French cavalry divisions, who outnumbered them by four to one. The Germans retreated, again dispersed the French infantry, which, having once more rallied, barred their road, and retired to their former position at Flavigny. Out of 800 men in this "Ride of Blood and Death," which Ferd. Freiligrath has sung in stirring verse, 400 fell or were taken prisoners; but their heroism was not in vain. "This heroic ride into the jaws of death," says Arthur Chuquet, "saved the 3d corps. Canrobert did not move again that whole day; he might have broken through, but from the furious onslaught of Bredow's six squadrons he feared to fall into a trap and kept quiet." But since gradually the 10th corps from the left and the 8th corps from the right came to Alvensleben's support, the danger passed; the Germans, who on this day faced 120,000 French at first with 29,000 and later with 65,000 men, were in possession of the field of battle.

Of the roads by which Bazaine could reach Verdun from Metz, the southern was blocked against him; he could only effect his retreat now on the northern road, by Saint-Privat. And that possibility was then taken from him, since on the 18th of August the two German armies, both of which meantime had crossed the Moselle above Metz, advanced to the attack on the entire front from Sainte-Marie-aux-Chênes and Saint-Privat to Gravelotte. In the course of the operations the Saxons under the Crown Prince Albert, and the Guards under Prince Augustus of Württemberg, stormed the fortress-like position of Saint-Privat with terrific carnage; on the right wing at Gravelotte no success was attained. But the main point had been achieved. The great French army had been hurled back on Metz, and was immediately surrounded there by the Germans in a wide circle. The indecision of the French commander-in-chief was much to blame for this momentous issue to the prolonged struggle, in which some 180,000 men on either side ultimately took part. From fear of being finally cut off from Metz itself and surrounded in the open field, Bazaine kept a third of his forces in reserve; if he had staked these, he might, perhaps, have won the game. The casualties on either side were enormous. The Germans lost on the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August 5,000, 16,000, and 20,000 men, making a total of 41,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the French, 3,600, 16,000, and 13,000, some 33,000 men in all. The comparative smallness of the French losses is explained by the fact that they were mostly on the defensive (although they ought properly to have attacked) and fought behind intrenchments.

(d) *The Right Advance of the Germans; Sedan.*—The French army in Metz was lost, if a hand were not stretched out to it by its comrades in arms outside the town; it was rumoured that Bazaine would make a renewed attempt to meet the expected relieving force at Montmédy or Sedan. All the journals in Paris declared with one voice that Bazaine must be rescued at any cost. Under the pressure of this situation MacMahon, who had been reinforced at Châlons by a division recalled from the Spanish frontier and by four regiments of marines, and had been nominated commander-in-chief of all the forces outside Metz, decided not to retreat to Paris, a course which seemed to him most correct in itself, but to leave the camp of Châlons to its fate and march on Montmédy by way of Vouziers and Buzancy, and there effect a junction, if possible, with Bazaine.

King William had meantime commanded Prince Frederick Charles to invest Metz with seven army corps (the 1st, 2d, 3d, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th). General Steinmetz, since he was not on good terms with Prince Frederick Charles, now his superior, and especially since he had failed in his task (Gravelotte), was appointed governor-general of Posen and Silesia. The 9th and 12th corps as well as the Guards were placed, as "the Meuse army," under Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, a splendid leader, and instructions were given to him to push on towards Châlons with the third army; his task was to frustrate all attempts of the French to take up a position there and advance on Metz. But when the Meuse army had passed Verdun, and the third army had reached Ste-Menehould, the headquarters, which followed these movements, learnt of MacMahon's march from Châlons and Rheims; Moltke immediately issued orders on August 25 that the two armies should wheel to the right, in order, if possible, to take MacMahon in the rear.¹ This dangerous manœuvre, which extended of course to the baggage trains of the armies, was completely successful, without causing any confusion to the columns. MacMahon failed to see the favourable chance, which presented itself for several days, of hurling his one hundred and twenty thousand men against the ninety thousand under the Crown Prince of Saxony and annihilating them before the third army came up.

When MacMahon found no trace of Bazaine on the 27th of August at Montmédy, he wished to commence the retreat on Paris; but on the direct orders of Palikao, the Minister of War, and postponing military to political considerations, he continued his march in the direction of Metz, and hastened to his ruin. On the 30th of August the corps of General de Failly was attacked by the Bavarians and the 4th Prussian corps under Gustav von Alvensleben at Beaumont, and thrown back on Mouzon.

The whole French army retired from that place to the fortress of Sedan, in the hope of being able to rest there and then to retire along the Belgian frontier northwards. But that was not allowed to happen. The Meuse army pressed on from the east, the third army from the west; the 11th corps seized the bridge which crossed the Meuse at Donchery, and thus cut off the road to the northwest. The neighbourhood of Sedan was certainly easy to defend, since the Meuse, some streams, and gorges presented considerable difficulties to an attack; but on September 1 the Germans, who outnumbered the French by almost two to one, advanced victoriously onward, in spite of the most gallant resistance. The Bava-

See the sketch of the lines of operation on the inserted map, "The War of 1870-1871."

THE WAR OF 1870-71.

From the plans of the Prussian General Staff and other Sources

I.

London: H.M. Stationery.

Printed by the Bibliographisches Institut, 1871.



rians captured Bazeilles on the southwest, where the inhabitants took part in the fight and thus brought upon themselves the destruction of their village. The 11th corps took the cavalry of Illy in the north. A great cavalry attack, under the Marquis de Gallifet, at Floing could not change the fortune of the day; the French army, thrown back from every side on to Sedan, had only the choice between surrendering or being destroyed with the fortress itself, which could be bombarded from all sides. Marshal MacMahon was spared the necessity of making his decision in this painful position; a splinter of a shell had severely wounded him in the thigh that very morning at half-past six. The general next to him in seniority, Baron Wimpffen, who had just arrived from Algiers, was forced, in consideration of the six hundred and ninety pieces of artillery trained on the town, to conclude an unconditional surrender on September 2. In this way, besides 21,000 French who had been taken during the battle, 83,000 became prisoners of war; and with them 558 guns were captured. The French had lost 17,000 in killed and wounded (the Germans 9,000); an army of 120,000 men was annihilated at a single blow. Two German corps were required to guard the prisoners and deport them gradually to Germany.

The emperor Napoleon himself fell into the hands of the Germans, together with his army. It is attested, as indeed he wrote to King William, that he wished to die in the midst of his troops before consenting to such a step; but the bullets, which mowed thousands down, passed him by, in order that the man on whom in the eyes of history the responsibility for the war and the defeat rests, although the whole French nation was really to blame, should go before the monarch whom he had challenged to the fight, and that the latter should prove his magnanimity to be not inferior to his strength. The meeting of the two monarchs took place at two o'clock in the château of Bellevue near Frénois, during which Napoleon asserted that he had only begun the war under compulsion from the popular opinion of his country. The castle of Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel was assigned him as his abode, and the emperor was detained there in honourable confinement until the end of the war.

That evening the king, who in a telegram to his wife had given God the honour, proposed a toast to Roon, the Minister of War, who had whetted the sword, to Moltke, who had wielded it, and to Bismarck, who by his direction of Prussian policy for years had raised Prussia to her present pre-eminence. He modestly said nothing about himself, who had placed all these men in the responsible posts and rendered their efforts possible; but the voice of history will testify of him only the more loudly that he confirmed the truth of the saying of Louis XIV, "*gouverner, c'est choisir*," — the choice of the men and the means, both require the decision of the monarch.

L. THE WAR OF GERMANY AGAINST THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

(a) *The Results of the Victory of Sedan.* — The victory of Sedan led to a series of momentous results. Not merely did it evoke in Germany universal rejoicings, such as the capture of the monarch of a hostile State and of a great army necessarily call forth, but it powerfully stimulated the national pride and definitely shaped the will of the nation. Thousands of orators at festivities in honour of

the victory and countless newspaper articles voiced the determination that such successes were partially wasted if they did not lead to the recovery of that western province which had been lost in less prosperous times, of Alsace and German Lorraine with Strassburg and Metz, and also to the establishment of that complete German unity which was first planned in 1866. Bismarck gave a competent expression to the former feeling when he declared in two notes to the ambassadors of the North German Confederation, on September 13 and 16, that Germany must hold a better guarantee for her security than that of the good-will of France. So long as Strassburg and Metz remained in the possession of the French, France would be stronger to attack than Germany to defend; but, once in the possession of Germany, both towns gained a defensive character, and the interests of peace were the interests of Europe.

In the second place, the victory of Sedan affected the attitude of the neutral powers. We know from the evidence of King William's letter of September 7, 1870, to Queen Augusta, that all kinds of cross-issues had cropped up before Sedan; that neutrals had contemplated pacific intervention with the natural object of taking from Germany the fruit of its victories. The ultimate source of these plans was Vienna, where much consternation at the German victories was bound to be felt. But they had found an echo in St. Petersburg also. The Czar Alexander, it is true, loyally maintained friendly relations with Prussia, and his aunt Helene (*née* Princess of Württemberg, wife of the Grand Duke Michael Pavlovitch, brother of the Czar Nicholas I) was a trustworthy support to the German party at court; but the imperial chancellor Alexander M. Gortchakoff expressed disapproval of every demand for a cession of French territory, since that would prove a new apple of discord between Germany and France, and thus a standing menace to the peace of Europe. King William made the just remark that according to this view Germany must give back the whole left bank of the Rhine, since in that case only was tranquillity to be looked for from France. The battle of Sedan put an end to all wish on the part of the neutrals to interfere in a war which they had not hindered. It was as Emanuel Geibel expressed it in the lines—

"Es stritt mit uns im Gliede
Niemand als Gott allein;
So soll nun auch der Friede
Ein deutscher Friede sein."¹

The third result of the day of Sedan was that the French Empire fell with a crash. The Empress Eugénie received the official news of the surrender on the evening of the 2d of September. She hesitated the whole of the 3d as to what was to be done in this position. But on the 4th the Chamber had to be allowed to speak, and Jules Favre, the leader of the Left, immediately moved that Napoleon Bonaparte and his house should be declared deposed, and that the *corps législatif* should nominate a committee, which might exercise all the powers of the government, and whose task it should be to drive the enemy from the country. The Palikao ministry also proposed a similar committee of five members to be nominated by the legislative body, but its lieutenant-general was to be Palikao. The latter furnished a guarantee that the committee, on which in any case the majority

"None fought on our side but God alone, and so the peace we make shall be a German peace."

of the Chamber would elect trustworthy Bonapartists, would keep the place warm for the empire, which might be reinstated at a fitting hour.

The fear of this incited the mob to act not with the Chamber, but against it. Crowds thronged into the galleries, and finally into the chamber itself, so that Eugène Schneider, the president, declared it an impossibility to continue the debate under such conditions, and the sitting was over. The attempt to hold an evening sitting, and exclude all disturbance, could not now be carried out; at three o'clock the Senate also had to be closed. The republic was then proclaimed at the Hôtel de Ville; and in its name the deputies of Paris, with the exception of Thiers, who refused, met as a provisional government. The radical journalist, Henri Count Rochefort, whom it was thus hoped to win over, and General Trochu, as governor of Paris, were nominated members of it. Trochu became head of this government, and Jules Favre was his deputy. A ministry was formed by this government on September 5, in which Favre assumed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the energetic lawyer Léon Gambetta that of the Interior, and General Leflô the War Office. The legislative body was at once dissolved, the Senate abolished, all officials released from their oath taken to the emperor, and thirty new prefects of strict republican views appointed. The German merchants who had hitherto remained in France were, so far as no special permission was granted to them, ordered to leave Paris and its vicinity within twenty-four hours.

(b) *The Continuation of the Struggle, and the Advance on Paris.* — On the burning question of the moment, whether France after these severe defeats should not seek peace, Favre declared in a circular of September 6 that, if the king of Prussia wished to continue this deplorable war against France, even after the overthrow of the guilty dynasty, the government would accept the challenge and would not cede an inch of national territory nor a stone of the fortresses. Thiers, who had volunteered for the task, was sent on September 12 to the neutral powers, to induce them to intervene; but, in view of the above-mentioned proclamations of Bismarck of the 13th and 16th of September, no power thought it prudent to meddle, since Germany desired a cession of territory as emphatically as France refused one. Any agreement between the belligerents was thus for the time totally excluded. Thiers received in London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Florence courteous words, but no support. Beust, deeply concerned, then wrote, "*Je ne vois plus d'Europe*;" even Gortchakoff drily advised the envoy to purchase peace without delay by some sacrifices, since later it might have to be bought more dearly.

The Germans meanwhile were marching straight on Paris. Metz remained at the same time invested by the seven corps under Frederick Charles; the effort of Bazaine to play into MacMahon's hand on August 31 and September 1, by a great attempt to break through at Noisseville, proved completely futile; thirty-six thousand Germans had held a line of five and one-half miles against one hundred and thirty-four thousand French.

Even the French fleet of ironclads, which appeared in August off Heligoland and Kolberg, could do nothing from its want of troops to land. Shattered by a terrible storm on September 9, it returned ingloriously to its native harbours. On November 9 the French despatch boat "Bouvet" was attacked by the German gunboat "Meteor" under Captain Knorr off the harbour of Havana and compelled to withdraw through the destruction of its boiler.

When the Germans after the capture of Rheims and Laon appeared in the vicinity of Paris, Favre asked for an interview with Bismarck. Conversations between the two statesmen took place on the 19th and 20th of September in the châteaux of Haute Maison and Ferrières. Favre declared that cessions of territory could in any case only be granted by a national assembly, and asked for fourteen days' armistice, in order that such an assembly might be elected. Bismarck was ready to accede to the request, but asked, as compensation for the fact that France in these fourteen days of armistice could to some degree recover her breath, that the fortresses of Pfalzburg, Toul, and Strassburg should be surrendered. Since Favre would not hear of such conditions the negotiations were thus broken off.

(c) *The Fall of Strassburg.*—The Germans completed the investment of Paris on the 19th September, and forced Toul to capitulate on the 23d. Strassburg had been besieged since the 11th of August by the Baden troops under General Werder, and since the 23d had been exposed to a bombardment through which the picture gallery, the library with its wealth of priceless manuscripts, the law courts and government buildings, and the theatre were burnt; of the cathedral, only the roof caught fire. Four hundred and fifty private houses were ruined and two thousand persons killed or wounded. This misfortune was due to the fact that Strassburg was a thoroughly antiquated fortress, the bombardment of which involved the destruction not merely of the works but also of the houses of the inhabitants. The French commander, General Uhrich, ought not, under the circumstances, to have allowed matters to go so far as a bombardment; but in the knowledge that "Strassburg was Alsace," he offered resistance until a storm, the success of which admitted no doubt, was imminent. The capitulation was signed on September 28, at two o'clock in the morning; it was the very day on which, one hundred and eighty years before, Louvois had accepted the surrender of Strassburg to the army of Louis XIV (cf. Vol. VII, p. 484). There were endless rejoicings in Germany when the good news was proclaimed that a city had been won back which had remained dear to every German heart, even in the long years when it stood under a foreign yoke. The 28th of September was felt to be a day of national satisfaction, a tangible guarantee that the time of German humiliation and weakness was now past for ever.

Since Strassburg had fallen, the great railroad to Paris lay at the disposal of the Germans; the captures of Schlettstadt (October 24), Verdun (November 8), Neubreisach (November 10), Diedenhofen (November 24), Montmédy (December 14), and Pfalzburg (December 14) completed the reduction of the smaller fortresses of the East, with which great stores of artillery and powder fell into the hands of the victors. The communications in the rear of the Germans gained greatly in security and quiet.

(d) *The Siege of Paris, and the French Attempts to relieve the City.*—This fact was the more important because, since the battle of Sedan, the war, which hitherto had been a duel between armies, assumed another phase. Under the title of *Franctireurs* armed bands from among the people took part in the struggle, and caused considerable losses by unexpected attacks on isolated German outposts and rear-guards. On the German side these bands were declared to stand outside the law of nations, and villages whose inhabitants took part in the war as

Franc tireurs were under certain conditions burnt down as a deterrent. Even Frenchmen admit that the licentious Franc tireurs were frequently more dangerous to the natives than to the enemy.

The chief aim of the French, now that negotiations for peace had fallen through, was necessarily the liberation of the capital. For although among the 1,700,000 persons who were in Paris, some 540,000 were men capable of bearing arms, yet of these the 340,000 Parisian National Guards were worthless from the military point of view, and of the 120,000 Gardes Mobiles, only a part of the provincials was of any value. Thus only the 80,000 soldiers of the line were thoroughly useful, and with these alone General Trochu could not break through the 150,000 and later 200,000 picked German troops, who were drawing an iron girdle round the city (under the supreme direction of the king, who resided at Versailles), and force them to raise the siege. Under these conditions the duty of obtaining support from outside was incumbent on the members of the government, who had left Paris in good time, in order to conduct the arming of the country, and had taken up their seat at Tours on the Loire.

But life was not instilled into this "delegation," consisting of three old men, Crémieux (p. 179), Martin Fourichon, and Alex. Glais-Bizoin, until Gambetta left Paris on October 6 in a balloon, and arrived in Tours on the 9th. He immediately took on himself the Ministry of War in addition to that of the Interior, and with the passionate energy of his southern temperament and his thirty-two years he girded himself for the task of "raising legions from the soil with the stamp of his foot," and of crushing the bold hordes who dared to harass holy Paris, "the navel of the earth." Gambetta's right hand in the organisation of new forces was Charles de Freycinet, a man of forty-two, a Protestant, originally an engineer, clever and experienced, clear and cool in all his actions, but, in consequence of the complete wreck of the professional soldiers, full of haughty contempt for military professional knowledge, and inspired by the persuasion that now men of more independent views must assume the lead, and that a burning patriotism must replace military drill. The thought recurred vaguely to the minds of both that 1870 must go to school with 1793, and that just as then the soldiers trained in the traditions of Frederick the Great and Laudon were repulsed by the *levy en masse*, so now the laurels might be torn from the soldiers of William I by the same means. That was really a grave error. In 1793 the powers allied against France were defeated chiefly from their want of combination, not by the armed masses of the French people, which to some extent existed only on paper; and the army which was now fighting on French soil far surpassed the troops of the first coalition in number and moral worth. Gambetta's exertions did not therefore rescue France, but only prolonged her death agony, multiplied the sacrifices, and enhanced the victory of the Germans. Besides this, it was not possible, with all his resolute determination, to turn armed men into soldiers in a moment. Since it was necessary in a country which only possessed six batteries and two million cartridges to procure arms and ammunition from every source, especially from England, a varied selection of weapons was the result; there were in the new army alone fifteen different kinds of guns in use. Nevertheless Gambetta deserves admiration for having raised six hundred thousand men within four months; and even if all attempts were completely shattered against the superior

strategy and the incomparable efficiency of the German troops, still Gambetta saved the honour of France, and with it the future of the republic.

(e) *The Fall of Metz.*—The Germans, shortly after Gambetta's arrival at Tours, had occupied Orleans on October 11, under the command of the Bavarian general, Ludwig von der Tann-Ratsamhausen, and on the 18th of October, under General Ludw. von Wittich, stormed Châteaudun, which was burnt, because the inhabitants had joined in the fight. But now troops in such superior numbers were being massed against Von der Tann, that at the headquarters in Versailles serious misgivings were felt as to the possibility of checking all the threatening advances upon Paris.

Under these circumstances all eyes were eagerly fixed on Bazaine (pp. 313, 336), who still kept half the German army stationary under the walls of Metz. During this period all sorts of political negotiations had been conducted between Bazaine, the German headquarters, and the empress Eugenie, now an exile in England. The gist of these negotiations was that Bazaine, supported by his army, which still remained loyal to its captive monarch, should conclude a peace and restore the empire; but the attempt failed from the numerous and great difficulties which stood in the way, and the position of the encircled army, which was unable to burst the ring of besiegers, became daily worse. From the 8th to the 31st of October continuous rain fell in such torrents that the besiegers and the besieged, who were both encamped on the open field in miserable huts, suffered incredible hardships. Hardly any one had dry clothes; the wind whistled through the crevices; and German divisions which had only a fifth of their numbers in hospital were considered to be in an exceptionally good condition. Among the French, the miseries of the weather were aggravated by the daily increasing want of provisions; in the end the soldiers received only one-third of their original allowance of bread, and the supply of salt was entirely exhausted. Bazaine therefore, after he had vainly tried to obtain the neutralisation of his army, and then its surrender, without the concurrent capitulation of Metz, was compelled to surrender himself with 173,000 men and 1,570 pieces of artillery to Prince Frederick Charles on October 27. This was a success which surpassed the day of Sedan in grandeur, if not in glory. Germany now had in her hands the territory which she thought essential to secure her tranquillity, and the whole army of Frederick Charles was available for other theatres of war.

(f) *Russia's Attack on the Treaty of Paris of 1856.*—About this time the world was surprised by a circular from the Russian imperial chancellor Prince Gortchakoff, which, bearing date October 31, contained the declaration that the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, had been repeatedly infringed; for example, in 1859 and 1862, by the union of the two Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia into the single principality of Roumania (p. 272), and that it was not Russia's bounden duty to observe merely those clauses in the treaty which were detrimental to her. She did not therefore consider herself bound by that provision which declared the Black Sea neutral, but would, on the contrary, make full use of her right to construct a naval harbour there. The circular showed that the authorities at St. Petersburg wished to turn to account the position of Europe, and during the weakness of France to cancel that treaty which

France and England in their time had forced upon the dominions of the Czar, since it was detrimental to the honour and power of Russia.

England and Austria issued on the 10th and 16th of November a protest against this selfish policy of Russia; but the conference at London, which met at Bismarck's suggestion on January 17, 1871, approved the action of Russia in the Black Sea, and only stipulated that the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be closed to the warships of all the great powers (with the obvious exception of Turkey). The German Empire stood in this question on the side of Russia, whose emperor had indisputably facilitated the victory over France by his attitude, even if his chancellor, Gortchakoff, tried to depreciate as far as possible the results of this victory.

(g) *The Battles on the Loire.* — After the fall of Metz Prince Frederick Charles received orders to detach the 1st, 7th, and 8th corps (substantially, therefore, the original first army), under General Manteuffel, in order to capture the still untaken fortresses in the rear of the Germans; he himself, with his four remaining corps, the 2d, 3d, 9th, and 10th, was to advance rapidly on the Loire by way of Fontainebleau and Sens. The state of things in that direction was critical. The French army of the Loire under General L. J. B. d'Aurelle de Paladines, an energetic leader, with a strength of 60,000 men, had thrown himself on the 15,000 Bavarians of Von der Tann, defeated these at Coulmiers on November 9, and compelled them to evacuate Orléans. The king immediately sent to the support of the Bavarians the 17th and 22d divisions (Hanseates, Mecklenburgers, and Thuringians), with four cavalry divisions, which were no longer required before Paris, and intrusted the command of this "army section," including the Bavarians, to the Grand Duke Frederick Francis II of Mecklenburg. Everything pointed to a great and decisive action. The Paris army was preparing for a sortie on a large scale, to which Gambetta wished to respond by a bold attack from Orleans; the Germans encamped in front of the metropolis were to be caught, if possible, between two fires and compelled to raise the siege. But the onslaught of 58,000 French on November 28 at Beaune-la-Rolande, under the impetuous General Jean Constant Crouzat, whom Freycinet made the mistake of restraining, proved ineffectual against the bravery of five German regiments and some batteries, commanded by Major Körber, a hero of Mars-la-Tour. But the great sortie which General Ducrot (p. 314) attempted in the southeast of Paris on November 30, against the positions of the Wurtembergers and Saxons near the villages of Champigny and Brie (see the sketch map on p. 340), did not attain its object in spite of the great superiority of the French. The fire of the Würtembergers, bursting from behind the park walls of Villiers and Coeuilly, mowed down the attacking columns of the French in heaps. On December 2 the village of Champigny, which had been lost on November 30, was to a great extent won back by help of the Pomeranians, and on December 3 the army of the sortie returned back to Paris. It had lost 12,000 men, the Germans 6,000, and the besiegers had to abandon all hope of breaking their way through by their unassisted strength. General Ducrot, who had vowed to conquer or to die, and exposed himself recklessly to the bullets, was compelled to re-enter Paris alive and defeated.

Prince Frederick Charles defeated the army of the Loire, now commanded

by the gallant General Chanzy, in the four days' battle of the 1st to the 4th of December at Loigny and Orléans, and on December 4 the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg again entered this town. German outposts bivouacked beneath the statue of the Maid of Orléans. The French army was in a most lamentable plight; the soldiers, clothed only in linen trousers and blouses, shivered with cold and refused to fight any more. The army was finally broken into two parts, of which one, under Charles Bourbaki, turned eastward on December 4 (see below), the other part, under Chanzy, retired in a northwesterly direction on the right bank of the Loire, leaving Tours to its fate, while Gambetta with the "delegation" fled to Bordeaux on December 8. Chanzy, pursued by the Prince and the Grand Duke, was again defeated at Beaugency (December 7-10) and driven back on Le Mans. But the Germans followed him thither, along roads deep in snow and covered with ice, where the cavalry had to dismount and lead their horses, and on January 11 and 12, 1871, won another great victory before Le Mans, in consequence of which Chanzy was compelled to retire still further west toward Brittany to Laval. The army of the Loire was thus to all intents annihilated.

(h) *The Battles round Dijon and in the North.* — Meantime there was fighting in two other districts. General Werder, after the capture of Alsace, had forced his way into Franche Comté and Burgundy, where he occupied Dijon, the capital, on October 31. The chief command against him was held by the hero of the Italian revolution, Garibaldi, who was so much moved by the change of France into a republic that he placed his sword at the services of that very nation which in 1860 had taken his native town of Nice from the national State of Italy (p. 265). Chuquet remarks that he, who was only a shadow of himself and could no longer sit a horse, together with his Chief of the Staff Bordone, an ex-apothecary, would have done best to have remained on his rocky island of Caprera. The Garibaldian volunteers from Italy and other countries who mustered round the leader were a rabble clothed in a picturesque uniform, who eventually proved more troublesome to the French than to the Germans. The Badenese, under General Adolf von Glümer, without allowing themselves to be stopped by these troops, took Nuits by storm on December 18, a town which was defended by General Camille Crémier, a fugitive from Metz, who had to drive his officers to the attack with a pistol at their heads. Glümer himself and Prince William of Baden, brother of the Grand Duke Frederick, were severely wounded on this occasion.

The other theatre of war was the northeast of France, especially Picardy and Normandy. The resistance here, as elsewhere, was organised by emissaries from the "delegation" (p. 345), and the northern army was created, so that the German headquarters sent General von Manteuffel there in November with two army corps, the first under H. A. von Zastrow (p. 337), and the eighth under August von Goeben. Manteuffel defeated the French under Farre on November 27 at Amiens, where the "Moblots" (Gardes Mobiles) by a disgraceful flight carried the troops of the line away with them. Amiens and Rouen were occupied, and General von Goeben knew how to treat the Normans so well that they ran after him trustingly on the roads, and the peasants willingly brought provisions to the markets, — quite otherwise than in the east, where all the shutters were closed and the doors locked when the Germans approached.

The prudent and energetic General Faidherbe (cf. Vol. III, p. 489) succeeded,

it is true, in rallying and strengthening the French troops; but on his advance from Lille he was beaten back by Manteuffel on the river La Hallue, at Port Noyelles, on December 23. Since his soldiers were forced to spend the night fasting, with a temperature far below freezing point, he felt himself, on December 24, unable to fight any further; he therefore abandoned his dangerous positions and withdrew to Arras. A second advance, on January 3, 1871, at Bapaume, was equally unsuccessful. General Goeben (p. 338), who, after Manteuffel was sent to the southeast, received the supreme command over the two German corps, ended the war in the north by the capture of the fortress of Péronne on January 8, and by the brilliant victory at St. Quentin on January 19, where Faidherbe lost 13,000 men. The fortress of St. Quentin itself fell into the hands of the victors, and the French northern army was reduced to such a condition that it no longer counted for anything.

(i) *The Question of the Bombardment of Beleaguered Paris.*—The capital of France held out all this time against the Germans who were investing it. But provisions were getting scarcer and scarcer, and occasional attempts at insurrection among the populace indicated that the reputation of the government was waning. The resistance nevertheless lasted far longer than was ever considered probable on the German side, and public opinion in Germany demanded with increasing emphasis that Paris should be effectively bombarded to accelerate the capitulation. Bismarck, from the very beginning of the siege, maintained that too much energy could not be shown in attacking the enemy, since, in the first place, the investing army suffered mentally and physically from the long inaction, and, secondly, since the apparently successful resistance of Paris revived the hopes of the French for an eventual victory and once more brought up the danger of foreign intervention which was thought to have been surmounted after the day of Sedan. But the Crown Prince, his Chief of the Staff, Leonhard von Blumenthal (p. 300), Moltke himself, and General von Gottberg were of opinion that a bombardment would not reach the workmen's quarter of Paris, and would thus be ineffective, and that the only means of reducing the city lay in starving it out; according to Blumenthal six weeks would be sufficient. King William was first enlightened as to the true state of affairs in the council of war of the 9th and 10th of December by the artillery leaders General von Hindersin, Prince Kraft von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, and others. Bismarck and Roon, in their memoirs, sustain the thesis, which cannot now be substantiated, that representations coming from England by way of Berlin and through the Crown Princess had produced in the Emperor's mind a reluctance to treat Paris, the Mecca of civilization, like any ordinary fortress.

(k) *The Solution of the Question of German Unity.*—During this time of expectancy the most important event of all, the question of the unity of Germany, was destined to be decided under the walls of Paris. There was a universal feeling directly after the first victories that the Germans, who had marched united to the war, ought not at its close to break up again into the old disunion, but that political union ought to result from the military union as a necessary consequence and as the chief fruit of the war. From the moment when Bismarck, in the name of the Germans, demanded the cession of Strassburg and Metz as tangible guaran-

tees for peace, the fact was firmly established that these border fortresses of the German people could not be held without the permanent political unity of the German nation. The current of opinion setting towards unity was strong enough to carry with it the princes, who, on account of the probable sacrifices of their sovereignty thereby entailed, could not lightly resolve upon the decisive negotiations. These negotiations were stimulated by a large meeting held in Berlin on August 30, which proposed as its motto that the fruits of the war must be, "a united nation and protected frontiers." The Grand Duke Frederick of Baden, whose first counsellor since the death of Mathy (see above, p. 314) was the keen advocate of national unity, Julius Jolly, declared on September 2 that he would support the constitutional union of the South German States with the North German Confederation. King Lewis II of Bavaria and King Charles I of Württemberg also gave an assurance on the 5th and 7th of September that they were anxious to secure to Germany the fruits of victory in the fullest measure and to establish a just mean between the national coherency of the German races and their individual independence.

The official negotiations were opened at Munich towards the end of September by Rudolf Delbrück (born April 16, 1817, died February 1, 1903), the President of the Federal Chancery of the North German Confederation, and afterwards continued by Bismarck in Versailles. They encountered, indeed, considerable difficulties, since the Particularists were only willing to concede the most modest measure of centralisation. The Bavarians argued the superfluity of a strict union from the very loyalty which all races had shown to the thought of nationality; in case of necessity Germany would always find all her children rallying round her. The king of Bavaria claimed as compensation for his consent to the establishment of a German federal State a sort of viceroyalty for the house of Wittelsbach, so that the Bavarian ambassadors in the event of any impediment to the imperial ambassadors, should of their own accord represent them. In fact, according to the diary of Moritz Busch, Prince Leopold, the uncle of the king, had suggested on January 10, 1871, the alternation of the imperial crown between the houses of Hohenzollern and Wittelsbach, but had received no answer at all. In addition to Bavaria, Hesse, the Minister of which, Baron von Dalwigk, was a sworn enemy to Prussia, made as many difficulties as possible. The king of Württemberg on the 12th of November, when everything seemed already settled, allowed himself to be persuaded by influence from Munich once more to delay the termination. But when Baden on the 15th of November signed the treaty as to the admission into the North German Confederation, and Hesse followed on the same day, the ice was broken.

According to remarks in the diary of the Crown Prince Frederick William, which are confirmed by the contemporary notes of Ludwig Bamberger, the Crown Prince became so impatient at the delays in the settlement of the matter that he thought that the business should be hurried on, that emperor and empire should be proclaimed by the princes of Baden, Oldenburg, Weimar, and Coburg, and a constitution corresponding to the reasonable wishes of the people should be sanctioned by the Reichstag and the Landtags; in that case the two South German kings would have to acquiesce with the best grace they could. The Crown Prince and Bismarck were thoroughly agreed upon the point that the king of Prussia as president of the German Federal State must bear the old and honourable title of

emperor. The aged monarch himself had grave doubts as to relegating to the second place the comprehensive title of King of Prussia, which his ancestor Frederick I had created of his own set purpose, and of assuming an empty title, which his brother had declined in 1849, and which he himself had jestingly styled "brevet-major."

Bismarck maintained his own wise independence toward the father and the son. To the first he emphasised the fact that the title of emperor contained an outward recognition of the *de facto* predominant position of the Prussian king, on which much depended; and he asked the latter whether he could consider it wise and honourable to exercise compulsion on two loyal allies who had shed their blood shoulder to shoulder with the North Germans. He is said to have uttered words which are no less noble and beautiful than they are wise, "I wish for a contented Bavaria." He was convinced that the new empire would not rest on firm foundations unless all the German races joined it of their own free will, without the feeling that any compulsion was being applied to them. He therefore granted to the Bavarians and the Würtembergers by the "Reserved Rights" a privileged position in the empire, which, although only accepted with reluctance by all determined supporters of German unity, has justified the foresight of the great statesman by affording these kingdoms the opportunity of joining the national cause without humiliation to their sense of importance. The treaties which Von Bray-Steinburg as minister signed on 23d November at Versailles for Bavaria, and the ministers Von Mittnacht and Von Suckow signed on 25th November, 1870, at Berlin for Würtemberg, reserved for both States the independent administration of the post office and telegraphs, and the private right of taxing native beer and brandy; this second privilege was granted to Baden also. It was further settled that the Bavarian army should be a distinct component part of the German Federal army with its own military administration under the command of the king of Bavaria, and that also the Würtemberg (13th) army should form a distinct corps, whose commander, however, could only be nominated by the king of Würtemberg with the previous assent of the king of Prussia. The organisation, training, and system of mobilisation of the Bavarian and Würtemberg troops were to be remodelled according to the principles in force for the Federal army. The Federal commander possesses the right to inspect the Bavarian and Würtemberg armies, and from the first day of mobilisation onwards all the troops of North and South Germany alike have to obey his commands.

The consideration which Bismarck showed to the kings procured him not merely their sincere confidence during the whole term of his life, a fact which was politically of much value, but also facilitated the settlement of the question of the title. Recognising that it is more palatable to the ambition of secondary States to have a German emperor over them than a king of Prussia, King Louis consented on December 3 to propose to the German princes, in a letter drafted by Bismarck himself but accepted and sent by Louis, that a joint invitation should be given His Majesty the King of Prussia to combine the exercise of the rights of president of the Federation with the style of a "German emperor." King William consented, waiving his scruples in deference to the universal wish of the princes and peoples of Germany. The Reichstag and the Landtags sanctioned the constitution of the "German Empire" in December and January, and on the 18th of December a deputation of the Reichstag appeared at Versailles, in order

to transmit to the king through the president, Simson (p. 228), the good wishes of the representatives of the people for the imperial crown. There was still friction to be smoothed away; but on the 18th of January, 1871, the day on which in 1701 the Prussian monarchy had been proclaimed (Vol. VII, p. 500) in the Hall of Mirrors of the splendid Château of Versailles, erected by Louis XIV, the adoption of the imperial title was solemnly inaugurated in the presence of numerous German princes. The Grand Duke Frederick of Baden led the first cheer for His Majesty Emperor William. In a proclamation to the German people, composed by Bismarck, the emperor announced his resolve "to aid at all times the growth of the empire, not by the conquests of the sword, but by the goods and gifts of peace, in the sphere of national prosperity, freedom, and culture." In the thirty years and more that have elapsed since that day the world has had opportunity to recognise that this purpose has been no empty phrase, but the guiding star of three German emperors.

(1) *The Destruction of the Paris Forts; the Battles on the Lisaine.*—At the moment when the empire was revived, or, to speak more correctly, was called into existence, the French powers of resistance were everywhere becoming exhausted; even those of the capital were failing. At Christmas time 235 heavy pieces of siege artillery were collected in Villacoublay, east of Versailles, and the bombardment of the east front of Paris was commenced on December 27 with such violence that the French evacuated Mont Avron "almost at a gallop." The bombardment of the city itself began from the south side on the 5th of January, and after five and a half hours Fort Issy ceased its fire. Since the shots, owing to an elevation of thirty degrees, which had been obtained by special contrivances, carried beyond the centre of the city, the inhabitants fled from the south to the north of Paris,—a movement by which the difficulties of feeding them were much increased. A great (and final) sortie toward the west, which was attempted on January 19 by Trochu with ninety thousand men, was defeated at Buzenval and Saint-Cloud, before the French had even approached the main positions of the Germans. The bombardment of the north front began on January 21. Here too the forts were completely demolished; parts of the bastions were soon breached; the garrisons had no protection against the German shells. It was known in the city that Chanzy had been completely routed at Le Mans on January 11 and 12, and the last prospect of relief was destroyed by the ill tidings from the east.

General Bourbaki had marched in that direction with the one-half of the army of the Loire; with the strength of his forces raised to 130,000 men, he hoped to compel the Germans under Werder, who only numbered 42,000, to relinquish the siege of the fortress of Belfort, and to force the Germans before Paris to retire, by threatening their communications in the rear. But Werder attacked the enemy, three times his superior in numbers, at Montbéliard on the Lisaine, and repulsed, in the three days' fighting, from the 15th to 17th January, all the attacks of Bourbaki. Not one French battalion was able to reach Belfort, where salvos had been vainly fired in honour of victory when the cannon-shots were heard. Bourbaki commenced his retreat, dispirited and weakened; but when he learnt that Moltke had sent General Manteuffel with the Pomeranians and Rhinelanders (the 1st and 7th corps) to block his road by Gray and Dôle, and when Garibaldi, although he retook Dijon and on January 23 captured the flag of the

61st regiment from under a heap of dead bodies, was unable to help him, he went back to Pontarlier. But before he surrendered his army to be disarmed by the neutral Swiss he made an ineffectual attempt to blow out his brains. His successor Justin Clinchant finally crossed the Franco-Swiss frontier on February 1 with 80,000 men. The last army of France was thus annihilated and the fate of Belfort sealed. Colonel Denfert-Rochereau surrendered the bravely defended but now untenable town to General Udo von Tresckow on February 18.

(m) *From the Armistice to the Conclusion of Peace.* — In Paris the dearth of provisions grew greater and greater during January. On the 21st a pound of ham cost 16s., a pound of butter 20s., a goose 112s. Horses, cats (= 9s.), dogs, and rats had long been eaten. In view of the threatened famine, Favre, the Foreign Minister, eventually appeared at the German headquarters on January 23, the one hundred and twenty-seventh day of the siege, to negotiate the terms of a capitulation. An agreement was at last reached on January 28, by which an armistice of twenty-one days was granted for the election of a National Assembly, which should decide on war and peace; but in return for the concession all the forts round Paris were delivered up to the Germans, and the whole garrison of the town declared prisoners of war. The town had to hand over all its cannons and rifles within fourteen days; the only exception was made in favour of the National Guard, the disarmament of which Favre declared to be impracticable owing to the insurrectionary spirit prevailing in that corps. Paris was thus in the hands of the Germans, although the emperor refrained from a regular occupation of it, which might easily lead to bloody encounters and hence to new difficulties, in the hope of peace being soon concluded. Permission was, of course, given for provisioning the city.

Gambetta would not consent to the armistice, but was compelled by Jules Simon, who was sent by the government to Bordeaux, to retire on February 6. The great man of the crisis was henceforward Adolphe Thiers (p. 313), who at the beginning of the war had counselled a cautious policy, and then, after Sedan, had vainly endeavoured to induce the great powers to intervene. He had proved himself a far-sighted patriot, from whom the country might look for its rescue. On February 8, twenty-six departments elected him to the National Assembly, which numbered among the 768 deputies 400 to 500 supporters of the monarchy (Orléanists and Legitimists), but included a large majority for peace. Fully a third of France was occupied by the Germans, and Faidherbe declared that if the government wished to continue the war in Flanders, the people would intervene and surrender to the Germans! On February 17 Thiers was elected to the highest post in the State under the title of "Chief of the Executive," and was sent on the 21st to Versailles in order to negotiate a peace. Bismarck demanded the whole of Alsace with Belfort, and a fifth of Lorraine with Metz and Diedenhofen, in addition six milliards and the entry of the German troops into Paris. After prolonged negotiations he assented to remit one milliard and waive all claim to Belfort (see the accompanying plate, "Important Extracts from the Preliminary Peace of Versailles," etc.), but insisted the more emphatically on the entry into Paris, which in some degree would impress the seal on the German victories and place clearly before the eyes of the French their complete defeat, as a deterrent from future wars. Thiers hurried with the conditions mentioned to

Bordeaux. On March 1, the same day on which thirty thousand German soldiers, selected from all the German races, marched into Paris and occupied the quarter of the town near the Champs Elysées together with the Château of the Tuileries, the preliminary treaty for peace, which the National Assembly had adopted, after a stormy debate, by 546 votes to 107, was completed in Bordeaux. The official ratification of it reached Versailles on the evening of March 2. The Germans evacuated Paris on the 3d, and retired behind the right bank of the Seine, which was to be the boundary of the two armies until the final peace was concluded. According to this agreement the forts to the east and north of Paris were still occupied by the Germans.

The subsequent peace negotiations were conducted in Brussels by plenipotentiaries, but proceeded so slowly that Bismarck, at the beginning of May, 1871, finally invited Favre to Frankfort-on-the-Main, in order to arrive at a clear understanding with him through a personal conference. After a short discussion the final peace was signed there on May 10 (see the accompanying plate); it contained, contrary to the preliminary treaty, a small exchange of territory at Belfort and Diedenhofen, and the proviso that the evacuation of French territory by the Germans should take place by degrees, in proportion as instalments of the war indemnity were paid.

The results of the German struggle for unity were immense. In comparison with them the sacrifices of the war were not so excessive. They amounted on the German side to 28,600 killed in battle, 12,000 deaths from disease, and 4,000 missing, — a grand total, therefore, of about 45,000 men; the number of wounded was calculated at 101,000. The French lost 150,000 killed and 150,000 wounded; the number of prisoners was eventually raised to more than 600,000.

Emperor William I held a grand review of the victorious troops in the east of Paris on March 7, and entered Berlin on March 17. On the 21st of March he opened in person the first German Reichstag; on June 16 a triumphal entry of the German army, selected out of all the German races, was made into Berlin between two lines of seven thousand four hundred captured cannons. The age of Louis XIV and the Napoleons was over. The European balance of power rested henceforward firmly and securely on the unassailable might of the German nation, now united for all time.

2. WESTERN EUROPE, 1871-1902

A. THE GERMAN EMPIRE

IN the years 1871-1902 three emperors have ruled at the head of the German Empire. First, the veteran founder of the empire, William I, from 1871 to 1888; then his son Frederick III, known as Crown Prince Frederick William, a victim of incurable cancer, who reigned only ninety-nine days, from March 9 to June 15, 1888; and, lastly, his eldest son William II (born the 27th of January, 1859).

The differences between the characters of these three rulers are strongly marked. William I was a man of simple character, a thorough soldier, taking no great interest in the arts and sciences, but keenly devoted to the practical business

EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS

IN the Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871, much interest attaches to the conclusion of the first article, in which, after the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, together with Metz, express mention is made of the cession of Marie-aux-chênes and Vionville to Germany and of the retention of Belfort by France, as well as to the beginning of the second article, in which France consents to pay five milliards of francs (instead of the six milliards demanded by Germany). The handwriting is that of a government official. The last page of the lengthy preliminary treaty contains, besides the last paragraph of the articles, the signatures of Bismarck (with his seal), Thiers, and Favre. Underneath, in the autograph of Count Bray, is the declaration of assent by the States of South Germany, namely, Bavaria (Count Bray-Steinburg), Würtemberg (Baron Waechter and Mittnacht), and Baden (Jolly).

Since the most important stipulations as to Alsace-Lorraine, Belfort, and the war indemnity are not found in the Treaty of Frankfort itself, but only in the preliminaries of peace at Versailles, the preamble and the conclusion of the definitive treaty are most interesting portions.

TEXT OF THE ORIGINAL.

Left. [Preamble. Article I. . . . La frontière telle qu'elle vient d'être décrite, se trouve marquée en vert sur deux exemplaires conformes de la carte du territoire formant le Gouvernement général d'Alsace, publiée à Berlin, en septembre 1870, par la division géographique et statistique de l'état-major général, et dont un exemplaire sera joint à chacune des deux expéditions du présent traité.]

Toutefois le tracé indiqué a subi les modifications suivantes de l'accord des deux parties contractantes: Dans l'ancien département de la Moselle les villages de Marie-aux-chênes près de St. Privat-la-Montagne, et de Vionville, à l'ouest de Rezonville, seront cédés à l'Allemagne. Par contre la ville et les fortifications de Belfort resteront à la France avec un rayon qui sera déterminé ultérieurement.

Article II.

La France paiera à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne la somme de cinq milliards de francs.

[Le paiement d'au moins un milliard de francs aura lieu dans le courant de l'année 1871, et celui de tout le reste de la dette dans un espace de trois années à partir de la ratification des présentes.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

. . . [The frontier, as just described, is marked in green on two identical copies of the map of the territory constituting the government-general of Alsace, published at Berlin in September, 1870, by the geographical and statistical division of the Headquarters Staff; an impression of the map will be attached to each of the two copies of the present treaty.]

The frontier as there marked has, however, been modified as follows by the consent of the two contracting parties: in the former department of Moselle the villages of Marie-aux-chênes near St. Privat-la-Montagne, and of Vionville, to the west of Rezonville, will be ceded to Germany. On the other hand the town and fortress of Belfort will continue to belong to France, together with some surrounding districts which will be subsequently defined.

Article II.

France will pay to H. M. the German Emperor the sum of five milliards of francs.

[At least one milliard of francs will be paid during the year 1871, and the rest of the indemnity before the expiration of three years from the ratification of these presents.

Article III.

L'évacuation des territoires français occupés par les troupes allemandes commencera. . . .]

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont revêtu le présent traité préliminaire de leurs signatures et de leurs sceaux.

Fait à Versailles le 26. février 1871.
v. Bismarck. A[dolphe] Thiers.
Jules Favre

Les Royaumes de Bavière et de Wurtemberg et le Grand Duché de Bade ayant pris part à la guerre actuelle comme alliés de la Prusse et faisant partie maintenant de l'Empire Germanique, les soussignés adhèrent à la présente convention au nom de leurs souverains respectifs.

Versailles, le 26 Février, 1871.
C^{te} de Bray-Steinburg
B^r de Waechter
Mittnacht.
Jolly

Right. Le Prince Othon de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, Chancelier de l'Empire germanique, le Comte Harry d'Arnim, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne près du St. Siège: stipulant au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'un côté, de l'autre Monsieur Jules Favre, Ministre des affaires étrangères de la République française, Monsieur Augustin Thomas Joseph Pouyer-Quertier, Ministre des finances de la République française, et Monsieur Marc Thomas Eugène de Goulard, Membre de l'Assemblée nationale, stipulant au nom de la République française [s'étant . . .

. . . d'un côté, et de l'autre par l'Assemblée nationale et par le Chef du Pouvoir exécutif de la République française] seront échangées à Francfort dans le délai de dix jours ou plus tôt¹ si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Francfort le 10 mai 1871.
v. Bismarck Jules Favre
Arnim Pouyer-quertier
E. de Goulard

Article III.

The evacuation of the French territory occupied by the German troops will begin . . .]

In confirmation whereof the undersigned have attached their signatures and seals to the present treaty.

Versailles, February 26, 1871.
v. Bismarck. A. Thiers.
Jules Favre.

Since the kingdoms of Bavaria and of Wurtemberg and the Grand Duchy of Baden have taken part in the present war as allies of Prussia, and now form a part of the German Empire, the undersigned agree to the present convention in the names of their respective sovereigns.

Versailles, February 26, 1871.
Count Bray-Steinburg
Baron Waechter
Mittnacht
Jolly

Prince Otto Bismarck-Schoenhausen, Chancellor of the German Empire, Count Harry Arnim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H. M. the German Emperor to the Holy See, contracting in the name of H. M. the German Emperor of the one part, Monsieur Jules Favre, Foreign Minister of the French Republic, Monsieur Augustin Thomas Joseph Pouyer-Quertier, Finance Minister of the French Republic, and Monsieur Marc Thomas Eugen de Goulard, member of the National Assembly, contracting in the name of the French Republic, of the other part . . .

. . . [on the one side and on the other by the National Assembly and by the chief of the executive power of the French Republic] will be exchanged at Frankfort within a period of ten days,¹ or sooner if possible.

In confirmation of the above the respective plenipotentiaries have signed it and sealed it with their own coat of arms.

Signed at Frankfort the 10th May, 1871.
v. Bismarck Jules Favre
Arnim. Pouyer-Quertier
E. de Goulard.

The word *plutôt* originally written by the clerk has been erased and *plus tôt* substituted.

of life, full of manly amiability and loyal conscientiousness. The words he uttered on his deathbed, "I have no time to be tired," characterise his whole nature. He had the highest conception of his royal rights and duties; he read everything which he had to sign, and emphatically asserted his own views; but he was accessible to the counsel of experienced statesmen. He adhered with the greatest tenacity to the old Prussian traditions.

Frederick III was by nature and through the influence of his English consort Victoria, the eldest daughter of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert of Coburg, devoted to the liberal ideas of the time, a warm friend of all artistic and scientific effort (for example, following the suggestion of Ernst Curtius he ordered the excavations at Olympia to be carried out at the cost of the State), and a soldier so far and no farther than his political position required. In his brief reign he allowed himself to be directed by the imperial chancellor, Otto von Bismarck († July 30, 1898; Prince Bismarck since 1871), from whom his father had repeatedly declared that he never wished to be separated. Differences of opinion which had earlier (especially 1863-1866) existed between the monarch and the statesman sank so much into the background in the ninety-nine days, that Bismarck asserted he had never, in his long ministerial career, known less friction between crown and ministry than under the emperor Frederick.

Affairs assumed a quite different shape under William II, who, coming to the throne as a young man of twenty-nine years, brought with him a thoroughly independent, indeed despotic, nature, and in the consciousness of ample abilities and honest purpose felt competent to be his own chancellor. Thus, after only one year and a half a sharp quarrel broke out between the young monarch and the gray-haired statesman, who so long had conducted affairs with prudence and courage. From differences of opinion as to the legitimate position of the prime minister toward the crown and his colleagues, and as to the social and political questions which William II thought he was able to solve at one stroke, the feud blazed up so fiercely that the emperor on March 20, 1890, abruptly dismissed Bismarck. Since then, Count Leo von Caprivi († February 6, 1899), from October, 1894, Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst († July 6, 1901), and after October 17, 1900, Bernhard (Count) von Bülow, have successively filled the office of imperial chancellor; but the importance of the office has been much diminished by the personal activity of the emperor.

Although just criticism has often been brought to bear on particular measures taken by the government in the period from 1871 to 1902, and on its frequently slack and unsteady attitude since 1890, and although serious discontent was produced, especially under Caprivi, by its Anglophile tendencies, its indulgence towards the Poles, and its brusque treatment of Bismarck, whom the emperor took back into favour in January, 1894, yet it cannot be disguised that during this whole period the development of the German nation, in spite of disagreeable episodes of every sort, has been materially advanced. The phrase of William II, "I am leading you towards splendid prospects," was a proud but not untrue utterance.

(a) *The Consolidation of the Empire at Home.*—The institutions of the empire in the very first years of its existence were completed by unceasing and generally successful legislative work. In the year 1872 a uniform decimal system was

introduced in place of the former countless varieties of coins, weights, and measures. The coinage was placed on the basis of a gold standard, which could not be seriously shaken by the violent attacks of the bimetallist party.

In the domain of legal administration the unification of civil procedure and the arrangement of the courts was carried out in 1876, after the North German Confederation had already unified the administration of the criminal law (p. 317). The concluding step in the reform in the law courts was the acceptance of a uniform civil code by the Reichstag in the year 1896. The code, after the introductory labours were completed, came into force for the whole empire on January 1, 1900. Under this head comes the decree, made in the year 1898, establishing a uniform military criminal procedure, when a concession was made to the Bavarian spirit of individualism in the shape of an exclusively Bavarian senate in the High Court at Berlin.

Bismarck availed himself of the economic crisis in the middle of the seventies to effect in 1879, with the help of the Centre, a tariff reform which granted moderate protective tariffs for all branches of national productive enterprise for agriculture and industrial employments, and filled the empty coffers of the empire by the State taxes imposed on colonial produce. Since then the empire, until quite recently, instead of being compelled to meet its expenses by calling upon the individual States for proportionate contributions (p. 309), has been, on the contrary, in a position in favourable years to devote considerable advances out of its income to these States. The allied governments regarded the complete severance of the finances of the empire from those of the separate States, so that each part would have assigned to it distinct sources of taxation for its exclusive use, as the ideal of a systematised financial economy. Hitherto this plan of the Prussian finance minister Johannes von Miquel († September 8, 1901) has failed to obtain a majority in the Reichstag; the Centre in particular dreaded that its parliamentary influence would be weakened by the independence of the imperial government in financial respects, and that the independence of the separate States would be despised by an empire which was self-supporting. In the end the necessity of meeting the imperial outgoings in extreme cases by claims on the separate States seemed an incentive to economy in imperial finance. The Zollverein was in 1882 and 1885 completed by the entry of the still outstanding Hanse towns Hamburg and Bremen into the union, though Hamburg only consented after an opposition as violent as it was short-sighted. Bismarck, when the thought of unity had forced its way in, true to his fixed principle of promoting unity, did much to support the just interests of Hamburg; and the city owes to that step, from which it originally feared its destruction, a prosperity of trade and commerce which raises it to the first place on the continent of Europe, and which is only surpassed by London in the whole world. During the chancellorship of Caprivi commercial treaties were settled in 1892 with Austria, Italy, and Roumania, and one with Russia in 1894. Industries were greatly benefited by these, while agriculturists complained of severe losses from the lowering of the corn tax from five marks to three and one-half marks for the double hundredweight. For this reason the proposal to renew the commercial treaties which expired in 1904 met with the emphatic opposition of the German agriculturists, and the government declared its readiness to restore the rate of five marks. The Reichstag approved the tariff laid before it on December 14, 1902.

The reform of the military system was of great importance for the consolidation of national unity; for peaceable as the policy of the empire has been under all three emperors, yet the existence of so powerful a force as the empire represents has roused envy and distrust in Europe on many sides. Above all, the heartfelt longing of the French nation remained for decades fixed on one object,—the exaction, so soon as any opportunity presented, of a bloody revenge for the humiliation sustained in 1870-1871, and the restoration of the old pre-eminence of France in Europe. The obvious necessity of withdrawing military matters from the arena of parliamentary disputes and of giving them a more secure and more permanent basis than was possible under the system of annual grants, and the natural wish of the Reichstag to maintain with regard to the army its right of making yearly money grants, constituted a difficult problem; Bismarck, however, in 1874, found an acceptable middle course, by agreeing to the proposal of the National Liberals, who were predominant in the Reichstag, and by declaring that the grant of the requisite means for a peace strength of 401,000 men for seven years would be sufficient. In 1880 the necessary sums for an army of 427,000 men, corresponding to the increase of the population, were once more granted. When in 1887 the government asked for a renewal of the septennial grant, this time for 468,000 men, a majority, formed of a Catholic Centre and the Left, which had existed since the elections of the autumn of 1881, rejected this demand by 186 votes to 154. The 468,000 men were only to be granted for three years. But the emperor then, with the consent of the Bundesrat, dissolved the Reichstag, and, on the new elections, the government obtained a majority of roughly 220 to 180 votes, so that on March 11 the army bill as framed by the government was accepted. The Reichstag elected under the influence of the military dispute and of an apprehended collision with France was in other respects fruitful in results. In 1888 it substituted quinquennial elections for triennial, in order that the Reichstags might enjoy a longer period of activity undisturbed by election considerations. Since it was impossible permanently to carry out the system of universal liability to bear arms with a three years' service except at an enormous cost, in 1893, under Caprivi's chancellorship, but not without a renewed dissolution of the Reichstag (May 6), the two years' period of service, with a concurrent raising of the peace strength to 479,000 men, privates, lance-corporals, and corporals (that is to say, without reckoning the under officers, the one-year volunteers, and the officers), was passed on July 15 by a bare majority. The increase of recruits consequent on this law amounted annually to 60,000 men. The opposition was willing, indeed, to accept the shortening of the period of service, but not to concede the strengthening of the army; this time, however, it was finally left in a minority in the Reichstag, although it was supported by a small majority of the electors.

The ever pressing necessity that Germany should acquire her share of international commerce, and the oversea territory which is indispensable as a base for such commerce (cf. below, p. 363), led, under William II, to the building of a powerful fleet. "Our future," declared the emperor, "lies on the sea; we must follow a world-policy." In 1898, therefore, a preliminary naval bill was carried in the Reichstag, which fixed the number of battle-ships at nineteen. But the victory of the United States of North America over the feeble naval resources of Spain (cf. Vol. I, p. 564, and Vol. IV, p. 562) immediately changed the situation; the United States became a great power in Eastern Asia, and it was shown that

antiquated ships were not merely worthless, but absolutely dangerous to their crews, since they are certain to be destroyed in a battle with better-equipped opponents. In order that Germany might not be entirely outstripped, a second naval bill was passed on June 12, 1900, through the patriotic self-sacrifice of the Reichstag, by 201 votes to 103, by which the number of the battle-ships was increased to 38, that of the cruisers to 52. If the provisions of this bill are carried out by 1916, Germany will then be able to put into action a war fleet which might contest with the English fleet (so far as it could be employed for the North Sea) for the sovereignty of her own sea. The French journal "*Le Temps*" was right when in 1898 it greeted the first attempts to found a German fleet on a grand scale with the words, "*Une grande puissance navale va entrer en scène.*"

(b) *The Kulturkampf*.—The first decade of the new empire was to a large extent occupied with a violent struggle between the Prussian State and the Catholic Church, in which the sympathies of the whole empire were enlisted on the one side or the other. It was, as Karl Aug. von Hase, the Protestant ecclesiastical historian (Vol. VII, p. 346) aptly remarked, in itself improbable that the Roman Curia and a State of such pre-eminently Protestant stamp as the German Empire would at once find their proper relations one to the other without a conflict; on the contrary, they would only learn this from a contest in which both parties felt the strength of their antagonist.

In the first German Reichstag an almost exclusively Catholic party was formed, the Centre, which stood under the extremely clever leadership of the Hanoverian ex-Minister of State Ludwig Windthorst (1812–1891), and immediately proved itself the refuge of Ultramontane, Guelf, and Particularist efforts. It aimed, but unsuccessfully, at a German interference in Italy, in order to win back for the Pope his temporal power, and demanded that the articles of the Prussian constitution, which secured to the churches complete freedom from State control, should be introduced into the imperial constitution; but it was unable to carry its wishes either with Bismarck or in the Reichstag. It adopted, in consequence, an unfriendly attitude towards the government. The Prussian government further complained that the Catholic clergy in Posen and West Prussia, by an abuse of their influential position, especially in the matter of elementary schools, which were under their direction, supported the national Polish movements and prejudiced the German Catholics in favour of Poland.

As a result of all this agitation Heinr. von Mühler, the Minister of Public Worship, who was considered a willing tool of the ambitious schemes of the Church, both Catholic and Evangelical, was dismissed in January, 1872, and the ministry of Public Worship and Instruction was transferred to Adalbert Falk (1827–1900), a man who might be expected to check these plans. The latter first carried a bill in 1872, which strictly defined the inspection of schools as a State concern, and threw open to laymen the office of inspector, particularly in country districts. Falk then in 1873 brought before the Landtag of the monarchy the four bills, which, in spite of violent opposition on the part of the Centre and the Extreme Right, obtained a large majority and were called "May Laws," since they received the sanction of the crown in May, 1873. The first of these laws confined within closer limits the right of the churches to inflict penalties on laymen in the case of contumacy; the second restricted their

disciplinary power over their clergy and abolished all foreign (and therefore all papal) jurisdiction over Prussian clergy. The third enacted that the clergy should no longer be educated for their profession in ecclesiastical but in State institutions, and prohibited their attendance at foreign seminaries, especially those in Rome; it also provided that the bishops, before making any appointment to a benefice, should give notice to the State authorities, and, if a well-founded protest was made by the State, should make another nomination. The fourth law regulated withdrawals from the churches. Finally, in 1875 a fifth law abolished all religious orders in Prussia which did not devote themselves to the care of the sick, and thus in particular put an end to their activity in school matters.

Since the Pope, and the bishops following the example set them by the Pope, pronounced these laws incompatible with the principles of the Catholic Church, and in accordance with the saying, "We must obey God more than men," refused submission to these laws, a struggle of many years' duration broke out between the State and the Church; the vast majority of the Catholic population showed unbroken loyalty and obedience to their spiritual leaders. The struggle was waged on both sides with much bitterness, and since Catholic priests frequently used the pulpit in order to fire the believers to resist the State laws, the Prussian government held itself bound to proceed against such agitation by penal measures. But since criminal jurisdiction was one of the rights of the empire, it was inevitable that the latter should be entangled in the quarrel. At the instance of Johann Lutz, the Bavarian minister, who was engaged in a keen contest with the Bavarian Ultramontanes, the so-called "pulpit paragraph," which attached penalties to the misuse of the pulpit for inciting opposition against the government, had been inserted in the Criminal Code in November, 1871. The empire on two other occasions lent the Prussian government its aid, first on July 4, 1872, when it prohibited the Jesuit order and its branches from owning establishments in the dominions of the empire and from developing any activity as an order, and again on February 6, 1875, when it introduced civil marriage in a universally binding form (not merely the so-called civil marriage of necessity). By these imperial laws it was rendered impossible for the Catholic clergy and that warlike militia of the infallible Pope, the order of Jesuits, to agitate against the May Laws; and the influence of the Church on civil life was checked, since a marriage might be contracted and a household founded without the benediction of the Church.

The government was supported in this struggle by the two middle parties, the Free Conservatives and the National Liberals, who formed its parliamentary support generally, and for some time also by the Progressist party. To a leader of this party, Professor Rudolf Virchow of Berlin, is due the phrase that the dispute was a "Kulturkampf," that is to say, a victory of the State would signify a victory of culture over barbarism. Almost the entire liberal and radical press attacked the Catholic Church and the Centre most vigorously, and the minister Falk (= falcon) was greeted on his journeys as the noble falcon whose mission was to scare away the tribe of owls from Germany.

The government had for its supporters among the Catholic population the Old Catholics, the opponents of the dogma of infallibility, who, under the leadership of Reinkens (chosen bishop by their synod; cf. Vol. VII, p. 352), Friedr. Michelis, Döllinger, Joh. Friedr. Ritter von Schulte and others, represented

the religious aspirations of Catholicism in contrast to the political ambitions of the Ultramontanes, and the so-called National Catholics, who recognised, it is true, the infallible Pope, but with a peculiar inward contradiction argued for the independence of the State in its own territory, as if the Church, built up on the basis of infallibility, would regard any territory as exempt from her authority. But the great bulk of the Catholic Prussians attached themselves more closely than ever to the side of the Pope and the bishops, owing to the "Diocletian-like persecution," when seven out of twelve Prussian bishops were deposed for neglecting to give notice of ecclesiastical appointments, and nearly one thousand parsonages were made vacant. The number of Catholic journals grew in six years from four to one hundred and twenty, and the Centre, which, when founded, held only fifty seats in the Reichstag, rose to more than one hundred members, since by degrees all the constituencies in which the Catholic religion predominated were captured by it. The parliamentary position of the Centre was strengthened in 1876 by the circumstance that the Conservative movement, which had long been weakening, was revived, and soon, under the name of the "German-Conservative party," obtained considerable power in the Reichstag. It did not allow the Extreme Right (which under the ex-Landrat Gustav von Diest-Daber declared war on Bismarck as a revolutionary and a hireling of the ultra-Semitic bourse) to give the keynote to its policy, but in general political questions followed the lead of the great statesman who had formerly been fiercely attacked without good cause by the Conservatives, also on account of the radical Prussian district organisation (cf. p. 366). It took up, however, an unfavourable attitude towards the Kulturkampf, because the latter did far more harm to the Evangelical Church than to the Catholic. The Catholics found an advocate at court in the empress Augusta, and the difficulties which this clever woman put in the path of Bismarck and Falk were much resented by both.

Bismarck during the heat of the dispute had already declared that the government built up their hopes of peace mainly on the prospect that a peace-loving Pope would once again, as had happened in past history, succeed the belligerent Pope Pius IX. This event occurred in February 20, 1878, when, after the death of Pius (February 7), Cardinal Joachim Pecci was elected Pope, and took the title of Leo XIII. He prided himself on calming by peaceful concessions the disturbances under which the reputation alike of State and Church had suffered greatly (Bismarck was, on July 13, 1874, the object of a murderous attack by Kullmann, a fanatical Catholic). The nuncio at Munich, Gaet. Al. Masella, visited Bismarck at Kissingen in July, 1878. Falk was obliged to retire on July 14, 1879, and the co-operation of the Centre with Bismarck in the question of the customs tariff had a favourable influence on the other relations of the two parties. After nine years of excessively difficult negotiations a truce was concluded in 1887, to which the most trenchant May Laws were sacrificed; for instance, the law concerning the ecclesiastical court and the preliminary training of the clergy in State institutions. But the State had by no means made an unconditional surrender to the Church; on the contrary, all the three imperial laws remained in force, and in Prussia the law as to State control of the schools, the exclusion of the orders from the schools, and the obligation of the bishops to signify beforehand to the *Oberpräsident* (lord lieutenant) of the respective province the names of the clergy whom they proposed to appoint to vacant benefices. The Centre became, nominally after Caprivi's

entrance on office, and completely after it held the presidency of the Reichstag, more and more a support of the government, and knew how to turn its powerful position in parliament to its own account. It was not able, however, to procure the subordination of schools to the Church, although this proposal was keenly advocated by Count Robert von Zedlitz, the Minister of Public Worship in 1892; a measure for the admission of the Jesuits and the "Lex Heinze" against the nude in art were also rejected; although in the first and third points the Centre was supported by the Conservatives. Since 1893 there had frequently been a majority in the Reichstag in favour of the readmission of the Jesuits; and at the beginning of 1903 the imperial chancellor disclosed to it the prospect of repealing the second paragraph of the law affecting the Jesuits (p. 359), by virtue of which the Bundesrat can assign a residence to individual Jesuits.

(c) *The Social Question in Germany.* — The discovery of the steam-engine by James Watt (cf. Vol. VII, pp. 109 and 370) inaugurated an economic development which destroyed the previously existing connection of labour with the tools of labour; the tools were given up to the capitalist, who then hired and made full use of the human working power. In earlier centuries the handworker himself possessed the tools of his craft and was independent; he worked only on his account. But for the future only the rich man could procure the costly working apparatus, to which the invention of the steam-engine has led; the workman, in order to earn his living, was compelled to hire himself out to the owner of the machine, and to leave him a share of the proceeds of his work. The workmen felt this to be unjust; they did not take into consideration that the factory owner primarily has to bear the risks of a stoppage of the machinery, and must devote his brains and his business faculties to the management of the whole concern. They demanded the full proceeds of their work for themselves, and accordingly aimed at transferring the apparatus of labour (the factories, the machinery, and the sites) into the joint possession of all workers. They considered that one who hired workmen for wages, whether as a manufacturer or as a landowner, was making unfair profit out of his fellow-men. That was the view of the Social Democrats, who, as their name attests, aimed at replacing the supremacy of a capitalist aristocracy by that of the people united for the purposes of collective production. The scientific champions of Social Democracy in Germany were Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), Karl Marx (1818-1883), and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895); their leaders, August Bebel (born 1840), and Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826-1900; cf. Vol. VII, p. 414 *et seq.*).

The movement was rapidly swollen by the stimulus which was given to trade and industries immediately after the war of 1870, since hundreds of new factories sprang up, and thousands and thousands of men abandoned agriculture and streamed into the factories. The reaction which set in after the second half of the year 1873 left a mass of these workmen without bread, planted bitterness and revolutionary thoughts in their hearts, and thus increased the number of those who were discontented with the existing order of things. In the year 1875 the two parties hitherto existing within the Social Democracy, the followers of Bebel and Liebknecht, and those of Lassalle, amalgamated at Gotha into the "Socialist Labour party," and, thanks to universal suffrage, won in the elections to the Reichstag of 1877 more than twenty seats.

An indirect consequence of the efforts of the Social-Democratic press to incite the people against the State and society was that on May 11, 1878, a plumber's assistant, Max Höbel, who described himself as an Anarchist and Nihilist, fired several revolver-shots at the emperor William, then in his eighty-first year. The shots missed, but on June 2 Dr. Karl Nobiling (who by prompt suicide avoided all inquiry) repeated the murderous attempt with greater success; by firing two charges of buckshot at the emperor while he was graciously saluting his people from his carriage, he inflicted some thirty wounds on the old man, so that the Crown Prince had to represent him officially for six months. The intense feeling excited by these brutal outrages contributed to the result that the newly elected Reichstag accepted in October, 1878, the law "against the common danger threatened by the Social Democracy," not indeed permanently, as the government wished, but only for two and a half years; but the law was repeatedly prolonged (until September 30, 1890; cf. Vol. VII, p. 416). By this law all the clubs of the Social Democrats were broken up and their newspapers suppressed; but the organisation still existed in secret, and new organs of a Social-Democratic tendency appeared under the pretext of representing workmen's interests. Nevertheless the law, by imposing strong restraints on revolutionary behaviour, emphatically impressed upon the Social Democrats the power of the State and of society, and educated them to more law-abiding behaviour; it never suppressed, nor indeed ever wished to suppress, the movement itself, which had deep-lying economic causes.

Emperor William and Bismarck were from the first thoroughly convinced that restrictive legislation must be accompanied by constructive measures, and that the roots of discontent can only be destroyed by the removal of the just grievances of the workmen and by solicitude for "the unprotected members of the State, that they may not be run over and trampled under foot on the high-road of life." The Reichstag chosen in 1881, which contained a majority of Ultramontanes and Democrats, received on November 17 a memorable message from the emperor, describing the business of social reform as an urgent duty of the State; the emperor, then eighty-four years old, expressed his wish in it that "at his death he might bequeath to the needy greater security and abundance of assistance." This action of the government and the intelligent support of the Reichstag produced a series of beneficial enactments: first, the law as to the institution of banks for the support of workmen when ill or injured (1883 and 1884); then the law as to insurance against old age and infirmity (1889); lastly, the laws as to the protection of workmen against inconsiderate demands upon their time and strength (1891), as to absolute Sunday rest from labour in all industries (1891), and a qualified Sunday rest in business (from January 1, 1897). An attempt has been made in recent years to supplement by a series of new enactments the deficiencies that have come to light in the actual working of those laws.

The "National Socialism," or, to use Bismarck's phrase, the "practical Christianity," which appeared in this legislation, was opposed by the "German Radical Party," which was formed in 1884 out of the Progressist party and the Left wing of the National Liberals; it approved of the "Manchester doctrine," according to which any interference of the State in economic matters has only an injurious effect, and salvation comes from the "free play of economic forces."

The party did not, however, find much support, and dropped from more than one hundred députés to between twenty and thirty. It split up in 1893; the followers of Eugen Richter styled themselves a "Radical popular party," while the more moderate minority formed the "Radical Union."

The Social Democrats also were opposed to the National Socialists. If the latter school went too far for the German Radicals, it did not go far enough for the Social Democrats. A legislation which brings daily a million marks to the workmen, and to which the French Social Democrat and Minister of Commerce, Alexandre Millerand, paid in 1900 a tribute of warm recognition, was termed by them a "policy of alms"; whereas this legislation, which for example provided that any surplus derived from the customs tariff of 1902 should be assigned to the widows and orphans of workmen, in principle offers the workman no favours, but merely rights. The Social Democrats, after the exceptional law, which expired on October 1, 1890, grew so amazingly that in 1898 it obtained two and one-quarter million votes and fifty-six seats. But while it was spreading over a quarter of the nation, an inner change was unceasingly proceeding, which must change it from a party of violent revolution to a party of lawful development by peaceful means and of gradual reform. Instead of hunting after the imaginary picture of the socialistic "state of the future," where there is only one class of men and heaven is transported to earth, the Social-Democratic masses and some of their leaders, for example, Ed. Bernstein (Vol. VII, p. 418) and Georg von Vollmar, applied themselves to reform and ameliorate the existing order, which offered ample room even for the "disinherited."

(d) *The Acquisition of Colonies by the German Empire.*—Schiller, in his poem, "Die Teilung der Erde" (The partition of the earth), complained a hundred years ago that the world had been given away to foreign nations, and only the sky was left remaining for the German. But, little as a nation is able to live permanently without an ideal, still less can it do so without bread; and the more quickly the German population grew (it increased in the three decades, 1871-1901, from thirty-eight to fifty-six millions), the more essential it was to procure elsewhere the means of subsistence for the masses who could not find food at all times from agriculture. Everything then combined to urge Germany on the path of economic development. But in order to obtain cheap raw materials for the industries and to make a sale for their products, all of which the home market could not take, Germany needed assured commercial dealings with other nations and a sufficiently strong war fleet (p. 358) to be able to maintain that security of trade, if necessary, by force of arms; and not only this, but it required its own oversea possessions as bases for commerce, as coaling stations for its ships, and as advanced posts in those hitherto closed parts of the globe which are now slowly opening to European civilization,—Africa and East Asia.

Prince Bismarck did not hasten this development toward the acquisition of colonies, for the good reason that the possibility of disputes with other nations was increased by it, and Germany, as it was, required to be on her guard in Europe, owing to the French thirst for vengeance; he also was of opinion that only an inevitable development, springing from internal causes, afforded in itself guarantees of success and permanency; colonies must "grow wild." But where this was the case, he ultimately intervened with the mighty arm of the empire, to

help and to protect. Thus he took under the protection of the empire (Vol. III, p. 496), on April 24, 1884, the territory which Lüderitz, a merchant of Bremen, acquired on the bay of Angra Pequena in Southwest Africa from the Hottentots; acquisitions of fresh territory then followed in rapid succession; the order of events was everywhere the same; first of all, trading companies established themselves, and obtained the protection of the empire; then, after some time, followed the annexation of the territory which they had acquired. In this way the Cameroons, Togoland, German Southwest Africa and German East Africa, Kaiser Wilhelm's Land in New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands, the Carolines and Mariannes, and the two chief islands of the Samoa group, Sawaii and Upolu, were successively acquired between 1884 and 1899. The entire colonial possessions of Germany comprised, in 1901, about 2,650,000 square kilometres, with more than 12,000,000 inhabitants. The frontiers have been as accurately defined as possible by treaties with France, England, the Congo State, and the United States of America, and thus an incontestable legal right has been acquired. Togoland and the Cameroons are the most flourishing territories; in the others a steady development can be observed, although private capital, as well as the empire, will have to take bolder risks if the treasures still lying unexploited in the soil of the colonies are to be brought to light.

(e) *The Chinese Troubles.* — Japan in 1894–1895, in a war fought for the pre-dominant influence in Corea, annihilated the fleet of China on the river Yalu, and by the treaty of Shimonoseki obtained the cession of Formosa; but without being able to hold the important peninsula of Liautung, and with it the key to Peking, in face of the united representations of Russia, France, and Germany (Vol. II, p. 53). Since that time the question of the Far East has been opened, the difficulty of which consists in the fact that all the great powers wish to secure their share in the commercial advantages to be derived from China; but in this matter the interests of Russia on the one side and those of Japan and England on the other, are diametrically opposed. Russia, as the near neighbour of China, can best lay hands on its northern provinces; but Japan cannot look with indifference on this rapid growth of Russia, and the interests of England in the Yangtse district are so great that the independence of China is of paramount importance to her. In the fourth place comes Germany, whose trade with China grows continuously; France is only concerned with the south of the vast empire, on which the French colony, Tonkin, won in 1885, abuts (Vol. II, p. 539).

The murder of German Catholic missionaries in the province of Shantung gave the German Empire in November, 1897, an opportunity of taking a firm position in Kiauchau, and of leasing in January, 1898, a piece of land there from China for ninety-nine years; the town of Tsingtau has rapidly risen to great prosperity. Russia thereupon "leased," in December, 1897, the Chinese harbour Port Arthur, and in March, 1898, England did the same with the harbour of Weihaiwei, which faces Port Arthur on the south side of the Gulf of Pechili. A number of European companies obtained from the young emperor, Kwang Hsu, who was personally inclined to progress and followed the advice of the reform-loving statesman, Li Hung Chang (1821–1901), the permission to build lines of railway which should open up the interior of China to commerce.

This rapid influx of Europeans, which flooded the empire so long closed to the outside world, produced a national reaction in North China, the region immediately affected. The political society of the "Boxers" was formed, whose object was the expulsion of the foreigners; the Boxers murdered in the year 1900 some two hundred and fifty Europeans and thirty thousand Chinese Christians, not infrequently with cruel tortures. It was assumed as certain that the dowager empress Tsze Hsi favoured the first efforts of the Boxers; she nominated Prince Tuan, a bitter enemy of all foreigners, president of the Tsungli Yamen, the officials who look after foreign affairs. On June 12 the secretary of the Japanese embassy, and on June 20 Baron Ketteler, the German ambassador, were assassinated in the streets of Peking; the latter was shot by a soldier of the imperial standard bearers acting under instructions from high quarters. The rest of the ambassadors with their families were besieged for almost two months by Boxers and imperial troops, and owed their lives to the European relieving force which was summoned in time, and perhaps to the efforts of some high officials who were friendly to foreigners.

On the receipt of this news the emperor William II sent a squadron of warships and some twenty-five thousand volunteers to China. The other great powers similarly equipped considerable forces; in order to guarantee the necessary co-operation of these troops, a commander-in-chief of the allied forces was nominated in the person of a German field-marshal, Count Waldersee, a veteran of sixty-seven years. But before he arrived in China, Peking had been captured, on August 14, by some twenty thousand Europeans, Americans, and Japanese, and the lives of the besieged were saved. The imperial court had fled to the old capital, Singanfu. Waldersee had, however, still an opportunity of contributing to the improvement of the situation by clearing the large and populous province of Pechili from Boxers and robbers, and also, by tactful action, of maintaining harmony among the troops of the powers, whose interests in China were in some respects divergent. It often seemed as if a quarrel would break out between England and Russia, who seized Manchuria under the pretext of being obliged to establish order. Germany and England, on the other hand, came to an agreement in October, 1900, on the terms that they would not try to procure for themselves special advantages in China, and would enforce the principle of the "open door" for all civilized nations. China finally consented to offer satisfaction for the murders to Germany (Prince Chun in Potsdam, September 4, 1901) and Japan, by means of special expiatory embassies; and in the protocol of the peace signed on September 7, China promised the payment of £67,000,000 sterling as indemnity for the cost of the war to Germany, England, France, Italy, Japan, Austria, Russia, and the United States. Peking was soon afterwards evacuated by the allies; the imperial court returned in December, 1901, to the capital. On January 30 and in March, 1902, England and Japan first (cf. Vol. II, p. 54) and then Russia and France concluded alliances for the promotion of their interests in China and Corea, so that now in the Far East two alliances are opposed one to the other. The German Empire still maintains, for the protection of its subjects, like other powers, a garrison in Pechili; a strong garrison is quartered in Tsingtau.

(f) *The Individual States of the German Empire.* (a) *Prussia.*—The Prussian State received through the mighty events of 1866 and 1870, which altered its whole framework and put new and important duties before it, a definite stimulus toward internal reforms: the absolutism and the bureaucratic principles of the age of Frederic the Great had obtained recognition in the constitution of 1850; the landed nobility were still a privileged body. It was necessary that these anomalies should be removed and that self-government should be introduced. For example, in rural districts the lord of the manor had still the right to nominate the *Schultheiss* (village mayor); the Landrat of the district was appointed by the king on the nomination of the chief landowner, the other inhabitants of the district being neglected; and the nobility predominated in the provincial Landtags.

The king, in his speech from the throne on the opening of the Landtag on November 27, 1871, had pledged his word that his government would introduce a new scheme of local government. Count Friedrich zu Eulenburg (1815–1881, Minister 1862–1878), the Minister of the Interior, set to work to elaborate it, and although the House of Peers, under the influence of the private interests of the aristocracy, rejected the bill at first and Bismarck had grave doubts on the point, he carried it in December, 1872, with the help of the king, who created twenty-five new peers. The king signed the bill on December 13. It applied at first only to the five eastern provinces: Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Silesia. Anxiety as to the sentiment of the Poles forbade the grant of full self-government to the districts in Posen. According to the new law, the country communities elected for the future their own head; and only in some special cases was the landowner or his nominee still allowed to fill up this post. Country and town communities which contained under twenty-five thousand inhabitants were for the time being constituted as a district, whose affairs were administered by a *Kreistag* (district council) of at least twenty-five members chosen by delegates, and therefore indirectly, from all the residents in the district. In the Kreistags half the votes at most were to belong to the towns, the rest to the rural population. At the head stands a *Landrat* whom the king appoints at the nomination of the entire Kreistag; a committee of six members is assigned to the Landrat to assist him. Towns with more than twenty-five thousand inhabitants form special "urban districts." Since the new scheme of local government worked very satisfactorily, it was extended in 1885–1889 to the remaining six provinces; in Posen, for the reasons mentioned, narrower limits were imposed on self-government.

In the year 1875 the provincial Landtags were reformed. In future they were to consist of representatives of the Kreistags and of the municipal colleges (the magistrates and municipal officers) which met for the purpose of election in a common session; they were to assemble at least once in every two years at the royal summons and pass resolutions affecting all provincial matters, especially the construction of roads, land improvements, public institutions, public libraries, the care of monuments, and the application of the sums of money assigned to the provinces by the State in virtue of the law of dotation. A provincial committee of seven to thirteen persons, with a provincial director as the head of all the provincial officials, was to be elected for the administration of the affairs of the province. The feature of all this legislation was that it preserved to the

greatest possible degree the principle of communal self-government; there is now no country in the world which, so far as laws enable it, can show so many guarantees as Prussia for the sovereignty of the law and for the effectiveness of self-government; the duty of the people now is to cultivate those characteristics which give to such laws force and vitality.

Bismarck, however, was so displeased, both at the action of his colleagues, who had acted against his wishes when they induced the king to create that batch of peers, and also at the political short-sightedness of the conservatives, who had brought matters to a crisis in the House of Peers, that he resigned, on December 21, 1872, the premiership in the Prussian ministry to the War Minister, Field Marshal Count Roon, and confined himself merely to the headship of the foreign department. But he soon learnt that this separation of the office of Imperial Chancellor from that of Prussian Premier made the position of the Imperial Chancellor far more arduous, and he therefore resumed the premiership when Roon from failing health retired on November 9, 1873,¹ not to give it up until his fall in March, 1890.

The liberal-minded Professor of Jurisprudence, Emil Herrmann, who had been placed by Falk, the Minister of Public Worship, at the head of the Prussian evangelical High Consistory, elaborated in 1873 for the eastern provinces an evangelical church constitution, which limited the power of the king, as bishop of the country, since it gave each parish a vestry, and each district and province a representative synod for ecclesiastical purposes. In 1876 this constitutional work was crowned by the institution for the eight old provinces of a general synod, which consisted of one hundred and fifty delegates from provincial synods, thirty members nominated by the king, and six representatives of the universities of Königsberg, Greifswald, Breslau, Berlin, Halle, and Bonn. Owing to the splendid organisation of the "positive" or orthodox party, which possessed in the greater part of the clergy and the great landowners trustworthy partisans and leaders, it thus obtained the majority in most of the synods, those of the districts and provinces, and in the general synod. In the new provinces of Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse-Nassau no change was made in the existing national churches; the High Consistory in Berlin remained accordingly the supreme authority only for the church of the eight old provinces. In every single province the conduct of the provincial ecclesiastical affairs fell to a consistory and a general superintendent.

So soon as it became possible for Bismarck, after the French war and the first institution of the empire, to pay greater attention to the problems of economic life, he gave proof of the same spirit of far-sighted statesmanship and bold progress which runs through his other work. In 1879, owing to the economic crisis which broke out in 1873 after two years of great prosperity, he left the path of free trade, through following which Germany "threatened to bleed to death" (p. 356), for that of moderate protective tariffs (a policy which made him as unpopular with the Liberals as acceptable to the Centre). He asked in the Prussian Landtag of 1876 for full powers to sell all the Prussian State railways on a suitable opportunity to the empire; he hoped thus to transfer all German railroads to the empire and by so doing to render possible a uniform railway policy on a large scale. The motion was carried in the Landtag and became law in June, 1876, by the royal signature,

¹ He died February 23, 1879.

in consequence of which Delbrück, the president of the Imperial Chancery and hitherto Bismarck's colleague, an opponent of any State interference in economic matters, retired from his office. The minor States, however, offered stubborn resistance to the amalgamation of the German railroads, since they feared some danger to their independence from the surrender of their lines; and since Bismarck avoided on principle the exercise of any pressure on the members of the Confederation except in cases of the most urgent necessity (p. 351), he abandoned the great idea and withdrew to a narrower sphere where he could proceed according to his judgment.

With the help of the cautious and energetic Albert Maybach, who in 1878 became head of the newly created Ministry of Public Works, between 1880 and 1885 all the larger private railways, of which there were forty-nine altogether, were bought for a sum of about five and a half milliards of marks (£275,000,000) for the State, which in 1878 owned only 4,800 kilometres, but now owns 34,000. The extent of the privately owned lines has diminished to 1,300 kilometres, and most of them are purely local lines. By the completion of this purchase by the State the largest railway system in the world under one management was created, and its systematic working was rendered possible; since a considerable amount of independence was left to the twenty-one boards of railway directors, one of which had to manage some 1,600 kilometres, the disadvantages of excessive centralisation were avoided. Although fault has been found with the Prussian railway management, and in particular the high scale of its charges was blamed, since a yearly surplus of about two and a half millions sterling was obtained, yet the results of this administration are undeniable. The surplus was profitably applied to other objects; during a period when France spent ten millions on augmentation of salaries and improvements of land, Prussia laid out two hundred millions on that object. In the year 1896 the Grand Duchy of Hesse (which formerly was the first minor State to join the Zollverein, cf. p. 163) once more was the first minor State to conclude with Prussia a treaty as to a community of railways by which the Prussian and Hessian State railways might be administered as a whole; Hesse sends a member to the Supreme Board of Management in Berlin, and receives its share of the profits. These amounted annually to about two million marks (£100,000) with which a series of long-postponed Hessian State projects, such as the improvement of the pay of officials, could be carried out without any claims being made on the taxpayers. Besides this the quantity of rolling-stock was considerably increased, the fares lowered, and the salaries of all the railway employees substantially raised.

On June 24, 1890, the Oberbürgermeister of Frankfurt, Johannes Miquel (February 11, 1828, to September 8, 1901; cf. pp. 311 and 356), was by the special favour of the king appointed head of the Prussian Finance Ministry and held the post until the beginning of May, 1901. His friend Rudolf von Bennigsen ventured to call him in a funeral oration the greatest Prussian finance minister of the nineteenth century. To him is chiefly due the credit for having completely reorganised the system of taxation in the year 1891. He arranged the income tax as follows: The taxpayer was placed under an obligation to declare his income on oath; the scale of taxation was graduated according to income; and income derived from real property was subjected to a supplementary tax. Under this system the burden of taxation was equalised, whereas previously the rich (owing to the assessment of their income by others) had paid too little and the poor were to

a large extent relieved of their burden; incomes under nine hundred marks (£45) remained untaxed. The gross proceeds of the income tax, after the reform carried out in the year 1892, amounted to one hundred and twenty-five millions, and that of the property tax to thirty-two millions of marks; the net proceeds of both taxes amounted to one hundred and forty millions, or a full quarter of the current administrative expenses of the State. In connection with this reform of the State taxes Miquel carried a bill in the Landtag for a new method of local rating.

While Miquel has secured a well-earned reputation by his fiscal reform, he was less successful with his plan (p. 356) for placing the finances of the empire and of the separate States on distinct bases and of obviating the disturbing influences of the empire (by demands for contributions from the several States) on the budget of the federal States. Equally unsuccessful was the plan, which the emperor himself cordially supported, of constructing a great network of canals from the Rhine to the Weser and the Elbe, with the object of relieving the great strain on the railways of the Eastern Rhine district and Westphalia. It is true that the House of Representatives in 1886 sanctioned the canal from Dortmund on the Ruhr to the Ems; but the canals from Dortmund to the Rhine and the great "Inland Navigation Canal" from the Ems to the Weser and further to the Elbe aroused serious doubts among the representatives of agriculture in the Conservative body and in the Centre, who feared a further increase in the importations of foreign corn, as well as among the Silesian manufacturers who expected from it that their rivals in the West would have greater facilities for outbidding them: the House of Representatives rejected the proposal on August 17, 1899, by 228 to 126 votes. An amended proposal, which was introduced in 1901, met also with such determined opposition that the government suddenly dissolved the Landtag in May, since its deliberations were bound to be barren in results.

(*ß*) *Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, and Baden.*—In Bavaria, under King Lewis II (born 1845), Lutz (p. 359) was at the head of affairs. He was a keen antagonist of the Ultramontanes, who also met with the pronounced disfavour of the king. The latter withdrew more and more from public life, and relapsed into a dreamy existence, devoted to music and architecture, while his enormous expenditure on royal castles totally disordered the civil list. He was obliged in the end to be placed under supervision; in order to escape from it he drowned himself and his attendant physician Bernhard von Gudden in the lake of Starnberg on June 13, 1886. Since his brother Otto (born 1848) had also long been mentally afflicted, his uncle Prince Leopold (born 1821, second son of Louis I) assumed the sovereignty as Prince Regent. He left the Liberal ministry in office; but the Ultramontanes acquired more and more influence, and after 1899 they had even a small majority in the Second Chamber. At the urgent pressure of the Roman Catholic bishops the State refused to recognise the Old Catholics as belonging to the Catholic Church, and only granted them the rights of a private religious body (March, 1891). The moderate-liberal minister President Count von Crailsheim was compelled to resign on May 31, 1890.

In Saxony King John died on October 29, 1873; he was succeeded by his son Albert, who had won fame in the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871, and was a capable ruler with German sympathies. In order to anticipate the imperial railway scheme, the Saxon government bought up gradually all the private lines in

Saxony by the middle of the seventies; in 1894 and 1901 the class-tax and income-tax law of the year 1873 was reformed in accordance with the spirit of the times. Owing to an increase in the number of the Social Democrats, who carried in 1891-1892 eleven, and in 1895 actually fourteen, out of the eighty-one electoral districts for the Landtag election, the government and the Estates, which since 1880 were under the control of the Conservatives, resolved in 1896, notwithstanding the well-grounded protests of educated sympathisers with the social cause, to replace the universal suffrage introduced in 1868 by a suffrage graduated in three classes, which would render the third class of owners and voters quite helpless against the two upper classes. In the year 1897 the Social Democrats lost six seats at once in consequence; and from 1901 on no Social Democrat has sat in the Landtag. Since the death of King Albert at Sibyllenort on June 19, 1902, his brother George (born 1832) has been on the throne.

In Württemberg, under the rule of King Charles I (1864-1891, born 1823) the "German Party," which combined in itself the National Liberals and the Free Conservatives, was preponderant in the Landtag, and Baron von Mittnacht (p. 351), the minister-president in agreement with this party, conducted the affairs of state in a spirit of loyalty to the empire. In the year 1891 Charles I was succeeded by his cousin William II (born 1848), who had served in the French war and gave proof of conscientiousness, good intentions, and sound sympathy with the national cause. On December 1, 1893, in the hunting-lodge of Bebenhausen near Tübingen he agreed with the emperor to draw up a joint seniority list for the Prussian and Württemberg officers. At the Landtag elections of 1895 the Democrats of the "German Popular Party" and the Centre, which had just been formed in Württemberg, obtained jointly the majority, and the former party filled the presidency of the Second Chamber. Mittnacht adapted himself to the demands of the Democracy, but neither the constitutional reform, which proposed to exclude from the chamber the privileged classes ("Knights and Prelates"), nor the fiscal reform, by which a supplementary income tax was to be introduced, nor the law to abolish the appointment for life of the district presidents (*Ortsvorsteher*) weathered the parliamentary storms which they provoked. At the end of 1901 Württemberg, while maintaining its postal independence (p. 351), resigned its special postage stamps; from April 1, 1902, onward one uniform stamp came into use for the whole empire, excluding Bavaria. Since 1900 a movement has been on foot to conclude a railway amalgamation with Prussia-Hesse, since the profits of the State railways barely reached three per cent; but the ultramontane and democratic majority of the Second Chamber offered temporary opposition to such a step.

In Baden Grand Duke Frederick I (born 1826), the son-in-law of Emperor William I, a thoroughly loyal prince of national and liberal sympathies, has reigned since 1852. The intense antagonism between the State and the Catholic Church led in 1876, under the ministry of Julius Jolly (February, 1868-October, 1876) to the introduction of elementary schools of mixed denominations. Since 1881 the tension has gradually been relaxed; but the Centre pursued unremittedly their object of reducing the ruling National Liberal party in the Landtag to a minority by the help of the Democrats; they lowered the majority of their rivals in 1891 to one vote, and completely attained their object in 1893. On June 27, 1901, there occurred a change in the ministry in favour of Conservatism, since Arthur Brauer became Premier in place of the veteran Liberal Wilhelm

Nokk († February 13, 1903), and Alexander Dusch, Minister of Public Worship; the latter showed an inclination to fulfil the wish of the Episcopal Curia in Freiburg and of the Centre for the toleration of monasteries, since he hoped in this way to get the upper hand of the more conciliatory party in the Centre.

(γ) *The Imperial Provinces (Reichslande).* — In Alsace-Lorraine, by the imperial law of June 9, 1871, the executive power was conferred upon the emperor. The country thus became an imperial province (*Reichsland*) in so far that the executive power in the State, which in the other German countries is held quite apart from the executive power in the empire, coincides here with it. The Imperial Chancellor was minister for the *Reichsland*; the administration of the country was conducted from 1871 to 1879 by the able and wise Eduard von Möller, who was nominated High President. In virtue of paragraph 10 of the law of 30th December, 1871, he possessed the right of taking every measure which seemed necessary to him in case of danger to the public safety, and in the most extreme cases even to raise troops for the defence of the country. The disaffection of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, among whom in particular the "Notables," namely, the manufacturers, large landowners, doctors, and notaries, were quite un-German, rendered this "Dictatorship paragraph" essential for a long time. On January 1, 1874, the imperial constitution came into force for Alsace-Lorraine; the fifteen representatives elected to the Reichstag belong almost all to the "Protesters," who condemned the severance of the provinces from France as an act of violence.

But gradually the so-called Autonomists gained ground; these accepted the incorporation into Germany as an irrevocable fact, but wished to win the greatest amount of self-government and provincial independence for the country. Bismarck thought it wise to support the movement and by this indirect method to make the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine good Germans. He granted to the country in October, 1874, a popular representation, — at first deliberative only, but since 1877 with powers to legislate; this was the *Landesausschuss*, which contains fifty-eight members, — thirty-four elected by the three district councils of Upper and Lower Alsace and Lorraine, twenty by the twenty country districts, four by the towns of Colmar, Metz, Mülhausen, and Strassburg. Universal and equal suffrage was not employed for the *Landesausschuss*, since that would have served to make the anti-German clerical party supreme; but the restricted suffrage gave the Notables the authority.

On July 4, 1879, the empire granted to the Imperial Province the self-government which it desired. An imperial Governor-General (*Statthalter*) was to administer the country for the future in place of the High President; under him were placed for the conduct of affairs a Secretary of State and four under-Secretaries of State, all to be nominated by the emperor. The Imperial Chancellor thus ceased to be minister for the Imperial Province; Alsace-Lorraine was allowed to send three deliberative representatives into the Bundesrat, which thus was increased to sixty-one members. The post of governor was filled from 1879 to 1885 by the ex-Field-Marshal Edwin von Manteuffel (p. 348), who displayed a deplorable weakness toward the Notables. He was succeeded by Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (cf. pp. 316 and 327), hitherto ambassador at Paris, whose refined and dignified manner somewhat improved the situation. When he

became Imperial Chancellor in 1894, the governorship was conferred on the uncle of the empress, Prince Hermann von Hohenlohe-Langenburg.

The results of the first thirty years of the incorporation of the *Reichsland* into the empire are not unsatisfactory, if fairly estimated. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine have gradually adapted themselves more or less to the new position of affairs. The Protesting party as such has disappeared, and if the country has not yet become German in the fullest sense, it is, at any rate, no longer French. The reasons for the slow development are clear: threads which have been snapped for nearly two centuries can only slowly be joined together again, and the year 1870, which for Germans is a great and glorious remembrance, signifies for Alsace-Lorraine a year of defeat and oppression, and the blessings it brought with it are only slowly being realised by the people. In June, 1902, such progress, however, had been made that, from confidence in the increasing good-will of the population toward the empire, the "Dictatorship paragraph" was repealed; and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine now from being Germans of the "second class" became Germans of the "first class."

(δ) *Hesse-Darmstadt and the other German Federal States.*—In the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt the Grand Duke Lewis III (1848–1877) died on June 13, 1877, a prince as incapable as he was conceited. Under his nephew Louis IV (1877–1892), who was married to Alice, daughter of Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and had commanded the Twenty-fifth Division in the French war, the long-standing dispute with the Catholic Church was settled in 1887–1888. His son Ernest Louis (born 1868) concluded in 1896 the railway convention with Prussia (p. 368).

In Brunswick the reigning line became extinct on October 18, 1884, by the death of Duke William, and since the next heir, Duke Ernest Augustus of Cumberland, son of the exiled King George V of Hanover, who died in 1878, had not made any treaty with Prussia, Prince Albert of Prussia (born 1837), a nephew of Emperor William I, was appointed regent by the Bundesrat. The interest, however, on the Guelf fund (p. 308) was paid over in 1892 to the Duke of Cumberland. In Mecklenburg-Schwerin the Grand Duke Frederick Francis II, who had commanded in France with distinction in 1870, died on April 15, 1883. In Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, Duke Ernest II died on August 22, 1893; he had fought in 1849 at Eckernförde (cf. explanation of the plate at p. 209) and had made a sacrifice to the cause of unity by a military treaty with Prussia as far back as 1860. In Lippe-Detmold Prince Waldemar, at his death on March 20, 1895, left a will, according to which Prince Adolf of Schaumberg, brother-in-law of the emperor, was to govern as regent for his feeble-minded brother, Prince Alexander. But Count Ernest zur Lippe-Biesterfeld protested against this, and by the decision of a court of arbitration, in which King Albert of Saxony presided over six members of the Imperial Court, Count Ernest was appointed to the regency in July, 1897. In Oldenburg, Grand Duke Peter, one of the warmest supporters of national unity, died on June 13, 1900; and in Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Grand Duke Charles Alexander, one of the last eye-witnesses of the great age of Weimar, who had seen Goethe and breathed some of his inspiration, died on January 5, 1901.

B. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

(a) *Austria*. — Although in Austria the German Liberal bourgeois ministry of Herbst-Giskra (p. 320) resigned at the beginning of 1870, partly on account of internal dissensions, yet the Constitutional party there, resting on the German Liberals, remained at the helm until 1879. Prince Adolph Auersperg was at the head of the Liberal cabinet from 1871 to 1879. The Czechs, who did not recognise the constitution of 1861, absented themselves from the Reichsrat and made no concealment of their leanings toward Russia as the chief Slav power. By this means the position of the constitutional party was gradually shaken; and when, at the beginning of October, 1878, it opposed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, it completely lost ground with the emperor Francis Joseph, who recognised that this occupation was of vital interest to the monarchy, which had to secure a more advantageous position for itself on the Balkan Peninsula against the intrusion of Russian influence. The emperor summoned on August 12, 1879, the ministry of Count Eduard Taaffe, which aimed at the so-called reconciliation of the nationalities by the grant of equal rights to all; but by this he gave offence to the Germans, who had hitherto held the leading position, and relied in fact upon the Slavs as well as the German clericals allied with them and the feudal nobility (especially the Bohemian). The Czechs, amongst whom the conservative Old Czechs were gradually crowded out by the more radical Young Czechs, now entered the Reichsrat and usurped the power in the Landtag Chamber at Prague, in consequence of which, among other things, they carried the proposed division of the ancient German University at Prague into German and Czech sections. The Germans on their side did not appear for some time in the Landtag. The more radical views of the "German Popular party" and of the "Pan-German" party, which only pursued German national interests, under the clever leaders Von Schönerer, Iro, and Wolf, gained more and more the ascendancy with them, and overshadowed the Liberal Constitutional party, which placed the interests of Austria above the cause of nationality. The two former parties were at the same time strongly anti-Semitic, while the Liberal Conservative party had a large Jewish element. Taaffe fell on November 11, 1893, since he wished to introduce universal and equal suffrage, an innovation which would have greatly weakened the parliamentary representation of the Poles, Conservatives and Liberals.

After an attempt to govern with the Coalition Ministry of Count Alfred Windisch-Graetz (until June 16, 1895), Count Badeni, a Pole, seized the reins of government on September 29, 1895. He conceded in 1896 the election of seventy-two representatives by universal suffrage (in addition to the three hundred and fifty-three representatives elected under a restricted franchise), but in general conducted an administration on principles partly Slav, partly clerical, and partly feudal, and by his language ordinances of April 5, 1897, in consequence of which all officials in Bohemia and Moravia from 1901 onwards were to possess a mastery of the Czech as well as of the German language, precipitated the whole Austrian monarchy into the wildest confusion. For in order to prevent the *Czechising* of the official classes, and finally of the Germans generally, which was threatened by the language ordinance, the Germans in the Reichsrat set about the

most reckless obstruction of all parliamentary business, and secured on November 28, 1897, the dismissal of Badeni and the repeal of the ordinances.

But the storm was not calmed by this. The Czechs demanded the restoration of the ordinances, which would have only meant the establishment of equal rights for all; but the Germans demanded legal recognition of the dignity of the German language as the language of the State. The Reichsrat was completely crippled for four full years by this impassable breach between the parties, since at one time the Germans, at another the Czechs, "obstructed," while by their interminable speeches and motions they hindered the progress of legislation. The German constitutional party sank more and more into the background; Vienna was wrested from it by the Catholic "Social Christian" party under its leader Karl Lueger, whom the emperor actually confirmed in office as burgomaster (April, 1897), and the Pan-German section was enlarged in the Reichsrat elections of 1900 from five to twenty-one representatives. While the Catholic clergy made overtures to the Slavs, a movement, advancing with the watchword "Freedom from Rome!" began among the Catholic German population of Bohemia and the Alpine districts; this movement has led to the founding of numerous Evangelical or Old Catholic communities in hitherto purely Catholic districts, and it is still increasing. Since the barrenness of the Reichsrat was finally felt to be irksome by the electorates, whose economic interests remained unsatisfied, the minister Ernst von Koerber (after January 19, 1900) succeeded in 1901, by an appeal to material interests, in breaking down the spell of obstruction and making the newly elected Reichstag once more capable of work. More than seven hundred million crowns were granted then for railroads and canals, and in May, 1902, a budget bill was carried for the first time for five years.

(b) *Hungary*. — The relations of Hungary to Cisleithania depended after 1867 on the terms of a treaty concluded for ten years (p. 319), which was renewed in 1877 and 1887. But the third renewal met with great difficulties, since Cisleithania demanded an increase in the share of thirty per cent which Hungary has to pay of the common expenditure, and the inefficiency of the Reichsrat of 1897–1901 spread to this domain. The *Ausgleich* was therefore in 1897 first extended by a royal and imperial urgency ordinance. The Liberal party founded by Deák (p. 318) was uninterruptedly predominant; in 1894, in spite of the opposition of the Crown and of the Upper House, it introduced civil marriages, legalised undenominationalism and the recognition of the Jewish religious community. The celebration of the millennium of the Hungarian nation took a most brilliant form. The Germans, Roumanians, and Serbs in Hungary had indeed cause to complain of the forcible suppression of their nationality. Thus, in 1898, in virtue of a State law Magyar names were substituted for all the non-Magyar place names, and at the elections the ministry of Desiderius Banffy, which was formed on January 14, 1895, employed every means of intimidating and deceiving public opinion. The inevitable change of cabinet on February 26, 1899, which brought into power the ministry of Koloman von Szell, led to some improvement in this respect; the elections of 1901 were carried out for the first time without acts of violence. A law, which disqualified the presidents of banks for seats in the House of Representatives, served also to purify public affairs. Szell effected on June 10, 1899, a preliminary convention with Austria about the *Ausgleich*, accord-

ing to which it was to be extended until 1907; the Hungarian quota was also raised to thirty-four and four-tenths per cent. On December 31, 1902, both governments finally agreed to the *Ausgleich*, but it has not yet been formally accepted in the parliaments.

C. GREAT BRITAIN

THE electoral reform of 1867, which bestowed the suffrage upon all householders and all occupiers of lodgings of corresponding value in the towns, was extended in 1884 to county constituencies, and thus the Lower House, originally an aristocratic corporation, became more and more democratic. The Irish question engrossed English politics for a decade. It owed its existence to the fact that the mass of the Irish country population had lost the ownership of the soil since the Anglo-Saxon conquest in the twelfth century, and in the position of oppressed farmers cultivated the land which belonged to some ten thousand landlords (cf. Vol. VII, p. 394). To this social abuse was added the national contrast between Irish and English, and, thirdly, the religious difference, since the Irish are almost all Catholic, and only the Anglo-Saxon immigrants and the north (the province of Ulster with Belfast) are Protestant. The Liberal Cabinet of Gladstone carried in 1881 a land law which protected the farmer against excessive rent and arbitrary eviction by the landlords. But the Irish were not contented with that; led by Charles Parnell, they demanded for the farmers in possession full rights of ownership of the soil, as well as home rule,—that is to say, the self-government of the island, and a parliament of their own in Dublin. Gladstone resolved to venture on granting this request; but on June 7, 1886, he was defeated at a general election through the disinclination of England for home rule. Power passed into the hands of a coalition of the Tories and the deserters from this party, the Liberal Unionists. When the fortune of the elections turned in his favour in 1892, his bill was wrecked in September, 1893, on the opposition of the House of Lords, which was backed up by the majority of English voters, though Scotland took the Irish side.

In July, 1895, the Tories and Liberal Unionists won so complete a victory at the polls that the combined Conservative and Unionist ministry of Lord Salisbury was supported by a majority of four hundred and eleven members against two hundred and fifty-four Liberals and Irish members. The prospects of home rule for Ireland were thus annihilated; but the hatred felt by the Irish became only the more intense, and every defeat of the English troops by Zulus, Boers, and Indian Afridi was hailed with delight by the extremest section of the Nationalists. Joseph Chamberlain (born July 8, 1836), the Secretary of State for the Colonies, became more and more the soul of the cabinet. He was the real head of the Imperialist movement, which aims at the closest bond of union between the mother country and her colonies, and takes for its watchword "Greate Britain" in place of "Great Britain."

This policy was impeded in South Africa by the two Free States, which had been formed by the emigration of Dutch Boers from Cape Colony (cf. Vol. III, p. 506), the Orange Free State (March 11, 1854), and the South African Republic or Transvaal (February 13, 1858). England had laid her hand on the Transvaal as far back as April 12, 1877, but after the defeat of her troops under Sir George

Colley on Majuba Hill (February 27, 1881) had thought it prudent to recognise once more, on August 3, the independence of the country. Elsewhere, however, the expansion of British influence in South Africa proceeded apace. In 1879 the warlike king of the Zulus, Cetewayo (Vol. III, p. 437), at the head of his 20,000 warriors, had inflicted at first a severe disaster on the English army of 15,000 under Lord Chelmsford. A detachment of the 24th regiment had been massacred at Isandula on the Tugela on January 22, 1879, when 500 men and 60 officers fell; the regimental colours and two cannons were taken by the blacks. Prince Louis Napoleon, the brave and capable son of Napoleon III, met an untimely death in an ambush on June 1. Finally, however, Cetewayo was overcome at Ulundi on July 4, 1879, by the superior strategy of his civilized opponents. His land was divided among thirteen chiefs, but was reunited in 1882 under Cetewayo's son Dinisulu.

In 1882 England took advantage of a rebellion, which the national party in Egypt under Arabi Pasha plotted against the Khedive Tewfik Pasha (1879–1892; cf. Vol. III, p. 719), who was a puppet in the hands of the Europeans, to make herself actual master of the country, after the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet and the defeat of Arabi by Sir Garnet Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir. Tewfik's son Abbas II Hilmi has been since 1892 Viceroy of Egypt, nominally under the Sultan. A fanatical religious movement, at whose head stood the "Mahdi," Mohammed Ahmed (Vol. III, p. 559), arose in the Sudan against the unbelievers, who occupied a Mohammedan land. The Mahdi captured on January 26, 1885, Khartoum, which was heroically defended by the English General Gordon, who was himself killed. But the successor of the Mahdi, the Khalifa Abdullahi (ibid. p. 566), was totally defeated on September 2, 1898, at Omdurman by the English General Kitchener, the Sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army, and was killed on November 24, 1899. By a treaty between England and Egypt Lord Kitchener became governor of the Eastern Sudan after France, at whose orders Captain J. B. Marchand had occupied Fashoda on the Nile, had been compelled by threats of war to withdraw her troops from the valley of the Nile. The treaty of March 21, 1899, handed over as compensation the west of the Sudan (Wadai and Kanem) in most respects to the French.

Mr. Chamberlain now set about his purpose of making Africa English from the Nile to the Cape. After Jameson's raid in the Transvaal (Vol. III, p. 512) had failed, on January 1, 1896, Chamberlain, in June, 1899, demanded that the republic should grant full rights of citizenship after a five years' residence to all "Uitlanders" (foreigners who had poured into the country in crowds owing to the gold mines in Johannesburg), a demand which threatened the danger that the Boers themselves would in the end be outvoted by the new citizens. Besides this, Mr. Chamberlain revived the English claim of suzerainty over the Transvaal, which had been expressly admitted in the Pretoria Convention of 1881. President Krüger, in a conference with Sir Alfred (afterwards Lord) Milner, the British High Commissioner, expressed himself as willing to concede the franchise, if Great Britain would abandon the claim to suzerainty. The excuse for the latter demand was found in the London Convention of 1884, an amended form of the Pretoria Convention, in which the British suzerainty had not been explicitly mentioned. But if Mr. Gladstone's government had been willing to abandon the claim or to waive its discussion in 1884, the Unionist cabinet thought otherwise in

1899. The High Commissioner broke off the negotiations. Troops were ordered to South Africa from England and India, and it became evident that if the Transvaal was to strike, the blow ought not to be further delayed. The Free State, under President Steyn, declared its intention of standing by the Transvaal; and on October 9, 1899, the Boers presented an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of British troops from South Africa. As this was refused, war broke out. During the first months the Boers, favoured by their marksmanship and their temporary superiority in numbers, invaded Natal and Cape Colony, and besieged the towns of Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith. The army sent to the relief of Ladysmith was several times repulsed on the Tugela, and another, marching upon Kimberley, was brought to a standstill after it had forced a passage over the Modder River, by a serious check at Magersfontein (Vol. III, p. 514). But the Boers were lacking in spirit for a bold attack; they were encamped almost inactive in front of the three towns until the new British Commander-in-Chief Lord Roberts, whose Chief of the Staff was Lord Kitchener, had collected vastly superior forces. With these he relieved Kimberley, took General Cronje prisoner with four thousand men on February 27, 1900, at Paardeberg, and captured between March and June the towns of Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. Long before the last of these had fallen the heroic garrison of Ladysmith had been relieved. The capture of Hlangwana Hill on February 19 enabled General Buller to cross the Tugela, and after some days' hard fighting the Boers broke up the siege, and Buller entered Ladysmith on February 28. On July 29, 1900, General Marthinus Prinsloo († February 2, 1903) surrendered with three thousand men at Fouriesburg. England thought that the goal was reached.

President Krüger went, in October, 1900, to Holland, in order from thence to obtain the intervention of the great powers, especially of Russia, whose peaceable-minded young Czar Nicholas II (succeeded November 1, 1894) had promoted a conference of all the great powers at the Hague from May 18 to July 29, 1899, to discuss the establishment of international peace, and, as this was not feasible, the more humane conduct of war and the institution of a permanent court of arbitration. But no intervention of the powers resulted, since England bluntly refused every idea of mediation, and no one could injure the mistress of the seas. Mr. Chamberlain insisted on the complete subjection of the Boers. King Edward VII, who had succeeded his aged mother Victoria on January 22, 1901, assumed the title "Supreme Lord of and over the Transvaal Colony and Supreme Lord of and over the Orange River Colony." But the resistance of the Boers was not yet completely overcome. Under their leaders Christian de Wet in the Orange State, and Louis Botha with his subordinates Delarey, Beyers, Viljoen, Chr. Botha, and J. C. Smuts in the Transvaal, they began a terrible guerilla war, while the Dutch of Cape Colony, in spite of various Boer inroads, remained on the whole tranquil. A nation of three hundred thousand souls, of whom at most sixty thousand were fighting men, defied the great world power, which, from want of conscription, could only arm and ship over paid soldiers (in the end about three hundred thousand men).

The terms of peace offered by the English government on March 7, 1901, in the course of a personal conference at Middelburg on February 20, between Kitchener and Louis Botha, were declared by the latter to be impossible, since England did not accept the demands of the Boers, namely, the recognition of their

independence, and an amnesty for the Cape rebels. In September, Kitchener began to deport all the Boer prisoners out of Africa and to confiscate the property of the still fighting burghers for the support of their families. He ordered a number of captured Boer officers who were natives of Cape Colony to be shot, according to the laws of war, as rebels caught red-handed. But since neither party could win a complete victory, a treaty of peace was concluded on May 31, 1902, in Pretoria, according to which the Boers recognised Edward VII as their lawful sovereign, and in return received the assurance of internal independence and the sum of three millions sterling for the rebuilding of their destroyed farmhouses. The Cape rebels were to be punished only by loss of their electoral rights. On February 1, 1903, Lieutenant-General Sir Neville Lyttelton was appointed commander-in-chief of all the British troops in South Africa from the Zambesi to the Cape.

D. FRANCE

(a) *The Internal Development.* — The great majority of the French National Assembly elected on February 8, 1871, were in favour of monarchy, and, since Paris was republican, the assembly fixed on Versailles as the seat of government. The threatened restoration of the monarchy, as well as the conscious pride with which Paris as the "heart of France" was opposed to the provinces, produced that terrible revolution which is called, from the municipal committee elected by the proletarian masses, the rising of the Commune. On March 28 the "Communitic Republic" was proclaimed, which at once procured the required supplies of money by compulsory loans from the wealthy and by the confiscation of the property of the religious orders. The Parisians had been allowed to keep their arms on the conclusion of the truce in January, 1871, at the express request of the infatuated Favre; with these arms they resisted for nearly two months the attacks of the army led by Marshal MacMahon against the rebellious city. The troops eventually forced their way into the city after a series of murderous engagements; but in the moment of defeat the Communards sought to revenge themselves on their conquerors by levelling the Vendôme column, burning the Tuileries, the Hôtel de Ville, and other public buildings, and shooting the clergy fallen into their hands, and foremost among them Georges Darboy, Archbishop of Paris. As a punishment for this, twenty-six ringleaders were executed by order of court-martial on the Plain of Satory, and some 10,000, who had been taken with arms in their hands, were sentenced to transportation or imprisonment in France itself. In the conflict 7,500 soldiers and 6,500 rebels had been killed or wounded.

These terrible events at first only strengthened the inclination towards monarchy. Thiers, however, being convinced that in the end a conservative republic was the form of constitution most advantageous to his country, opposed any restoration of the monarchy; but although by a prompt payment of the five milliards he contrived that France should be evacuated by the Germans in 1873, he was compelled to retire from the post of president of the executive in May, 1873, before the evacuation was complete. Marshal MacMahon (pp. 251 and 337) became his successor. Since there were three parties in the ranks of the royalists, — the supporters of the Bourbons, of the house of Orleans, and of the Bonapartes, — it was very difficult to set up the monarchy, which, after all, only one of these dynasties

could hold. The Orléanists, it is true, gave way to their childless cousin Henry (V) of Bourbon, who, as Count of Chambord, lived at Frohsdorf, near Vienna, and MacMahon was prepared to restore the Bourbon monarchy; but when in 1873 the Count demanded the disuse of the national tricolor and the reintroduction of the white standard with the lilies of his house, in order that there might be a clear sign of the return of the nation to the pre-revolutionary standpoint, the courage even of the moderate royalists failed at such a step. The republic received in 1875 its legal basis by the grant of a seven years' tenure of office to its president.

When MacMahon in 1877 made a renewed attempt to pave the way for a restoration of the monarchy, he failed, through the energy of Gambetta (p. 343) and the resistant power of Republicanism. The elections produced a strong republican majority, and on January 30, 1879, MacMahon, despairing of the victory of his cause, gave way to the republican Jules Grévy. He was followed by François Sadi Carnot, J. P. P. Casimir-Périer, Félix Faure, and Émile Loubet; the latter has held the office since February 18, 1899. Grévy was forced, through the defalcations of his stepson Daniel Wilson, to resign on December 1, 1887; Carnot fell on June 24, 1894, at Lyons, under the dagger of the Italian anarchist Santo Caserio; Casimir-Périer retired as soon as the 15th of January, 1895, from disgust at his office, which conferred more external glitter than real power; and Faure died on February 16, 1899, soon after an attack of apoplexy.

The Monarchists were no longer able to obtain a commanding position, especially since Pope Leo XIII in 1892 had ordered the Catholics to support the existing constitution. The party which was obedient to the Pope styled itself *les ralliés*. Even the venality of republican statesmen who allowed themselves to be paid¹ for their support in Parliament by the company for the construction of the Panama Canal, which went bankrupt in December, 1888, was unable to overthrow the republican government. A crisis even more alarming was produced by the lawsuit of the Jewish captain Alfred Dreyfus, who, on December 22, 1894, was found guilty of betraying military secrets, ignominiously degraded and transported to the Devil's Island, near Cayenne, but after the resumption of his trial was condemned, on September 9, 1899, to ten years' imprisonment in a fortress, only on September 19 to be pardoned by President Loubet. But again the republic weathered the storm. One consequence of the Dreyfus agitation has been to increase the anti-clerical tendencies of the executive. In June, 1899, the Social Democrat Alexandre Millerand (p. 363) actually entered the cabinet as Minister of Commerce. In March, 1901, a law against associations was passed by the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau, which placed under State control the religious orders, especially those inveighing against the "atheistic" republic, punished the disobedient ones with dissolution, and deprived the orders of the instruction of the young.

A drama which is interesting from a different point developed round the figure of General Boulanger. He was Minister of War from January, 1886, to June, 1887, and obtained an immense popularity. He almost provoked a war with Germany in the spring of 1887, and after April, 1888, undertook to remodel the constitution with a view to the restoration of the empire. Wherever he appeared on his black charger the crowds greeted him with loud cheers. But at last M. Constans, the

¹ See the verdicts of March 24, 1893, and December 30, 1897.

minister, boldly laid hands on him, and arraigned him before the High Court as a conspirator against the constitution. Boulanger, from fear of condemnation, and not being bold enough to stir up a revolution, fled, on April 8, to Brussels, where he died by his own hand, on September 30, 1891.

(b) *The Foreign Policy of the Republic.* — In the sphere of foreign policy the Third Republic was very successful in so far that on May 12, 1881, by use of the temporarily good understanding with Germany established by the ministry of Jules Ferry, Sidi Ali, the Bey of Tunis († June 11, 1902), was forced to accept the French protectorate, and thus the position of France on the Mediterranean was much strengthened. Tonkin in Further India was acquired after a checkered campaign against China, between 1883 and 1885 (cf. Vol. II, p. 534); on October 2, 1893, Siam was driven back behind the Mekong (ibid. p. 529); and on August 6, 1896, Madagascar was incorporated into the French colonial possessions (ibid. p. 572). France also won considerable territory on the continent of Africa. In 1892 she occupied the negro kingdom of Dahomeh (Vol. III, p. 461), while concurrently the whole western Sudân from Timbuctoo to the Congo became French (cf. Vol. III, p. 492). On Lake Chad France is the predominant power, and treaties with Germany and England secured its possessions. Recent troubles in Morocco have given an opportunity for French interference, which the republic shows every intention of utilising to the utmost. Her only severe check in Africa has been that experienced from England in connection with the Fashoda episode (see above, p. 376).

But the originally most ardent wish of the French, to revenge themselves on Germany and to win back Alsace-Lorraine, has not been gratified. The efficiency of the German army and the increasing numerical superiority of the German population (in 1901 fifty-six million Germans to thirty-eight million French) excluded all possibility of a French victory in a duel between the two nations. Even the Dual Alliance with Russia, which was projected in 1891 under Alexander III and concluded under Nicholas II (deciding visit of the Czar to France October 6–9, 1896, return visit of Faure's August 23–26, 1897), has freed, indeed, France from her isolation, but — according to the noteworthy confession of *le Siècle* of September 19, 1901 — has made a re-conquest of the lost provinces impossible, for the reason that Russia also must wish to stand on good terms with her neighbour Germany. A dispute with the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, who did not satisfy the demands of some French officials, led to the despatch of a French fleet under Vice-Admiral Léonce Albert Caillard in November, 1901, to Mytilene. The Sultan gave in, granted to French schools and hospitals in Turkey the immunity from taxation which was demanded for them, and thus saved the island from the fate of Cyprus, which the English had occupied in 1878 in order to keep it.

E. SPAIN.

(a) *The Period 1870–1890.* — After the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the throne of Spain had failed (p. 331), the Spaniards succeeded in finding a king in the person of Prince Amadeo of Savoy, the second son of Victor Emmanuel II; but the excellent monarch soon abdicated, on February 11,

1873, since he was unable to display any profitable activity owing to the party spirit which choked every attempt. The republic, of which Don Emilio Castelar was the head, and against which the Carlists (cf. Vol. IV, p. 557) at once rose, only held together for a short time. On January 14, 1875, Alfonso XII, son of the exiled Isabella, was proclaimed king. He crushed in 1876 the insurrection of the Carlists, who contested the Pragmatic Sanction of 1830 (Vol. IV, p. 553), and consequently the legitimacy of the monarchy of Isabella and her son, and supported the cause of the Duke of Madrid, Don Carlos, born in 1848, a grandson of the brother of Ferdinand VII. Don Carlos, who obstinately maintained his pretensions, was forced once more to withdraw into exile. When Alfonso XII, a prince of whom some hopes were entertained, died as early as November 25, 1885, his widow, Maria Christina of Austria, took over the government for her still unborn child. She gave birth, on May 17, 1886, to Alfonso XIII, who attained his majority on May 17, 1902. Under the regency of Maria Christina universal suffrage was introduced on May 1, 1890.

(b) *The War with the United States of America.*—In 1895 an insurrection once more broke out in Cuba against the Spanish government, which the inhabitants blamed for the unscrupulous profit it made out of the island; they also complained that they were excluded from all important offices. As the Spanish governors, although in the end two hundred thousand men had been thrown into the island, could not master the insurrection, and a revolution broke out on the Philippines whose resources were drained by the monastic orders, the United States of America, a power from which the rising of the Cubans had long received secret encouragement, interfered in the matter in 1898, partly to enforce respect for the enlarged Monroe doctrine (Vol. I, p. 563), partly from eagerness to possess the island which produced sugar and tobacco in large quantities and of an excellent quality. Since Spain would not surrender Cuba, President McKinley declared war on it. The Americans, under the command of George Dewey, defeated the Spanish fleet, which consisted of antiquated ships, in the Bay of Cavite in front of Manila (May 1), while W. T. Sampson, and then Winfield Scott Schley, were victorious off Santiago in Cuba (July 3), and captured this fort after fierce fights. Maria Christina was driven to conclude the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, by which Spain was forced to relinquish Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The monarchy, to which in the sixteenth century half the New World belonged, had at one blow completely lost its still large colonial possessions. The groups of the Caroline, Pellew, and the Marianne islands, now worthless to her under the new conditions, were sold by Spain to the German Empire on June 19, 1899, for seventeen million marks (Vol. IV, p. 560), and her colonial ministry was abolished. The sole oversea possessions of Spain at the present day are the islands of Fernando Po and Annobom, opposite the Cameroons, the Canary Isles, and Ceuta, Rio del Oro, and Corisco.

The Cuban war has crowned with success a movement in the United States which goes far beyond the traditional limitation of the sphere of influence of the United States in America (the Venezuelan disturbance gave another example), since it aims at the establishment of a world-empire striving for the dominion over the Pacific ("Imperialism"). The acquisition, in June, 1897, of the Sandwich Islands (where, on January 17, 1893, Queen Liliuokalani was deposed and a repub-

lic proclaimed; cf. Vol. II, p. 323) was a step in this direction; the conquest of the Philippines, where the aboriginal Tagal population even now, in spite of the capture of their leader, Emilio Aguinaldo (ibid. p. 571) is in arms against the new rulers, and of the Caroline island Guam, as well as of the Samoa islands Tutuila and Manua (on December 2, 1899, by a treaty with Germany; cf. Vol. II, p. 326 *et seq.*), mark further stages on a road on which the United States may easily come into collision with other great powers. The necessity of strengthening the army from twenty-five thousand to one hundred thousand men, and of increasing the fleet proportionately, has already intruded itself. The United States, indeed, by the growth in population (on June 1, 1900, seventy-six millions, which, compared with the state of things in 1890, means an increase of twenty-one per cent), and by the gigantic industrial development under the influence of the protective tariff introduced by McKinley in 1890 (Vol. I, p. 563), have attained a power which makes them appear formidable rivals of Europe. The capitalistic development which led to the formation of trusts, such as the Standard Oil Trust, the Sugar Trust, etc., and to the accumulation of enormous fortunes (multi-millionaires, such as J. J. Astor, Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, Pierpont Morgan, John Rockefeller, etc.) has also brought over to the New World the struggles between labour and capital, and prolonged the existence of a corrupt political morality, which regards the State and its offices as the spoils of party conflict. President Garfield was murdered on July 2, 1881, by a place-hunter (by name Charles Guiteau) whose petition he had refused, and on September 14, 1901, President McKinley fell a victim to the wounds which an anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, had inflicted on him in Buffalo.

F. ITALY

THE predominant party in the kingdom of Italy was from 1861 to 1876 the *Consorteria*, or Moderate Conservative, which had been founded by Cavour. Its failures, however, and all kinds of personal jealousies enabled the Left to gain the supremacy, which was only temporarily taken from it by the renewed strength of the Right under the Marquis di Rudini. The Left abolished the duty on flour, which made the workingman's bread dear, and conferred the suffrage on all who could read and write and paid a small tax. But it could not check satisfactorily the miserable destitution of the poorer classes, especially of the labourers in the north, in the Basilicata, and in Sicily, and of the miners in the Sicilian sulphur-mines. Sicily also suffered under the reign of terror, which the secret society of the Mafia established in many parts. Owing to the dearth of food the social revolution in Milan, Ancona, the Romagna, and Southern Italy repeatedly produced open insurrection against the authority of the State. From the 6th to the 12th of May, 1898, Milan was completely in the hands of the revolution, and order was only restored after sanguinary conflicts in which fifty-three persons were killed and hundreds wounded. The efforts of *Italia irredenta*, which wished to unite with the monarchy the whole "unredeemed" Italian population outside Italy (in Trieste, Dalmatia, Tirol, Ticino, and Nice), had been, especially since 1878, detrimental to a good understanding with neighbouring States; they hindered the alliance of Italy with Austria, and so also with Germany, and gave France an opportunity to carry off, on the pretext of the depredations of the Tunisian border

tribes of the Krumir, the province of Tunis, under the very eyes of the Italians, who had been trying to acquire it themselves. King Humbert I, the worthy son of Victor Emmanuel II (1878 to 1900), being thus taught the dangers of the policy of the "free hand," concluded in March, 1887, at the advice of his minister Count Robilant, the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany, which, being subsequently consolidated by the policy of Francesco Crispi, has proved hitherto the main support of the peace of Europe. It secured Italy's position in the Mediterranean, and thus effectively checked French designs on Tripoli. The attempt to place Abyssinia under Italian suzerainty gained, indeed, for Italy the possession of Assab in 1881, and that of Massowah in 1885 (Vol. III, p. 573). But on March 1, 1896, the great King Menelik with ninety thousand men defeated and nearly annihilated the Italian army, fifteen thousand men strong, under Baratieri at Abba Garima, east of Adowah, carried three thousand Italian soldiers as prisoners into the heart of his country, and extorted on October 26, 1896, a peace which secured the independence of Abyssinia and confined the Italian colony on the Red Sea ("Eritrea") within narrower limits; it now only extends from Massowah to the rivers Marab and Belesa. Bank scandals, from which even ministers did not emerge without damage to their reputations, caused repeatedly, as in 1894, for example, considerable excitement. King Humbert was assassinated on July 29, 1900, at Monza, by Gaetano Bresci, an anarchist sent from America; he was succeeded by his son Victor Emmanuel III (born 1869), who by his marriage to Princess Helene of Montenegro (October 24, 1896) has formed an alliance on the other side of the Adriatic. The economic position of Italy has made considerable progress, now that African expeditions no longer sap the vitality of the country, and a commercial treaty has been made with France. The four per cent Italian rentes stood in 1901 almost at par. The Triple Alliance was renewed in 1902.

The papacy is bitterly hostile to the national State of Italy, which has deprived it of all secular possessions. It forbade all true sons of the Church to show any sort of recognition of the "usurping" kingdom of Italy by taking part in the political elections to the Second Chamber, and thus to a large extent checkmated the Conservatives, to the manifest advantage of the Radicals. Even the Guarantee Act of May, 1871, which secures to the Pope his independence, the possession of the Vatican, and a yearly income of three million lire, has not so far been acknowledged by the Curia, since it emanates from the legislature of the monarchy, and the right of the monarchy to exist is contested by the Pope.

G. SWITZERLAND

THE Swiss Confederation has gone through a progressive development, so far as material interests are concerned, since about 1860. It obtained a rich market for its industries by commercial treaties with its neighbours, and the great lines of mountain railways into the Engadine, over the St. Gotthard, through the heart of which a tunnel fifteen kilometres long was driven in 1882, and into the Bernese Oberland, promoted the influx of strangers, from which Switzerland derives great profits.

The constitution of the confederation, like those of many cantons, has gradually become more democratic in the course of years. After the cantons of Zürich,

Basel-Land, Berne, and others had introduced since 1869 the *referendum*, or the voting of the entire people on legislative proposals, the Federal Constitution was modified on May 29, 1874, according to the views of the Liberals and the Centre. Legislation on the subjects of contracts, bills, and trade, as well as the jurisdiction over the army and the Church, were assigned to the confederation; it also received powers in economic matters. A supreme federal court and a system of registration of births, deaths, and marriages by government officials were introduced. The referendum is allowed in all cases when either thirty thousand voters or eight out of the twenty-two cantons demand that the nation itself shall say the last word on a measure approved by the Federal and National Councils. On July 5, 1891, the popular rights were increased by the grant to the people of the initiative in the legislation on condition that fifty thousand votes require it. This concession to democratic principles has, it must be confessed, produced the result that many useful laws which had been decided upon by the legislative bodies have been lost at the very last, especially when an increased expenditure might be expected from them. The French cantons of Western Switzerland and the Catholic cantons of Old Switzerland often came together in the attempt to hinder all progressive centralisation. The confederation received, however, on October 25, 1885, the monopoly of manufacturing and selling alcohol, and in 1887 the supervision of the forests and the right to legislate on the food supply; in 1898 the nationalization of the railways and uniformity of procedure in civil and criminal cases were granted by the people.

The confederation quarrelled with the papal throne in 1873, because Bishop E. Lachat of Basle had on his own responsibility published the Vatican decrees. The bishopric of Basle was in consequence abolished by the confederation on January 29; Kaspar Mermillod, who put himself forward as Bishop of Geneva, was banished from the country on February 17, and the papal *chargé d'affaires*, G. B. Agnozzi, was given his passports toward the end of November. The Old Catholic movement found great support in Switzerland, and received on June 7, 1876, a bishop of its own ("Christian Catholic") in the person of Edward Herzog, and a special theological faculty in Berne, which was, however, only thinly attended. But in the course of time a fresh agreement was effected between Church and State; the bishopric of Basle was revived in 1884-1885, though the nunciature remained in abeyance.

The social movement of the time led in 1887 to the legal restriction of the maximum working day to eleven hours, in 1881 to the adoption of a law of employers' liability, and in 1890 to the establishment of workmen's insurances against accidents and illness. On the other hand, the social democratic proposal to introduce into the constitution the "Right to Labour" was rejected by the people by three hundred thousand to seventy-three thousand votes. While the radical democratic party was prominent, the social democracy generally, although it rested on the radical Grütli-Verein (cf. Vol. VII, p. 423), which had formally joined it in 1901, and constituted a special group in the National Council, has attained to no great influence. Since also the Conservative Liberals were able to exercise very limited power, the minority have lately directed their efforts to carry the system of proportionate voting in the confederation as well as in the cantons, and thus to secure themselves at least a proportionate share in the popular representation and in legislation.

H. BELGIUM

THE Kingdom of Belgium had been released by the war of 1870-1871 from the continual danger which had threatened it from the side of the Third Empire (cf. pp. 312, 334). The two great parties of Liberals and Clericals were alternately in office, as had been the case for the past decades. But both parties saw themselves compelled, on political grounds, to abandon gradually the exclusive recognition of the French language in official matters and private intercourse, and to make concessions to the Flemings, who composed more than half the population of the kingdom. Accordingly, under the clerical cabinet of Baron J. J. d'Anethan, the use of the Flemish language was permitted in the law courts; under the liberal ministry of Hub. Jos. Frère-Orban, in 1878, its employment as the medium of instruction in the national schools was conceded; while under the renewed clerical government of 1886 a royal Flemish academy for language and literature was founded. In 1892 officers were required to learn the two national languages.

Frère-Orban, supported by a majority of eighteen votes, carried, on July 1, 1879, the law which introduced undenominational national schools into Belgium. The religious instruction was now given outside the school hours, but class-rooms were placed at the disposal of the clergy for the purpose. Owing to the ambiguous attitude of the Curia, which ostensibly exhorted the faithful to follow the law, but in secret stirred up opposition, d'Anethan, then ambassador at the Vatican, was recalled and the nuncio Serafino Vannutelli was given his passports. In 1881 the number of State gymnasia (athenæums) was increased and fifty undenominational girl schools founded. But since the new schools laid considerable burdens on parishes (as much as twenty-two million francs yearly), discontent gradually was felt with the Liberal ministry, which also opposed the introduction of universal suffrage; and the Clericals by the elections of 1884 won a majority of twenty votes. The Clerical Cabinet of Jules Malou now passed a law, in virtue of which parishes were empowered to recognise the "free" schools, that is to say, the schools erected by the Church, as national schools in the meaning of the law of 1879; in this way the latter was practically annulled. For the parishes from motives of economy made such ample use of this permission (in 1,465 cases), that out of 1,933 national schools 877 were closed within a year, and were replaced by Church schools. Diplomatic intercourse with the Curia was resumed in 1885 by a Belgian ambassador to the Vatican (Baron E. de Pitteurs-Hiëgaerts) and by the reappointment of a nuncio in Brussels (Domen-Ferrata). The Clerical party maintained their majority at the next elections; in fact they grew to be more than two-thirds of the members of the Chamber.

The rise of the Social Democrats, whose influence had begun to spread far and wide through the industrial regions of Belgium, combined, with a fall of wages, to produce a disastrous revolution in Liège, Brussels, and Charleroi in March, 1886, on the occasion of a festival in honour of the Paris Commune. A new and formidable antagonist faced the Clericals in place of the Liberals, who were divided into a moderate and a radical section. The government attempted to pave the way for Social Reform by the creation of courts of arbitration between workmen and manufacturers, by the introduction of State supervision over workshops, and the prohibition of the payment of wages in kind; but the Clericals could not bring

themselves to adopt really comprehensive measures of strict social justice, among which the universal liability to military service would be reckoned. At the elections of 1892 they lost the two-thirds majority, and conceded in 1893 universal suffrage, with the proviso that electors who possessed means, were married, and academically educated should possess a plural vote (cf. Vol. VII, p. 425). The number of electors was increased by this law from 130,000 to 1,200,000. Since the first clause in particular helped the clerical party in the country, it maintained its majority; the Liberals and Social Democrats vainly endeavoured to strike the clause conceding plurality of votes (*le vote plural*) out of the constitution. A general strike organised for this purpose on April 14, 1902, had to be abandoned on the 20th; and the new elections on May 25 resulted in a small gain for the Clericals.

King Leopold II did good service in opening up Africa, where he founded, with the help of Sir Henry Stanley, the Congo State (cf. Vol. III, p. 494), which contains 2,250,000 sq. kilometres and a population of 14,000,000. This State was recognised by the great powers at the Berlin Congo Conference in 1885, and Leopold, in virtue of a Belgian law which allowed him to bear this double title, assumed the style of Sovereign of the Congo State. The supreme government is at Brussels; the local government has its seat at Boma on the Congo, where it develops the resources of the enormous realm to which the other powers granted, on July 2, 1890, permission to levy import duties, and maintains tolerable order with four thousand soldiers. In the year 1892 Belgium lent the Congo State twenty-five million francs free of interest, and received in return the right to buy the State in ten years. After a hot debate the Chamber assented to a government proposal which asked for a postponement of the decision as to any incorporation of the Congo State into Belgium (July 17, 1901).

J. THE NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands also the institution of undenominational national schools in 1857 gave rise to excited party disputes. After that date the Catholics were completely separated from the Liberals, and among the Protestants a Christian-Conservative party, the "Anti-revolutionary," was formed, which gradually won many supporters; its leader is the energetic and talented Abraham Kuyper (born 1837), a pastor of the reformed religion. In March, 1888, and again in 1901 the united Catholics and Anti-revolutionaries obtained the majority. Kuyper, as Prime Minister of the Conservative Cabinet constructed on July 27, 1901, was now able to announce their decision to procure for Christianity once more its proper influence on national life, and thus first and foremost to restore the denominational national schools.

The social movement in Holland can point to comparatively little results. In 1889 a measure was passed to prohibit the excessive labour of women and children (cf. Vol. VII, p. 424), and in 1892 a graduated scale of taxation on property and incomes was introduced. In 1896 universal suffrage was accepted, with the limitations that the electors may be twenty-five years of age and must pay some amount, however small, of direct taxation. A strike of railway employees in February, 1903, necessitated remedial legislation.

In the Dutch Indies the colonial government in 1873-1879 and 1896 had to conduct difficult campaigns against the Sultan of Achin in Sumatra (cf. Vol. II, p. 554), and in 1894-1895 another on the island of Lombok, where the native dynasty had been deposed.

The male line of the house of Orange since June 21, 1884, when the Crown Prince Alexander died childless, was only represented by the king, William III. It was therefore settled in 1888 by a constitutional law that, on the death of William, his daughter Wilhelmina (born 1880, by the king's second marriage with Emma of Waldeck) should inherit the throne. The anticipated event occurred on November 23, 1890. While in Luxemburg, where females cannot reign, the former Duke Adolf of Nassau (cf. p. 308), as head of the Walram line and in this respect heir of the Ottonian line of the house of Nassau, became Grand Duke, the clever and popular queen mother Emma took over the regency for Wilhelmina until August 31, 1898. On that day the young queen, who then attained her majority, entered herself on her high office, and promised to rule with that same spirit of devotion to duty which endeared her ancestors to the Dutch nation. On February 7, 1901, she gave her hand to Duke Henry of Mecklenburg, who received the title of a Prince of the Netherlands, but no heir to the throne has yet been born.

V

THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ATLANTIC

By PROFESSOR KARL WEULE

1. CONFIGURATION AND POSITION

THE Atlantic may be regarded as a long canal which winds, in the form of a letter S (see the map facing page 389), and preserving an almost uniform breadth, between the Old World and the New. It extends from one polar circle to the other. Such a configuration, when once it became known to mankind, was bound to favour international communications. The narrowness of the Atlantic has had momentous results for the history both of states and of civilization. But it was long before the shape of the Atlantic was realised, and this for two reasons. First, the Atlantic has few islands, and this is particularly true of the zone which was the first to be attempted by navigators, the zone lying opposite the mouth of the Mediterranean. Secondly, the Mediterranean was a poor school for explorers. The broken coasts and the numerous islands of that sea make navigation too easy. The Mediterranean peoples did not therefore obtain that experience which would have fitted them for the crossing of the outer ocean. Their explorations were never extended more than a moderate distance from the Pillars of Hercules, either in the Greco-Roman period or in more recent times.

Almost the same obstacles existed to the navigation of the northern zone of the Atlantic. The North Sea and Baltic are not easily navigated, but they presented difficulties so great that for a long time they discouraged the inhabitants of their littorals from taking to the sea. We have seen that the dolmen builders showed some aptitude for maritime enterprise (Vol. I, p. 167); and much later we find the men of the Hanse towns and their rivals in Western Europe made some use of the sea for trade. But maritime enterprise on a great scale was not attempted by these peoples. In the days before Columbus, only the inhabitants of Western Norway made serious attempts to explore the ocean. They were specially favoured by nature. A chain of islands, the Faroes, Iceland, and Greenland, served them as stepping-stones. But the voyage from Norway to the Faroes is one of more than four hundred miles over a dangerous ocean; and this was a much more difficult feat than the voyage of the ancients from Gades to the Isles of the Blest, if indeed that voyage was ever made. The evidence for it is by no means of the best.

For the history of exploration and of culture it is a fact of some importance that the Norsemen found, beyond the Faroe Islands, a number of convenient halting-places. They were prevented by this circumstance from regarding Vineland

and Markland and Helluland as discoveries of special importance. They thought of these far-lying northern lands as suitable soil for colonies, like *Iceland and Greenland*. They never realised that they had reached the bounds of the Atlantic, and made as little account of the New World as of their earlier and more trifling discoveries. The civilized peoples of Central and Southern Europe passed over the intelligence of the new countries as a matter of no moment. They did so for reasons which we have already explained (Vol. II, p. 253), chiefly because material and spiritual progress after the year 1000 A. D. was concentrated on the east rather than on the west of Europe. Still the new discoveries attracted more attention in the world outside Scandinavia than is commonly admitted. We learn, for instance, that Gudrid, the heroic wife and companion of Thorfinn Karlsefni, the discoverer and coloniser of the three new countries, made towards the end of her life the pilgrimage to Rome; and two ships from Karlsefni's fleet were driven out of their course from Vineland and touched at Irish ports. Moreover, the northern bishops, more particularly those of Greenland and Iceland, spread the news of the discoveries through Southern Europe. The scant attention which their tales received was undoubtedly due to the ignorance and apathy of Western Christendom. The Norsemen themselves soon lost interest in Vineland, Markland, and Helluland. The very existence of these countries was forgotten, and the belief, inherited from the classical period, that the western ocean was of illimitable extent combined to hold the field. Not until the lessons of Greek geographical science were again studied with attention did the more enlightened intellects of Europe conceive the possibility of traversing the Atlantic.

It would be even more futile to discuss at length the attempts which were made in early times to fathom the secret of the South Atlantic. They were of the slightest kind, although the conditions were here exceptionally favourable. The South Atlantic, it is true, can boast of few islands; but the distance between some points of Africa and South America is not too great to be crossed in a few days by modern steamers; and the crossing from Sierra Leone to the Cape of San Roque is a possible one for the outriggered boats of the Polynesians or for the *prau* of the Malays. But the original inhabitants of Africa and South America had no inducement to make the voyage, and if they put out to sea at all they rarely ventured out of sight of land. And if they had been left to make the discovery for themselves, they would probably feel themselves to-day just as much on the edge of infinity as they seemed to be when Columbus started on the first of his great voyages.

The Atlantic is not merely remarkable for its narrowness and dearth of islands, but also for the great indentations which are to be found in its coasts on either side (see the map facing this page). These have exercised a great and a beneficial influence on the climate of the Atlantic seaboard. Those of the American coast line balance those of the Old World to a remarkable degree. It is true that the eastern coast of South America bends inward with a sweep less pronounced than that of the west coast of Africa. But there is a striking parallelism; and the same phenomenon strikes us when we study the shores of the North and Central Atlantic, in spite of the fact that broken and indented coast lines make it difficult to perceive the broad similarities at the first glance. Thus the Mediterranean corresponds to the immense gulf which separates North and South America.

The part which the Mediterranean of the Old World has played in history is so

important that it has demanded special treatment in a previous volume (IV, Section I). The Mediterranean of America has no such claim upon the attention of the historian. It facilitated the conquest and settlement of the Spanish colonies. It has favoured the development of those motley communities which fringe its shores from Cuba and Florida on the north to the Cape of San Roque on the south. But when we have said this, we have exhausted the subject of its historical importance. More important it doubtless will be in the future. Even at the present time it affords the sole outlet for the Central and Southern States of the American Union; and when the Panama Canal is completed, this sea will become the natural high-road between the Atlantic and Pacific, a great factor in political and economic history. It will be what the Eastern Mediterranean was in the early days of the Old World. But we are concerned with history and not with prophecy.

North of the latitude of Gibraltar the two shores of the Atlantic present a remarkable symmetry. In shape the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Hudson's Bay resemble the North Sea and the Baltic. Labrador, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton Island may be compared with Northwestern Europe. The chief difference between the two coast lines is one of scale. Hudson's Bay, for example, is considerably larger than the North Sea and the Baltic put together. This does not detract from the importance of the symmetry which we have pointed out. It is all the more important because it is most striking on those lines of latitude which have been most important in the history of mankind.

In view of this symmetry, it is truly remarkable that the history of the two seaboard should be so dissimilar. Our two North European seas have been the theatres of events and movements which have left enduring traces upon the fortunes of North and Western Europe. Particularly is this the case with the Baltic, to which we have elsewhere devoted a separate section (in Vol. V); and it has been necessary to discuss the North Sea also at some length. But on the other side of the ocean we find seas of which the history is a blank. From time to time Hudson's Bay has been explored by Europeans. But they have failed as often as they have succeeded, and they have aimed at little more than investigating the boundaries of the bay. The only other human inhabitants have been a few tribes of Indians and Esquimaux, who have gained a precarious subsistence by hunting, and who are to-day what they have been from time immemorial. The Gulf of St. Lawrence has a more noteworthy record, it is true. It has been the channel of communication between the colony of Canada, Europe, and the United States. It has played a part not dissimilar to that of the North Sea. But the history of the North Sea is infinitely more rich and varied. Climatic conditions have prevented, and continue to prevent, these American waters from rivalling their European counterparts. For the navigation of Hudson's Bay ships are required of an unusually stout build. Great nautical skill is essential; and even then it is only during a favourable summer that navigation becomes practical. The prospects of the St. Lawrence are less gloomy. It affords a passage to the Great Lakes; and the fishing grounds of Newfoundland will provide an opening for a great industry for an indefinite period of time. It is, however, unlikely that even the Gulf of St. Lawrence will ever rise to a position of great independent importance.

The richly indented configuration of its Arctic shores has been of even less advantage to the Atlantic Ocean. Nine hundred years ago the existence of that chain of islands, the Faroes, Iceland, and Greenland, enabled Europeans to reach

the western shores of the ocean; at the same time those islands have received a scanty sprinkling of European immigrants as permanent settlers, or, as in the case of Greenland, have been colonised repeatedly. The colonies thus founded naturally suffered from the extreme severity of the climate, and achieved no feats of any historical importance. Notwithstanding the special products of the civilization of Iceland, and the vigorous ecclesiastical life of West Greenland, these northern communities loom vaguely through the mist like the Hyperboreans (Vol. II, p. 200); the outer world knows little of their existence.

At the same time the Northern Atlantic Ocean has influenced the development of our general civilization in two directions; namely, by those physical characteristics which originate from its configuration, and by its situation with reference to the other countries on the globe. The extensive fishing grounds which it affords have been a source of wealth to European populations. Even when we take into account the colossal proportions of modern international trade, deep-sea fishing is none the less an industry of note, and makes a very important difference in the profit and loss accounts of many a northern country. Three hundred and even two hundred years ago the fishing fleets of the Northern Sea, which were then numerous though clumsy, gathered no doubt a harvest in no degree greater than do the steam fishing-boats of the present day; but at that time the profits made a much more appreciable difference to the national wealth, and the safety of the national food supply was more largely dependent upon their efforts.

Much more important from a historical point of view is the influence on character of this trading in the difficult northern seas; for the Teutonic nations of Northwest Europe, and for the French, it was the best of all possible schools of seamanship, and largely contributed to the fact that these nations were able to play a leading part in the general annexation of the habitable globe which was taking place during the last three centuries. The fisheries are here in closest communication with that other attempt, which historically at least exercised influence no less enduring, to find a passage round North America or round Northern Europe and Asia to the east shore of Asia. In truth, nothing did so much to promote the maritime efficiency of the British nation as the repeated attempts that were made to find the northwest and northeast passages (Vol. I, p. 589) which began with the voyage of the elder Cabot, and continued to the middle of the nineteenth century. To the Atlantic as a whole belongs the high service of having led the civilized peoples of the Old World out to the open sea from the confines of the Mediterranean and other landlocked waters; from the time of Columbus it has been a school of technical skill and self-reliance. However, its most northern part, storm-lashed and ice-bound as it is, is in no way inferior to the whole, in this respect at least, that it gave to one sole nation not of itself particularly strong, to the English, the supremacy over the seas of the world within a short three centuries.

2. THE AGE BEFORE COLUMBUS

A. UNTIL THE RETIREMENT OF THE ROMANS FROM THE NORTH SEA

IN the first volume of his work on human races and their distribution,¹ Friedrich Ratzel was the first to designate America as the eastern portion of the habitable

¹ *Anthropogeographie*, 1st ed., published in 1882.

globe, a designation entirely familiar to our own generation (cf. Vol. I, p. 18). The Atlantic Ocean is regarded as a broad gulf dividing the western and eastern shores of the habitable world, conceived as a huge band of territory extending from Cape Horn to Smith Sound; this implies a limitation of our previous ideas regarding the age of the human race. Its share in universal history does not begin before the moment when the keel of the first Norse boat touched the shore of Greenland or Helluland. Thus this sea, so important in the development of the general civilization of modern times, is, historically speaking, young, and its significance in the history of racial intercourse is not to be compared with that of the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. When compared with those ages during which these two giants, together with our Mediterranean, our Baltic and North Seas, made their influence felt upon the course of history, traditional or written, the mere thousand years during which the Atlantic has influenced history become of minor importance. The investigator, indeed, who is inclined to regard as "historical" only those cases in which the literary or architectural remains of former races have left us information upon their deeds and exploits, will naturally be inclined to leave the Atlantic Ocean in possession of its historical youth. He, however, who is prepared to follow out the ideas upon which this work has been based, and to give due weight to all demonstrable movements and meetings of peoples, which form the first visible sign of historical activity upon the lower planes of human existence, will consider the importance of the Atlantic Ocean as extending backwards to a very remote antiquity.

Our views of historical development, in so far as they regard mankind as the last product of a special branch of evolution within the organic world, have undergone a considerable change within recent times; the most modern school of anthropologists conceives it possible to demonstrate, with the help of comparative anatomy, that the differentiation of mankind from other organisms was a process which began, not with the anthropoid apes, that is to say, at a period comparatively late both in the history of evolution and geologically, but at a much earlier point within the development of the mammals. From a geological and palæontological point of view, this conclusion carries us far beyond the lowest limits previously stated as the beginnings of mankind (Vol. I, p. 115). We reach the Tertiary Age (cf. Vol. II, pp. 130, 537; Vol. III, p. 414), a lengthy period, interesting both for the changes which took place within organic life and for the extensive alterations that appeared upon the surface of the earth. The nature and extent of these changes must, in so far as the new theory is correct, have been of decisive importance for the earliest distribution of existing humanity. If the theory be true that during the Tertiary Age two broad isthmuses extended from the western shore of the modern Old World to modern America, then from the point of view of historical development there can be no difficulty in conceiving these isthmuses as inhabited by primeval settlers. That point of the globe over which at the present day the deep waters of the Atlantic Ocean heave would then, in fact, have been not only the earliest, but also the most important, scene of activity for the fate of mankind. As regards the later importance of the Atlantic Ocean, the collapse of these two isthmuses marks the beginning of a period which is of itself of such great geological length that those first conditions which influenced the fate of our race appear to its most recent representatives as lost in the mists of remote antiquity. After the Atlantic Ocean appeared in its present form, the inhabitants of the Old World had

not the slightest communication with the dwellers upon the other shore. The Atlantic Ocean then became in fact a gulf dividing the habitable world.

In all times and places mystery and obscurity have exercised an attraction upon mankind, and thus, too, the Atlantic Ocean, bounding as it did the civilization gathered round the Mediterranean, attracted the inhabitants of those countries from an early period. As early as the second millennium before the birth of Christ we find the Phœnicians on its shores, and soon afterwards their western branch, the Carthaginians. The special inducement to venture out upon its waves was the need of tin, the demand for which increased with the growing use of bronze; and the rarity of this metal induced them to brave the dangers of the unknown outer sea. However, these two branches of the great commercial nations of Western Asia did not attain to any great knowledge of the Atlantic Ocean. We are reminded of the reluctance of the towns and republics of Italy to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, though the high seas had long been sailed by the Portuguese and Spaniards, or the cowardice of the Hanseatics, who hardly dared to approach the actual gates of the ocean, when we find these two peoples who ruled for so many centuries over the Mediterranean, which is itself of no small extent, unable to advance any material distance beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Even as regards the tin trade, the chief labour was probably undertaken by the seafaring coast dwellers of separate parts of Western Europe. How small in reality were the achievements of both nations upon the Atlantic is plainly shown by the amount of praise lavished upon the coasting voyage of Hanno (Vol. III, p. 182), which, however important for geographical science, was no great achievement of seamanship. It is a characteristic feature of all landlocked seas to limit not only the view, but also the enterprise, of the maritime peoples upon their shores.

In Greek civilization the Atlantic Ocean as such is only of theoretical importance. A few explorers did indeed advance from the Mediterranean northwards and southwards into the Atlantic; such were Pytheas of Massilia (about 300 B. C.; cf. Vol. V, p. 11), who journeyed beyond Britain to the fabulous land of Thule. His compatriot and contemporary, Euthymenes, followed by Eudoxos of Cyzicus (about 150 B. C.) and the historian Polybius (about 205–123 B. C.), succeeded in reaching different points upon the west coast of Africa; but none of these undertakings led to any practical result. The reason for this fact is to be found in the length of a voyage from the coast of Greece, which was a far more difficult undertaking for the sailors of those days than it now appears. Especially important, moreover, is the fact that the Greeks, although they were the general heirs of the Phœnician colonial policy, never attempted to overthrow the supremacy of the Carthaginians in the western half of the Mediterranean Sea. For them, therefore, the great western ocean remained permanently wrapped in the obscurity of distance, a fact which enabled them to people its illimitable breadth with creations of fancy, such as the "Atlantis" of Plato; but distance was too important an obstacle to be successfully overcome by their instinct for colonisation and discovery.

However, in one respect at least the Atlantic Ocean was of great importance to the Greek world, at any rate in antiquity; it exercised a decisive influence upon the cosmography of the old Ionic geographers. The chief characteristics of this cosmography are determined by the conception of Oceanus, the illimitable breadth of which surrounds the continents. This Oceanus seems to have been

actually known to the western Greeks even in antiquity, probably by hearsay report derived from Phœnician sources until considerably later than the Homeric age, and by personal inspection after the beginning of their own period of colonisation. It was not until the Samian Colæus (about 640 B. C.) made his involuntary voyage through the Pillars of Hercules to the Punic Tarshish that the Greeks became acquainted with the outer boundaries of their cosmos by personal examination. If it be asked how their knowledge of this external sea at one single point could have led to the conception of an all-embracing ocean, we can reply with a reference, in the first place, to the fascination which remoteness lends to any object, and, further, to the character of the Atlantic Ocean itself. However vast the Mediterranean may for the moment have seemed to the Phœnicians and Greeks, they had eventually discovered a shore bounding it on every side, and occupied by human inhabitants. But in the sea beyond the Pillars of Hercules their experiences were wholly different. The Phœnicians, fearing the competition of other commercial rivals, had been careful to represent its enormous breadth as unsuited for maritime traffic. Personal experience showed the Greeks, it is true, the exaggerated nature of this statement; but at the same time the Atlantic Ocean, considering even its purely physical features, formed a sea of wholly different character to the Mediterranean. The proportions of its waves in length and breadth, the greater rise and fall of its tides, and finally its unending restlessness, must have produced a profound impression upon those who passed eastward from the Pillars of Hercules, leaving behind them the gentle ripples and the peaceful bays of the Mediterranean. The surprising lack of islands, which could not fail to contrast with the experience gained in the Mediterranean, no doubt also influenced the formation of that cosmography which obtained credence not only in the Greek world, but also among the Romans and the Arabs, and continued to hold its ground even when the discovery of the Canary Islands and Madeira had proved that the Atlantic was not wholly destitute of islands.

The Atlantic Ocean came into the purview of the Romans at the moment when their struggle with Carthage for the Iberian Peninsula ended definitely in their favour (210 B. C., Vol. IV, p. 485); it was not until then that this rapidly developing power in the west of the Mediterranean was able to advance from the east coast of Spain to the interior of the country and thence to its western coast. Notwithstanding the activity of Rome in colonisation, her supremacy in Iberia led to no enterprises by sea; nor were any such undertaken by the Romans until they had established themselves in Gaul, and had thus gained possession of a considerable seaboard upon the Atlantic Ocean. It was in 55 and 54 B. C. that Julius Cæsar made his voyage to Britain; a few decades later came the advance of Drusus and of Germanicus into the North Sea. The nature of these conquests precluded adventure upon the open sea. The Romans were attempting only to secure their natural frontier against the threatened encroachments of the Germanic tribes, and confined their explorations to the southern portion of the North Sea.

During the first thousand years after the birth of Christ the North Sea is the only part of the Atlantic Ocean which can be demonstrated to have had any enduring influence upon the history of Western Europe. The Veneti and other tribes inhabiting the western coasts of Spain, Gaul, and Germany certainly adventured their vessels upon the open sea southwards in continuation of the primeval trade in tin and amber; even the Romans before indefinitely retiring from Britain made

one further advance during the expedition which Cn. Julius Agricola (84 A. D.) undertook in the seas and bays surrounding Great Britain. Of other nations, however, we hear nothing during this age which would lead us to conclude that they carried on communication by means of the ocean to any important extent.

B. FROM THE SIXTH TO THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

(a) *The Atlantic Ocean as a Centre of Legend.* — The age preceding the tenth century, with the exception of the expedition of the Norsemen, is entirely wanting in maritime exploits, but is, on the other hand, rich in legends, the locality of which is the Atlantic Ocean (cf. Vol. I, p. 350). These are important to the history of civilization by reason of their number; they are the most striking proof of that general interest which was excited even during the "darkest" century of the Middle Ages by the great and mysterious ocean upon the west. Historically, too, they are of importance for the influence which their supposed substratum of geographical fact has exercised upon the course of discovery. This interest appears, comparatively weak at first, in the "Atlantis" legend. This legend, together with many other elements forming the geographical lore of classical Greece, was adopted by the Middle Ages, but cannot be retraced earlier than the sixth century. For nearly one thousand years it disappears with Kosmas Indikopleustes (Vol. IV, p. 215), that extraordinary traveller and student in whose works the attempt to bring all human discovery into harmony with the Bible, an attempt characteristic of patristic literature, reaches its highest point. In the "Atlantis" of Plato Kosmas apparently sees a confirmation of the teachings of Moses, which had there placed the habitation of the first men; it was not until the time of the Deluge that these men were marvellously translated to our own continent. However, the ten Kings of Atlantis were the ten generations from Adam to Noah.

The largest space in the Atlantic geography of the Middle Ages is occupied by the legend of the voyage of St. Brandan, and of the island or group of islands called after him. This Island of Brandan is the most firmly founded of those many "Utopias" where the Middle Ages conceived the earthly paradise to be, and after which they sought with greater zeal than they devoted to the discovery of other more valuable districts. In contrast to the majority of paradises, this was localised in the west, no doubt with some hazy recollection of the ancient Isles of the Blest and the Gardens of the Hesperides. The hero of the legend is Brandan the Irishman, who died on the 16th of May, 578, as the Abbot of Clonfert. He is said to have been excited by the descriptions of travel which he heard from his guest friend Barintus, and to have set out with fourteen comrades in search of the land of promise. For no less than seven years the monks were travelling about the Atlantic Ocean; this wandering and the whole of the mythical island archipelago form the subject of the narrative. Their adventures were countless and marvellous until they finally reached the main object of their journey; this was a great island, not to be crossed in forty days' journey, where night was never seen, and where the trees were ever laden with fruit, as though the season were an everlasting and prosperous autumn. According to the actual words of the legend,

which made its way into every literature of Europe from the eleventh century onwards, at the end of their forty days' wandering on the Island of Paradise a divine messenger met them in a shining, youthful form, who invited them to return home after loading their ship with precious stones and fruit. "For seven years," he said, "God had allowed the pious Brandan to continue searching for this country, in order that he might unfold to him all the secrets in the great ocean. But after a long space," added the stranger, "this country will be thrown open to your descendants, when we come to the help of Christianity in its hour of need." These words might almost induce one to suppose that Brandan's Island refers to some special locality of the Atlantic Ocean and to some particular discovery made upon its surface; criticism has, however, made it clear that there is no substratum whatever of geographical fact. However, the legend remains of importance in the history of discovery, even later than the period of the discovery of America. During the sixteenth century ships were thrice sent out in search of the famous land of Brandan, and even so late as 1721 the governor of the Canary Islands fitted out a ship for the same object.

An equally shadowy creation, though not without importance, is the Island of Antil(l)ia, the "island of the seven towns;" the influence of the open Atlantic Ocean upon mediæval thought is here represented in an even earlier stage of development than in the legend of the Isle of Brandan; for this legend goes back to the entry of the Arabs into Europe. After the decisive battle near Cadiz, at the mouth of the Salado (battle of Xeres de la Frontera, 711; cf. Vol. IV, pp. 495, 496), the archbishop of Portugal is said to have fled with six other bishops to a distant island in the ocean, where each of them founded a town. This island of the Seven Towns occupied the attention of mankind for centuries, at first only in legend and popular tradition; but from the fifteenth century onward a long series of special expeditions were sent in search of it. Documents of the Portuguese kings of that period assign the island of the Seven Towns to its discoverer with no less security than was then customary in the case of actually discovered districts; Paolo Toscanelli (Vol. I, p. 349) plainly mentions it in his famous letter to the Canon Ferdinand Martin(e)z (June 25, 1474). Finally, it played a decisive part in the plans of discovery formed by Columbus; it was in Antillia that he hoped to attain a welcome rest after his long journey westwards. Even when no trace of the island was discovered during the first journey, belief remained unshaken; on the 25th of September, 1492, Columbus pronounced that they must have sailed past it.

The last great legendary country within the limits of the Atlantic Ocean is the Island of Brazil. It appears on many maps of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in very various degrees of latitude, but always well out in the ocean. Though there was not the smallest evidence for its geographical existence, yet belief in it was soon as generally accepted as in the Island of Antillia; and, as in the latter case, during the last decades of the fifteenth century, immediately before and after the discovery of America, ship after ship sailed out upon the wide ocean in hope of its discovery, though in this case the funds were provided by the merchants of the British harbour of Bristol. The Brazil expeditions of 1480 and the following years were the first considerable efforts made by the English people upon the wide ocean, their first and almost half unconscious display of maritime power. As in the first decade of the sixteenth century, the name Antillia was applied to the islands discovered by Columbus and his contemporaries off the new continent;

so also the name of Brazil was transferred to the newly discovered South American Continent, as soon as its riches in coloured woods had been recognised.

(b) *The Atlantic Ocean at the Outset of the Age of Discovery.* — The power of legend as a purely theoretical force continued after the first millennium A. D. only in the northeastern borders of the Atlantic Ocean. The Baltic, owing to its Mediterranean situation, was at that period the theatre of so much human activity and progress that it is better reserved for special treatment. The North Sea, regarded as a landlocked ocean, was not so greatly benefited by its position as it has been in the later ages of inter-oceanic communication; at the same time the coincidence of advantages, small in themselves, but considerable in the aggregate, have made it more important than any other part of the Atlantic Ocean as an area of traffic. These advantages included one of immeasurable importance to early navigation, namely, a supply of islands which, as formerly in the Mediterranean, conducted the navigator almost involuntarily from point to point; a further advantage was the character of its inhabitants, who were far too energetic to be contented with a country which was by no means one of those most blessed by nature. Hence we need feel no surprise at the fact that the North Sea was navigated in all directions as early as the eighth century by the Vikings; their excursions to Iceland, Greenland, and to that part of North America which here projects farthest into the ocean, are fully intelligible when we consider the splendid training which the stormy northeastern Atlantic Ocean offered to a nation naturally adventurous.

The example of the Norsemen was not generally imitated in Europe at that time. Charles the Great launched, it is true, a fleet upon the North Sea to repulse their attacks, and this was the first step made by the German people in the maritime profession; though we also see the merchants of Cologne from the year 1000 sending their vessels down the Rhine and over the Straits to London, the commercial rivalry of Flanders and Northern France following them in the thirteenth century, and about the same time the fleets of the Easterlings visiting the great harbour on the Thames. For the immediate estimation of existing transmarine relations on the Atlantic side of Europe, these expeditions are useful starting points; they have, however, nothing to do with the Atlantic Ocean as a highway between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. The navigators who opened up the Atlantic for this purpose started from the point which past history and the commercial policy of civilized peoples indicated as the most suitable, that is, from the Mediterranean.

The sudden expansion of the Mohammedan religion and the Arabian power over a great portion of the Mediterranean gave a monopoly of the whole of the trade passing from east to west to the masters of Egypt and the Syrian ports (Vol. IV, p. 33, and Vol. III, p. 361); a considerable alteration took place in those conditions under which for more than a century commercial exchange had quietly proceeded between the far east and the west, — an alteration, too, greatly for the worse. Commercial intercourse became so difficult that the chief carrying nations of the Mediterranean, the commercial city-states, began to consider the possibility of circumventing the obstacles presented by the Moslem power, which not even the Crusaders had been able to shatter. From the year 1317 the traders of Venice and Genoa regularly passed the Straits of Gibraltar to secure their share of that extensive trade in England and Flanders which had everywhere

sprung into prosperity north of the Alps, owing to the great economic advance made by Northwest Europe (Vol. VII, p. 10).

Almost a generation earlier they had advanced from Gibraltar southwards in the direction which should have brought them into direct communication with India, according to the geographical knowledge of that day. This idea is the leading motive in the history of discovery during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, so far as the history was worked out upon the sea. We see it realised in the voyage of the brothers Vadino and Guido de' Vivaldi of Genoa in 1281, and that of Ugolino Vivaldi, who in 1291 sailed down the west coast of Africa in a ship of Teodosio Doria with the object of discovering the sea route to India; it is an idea apparent in the voyages made by the Italians to Madeira, to the Canaries and to the Azores, enterprises both of nautical daring and of geographical importance. Mention must also be made at this point of the several advances upon the west coast of Africa made by Henry the Navigator (Vol. IV, p. 539); this series of attempts occupied the whole life of this strange character.

It is true that the Portuguese of the fifteenth century, like the Italians before them, proposed to use the Atlantic Ocean as a means of communication only up to that point where an imaginary western mouth of the Nile came forth from the Dark Continent. Not in vain were the Arabs the teachers of the West, both in what they did and in what they did not understand; their additions to the knowledge of river systems are even more superficial than those made by European geographers of the Dark Ages. The mistake of the Arabs most fruitful in consequences was their division of the Upper Nile into three arms: one flowing into the Mediterranean from Egypt, one flowing into the Red Sea on the coast of Abyssinia, and one flowing into the Atlantic Ocean on the coast of Northwest Africa. This hydrographical myth, of which a hint had been given long before by Ptolemy, was transmitted to the West immediately by the Arabs. To the influence of this strange theory we must ascribe the attempts made by the Italians and also by Prince Henry; they hoped to find a short cut to the realm of Prester John and the Elysium of Southern Asia.

A common feature in all the theories of the time about the Atlantic Ocean is the tendency to consider it as the illimitable western boundary of the habitable world. In the history of discovery, this mental attitude continues until the time of Columbus, whose westward voyage cannot for that very reason be compared with any similar undertaking, because it was based upon the conception of the world as a closely united band of earth. However, in the scientific treatment of the great sea upon the west, views and conceptions of the world as a united whole had made their influence felt almost two centuries earlier. The fact that elephants are to be found both in Eastern India and Western Africa had led Aristotle to suppose that the two countries were separated by no great expanse of ocean. Eratosthenes, the scientific opponent of the Stagirite, actually discussed the possibility of sailing on the same line of parallel from Iberia to India, supposing the immense obstacles presented by the Atlantic Ocean to be first removed. Poseidonius attempted to estimate the length of this passage from east to west; he estimated that a voyage westward before a continuous east wind would extend for seventy thousand stades before India was reached. Finally the question was asked, "How far is it from the further coast of Spain to India?" and was answered by Seneca, the author of the "*Quæstiones Naturales*," with the words, "A journey of but few days

when a steady wind fills the sails." This philosopher, while he thus carefully avoids any attempt at an accurate estimate of distance, clearly belonged to that school of geographical theorists which in antiquity considered that water covered but a very moderate proportion of the surface of the globe, and that this globe was chiefly formed of land, which lay upon it in the form of an open cloak (a *chlamys*, Strabo calls it); the Atlantic Ocean would be represented by the openings in the cloak.

After the Patristic Age, which knew nothing of this conception of the cloak, the theory was revived by scholasticism upon the basis of Asiatic and Greek geography. As transmitted by the Arabs, this theory respecting the configuration of the ocean assumed that form which was bequeathed by Marinus of Tyre about 100 A. D. and by Ptolemy to the Caliphs. The Western Ocean, upon this theory, was not reduced to the narrow canal which Seneca had conceived; but, compared with the length of the continent which formed its shores, it yet remained so narrow that a man with the enterprise of Columbus might very well have entertained the plan of finding the eastern world upon the west by crossing its waters. Ptolemy had given the extent of the continent between the west coast of Iberia and the east coast of Asia as 180 degrees of longitude; thus one-half of the circumference of the globe was left for the ocean lying between. He had thus considerably reduced the estimate of his informant Marinus, who had assigned 225 degrees longitude for the whole extent of land, thus leaving only 135 degrees for the ocean; that is to say, a little more than a third of the circumference of the globe, a distance which a good sailor at the close of the eighteenth century could pass over in a short time. Columbus was more inclined to rely upon Marinus, as Paolo Toscanelli (p. 396) had estimated the extent of land at very nearly the same number of degrees as the Tyrian. Relying upon the stupendous journeys of Marco Polo and the travelling monks of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, he observed that Marinus had estimated his 225 degrees of longitude only for that part of Eastern Asia which was known to him; whereas the fact was, that this continent extended far beyond the eastern boundary assumed by Marinus, and should therefore be much nearer the Cape de Verde Islands than was supposed. This view strengthened Columbus in that tenacity and endurance which enabled him to continue working for his voyage during ten years full of disappointments (Vol. I, pp. 351-353), and it gave him that prudent confidence which is the most distinguishing feature of his character.

3. THE AGE AFTER COLUMBUS

(a) *The Atlantic Ocean as an Educational Force.* — One of the most remarkable facts in the history of geographical discovery is the failure of the discoverer of the New World to recognise it in its true character as an independent portion of the earth's surface; Columbus died in that belief that he had sailed on four occasions to the eastern and southern shores of Asia, and therefore to his last breath remained faithful to that picture of the globe we have been describing. His contemporaries were under the same delusion. This adherence to old beliefs regarding the hydrography of the globe has produced the characteristic circumstance that, in political history and in the history of exploration, the Pacific and Atlantic are closely linked until the year 1513, when Nuñez de Balboa descended from the heights of Darien to the shore of the southern sea (Vol. I, p. 361). The Pacific and Atlantic

Oceans were considered as forming one sea which lay between the western and eastern shores of an enormous continental island, the Indian Ocean being nothing more than an indentation facilitating communication to the western shore. It was not until the return of the "Victoria" from the voyage of circumnavigation undertaken by Magalhães (September 6, 1522) that Europe learnt that between the western and eastern shores of their own world there lay, not the narrow sea they had expected to find, but two independent oceans, divided by a double continent, narrower and running more nearly north and south, and possessing all the characteristics of an independent quarter of the globe. An entirely new picture of the world then rose before the civilization of the age, — new, not only from a scientific point of view, but new also, as soon appeared, in the influence it was to exert upon the further development of the history of mankind, which had hitherto run an almost purely continental course.

In every age from that of the early Accadians to that of Hanseatic ascendancy in the Baltic, the sea has ever been used as a means of communication. Before the year 1500 A. D. we see the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean with all their branches, as well as the North Sea and the Baltic, in constant use by mankind, and during that long period we know of a whole series of powers founded upon purely maritime supremacy. But the political and economic history even of those peoples whose power was apparently founded upon pure maritime supremacy has been everywhere and invariably conditioned by changes and displacements in their respective hinterlands; even sea powers so entirely maritime as the Phœnician and Punic mediæval Mediterranean powers and the Hanseatics have been invariably obliged to accommodate themselves to the overwhelming influence of the Old World. To those peoples their seas appeared, no doubt, as mighty centres of conflict; but to us, who are accustomed to remember the unity underlying individual geographical phenomena, these centres of historical action give an impression of narrow bays, even of ponds. On and around them a vigorous period of organic action may certainly have developed at times, but their importance to the geographical distribution of human life surpasses very little their spatial dimensions.

After the age of the great discoveries history loses its continental character, and the main theatre of historical events is gradually transferred to the sea. At the same time the coexistence of separate historical centres of civilization comes gradually to a close, and history becomes world-wide. However, the leap which the population of Europe was then forced to make from their own convenient land-locked seas to the unconfined ocean was too great to be taken without some previous training. This training the Atlantic Ocean provided in full; in fact, during the sixteenth century its historical importance begins and ends with the task of educating European nations to capacity for world supremacy. No other sea upon the surface of the globe has exercised such an influence, nor was any sea so entirely suited as a training ground by configuration or position. The Pacific Ocean lies entirely apart from this question, for reasons explained in Volume I; from 1513 the task naturally placed before the white races was that of learning to sail this sea, the greatest of all oceans, and apparently the richest in prospects. Its importance is chiefly as a battlefield; it has nothing to do with military training. In this respect the Indian Ocean can also be omitted (Vol. II), particularly for geographical reasons, though at the same time the chief obstacle to its extensive use

by European nations is its lack of some natural communication with the Mediterranean. Compared with these hindrances, the political obstacles varying in strength, but never wholly absent, raised by the Moslem powers of Syria and Egypt are of very secondary importance. How important the first obstacle has ever been is shown by the results of the piercing of it in modern times by an artificial waterway, which is kept open by treaty to the ships of every nation.

Speaking from the standpoint of universal history, we may say that the Mediterranean has exercised a retrograde influence upon humanity, even more so than the Baltic. Both seas conferred great benefits upon the inhabitants of their shores, and indeed the Mediterranean gave so much that we may speak of a Mediterranean civilization (Vol. IV, pp. 9-12) which had lasted for thousands of years, and did not end until the growing economic, political, and intellectual strength of Northern and Southern Europe transferred the historical centre of gravity from this inlet of the Atlantic Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean itself. But neither of these two seas enabled the inhabitants on its shores to take the lead upon the ocean, when the fulness of time appeared with the westward voyage of Columbus, the eastward voyage of Vasco de Gama, and the circumnavigation of the globe by Magalhães. These seas renounced the claims which they preferred before that great decade, to be regarded, if not as the transmitters of civilization and history, yet to be considered as a history and as a civilization. We do not see either Venice or Genoa crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, or the Hanseatics crossing the Skagerrack or the Straits of Dover, with the object of taking their share in the struggle that was beginning for maritime supremacy. Those powers were sufficiently skilled in seamanship to maintain their supremacy within their own narrow circles, but their experience was insufficient to enable them to venture upon the open seas surrounding the globe.

A strict and thorough maritime education has been from the age of discovery the fundamental condition for the attainment of the position of a modern civilized power in the hard struggle between races and peoples. Of the nations whose voices are heard with respect in the councils of peoples, there is none which does not consider itself permanently equipped and armed for the wide and mighty political and economic struggle upon the stage of the world; for of the original combatants on the scene those have obviously remained victorious who were forced to gain their early experience in the hard school of maritime struggle.

These original combatants were Spain and Portugal upon one hand, Holland, England, and France upon the other, and the scene of struggle was the Atlantic Ocean. As regards Spain and Portugal, it is a remarkable fact that this sea concerned them only temporarily and within definite limits, thanks to the papal edict of the 6th of May, 1493, which divided the world between the two Romance powers at the outset of their career of colonisation on conditions which placed their boundaries within the Atlantic Ocean itself. This line of demarcation was to run from north to south at a distance of one hundred leagues from the Cape Verde Islands, which was extended to three hundred and seventy by the treaty of Tordesillas of the 7th of June, 1494 (Vol. I, p. 359). Thus, as soon appeared, the main portion of the New World fell within the Spanish half, and only the east of South America was given to the Portuguese. The importance of their American possessions was naturally overshadowed by the far more important tasks which fell to the share of the little Portuguese nation in the Indian Ocean during the next one hundred and fifty years (Vol. II, pp. 450-457). Brazil served primarily as a base for the further

voyage to India and the Cape of Good Hope. It was impossible to make it a point of departure for further Portuguese acquisitions, as the Spaniards opposed every step in this direction on the basis of the treaties of partition (cf. Vol. I, p. 398).

More lasting was the struggle of the two Iberian powers with the nations that had been rapidly rising from the sixteenth century onwards north of the Pyrenees and the Bay of Biscay. No account had been taken of them in the papal edict; any one of them, therefore, was legally free to extend its power over the seas of the world had not the Spanish supremacy blockaded the Straits of Magellan, the only exit westward from the Atlantic Ocean, while the Portuguese closed the only route leading eastward, that round the Cape of Good Hope. Neither Holland nor England felt strong enough, before the end of the sixteenth century, to break down this double barrier; these youthful powers needed almost a century of development before they became capable of embracing the globe in their flight. During this age the growing sea powers of Northwest Europe were confined to the North Atlantic Ocean, which was assigned to them by geographical conditions. Great were the benefits that they gained from this limitation. We are reminded of the old Normans and their stern training in the North Atlantic (p. 397), when we observe the enthusiastic attempts of the English and Dutch after the age of Cabot to find an exit from the limits of the Northern Ocean to the eastern shore of Asia. We see them set forth again and again, with energy at times diminished but never wholly extinguished, to find a passage upon the northwest or northeast of the Atlantic Ocean, which was not only to be shorter than the long journey round the southern points of Africa and America, but would also bring with it the further advantage of making its discoverers independent of the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly of those two routes by sea.

During the first half of the sixteenth century other European powers besides England and Holland crowded into the north of the Atlantic Ocean in pursuit of the same objects; we find not only French explorers and fishermen, but also Spaniards and Portuguese, in the Polar waters of the American Atlantic. However, none of the other nations pursued their main object with such tenacity as the two first-named peoples, above all, the English; the period between 1576 and 1632 belongs entirely to them, and was occupied without interruption by their constant endeavours to discover the northwest passage (Vol. I, p. 589).

The reward, however, which the English people gained from their stern school of experience in the northern seas was one of high importance. England then was unimportant from a geographical point of view, and a nonentity in the commercial relations of the world at large; but it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that clear evidence was forthcoming that the communication by water between Baffin Bay and the Behring Straits, though existing, was of no use for navigation. But the high nautical skill, the consciousness of strength, and the resolve to confront any task by sea with adequate science and skill, in short, the unseen advantages which the English nation gained from these great Arctic expeditions and from their slighter efforts in the first half of the sixteenth century, proved of far higher importance than the tangible results achieved. It was these long decades of struggle against the unparalleled hostilities of natural obstacles that made the English mariners masters on every other sea, and taught the English nation what a vast reserve of strength they had within themselves.

In considering the historical career of this extraordinary island people from the

sixteenth century onwards, we are forced to regard modern history as a whole from the standpoint of national Arctic exploration, although this is far too confined for our purposes as compared with the sum total of forces operative throughout the world. During the age when maritime skill was represented by the city republics in the Mediterranean, and the Normans in the North Sea and the Northern Atlantic Ocean, the Spaniards and Portuguese were already fully occupied with their own domestic affairs (the Moorish domination). Their first advance in the direction of nautical skill was not made until a considerable time after the liberation of Lisbon from the Moorish yoke (1147; Vol. IV, p. 514), when the magnificent harbour at the mouth of the Tagus had become more and more a centre for Flemish and Mediterranean trade; even then it was found necessary to call in all kinds of Italian teachers of the nautical art. It was only slowly and at the cost of great effort that Spain and Portugal became maritime peoples; and their subjects were never seafarers in the sense in which the term is applied to the English and the Dutch of the present day, to the Norwegians, or even to the Malays or Polynesians; the period of their greatness gives us rather the impression of an age of ecstasy, a kind of obsession which can seize upon a whole nation and inspire them to brilliant exploits for a century, but which results in an even greater reaction so soon as serious obstacles to their activity make themselves felt. Only thus can we explain the fact that these two peoples, once of world-wide power, disappeared with such extraordinary rapidity and so entirely from the world-wide ocean. The last Spanish fleet worthy of consideration was destroyed off the Downs by the Dutch lieutenant-admiral, Marten Harpertzoon Tromp, on the 21st of October, 1629; about the same period the Portuguese were also considered the worst sailors in Europe.

The Dutch and the French held their ground more tenaciously. In both cases Arctic training ran a somewhat different course than in the case of the English; during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they certainly took part in the attempt to discover the northwest and northeast passages; with a tenacity highly praiseworthy they applied themselves to the more practical end of Arctic deep-sea fisheries and sealing. That such occupations could provide a good school of maritime training is proved by the energy with which the Dutch and afterwards the English and the French made the great step from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean; further evidence is also to be seen in the unusually strong resistance which the two colonial powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were able to offer to their most dangerous rival, the growing power of England.

B. THE PART PLAYED BY THE ATLANTIC OCEAN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE WORLD'S COMMERCE

TOWARDS the end of the sixteenth century the historical character of the Atlantic Ocean undergoes a fundamental change. From the beginning of the period of great discoveries its special destiny had been to provide a maritime training for the nations of Northwest Europe, and to make these nations sufficiently strong for successful resistance to the two powers of Spain and Portugal, for whom the supremacy of the world seemed reserved by their geographical position, the world-wide activity of their discoverers, and the pronouncements of the Pope. Maritime capacity they had attained by their bold ventures in the

Arctic and Antarctic waters of the Atlantic Ocean; the struggle was fought out by these nations independently or in common in the seas to the south either of their own continent or of the West Indies.

We refer to the great epoch of the English and Dutch wars against the "invincible" fleets of Philip II; it was a period, too, of that licensed piracy, almost equally fruitful in political consequences, which was carried on in the waters of East America by representatives of all the three northern powers. The North Sea, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean have all been scourged by pirates at one time and another; and in all three cases the robbers plied their trade so vigorously and for so long a time that the historian must take account of them. This older form of piracy was, however, undertaken by ruffians wholly beyond the pale of law, who were every man's enemy and no man's friend, and plundered all alike as opportunity occurred, it being everybody's duty to crush and extirpate them when possible. But towards the end of the sixteenth century a different state of affairs prevailed on the Atlantic Ocean. After the discovery of America as an independent continent, it became a question of life and death for the Northwest European powers, who had grown to strength in the last century, to find an exit from the Atlantic Ocean to the riches of the eastern countries of the Old World. It was possible that this exit was to be found only in the south, in view of the constant ill-success of expeditions towards the Pole; and to secure the possession of it in that quarter was only possible by the destruction of the two powers that held it. This attempt was undertaken and carried through in part by open war, in part by piracy, which was not only secretly tolerated but openly supported by governments and rulers. No stronger evidence is forthcoming for the value attached to these weapons and the free use of them during the last ten years of Elizabeth's reign (cf. Vol. II, p. 455) than the honourable positions of Sir Thomas Cavendish, Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, and Sir Walter Raleigh. On April 4, 1581, the maiden queen went on board Drake's ship, concerning which the Spanish ambassador had lodged a complaint of piracy on its return from the circumnavigation of the globe, and dubbed him knight.

This irrepressible advance on the part of the Northwest powers towards the east of the Old World is closely connected with the fact that the struggle for maritime supremacy was confined to the Atlantic Ocean only for a short period; hardly had England and Holland become conscious of their strength than we find both powers in the East Indies, on the west coast of America, in short, wherever it was possible to deprive the two older powers of the choicest products of their first and most valuable colonies. So early as 1595 Cornelis de Houtman (Vol. II, p. 453) sailed with four Dutch ships to Java and the neighbouring islands; he was followed shortly afterwards by the English and then by the Danes in 1616 (*ibid.* p. 454). When the Northwest European powers began to extend their encroachments beyond the limits of the Atlantic Ocean, this latter naturally ceased to be what it had been for a century past,—the main theatre of the naval war; not that it became any more peaceful during the next two centuries. On the contrary, the struggle which broke out amongst the victorious adversaries after the expulsion of the Portuguese and Spaniards from their dominant position were even more violent and enduring than those of earlier days. This conflict, too, was largely fought out in the Indian Ocean, but it was waged with no less ferocity on the Atlantic.

The great length of the two coast lines which confine the Atlantic Ocean, and

the general strength and growing capacity of the states of Northwest Europe, led to the result that, during the course of the last three centuries, repeated changes have taken place both in the locality and vigour of the struggle for the supremacy of this ocean, and also in the personality of the combatants. Among these latter we find Portugal and Spain long represented after their rapid decadence; in the first decades of the seventeenth century the Portuguese colonies on the coast of Upper Guinea fall quickly one after the other into the hands of the Dutch (Elima conquered 1537); in 1642 Brazil fell into the hands of Holland, after eighteen years' struggle, though nineteen years later, in 1661, it was restored to Portugal for an indemnity of eight million guildens; in 1651 the Dutch seized and held for one hundred and fifteen years the important position of the Cape of Good Hope (see the map facing page 389). In the West Indies the division of the Spanish possessions began from 1621 with the foundation of the Dutch West Indian Company, that "band of pirates on the lookout for shares;" in the course of the next ten years the majority of the smaller Antilles were taken from their old Spanish owners. In 1655 Cromwell took possession of Jamaica. The rest of the larger Antilles remained Spanish for a considerably longer period; Hayti held out its eastern part until 1821, and Cuba and Porto Rico remained Spanish until 1898 (cf. above, p. 381).

The combatants in Northwest Europe are divided into groups according to their respective importance; on the one hand the three powers of England, Holland, and France, each of which has made enormous efforts to secure the supremacy of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and on the other hand Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, which pursued objects primarily commercial and on a smaller scale. Their efforts on the African coast (Vol. III, p. 490) are marks of the rising importance then generally attached to transoceanic enterprise, and form points of departure of more or less importance in the histories of the states concerned; but in the history of the Atlantic Ocean all of these are events of but temporary importance compared with the huge struggle between the other three powers.

(a) *The Importance of the Navigation Acts.* — The beginnings of this struggle as far as England and Holland are concerned go back to the foundation of the English East India Company; the first serious outbreak took place upon the promulgation of the Navigation Act by Oliver Cromwell on October 9, 1655 (cf. Vol. VII, pp. 98–100). Henceforward English history is largely the tale of repeated efforts to destroy the Dutch supremacy, at first in home waters, afterwards upon the Atlantic, lastly on the Indian Ocean. This policy produced the three great naval wars of 1652–1654, 1664–1667, and 1672–1674, which, without resulting in decisive victory for the English, left them free to proceed with the second portion of their task, the overthrow of French sea power and the acquisition of predominance in the commerce of the world. Judged by the prize at stake, this struggle must rank among the greatest of modern times. It began in 1688, when Louis XIV opened his third war of aggression; it continued with some cessations of hostilities until the Congress of Vienna (1815). The struggle was carried on at many points. A land war in India (1740–1760) decided the future of the Indian Ocean. The contest to secure communications with that ocean was fought out in Egypt (1798–1801) and at the Cape (1806); but the main conflicts were waged on the seaboard of the Atlantic or on its waters. Supremacy in the Atlantic meant supremacy in

the world until the age of steam began and the Suez Canal opened a new route to the Further East.

Some events which are otherwise of secondary importance deserve notice because they prove how much the current estimate of the Atlantic's importance changed in the course of the struggle. Tangier came into the hands of England in 1662 as the dowry of Catharine of Braganza, the queen of Charles II; it was given up in 1684 on the ground that it cost more than it brought in. Twenty years later English opinion as to the value of Tangier had been materially modified; and Gibraltar, on the opposite shore, was seized in 1704. Since then England has never relaxed her hold upon this fortress; it has been repeatedly strengthened and defended under the greatest difficulties. Were Tangier an English possession to-day, English it would certainly remain, even though it were to cost infinitely more than the yearly vote of £40,000 which England has expended on Gibraltar for the last two centuries. Equally significant is the attitude of England towards the solitary isle of St. Helena. The Portuguese, by whom it was discovered in 1502, were content to found a little church on the island; the Dutch noticed St. Helena so far as to destroy the church in 1600. But the East India Company, upon acquiring it in 1650, recognised its importance by establishing upon it the Fort of St. James. The island, however, was not appreciated at its full value until the English supremacy in the Indian Ocean and Australia had been founded; that is, not before the beginning of the eighteenth century. The taking over of St. Helena by the English government in 1815 was the logical sequel to the occupation of the Cape. Both of these new possessions were intended to serve as calling stations on the main line of ocean traffic. It was not until the opening of the Suez Canal that this line declined in importance. The main route now runs from Gibraltar, by Malta and Cyprus, to Egypt, Perim, and Aden.

(b) *The Importance of the Declaration of Independence.* — The eastern part of the Atlantic has served, like the Indian Ocean, as an anteroom to the Pacific. The first explorers of the Atlantic, and those powers which first seized strategic points in it, had the Pacific for their ultimate object. The opening of the Suez Canal has taken away this characteristic of the Atlantic, which is now important for its own sake alone.

The political history of the Atlantic begins upon its western seaboard, though not so early as the history of exploration might lead us to expect. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of South and Central America a vicious system of government acted as a bar to political and economic development. In the French and English colonies of North America progress was slow, owing to the existence of serious physical obstacles. Independent development began in the American continent with the Declaration of Independence.

The American War of Independence marks from yet another point of view a turning-point in the history of the Atlantic Ocean. After the Convention of Tordesillas (p. 401), Spain had ruled supreme in the Atlantic, and had almost put her authority in a position above the possibility of challenge when she attempted to use Holland as a base for attacking England, the second of her rivals as an instrument for the destruction of the first. The treaty of Paris (1763) gave England a similar position of predominance in the North Atlantic, since it definitely excluded the French from North America and left their navy in a shattered condition. The

treaty created a *mare clausum* on a great scale and for the last time; under it England for the first time realised the object towards which her policy had been directed for the last two hundred years. This situation, the most remarkable which the Atlantic had witnessed since the days of Columbus, lasted for over thirteen years. It was not at once destroyed by the Declaration of Independence (1776), but the growth of the United States introduced a change into the existing conditions. England's position was altered for the worse; and the North Atlantic began to play a new part in the history of the world. Hitherto there had been a movement from east to west; this was now reversed by slow degrees. Europe had acted upon America; America began at the commencement of the nineteenth century to react upon Europe; and now, at the commencement of the twentieth century, America has become a factor, sometimes a disturbing and unwelcome factor, in European complications.

(c) *Importance of the Wars of Coalition.* — The American War of Independence was a chapter in the conflict for colonial and commercial power between England and France. The United States were largely indebted to French support for their victory. The desire to obliterate the humiliation of the treaty of Paris and to avenge the loss of vast tracts of territory in America and India had proved too much for the French. Their interference was repaid with interest by the English; for a long period the French marine was swept from the seas; for a considerable portion of the nineteenth century England monopolised the seas of the whole world. Next to the period of Atlantic supremacy from 1763 to 1776, that which followed the peace of 1815 is the most brilliant in the "rough island story" of the English. Geographical conditions were favourable to them. But they also showed a quality which few nations have possessed, — the power of not only recognising, but also of securing, their true interests.

Only in recent times have the real principles which actuated England in the wars against the Revolution and Napoleon received general recognition. Yet Goethe's fine historical sense detected the truth; he thought that the most useful lesson which he had learned from Walter Scott's "Life of Napoleon" was the truth that England had never intervened except in the interests of England. It was long supposed that in the period 1795–1815 England had acted as the champion of European liberty, as a deliverer from the aggressive tyranny of France. All, indeed, could see that England's treatment of Holland was governed by selfish motives; that the union of Holland and France in 1795 was the pretext and not the true reason for the destruction of the Dutch mercantile and fishing fleet, and for the seizure of the Dutch colonies between 1795 and 1801. The general war furnished a convenient occasion for destroying an old rival which was still active and dangerous. Nor was it difficult to see that England intended to nip French sea power in the bud. But the ordinary European mind was too much dazzled by the personality of Napoleon to scrutinise his great opponents coolly and dispassionately. It was enough for England's allies to know that her primary object was the overthrow of the Corsican usurper. What her ulterior motives might be, they neither knew nor cared; she was free, so far as they were concerned, to suppress the development of continental commerce, to secure what colonies still remained to the Dutch, to capture the fleets of war still remaining in Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Holland. They regarded with equanimity the maritime supremacy which the

English were found to have gained after completing a period of twenty years of "self-sacrifice."

C. THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AFTER THE NAPOLEONIC WARS

WITH the two conventions of peace concluded at Paris on May 30, 1814, and November 20, or with the closing act of the Vienna Congress of the 9th of June, 1815, the Atlantic Ocean commences a new period of its historical importance. In those conventions England had certainly condescended to return to their former masters some portion of the colonial plunder that she had gained during the last twenty years. These concessions were, however, of very little importance compared with the extent and the economic and strategical value of that increase to which the island kingdom could point on and upon the Atlantic Ocean alone. Even at that time these concessions were more than counterbalanced by England's retention of the Cape, and the claims which such a position implied to the whole of South Africa. Tobago and Santa Lucia in the West Indies, Guiana in South America were to be considered, under these circumstances, as accessions all the more welcome to England. These possessions could not compensate for the irrevocable loss of the North American colonies, but they implied an increase in the area of operations from which she could contentedly behold the development of the strong and independent life in the New World. The rocky island of Heligoland, which had been united to England in 1814 for seventy-six years, narrow as it was, was only too well placed to dominate commercially and strategically both the Skagerrack and particularly the mouths of the Weser and Elbe; it gave England the position, so to speak, of guardian over the slow growth of Germany and the no less slow recovery of Denmark.

England's maritime predominance after the conclusion of the great European wars was so strong, and the transmarine relations into which she had entered in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also so numerous, that this energetic nation could not fail to draw the fullest possible advantage in every quarter of the world from the position which she occupied at the moment. The period of England's unlimited predominance in the Atlantic Ocean, which she had gained at some cost to her own strength by the wars against France (1755-1763), had been too short for the completion of those transmarine objects which she had in view; but after 1815 England alone of all the powers found herself not only at the height of her strength, but had also the additional advantage of being able to avail herself of a longer period of time to strengthen her position in other respects precisely as she pleased. Then it was that England extended her Indian colonial empire in every direction, founded an equally valuable sphere of rule in Australia, and established herself in South Africa and on the most important points along the Indian Ocean (cf. Vols. II and III). In view of these undertakings, which claimed the whole of her attention, England had but little energy to spare during this period for the Atlantic Ocean. The occupation of the Falkland Islands to secure the passage of the Straits of Magellan in 1833, the occupation of Lagos as the obvious exit from the Sudân district of Central Africa in the year 1861, and finally the beginning of the further development of a limited trade on several other points on the west coast of Africa, — these were at that time the only manifestations of British activity on the Atlantic shores.

(a) *The West Coast.* — The increase in the value of the Atlantic Ocean to the nations of the world at large only began with the coincidence of a large number of new events. Of these the earliest is the surprisingly rapid growth of steam power for the purpose of transatlantic navigation. Not only were the two shores of the ocean brought considerably nearer for the purpose of commercial exchange than was ever possible with the old sailing-vessels, but passenger traffic was also largely increased; emigration from Europe to the New World on the scale on which it has been carried out since 1840 was only possible with the help of steam traffic.

The European powers of the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century have not yet fully realised the importance, either from an economic or political point of view, of the emigration to the United States, a phenomenon remarkable not only for its extent but for the unanimity of its object; yet the states thereby chiefly affected had already drawn general attention to the fact. This process of emigration and its results only forced themselves upon the general notice upon either side of the ocean after the youthful constitution of the United States of North America had coalesced into a permanent body politic and had developed a new race, the Yankee, by a fusion, unique in the history of humanity, of that growing population which streamed to it from every country of the world, and, finally, when this new nation had applied its energies to the exploitation of the enormous wealth of natural riches in its broad territory.

This highly important point of time was reached considerably earlier than any human foresight could have supposed, owing to the unexampled rapidity of the development of the United States; and its importance holds good not only for the Atlantic Ocean, but for the habitable globe. So early as 1812 the United States, when scarcely out of their childhood, had declared war upon the mighty maritime power of England, for reasons of commercial politics (cf. Vol. I, p. 461 ff.); in consequence, the United States seceded somewhat ingloriously, and paid for its first attempt at transoceanic aggression by confining itself to its own internal affairs for a long period; in particular, the proclamation of the Monroe doctrine on September 2, 1823 (cf. Vol. I, p. 537), is to be considered as a political act materially affecting the Atlantic Ocean. As a matter of fact, the doctrine still remains in full force notwithstanding the selfish demands of France upon Mexico in 1861 (Vol. I, p. 521), and certain views apparently entertained by England and Germany with regard to South America, as the American press affirmed, during the disturbances concerning Venezuela (p. 364). To this sense of their own military and naval insufficiency is chiefly to be ascribed the fact that the transmarine efforts of the United States were applied first of all to the Pacific Ocean which is turned away from Europe, although the European side still forms their historical coast. Between 1870 and 1880 America secured her influence in Hawaii (Vol. II, p. 319), while at the same time she succeeded in establishing herself in Samoa (ibid. p. 324). It was not until she advanced to the position of a leading state in respect of population and resources that she ventured any similar steps upon the Atlantic side, and even then her attacks were directed only against the Spaniards, who had grown old and weak.

The war of 1898 (p. 381) was the first great transmarine effort on the part of the United States. By their action at that time they openly broke with their former tradition of self-confinement to their own territory; for that reason above

all others the United States have become a factor in the politics of the rest of the world, not on account of the military capacity which they then displayed: any European power could have done as much either by land or sea. Far more important to European civilization than their military development is the economic development of North America, which has advanced almost in geometrical progression. The immediate consequence of that development has been that home production not only suffices for the personal needs of the United States, but has introduced a formidable and increasing competition with European wares in Asia, Africa, and the South Seas, or has even beaten them on their own ground; moreover, the enormous abundance of economic advantages has transformed the previous character of transatlantic navigation materially to the advantage of the United States. It is hardly likely that the bewildering number of transatlantic lines of steam and sailing ships will in any way diminish (see the map facing this page, "International Communication"), in the face of the North American trust which was carried out in 1902. But American control over English transatlantic lines and certain continental lines most certainly implies a weakening of European predominance. Henceforward the Atlantic Ocean loses its old character and becomes a great Mediterranean Sea. The teaching of history shows us that its further development is likely to proceed in this direction; so much is plain from the development of circumstances on either side of the Atlantic. Our European Mediterranean and Baltic are not, perhaps, entirely parallel cases, owing to their comparatively smaller area; yet the history which has been worked out upon their respective shores is in its main features nearly identical. Whether we consider the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, the Ionic Greeks, or the modern French on the shores of the Mediterranean, or turn our attention to the Hanse towns or the Swedes upon the Baltic, the result is the same; first of all, we find tentative efforts at occupation of the opposite shores. Phœnicia occupies Carthage; Greece colonises Asia Minor; France, Algiers and Tunis; and Sweden, Finland and Esthonia. In this way permanent lines of communication are slowly developed, though the mother country for a long period remains the only base. Independent commercial and individual life on the part of the colony only appears as a third step. Both the Carthaginians and the Greeks of Asia Minor surpassed their mother countries both in the extent and organisation of their economic development and the boldness with which they carried it out.

Applying these conclusions to the Atlantic Ocean, the prospects before the Old World seem somewhat doubtful; even to-day many an individual might find good reason for characterising the once boundless ocean as a future *mare clausum*, access to which is to depend upon Yankee favour. In any case, the times when the European powers could rightly regard the Atlantic Ocean as their special domain by right of inheritance are past for ever. Probably after the opening of the Central American Canal, the Pacific Ocean and the countries upon its shores will become more prominent than hitherto (Vol. I, p. 582); however, the general direction of American life will remain as before, directed towards Europe and the Atlantic Ocean.

The reasons for this are both historical and geographical. Historically speaking, the closest national and political relations conjoin both shores of the Atlantic Ocean. It is true that, when viewed in the light of the rapid growth of modern life, the dates of the foundation of the South and North American colonies appear

considerably remote. None the less Brazil at the present day considers herself a daughter of Portugal, and the united provinces of Canada recognise their origin upon this side of the Atlantic. In his dissertation, "The Sea as a Source of National Greatness" (1900), Friedrich Ratzel shows that these old ties of relationship tend to reappear with renewed force. In the financial year 1890-1891 two and four-tenths per cent of the United States imports went through New Orleans, six per cent through San Francisco, but no less than eighty-one and five-tenths per cent through the great harbours of the Atlantic coast. Moreover, notwithstanding the rapid development of the west, the most populous and the most commercially powerful colonies and states of North America are to be found on the Atlantic coast; the great towns, the most important centres of political and intellectual life, are also situated upon the shores that look towards Europe.

The indissoluble character of these historical relations is reflected almost identically in the geographical conditions. To a modern steamship even the great breadth of the Pacific is but a comparative trifle, and this means of rapid communication is proportionately a more powerful influence in the narrower seas. It was not until steam navigation had been developed that the full extent of the Indian and Pacific Oceans was explored. In the case of the Atlantic the date of exploration is much more remote, but this ocean has profited to an infinitely greater extent than the two former by the new means of communication. The advantage of friendly shores lying beyond its harbours favoured extensive sailing voyages ever since 1492, and this advantage naturally exists in increased extent for steam navigation. The general shortness of the lines of passage is more than a mere geographical phenomenon. Politically and economically, it brings the countries and continents into closer relation. England and North America are not only more closely related anthropologically and ethnographically, but at the present day they carry on a larger interchange of commercial products than any other two countries. Improved communication between the harbours of these two countries is certainly not the ultimate cause of the two phenomena above mentioned.

(b) *The Eastern Coast.* — Upon the west of the Atlantic Ocean the achievements of technical skill in steam navigation, together with the political and economic advance of the United States, has increased the importance of this sea to an unforeseen extent; so, too, upon the east the achievement of connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea, and the political progress implied in the rise of the German Empire, have led to the same result. To the southern part of the ocean as a whole the opening of the Suez Canal implied at first some loss; since 1870 the old lines of steamship traffic from Europe to India and the Pacific, by way of the Cape, have been deserted; sailing lines carrying heavy cargo to the south and eastern shores of Asia and the steamship lines bringing Europe into direct communication with the west coast of Africa have remained. Notwithstanding the rise of a commercial movement from west to east and a consequent lessening of the importance of the eastern ocean, the Suez Canal may in a certain sense be regarded as the primary cause of the greater value which has been recently attached to the eastern Atlantic Ocean and its shores. The opening of this canal (of no use to sailing-ships) through the old isthmus at the end of the Red Sea was certainly not the first and only cause of the remarkable sudden rise in oceanic communication, which is a feature as distinctive of the years 1870 to 1880, as is the decay in com-

munication by sail that then began ; this advance in transoceanic communication is much rather to be ascribed to progress in the art of naval construction. The fact, however, remains that since that period the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which had formerly been unknown to the maritime nations of Europe, with the exception of peoples like the English and the Dutch, who had sailed on them for nearly three centuries, have now been thrown open to the maritime world at large ; these powers required but a very mild stimulus to become aspirants for colonial possessions instead of desiring merely commercial activity.

This impulse is now visible as an influence affecting every district of the world that still awaits division, and it was Germany that performed the historical service of giving it ; we refer not to the old "geographical idea," but to the modern united empire of Germany, which has realised the necessity of making strenuous efforts if it is not to go unprovided for in the general division of the world. All the old and new colonial powers at once gathered to share in the process of division, so far as it affected the islands and surrounding countries of the two eastern oceans, — a fact that proves the importance of the new line of communication which had immediately given an increased value to the districts in question. These attractions were nowhere existent in the case of the west coast of the Dark Continent, which has only recently been opened, and perhaps not yet entirely to commerce ; they would, no doubt, have remained unperceived even yet had it not been for the surprising rapidity with which Germany established herself on different points of the long shore and thereby attracted the attention of others to that locality. So quickly did the value of the continent rise that in the short space of a year not a foot of the sandy shore remained unclaimed. Since that date, almost the whole of the interior of Africa, which had remained untouched for four centuries, has been divided among the representatives of modern world policy. Owing to the massive configuration and primeval character of the district, the greater portion of its history has so far been worked out within the continent itself behind its sandhills and mangrove forests ; at the same time, this discovery of modern politics, which in our own day implies an immediate commercial development, has again made the adjoining area of the Atlantic Ocean a prominent factor in the great struggle for the commerce of the world, more prominent, indeed, than could have been imagined two decades previously. The ocean, though it has ceased to provide a path for commerce from west to east upon a large scale, has become a path for commercial intercourse from south to north of no unimportant character.

4. RETROSPECT

THE examination of the general historic importance of the Pacific and Indian Oceans implied the examination of vast periods of history. The complexity of the conditions prevailing upon the Pacific Ocean made it necessary for us to devote attention to an area of enormous breadth. For the Atlantic Ocean the case in both respects is different ; chronological and local contraction is the main feature of its history. It was not, like the Pacific, ~~an~~ assistance to racial formation or to the fusions and interchanges of nationalities that took place on the east and north of the Indian Ocean ; until modern times it remained as a gap in the habitable world. It appears, it is true, thousands of years previously within the limits of well-attested

history, but as an area hardly sailed upon, illimitable and dreaded, its breadth almost bare of islands, early peopled with fantastic imaginings, the growing number and popularity of which plainly show the sentiment attached to it for many hundreds of years.

The conquest of the ocean was successfully carried out for the first time at a point where geographical configuration favoured the passage, while also demanding that maritime capacity which can only be acquired in a hard school of training. Such a school was provided for nearly a century by the Northern Atlantic Ocean for those nations who were forced to stand aside even after the discovery of the New World, and the clear delineation of its hydrographical conditions, by two enthusiastic and highly favoured nations of the south, had greatly increased the sphere of influence of the white races. In the event neither enthusiasm nor good fortune proved decisive for the attainment of success in this labour; the honour due to the final conquerors of the Atlantic Ocean and the sea in general belongs chiefly to the English nation, which, after its training in the Arctic school, made self-interest the leading motive of enterprise in every case.

The predominance over the Atlantic Ocean which this nation has rapidly acquired can no more be maintained at the present day than its domination over any other sea. Such an attempt is impossible in consequence of the modern development of other great powers on the sea as well as on land, and also because of the ominous neighbourhood of the United States. The recent American enterprises beyond the sea, based as they are upon a brilliant course of development, have deprived the Atlantic Ocean of its Old World character as a boundary sea or *oceanus*; at the present day it is a Mediterranean dividing the two worlds. In the Old World, the narrow area of the European-African Mediterranean once gathered the material and intellectual wealth of antiquity upon its shores, and became the nurse of widely differentiated civilizations; so at the present day the Atlantic Ocean, especially on its northern shores, has become the intermediary of our civilization, which embraces the world. This ocean is now the permanent means of communication between the two great centres of civilization, and the promoter of every advance in culture. We ask whether this, its character, is to be permanent? The value of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, of the Baltic and Mediterranean, to humanity in the past can be traced without difficulty, while their value at the present moment is clearly apparent, but what their influence will be upon humanity hereafter, how their relations may be adjusted with the Atlantic Ocean, their latest and most successful rival, only time can show.

I N D E X

INDEX

- ABBA GARIMA**, 383
Abbas II, Hilmi, viceroy of Egypt, 376
Abd-el-Kader, 176
Abdul Hamid II, 380
Abdul Medjid, 244
Abdullahi, Khalifa, 376
Abeken, Heinrich, 331, 332
Abel, Karl von, 181
Aboukir, 29, 42
Aboukir, bay of, 28, 29
Abrantès, duke of. See **JUNOT**, 49
Abyssinia, 321-323, 383
Acarua, 153
Addington, Henry, viscount Sidmouth, 34, 38, 95
Adelaide, Madame, 129
Adolph, grand duke of Luxembourg, duke of Nassau, 309, 387
Adrianople, Peace of, 128
Affre, Denis Auguste, 214
Afghanistan, 93
Africa, East: German, 364
Africa, South, 375, 376
Africa, Southwest, German, 364
Agnozzi, G. B., 384
Agricola, Cnaeus Julius, 395
Aguinaldo, Emilio, 382
Aix, 23
Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 85, 107, 108
Ajaccio, 24, 25
Albani, cardinal, 149
Albanians, 154
Albert, archduke of Austria, 183, 196, 303, 328
Albert, prince of Prussia, 372
Albert I, king of Saxony, 315, 339, 340, 370, 372
Albert, prince-consort, 280
Albrecht, Wilhelm Ed., 151
Alessandria, 32
Alexander, prince of Hesse, 303
Alexander, crown prince of the Netherlands, 387
Alexander I, czar of Russia, 33-34, 37, 41, 42, 46-48, 51, 53, 55-61, 66-67, 69-71, 73, 75, 78, 81, 86, 87, 95, 107, 109, 117, 126, 135, 147, 167
Alexander II, czar of Russia, 246, 247, 272, 312, 314, 342
Alexandria, 28, 30, 376
Alferi, Vittorio, 170
Alfonso XII, king of Spain, 381
Alfonso XIII, king of Spain, 381
Algiers, 49, 130, 176
Ali Pasha of Janina, 119
"Alliance of the four kings," 231
Alma, battle of, 245
Alps, Maritime, 77
Alsace, 9, 84, 305, 337, 342, 353
Alsace-Lorraine, 371, 372, 380
Altenstein, Karl zum, 54, 99, 102, 103, 157
Alvensleben, Constantin von, 339
Alvensleben, Gustav von, 340
Amadeus, king of Spain, 380
America, 399-411
American Revolution, 406, 407
Americans, 409
Amiens, 33, 348
Ancients, council of, 24
Ancillon, J. P. Friedrich, 101, 109
Anckarström, 14
Ancona, 26, 196, 382
Andrassy, Julius, 318, 319
Anethan, J. J. d', 385
Angoulême, duchess of, 78, 138
Angoulême, duke of, 69, 122, 123, 131, 140, 142, 170
Anhalt-Dessau, 59
Anhalt-Köthen, 113
Annobom, Island of, 381
Ansbach, 42
Anselme, 16
Anstett, Johann Profasius von, 62
Anti-Semitism, 144
Antillia, Island of, 396
Anton, archduke of Austria, 42
Anton, prince of Hohenzollern, 274
Anton, king of Saxony, 105, 152
Antonelli, Giacomo, 271, 327
Antraigues, Emmanuel L. H. de Launey de, 6
Antwerp, 65, 67
Aquila, count of. See **LOUIS**, count of Aquila
Arabi Pasha, 376
Arad, 205
Arago, Dominique François, 214
Arago, Étienne, 129
Aragon, 6
Arakcheieff, 109
Aranda, Pedro Abarca y Bolea, 48
"Arcadians" 313
Arcis-sur-Aube, 69
Arenburg, House of, 103
Armenia, 127
Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 45, 57, 107, 111, 112, 113, 256
Arnim, Achim von, 89, 91
Arnim, Heinrich Alexander von, 185
Arnim-Boitzenburg, Adolf Heinrich von, 173
Arnoldi, Wilhelm, 157
Arras, 15
Arysch, El, 29
Aschaffenburg, 81, 303
Aspern-Essling, 52
Aspromonte, battle of, 271
Assab, 383
Astor, J. J., 382
Athens, 126
Atlantic Ocean, 388-413
"Atlantis" 393, 395
Auber, D. F. E., 145
Auersperg, Adolph, 373
Auersperg, Carlos, 320
Auersperg, Karl Joseph von, 204
Auerstadt, 45
Auerswald, Alfred von, 175, 185
Auerswald, Hans Adolf Erdmann von, 224, 225
Augereau, Pierre François, 69, 71, 77
Augusta, electress of Hesse, 151
Augustenburg, House of, 208, 287
Augustus, prince of Arenberg, 9, 55
Augustus, prince of Wurtemberg, 299, 339
Aumale, duke of, 176
Aurette de Paladines, L. J. B. d', 347
Austerlitz, 41-44, 47
Australia, 408
Austria, 14, 17, 22, 26, 27, 29, 32, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 51-53, 56, 58, 61-63, 68, 71-77, 79-81, 84, 85, 96-98, 136, 162, 166-168, 182-184, 188-207, 226-227, 237-238, 241, 247-254, 284-292, 294, 295, 299, 303,

- 304, 313, 318, 320, 321, 325,
326, 328, 329, 335, 343, 347,
373-375, 383
Austria-Hungary. See AUSTRIA
and see Hungary
Austro-Prussian War, 292-305
Autun, 12
Auxonne, 25, 39
Avignon, 25, 26, 59, 76, 87
Azeglio, Massimo d', 258
Azores, 76
- BAADER, FR. X. VON, 87
Babeuf, 27
Bach, Alexander, 199, 203, 237
Bacska, district of, 201
Badajoz, 33, 65
Baden, 26, 37, 42, 43, 80, 103,
110, 152, 181, 189, 229, 305,
312, 314, 315, 317, 328, 370,
371
Baden Palatinate, 103, 107
Badeni, Kasimir Felix, 373, 374
Bagration, Peter, 42, 57
Bailly, 8, 13
Bakunin, Michael, 211
Balaclava, battle of, 245
Balho, Cesare, 258
Balboa, Nuñez de, 399
Balkan states, 47, 144
Baltic Sea, 330, 392, 397, 401,
404
Bamberger, Leopold, 350
Bapaume, 349
Bar-sur-Aube, 69
Baratieri, Oreste, 383
Barbary States, 29, 34, 95
Barbès, Armand, 129, 177
Barclay de Tolly, Michael, 61
Barère, 17, 18, 20, 21
Barnave, 9
Barras, Jean François, 18, 22, 25,
29, 30, 31, 74
Barrot, Odilon, 128, 178, 179,
215, 216
Bartenstein, 46
Barthélemy, François de, 27
Bas, Karl du, 153
Basel-Land, 384
Basle, 23
Basques, 169
Basques, Roads of, 84
Bastille, the, 8
Batavian Republic. See
NETHERLANDS
Batthyány, Ludwig, 184, 201,
202, 203
Bautzen, battle of, 61
Bavaria, 17, 22, 29, 32-34, 37, 42,
43, 53, 62, 75, 76, 80, 81, 106,
110, 156, 181, 292, 293, 295,
305, 312, 315, 317, 334, 351,
356
Bavarian Palatinate, 152
Bay, Nikolaus, 284, 285
Baylen, 50
Bayonne, 49, 62, 69
Bazaine, 313, 336, 338-340, 343,
346
- Beaconsfield, lord, 321, 322
Beaucaire, 25
Beauharnais, Eugène de, 41, 49,
59, 60, 65, 68, 79, 80, 170
Beauharnais, Hortense de, 74, 84
Bebel, August, 310, 361
Beck, Friedrich von, 300
Becker, Nikolaus, 166
Beckerath, Hermann von, 175,
223
Belcredi, Richard, 291, 319
Belfort, 352
Belgium, 6, 14, 16, 17, 22, 27, 30,
35, 82, 84, 138, 145, 146, 260,
312, 325, 385-386
Bell, Henry, 93
Bellegarde, Henri de, 65
Bem, Joseph, 206
Benedek, Ludwig von, 252, 296-
303
Benedetti, Vincent, 265, 302,
305, 312, 331-334
Bennigsen, Levin August Theo-
phil, 46, 47
Bennigsen, Rudolf von, 275, 311,
312, 368
Benningsen. See BENNIGSEN
Bentham, Jeremy, 74
Bentinck, Lord William Charles
Cavendish, 68, 116
Benzenberg, Johann Friedrich,
113
Béranger, Pierre Jean de, 73, 74,
85, 128, 137
Beresford, William Carr, 69, 115
Bereszowski, Anton, 314
Berg, grand duchy of, 65
Berlin, 22, 42, 56, 59, 62, 64, 70
Bernadotte. See CHARLES XIV,
JOHN, king of Sweden and
Norway
Berne, 28, 384
Bernhard, duke of Saxe-Meinin-
gen, 308
Bernstein, Eduard, 363
Bernstorff, Albrecht von, 280
Bernstorff, Gunther von, 117
122
Berry, duchess of, 142
Berry, duke of 69, 78, 84, 110
Berryer, Pierre Antoine, 130
Berthier, Alexandre Pierre, 28,
32, 72
Bertrand, Henri Gratien, 46, 63
Beseler, Wilhelm Hartwig, 210
Bessarabia, 56
Bessières, George, 122
Beugnot, Jacques Claude, 73
Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand, 231,
312, 314, 318, 319-321, 325,
326, 335, 343
Beyer, Gustav Friedrich von, 296
Beyers, 377
Beyme, Karl Friedrich, 103, 112
Bialolenku, battle of, 148
Bialystock, province of, 47
Bidassoa, 122
Bieberstein, Ernst von, 107
Biegeleben, Ludwig von, 290
- Bienvenida, 114
Bilbao, 169
Billaud-Varennes, 20, 21
Birmingham, 94
Bischofsheim, 303
Bismarck, 107, 235, 245, 248,
252, 253, 272, 274, 279, 281-
283, 290-295, 303-305, 307,
308, 310-314, 316, 317, 330-
332, 334, 341, 343, 344, 349-
351, 353-355, 360, 362, 363,
367, 371
Bismarck Archipelago, 364
Bissen, count, 52
Blacas, Pierre Louis Jean Casimir
de, 74, 77, 83
Black Sen, 246
Blanc, Louis, 178, 179, 214
Blanqui, Louis, 129, 177, 214
Blittersdorf, Fr. L. R. von, 186
Bloemfontein, 377
Blois, 70
Blücher, 60-63, 65-70, 82-84
Blum, Robert, 187, 205, 222
Blumenau, 304
Blumenthal, Leonhard von, 298,
300, 349
Bluntschli, Johann Kaspar, 173
Bocche di Cattaro, 47
Bodelschwing, Ernst von, 174
Bohemia, 52, 164, 292, 295-297,
320
Boisserée, Melchior, 91
Boisserée, Sulpice, 91
Boissy d'Anglas, François An-
toine de, 24, 25
Bologna, 26, 150, 196
Bonald, vicomte de, 92
Bonaparte, Carlo Maria, 24
Bonaparte, Caroline, 68
Bonaparte, Charlotte, 49
Bonaparte, Eliza, 41, 68
Bonaparte Jérôme, 39, 47, 48,
52, 55, 64, 82
Bonaparte, Joseph, 31, 39, 41,
43, 47, 49-51, 54, 55, 61, 68,
70, 82-84, 114
Bonaparte, Letitia, 24, 39, 72, 87
Bonaparte, Louis, 39, 41, 47, 54,
70
Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon. See
NAPOLEON III
Bonaparte, Lucien, 31, 33, 39, 73,
80, 82, 83, 84
Bonaparte, Napoleon Jeromc.
See NAPOLEON, prince
Bonaparte, Pauline, 38, 43, 72
Bonapartists, 137, 143, 343
Bonin, Adolf von, 298, 301
Bonin, Eduard von, 209, 276
Bonn, University of, 102
Bopp, Franz, 90
Bordeaux, 17, 69, 78, 218
Bordeaux, duke of. See CHAM-
BORD, count of
Bordone, Philippe Toussaint
Joseph, 348
Börne, Ludwig, 112, 153
Borodino, 57

- Borries, Otto, 284
 Borrosch, 204
 Bosco, general, 256
 Bosnia, 373
 Bossuet, 3
 Botha, Christian, 377
 Botha, Louis, 377
 Boulanger, 379, 380
 Boulogne, 38
 Bourbaki, Charles, 348, 352
 Bourbons, 13, 21, 39, 43, 49, 69, 70, 72, 74, 79, 86, 135-143
 Bourdaloue, 3
 Bourges, 19
 Bourges, Court of, 214
 Bourmont, Louis Auguste Victor, 130
 Bov, battle of, 209
 "Boxers," 365
 Boyen, Hermann von, 100, 101, 102, 112
 Brandan, St., 395, 396
 Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 225, 234
 Brandt, Heinrich von, 213
 Brauer, Arthur, 370
 Braun, Alexander Karl Hermann, 187
 Bray-Steinburg, Otto von, 329, 351
 Brazil, 49, 115, 123, 124, 396, 397, 401, 405, 411
 Bredow, Adalbert von, 339
 Breisgau, 103
 Bremen, 65, 105
 Brentano, Clemens, 89, 91
 Bresci, Gaetano, 383
 Brescia, 196
 Breslau, 59, 60
 Briganti, Fileno, 268
 Brissot, 13
 Bristol, 396
 Brittany, 3, 17, 27
 Brofferio, Angelo, 262
 Broglie, Achille Charles Léonce Victor de, 129, 177
 Broglie, Victor François de, 8
 Bronzell, 235
 Brougham, lord, 96
 Bruck, Karl Ludwig von, 98, 237, 238
 Bruhe, 190
 Brune, 28, 30, 87
 Brunn, 42
 Brunswick, 150, 163, 372
 Brussels, 22, 385
 Bubna, Ferdinand, general, 60, 61, 69
 Bucharest, 56, 119
 Bucher, Lothar, 330
 Buenos Aires, 123
 Buffet, Louis Joseph, 326
 Bugeaud, Thomas, 177
 Buller, Sir Redvers Henry, 377
 Bulow, Bernhard von, 355
 Bulow, Friederich Wilhelm von, 60-62, 64, 68
 Bulow, L. F. V. H. von, 100, 102, 165
 Bunsen, Christian Karl Josias von, 99, 157, 239, 241
 Buol-Schauenstein, Johann Rudolf von, 104
 Buol-Schauenstein, Karl Ferdinand, 244, 245, 246, 284
 Burgos, 50
 Burgundy, 9, 84
 Burmah, 93
 Burns, Robert, 91
 "Burschenschaft," 108
 Busaco, 65
 Buxhöwden, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 48
 Buxton, Thomas Howell, 93
 Buzenval, 352
 Byron, 125, 126
 Byzantine Empire, 28
 CABET, ÉTIENNE, 160, 214
 Cabot, Sebastian, 391
 Cabrera, Ramon, 169
 Cadiz, 50, 114, 123, 396
 Cadoudal, Georges, 38, 39
 Cæsar, Julius, 394
 Caillard, Léonce Albert, 380
 Cairo, 28, 29
 Calabria, 81
 Calatafimi, battle of, 267
 Calatrava, José Maria, 169
 Calderari, 116
 Calonne, Marquis de, 5
 Cambacères, Jean Jacques Régis de, 25, 31, 35, 36, 68
 Cambrai, proclamation of, 83
 Cameroons, 364
 Campbell, Neil, 76
 Camphausen, Ludolf, 175
 Camphausen, Otto, 317
 Campo Formio, 27, 40
 Canary Islands, 381, 394, 398
 Canning, George, 48, 108, 122, 125, 126, 127
 Canrobert, François Certain, 339
 Cape Colony, 93, 377
 Cape of Good Hope, 405, 408
 Cape São Vicente, battle of, 168
 Capodistrias, Augustine, 154
 Capodistrias, Joannes, 108, 112, 117, 120, 128, 154
 Caprivi, Leo von, 355, 356
 Caraman, Victor Louis de, 122
 Carbonari, 116, 146, 149, 171, 257
 Carignan, House of, 191
 Carinthia, 164
 Carlists, 241, 381
 Carlo, Luigi, 261
 Carlos, Don, 168, 169
 Carlos, Don, duke of Madrid, 381
 Carlotta, empress of Mexico, 313
 Carlsbad conferences, 88, 105, 110-114
 Carnegie, Andrew, 382
 Carnot, François Sadi, 379
 Carnot, Lazare Nicolas Marguerite, 20, 21, 25-27, 29, 36, 39, 65, 74, 83
 Caroline of Brunswick, 96, 125
 Caroline Islands, 364, 381
 Carra, Jean Louis, 6, 11
 Carrel, Armand, 178
 Carrier, 18
 Carthage, 38, 394
 Carthaginians, 393
 Casimir-Périer, J. P. P., 379
 Cassano, 30
 Cassel, 63, 64
 Castelar, Emilio, 381
 Castile, Old, 169
 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, 67, 75, 80, 93, 95, 108, 109, 121
 Catalonia, 169
 Catharine of Braganza, queen consort of Charles II, 406
 Catharine II, empress of Russia, 12, 22, 27
 Catholics, Germany, 358, 359, 360, 361
 Caulaincourt, Armand Augustin Louis, duke of Vicenza, 48, 61, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72
 Cavaignac, Louis Eugène, 214, 215, 219
 Cavendish, Sir Thomas, 404
 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 171, 249, 250, 253, 258, 260, 262, 263-266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 295, 382
 Cayenne, 27
 Central America, 406
 Central German Union, 163
 Cetewayo, 376
 Ceylon, 93
 Châlons, 338, 340
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 375-377
 Chambord, count of, 118, 132, 140, 142, 379
 Chamisso, Adelbert von, 91
 Champaubert, battle of, 68
 Champigny, 347
 Championnet, Jean Étienne, 29
 Chanzy, 352
 Changarnier, Nicolas A. T., 180, 219
 Chantelauze, Jean Claude Balthazar Victor de, 130
 Chanzy, Antoine Eugène Alfred, 348
 Chaptal, Jean Antoine, 43
 Charlemagne, 5, 44, 45, 49, 52, 397
 Charleroi, 83, 385
 Charles, archduke of Austria, 41, 50, 52, 98, 167
 Charles, grand duke of Baden, 107
 Charles, prince of Bavaria, 303
 Charles II, duke of Brunswick, 105, 150
 Charles II, king of England, 406
 Charles X, king of France, 8, 69, 73, 77, 84, 86, 124, 128, 129, 130, 131, 137-142, 158
 Charles, duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 100
 Charles I, king of Roumania, 272
 Charles III, king of Spain, 48

- Charles IV, king of Spain, 17, 33, 49
 Charles XIII, king of Sweden, 55
 Charles XIV, John, king of Sweden and Norway, 42, 55, 56, 60, 61, 63, 67
 Charles I, king of Wurtemberg, 314, 329, 334, 350, 370
 Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, 115, 118, 171, 192-195, 259
 Charles Alexander, grand duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, 372
 Charles Anton, prince of Hohen-zollern, 329, 330
 Charles Emmanuel IV, king of Sardinia, 29
 Charles Augustus, grand duke of Saxe-Weimar, 104, 108, 110
 Charles Felix, king of Sardinia, 115, 118
 Charles Louis Frederick, grand duke of Baden, 64, 80, 84
 Charles William Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick, 14, 15, 22
 Charlotte, princess of Great Britain, 96
 Charlotte, queen of Portugal, 123
 Charlottenburg, 45, 46
 Chartres, 6
 Chartres, duke of. See LOUIS PHILIPPE, king of the French
 Château-Thierry, battle of, 68
 Chateaubriand, François René de, 70, 71, 79, 91, 92, 122, 124, 128, 141
 Châteaudun, 346
 Châtillon, 68
 Chaumette, Pierre Gaspard, 19
 Chaumont, treaty of, 76, 79, 85, 88
 Chauvinist Party, 323
 Chelmsford, lord, 376
 Cherbourg, 5
 Chernysheff, Alexander, 63
 Chevandier de Valdrôme, Jean P. N. E., 326
 China, 364, 365
 Chios, 121
 Chlopicki, Joseph, 148
 Chlum, 301
 Chouans, the, 23, 32
 Christian, duke of Augustenburg, 208, 239, 287
 Christian VII, king of Denmark, 17, 33
 Christian VIII, king of Denmark, 208
 Christian IX, king of Denmark, 208, 239
 Christian August, duke of Augustenburg, 290
 Chrzanowski, Adalbert, 195
 Cialdini, Enrico, 269
 Cintra, 50
 Cisalpine Republic, 26-28, 36
 Cispadane Republic, 26
 Ciudad Rodrigo, 65
 Civita Vecchia, 217
 Clam-Gallas, Eduard von, 251, 297-299
 Clarke, Henri Jacques Guillaume. See FELTRE
 Clarkson, Thomas, 93
 Clary, Desirée, 60
 Clinchant, Justin, 353
 Clive, lord, 33
 Cloutz, Anacharsis, 11, 19
 Clotilde, princess, 250
 Cobbett, William, 95
 Cobenzl, Ludwig von, 32, 40, 41
 Coblenz, 15, 16, 67
 Coburg, prince of, 22
 Cockery, L., 331
 Code Napoleon, 35, 100
 Colæus, 394
 Colbert, 5
 Colley, Sir George, 376
 Collot d'Herbois, Jean Marie, 20
 Colmar, 371
 Cologne, 157
 Columbia, 123
 Columbus, 396, 398, 399, 401
 Commune, 378
 Conciergerie, the, 18
 Concordat, 1802, 34, 74
 Concordat, 1855, 320
 Condé, prince of, 4
 Confederation of the Rhine, 44, 45
 Congo, 386
 Conneau, Henri, 176
 Consalvi, cardinal, 34, 40, 85, 99, 116, 149, 156
 Constans, 379
 Constant, Benjamin, 74, 78, 79, 86, 90
 Constantin, Barthélemy Prosper, 150
 Constantine, grand duke of Russia, 70, 127, 147
 Constantinople, 47, 51
 Cook, James, 93
 Copenhagen, 48
 Coppet, 8
 Corday, Charlotte, 17
 Cordeliers Club, 11, 14, 15
 Corea, 364, 365
 Cormenin, Louis Marie, 31
 Cornelius, Peter, 91
 Cornwallis, Lord, 33
 Corsica, 24, 25
 Cosmas Indikopleustes, 395
 Cotta, Johann Friedrich von, 163
 Cottbus, 47
 Coulmiers, 347
 "Counts' Ministry," 291
 Couthon, 18, 20-22
 Cracow, 81, 149
 Craillsheim, 369
 Craonne, 69
 Crémer, Camille, 348
 Crémieux, Isak, 179, 345
 Crete, 126
 Crimean War, 243-247
 Crispi, Francesco, 266, 383
 Croatia, 201. 202. 211. 319
 Croats, 319
 Cromwell, Oliver, 405
 Cronje, Piet, 377
 Crouzat, Jean Constant, 347
 Cuba, 381, 405
 Culoz, 194
 Cuneo, 258
 Cusa, Alexander, 249, 272
 Custine, 4, 15
 "Customs Parliament," 316
 Customs union, German. See "ZOLLVEREIN"
 Custozza, battle of, 195, 302
 Czartoryski, Adam Georg, 42, 148
 Czechs, 188, 320
 Czersky, Johann, 157
 Czolgosz, Leon, 382
 DABORMIDA, GIUSEPPE, 261, 264
 Dahlmann, Friedrich Christoph, 90, 93, 112, 151, 222, 224, 228, 229
 Dahomey, 380
 Dalberg, Emeric Joseph, duke of, 77
 Dalberg, Karl Theodor von, 37, 44, 55, 64
 Dalwigk, Karl Friedrich Reinhard von, 350
 Damas, 124
 Damesne, Ed. Ad., 214
 Dandré, Antoine Balthasar Joseph, 74
 Danewerk, 289
 Danton, 11, 13, 15, 17-20
 Dantsic, 46, 47
 Danubian principalities, 51, 245
 Darboy, Georges, 335, 378
 Daru, Napoléon, 326, 327
 Dauphiné, 6
 David, Jacques Louis, 21
 Davoust, Louis Nicolas, 61, 62, 83, 84
 Davout. See DAVOUST
 Deák, Franz von, 168, 184, 201, 285, 318
 Debreczin, 206
 Decabrista, 127
 Decazes, Élie de, 87, 109, 110
 Declaration of Independence, 406, 407
 Delarey, 377
 Delbruck, Hans, 332
 Delbruck, Rudolf, 350, 368
 Delhi, 93
 Dembinski, Henryk, 148, 206, 207
 Denmark, 232, 286-289, 290
 Dennewitz, 32, 62, 67, 84, 408
 Depretis, Agostino, 268
 Derby, earl, 321
 Dershawin, Gawril R., 91
 Desancti, Luigi, 158
 Desèze, Romain, 16
 Desmoulins, Camille, 8, 11, 19, 20
 Dessoles, 109, 110
 Dewev. George, 381

- Dhamala, national assembly of, 127
 Diebitsch, Ivan, 128
 Diebitsch-Sabalkanski, Hans Karl, 58, 148
 Diedenhofen, 344
 Diest-Daber, Gustav von, 360
 Dijon, 348, 352
 Dino, duchess of, 70
 Disraeli, Benjamin. See BEACONSFIELD, LORD
 Doblhoff, Anton von, 199
 Doggenfeld, Anton Vetter von, 206
 Dohna, Alexander zu, 59
 Doll, 190
 Dollinger, Johann Joseph Ignaz, 222, 359
 Domen-Ferrata, papal nuncio, 385
 Donaueschingen, 190
 Donhoff, Sophie Juliane Friederike, 225
 Doria, Teodosio, 398
 Dossenbach, 190
 Douay, Abel, 337
 Drake, Sir Francis, 404
 Dresden, 56, 60, 61, 63
 Dresden conferences, 238
 Dreyfus, Alfred, 379
 Droste-Vischering, Klemens August von, 157
 Drouyn de l'Huys, Edouard, 216, 302, 305
 Drusus, 394
 Dubarry, countess, 21
 Duchâtel, Charles Marie Tanne-guy de, 178
 Duckwitz, Arnold, 223
 Ducos, Pierre Roger, 31
 Ducrot, 347
 Dufour, William Henry, 172
 Dumouriez, general, 14, 16, 17, 140
 Dunin, Martin von, 157
 Dunkirk, 17
 Dupauloup, Felix Antoine Phil-
 pert, 335
 Dupin, André M. J. J., the elder, 128
 Dupont, 19
 Dupont de l'Étang, Pierre, 50
 Düppel, battle of, 289
 Durando, Giacomo, 193, 194
 Duroc, Michel, 45
 Duruy, Victor, 323
 Dusch, Alexander, 371
 Dusseldorf, 26
 Dutch West Indian Co., 415
 Duyn, Van der, 65
 ECKERNFORDE, BATTLE OF, 209
 Ecole Normale, 323
 Edict of Nantes, 3
 Edward VII, king of England, 377, 378
 Eggmühl, prince of. See D'AVOUST
 Egypt, 28-30, 32, 33, 46, 86, 376
 Eichhorn, Joh. A. F., 241
 Eichhorn, Johann Friedrich, 113
 Eichhorn, Karl Friedrich, 89
 "Eider Danes," 208, 287
 Einbeck convention, 163
 Einsiedel, Detlev von, 105
 Eisenach, 296
 Elba, 33, 72, 76, 77
 Elchingen, duke of. See NEY
 Elizabeth, Madame, 14, 21
 Elizabeth, queen of England, 404
 Embabeh, 28
 Ems, 332
 Engel, Friedrich, 160
 Engels, Friedrich, 361
 Enghien, duke of, 38-40, 48
 England, 1, 4, 10, 12, 16, 17, 22, 28-29, 32, 33, 38, 40-49, 53, 56, 61, 62, 67, 77-80, 84, 85, 92-96, 125-126, 224, 243-246, 248, 321, 323, 334, 343, 347, 364, 375-378, 402-408, 411
 Entraigues, E. L. H. de Launey d'. See ANTRAIGUES, EMMANUEL L. H. DE LAUNEY D'
 Evos, Josef von, 184
 Epinal, 67
 Epirus, 153
 Erfurt, 34, 51, 55, 64, 71
 Ernest II, duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, 372
 Ernest III, duke of Saxe-Coburg, 17
 Ernest August, duke of Cumber-
 land, 308, 372
 Ernest August, king of Hanover, 151, 186
 Espartero, Baldomero, 169
 Esquimaux, 390
 Esterhazy, Moritz, 291
 Esterhazy, Paul, 184
 Etoges, battle of, 68
 Etruria, 48
 Ettenheim, 39
 Eudoxos of Cyzicus, 393
 Eugénie, empress of the French, 243, 333, 342, 346
 Eulenburg, Friedrich zu, 366
 Euthymenes, 393
 Ewald, Heinrich, 151
 Eylau, 46
 FABRICE, GEORG FRIEDRICH ALFRED VON, 315
 Faenza, 149
 Faidherbe, Louis Léon César, 348, 349
 Faillly, Pierre Louis Charles Achille de, general, 324, 340
 Falckenstein, Eduard Vogel von. See VOGEL VON FALCKENSTEIN
 Falk, Adalbert, 358, 360, 367
 Falkland Islands, 408
 Farini, Luigi, 263, 269
 Faroe Islands, 388
 Farre, Jean Joseph, 348
 Fashoda, 376, 380
 Faure, Félix, 379
 Favras, Marquis de, 11
 Favre, Jules, 342, 344, 354, 378
 Feltre, H. J. Clarke, duke of, 77, 78
 Fénelon, 3
 Fenians, 322
 Ferdinand I, emperor of Austria, 167, 183, 189, 199, 200, 205
 Ferdinand II, king of Naples, 266
 Ferdinand IV, king of Naples. See FERDINAND I, king of the Two Sicilies
 Ferdinand II, king of Portugal, 329
 Ferdinand I, king of the Two Sicilies, 17, 33, 116, 117
 Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, 49, 50, 62, 66, 91, 114, 121, 122, 169
 Ferdinand III, grand duke of Tuscany, 115
 Fernando Po, Island of, 381
 Ferrara, 26, 150, 171
 Ferretti, Mastai. See PIUS IX, pope
 Ferry, Jules, 380
 Fesch, Joseph, cardinal, 40, 53, 80
 Festetics, Thassilo, 301
 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 45, 108
 Fickler, Joseph, 190
 Ficschi, Joseph, 177
 Finck von Finckenstein, Rein-
 hold, 300
 Finkenstein, 46
 Finland, 47, 48
 Fiquelmont, Karl Ludwig, 199
 Fischhof, 204
 Five Hundred, council of, 24, 31
 Flahault, Aug. Ch., 219
 Flanders, 156
 Flavigny, 339
 Fléchier, 3
 Fleurus, 22
 Fleury, cardinal, 3
 Fleury, Emile Felix, 314
 Flies, von, general, 296
 Flushing, 67
 Follen, August Adolf Ludwig, 108
 Follen, Karl, 108
 Fontainebleau, 49, 59, 70, 72, 78
 Fontainebleau, edict of, 64
 Fontanes, Louis de, 71
 Forekenbeck, Max von, 309
 Forey, Élie Frédéric, 273
 Formosa, 364
 Forster, 8
 Foscolo, Ugo, 170
 Fouché, Joseph, 8, 21, 70, 74, 77-79, 83, 84, 87
 Fouqué, Friedrich Heinrich Karl de la Motte, 91
 Fouquier-Tinville, 20
 Fourichon, Martin, 345
 Fourier, Charles, 160
 Fouriesburg, 377
 Fox, Charles James, 38, 44
 France, 1-6, 9-74, 84-87, 109,

- 122, 128-132, 136-143, 165, 176-180, 213-220, 224, 242-247, 294, 302, 304, 313, 325, 326, 334, 336, 342, 343, 346, 354, 376, 378-380
- Francis I, emperor of Austria, 14, 15, 27, 32, 33, 40-42, 44-46, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 67-70, 75, 78, 81, 88, 96, 162, 167
- Francis IV, duke of Modena, 115, 149
- Francis II, king of the Two Sicilies, 266-268
- Francis Charles, archduke of Austria, 205
- Francis Joseph II, emperor of Austria, 205, 206, 227, 234, 235, 245, 251, 274, 275, 283, 291, 293, 297, 300, 302, 314, 317, 319, 320, 326, 328, 373
- Franco-German War, 328-354
- Franconia, 26, 44, 307
- Frankfort-on-Main, 15, 65, 104, 153, 186, 303, 305-307
- Frankfort-on-Main, conference of, 186
- Frankfort-on-Main, diet of, 1863. See GERMAN PRINCES, diet of, 1863
- Frankfort-on-Main, high federal council at, 182
- Frankfort-on-Main, revolt in, 224
- Frankfort Parliament, 220, 221, 227
- Franklin, Benjamin, 4
- Fransecky, Friedrich von, 301, 304
- Frederick, duke of Augustenburg, 287, 288, 290
- Frederick I, grand duke of Baden, 280, 314, 350, 352, 370
- Frederick VII, king of Denmark, 208, 240, 286
- Frederick III, German emperor, 280, 282, 291, 297, 298, 301, 336, 349, 350, 354, 355
- Frederick, prince of Netherlands, 145
- Frederick II, the Great, king of Prussia, 1, 42, 45
- Frederick I, king of Wurtemberg, 43, 56
- Frederick Augustus, duke of Nassau-Usingen, 80
- Frederick Augustus I, king of Saxony, 47, 59, 60, 63, 64, 75, 81, 105
- Frederick Augustus II, king of Saxony, 152, 186
- Frederick Charles, prince of Prussia, 297, 298, 299-301, 336, 340, 343, 346, 347
- Frederick Francis II, grand duke of Mecklenburg, 347, 372
- Frederick William I, elector of Hesse, 151, 186, 232, 283, 307, 308
- Frederick William, prince of Nassau-Weilburg, 80
- Frederick William II, king of Prussia, 13-15, 23, 27, 225
- Frederick William III, king of Prussia, 22, 27, 32, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45-47, 50, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, 66, 67, 70, 75, 80, 81, 88, 98-103, 108, 111, 146
- Frederick William IV, king of Prussia, 124, 164-166, 173-175, 188, 208, 223, 226, 228, 232-235, 241, 245, 248, 252
- Frederick William, crown prince. See FREDERICK III, German emperor
- Frederick William Charles, king of Wurtemberg, 80, 106
- Fredrikshamn, 48
- Free Conservative Party. See GERMAN EMPIRE PARTY
- Freemasons, 116
- Freiburg, 172
- Fréjus, 31, 72
- French Eastern Railway, 325
- Frère-Orban, Hubert Joseph, 325, 385
- Fréron, Louis Stanislas, 18, 23, 25
- Freycinet, Charles de, 345
- Freydorf, Rudolph von, 314
- Fridericia, battle of, 209
- Friedland, 47
- Friedrichsfeld, castle of, 64
- Friedrichstadt, 210
- Friesland, 64
- Frimont, Johann Maria, 118
- Frobel, Julius, 204, 205, 222
- Frossard, Charles August, 337
- Fuentes d'Onoro, 65
- Fulda, 64
- Furstenberg, princess of, 75
- GABLENZ, ANTON VON, 295, 298
- Gablenz, Ludwig von, 299
- Gaeta, 195, 270
- Gagern, Friedrich von, 190
- Gagern, Hans von, 76, 88
- Gagern, Heinrich von, 182, 186, 188, 221, 227, 229
- Gagern, Max von, 189, 209, 224
- Galicia, 60, 149, 273
- Galitzin, Alexander, 87
- Gallican Church, 3
- Gallifet, Gaston Auguste, marquis de, 341
- Gambetta, Léon, 343, 345-348, 353, 379
- Gans, Eduard, 89
- Garat, Dominique Joseph, 71
- Garfield, James Abram, 382
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 195, 196, 217, 251, 256, 258, 259, 263, 265-271, 304, 323, 348, 352
- Gärtner, von, 75
- Gastein, treaty of, 290, 291
- Gatshina, 80
- Gaudier, 35
- Geneva, 28, 37, 84
- Genoa, 26, 81, 397
- Genoa, duke of, 194
- Gentz, Friedrich von, 40, 44, 50, 88, 108, 111, 117, 162
- George III, king of England, 16, 27, 32, 69, 85, 95, 96
- George IV, king of England, 60, 96, 105, 125
- George V, king of Hanover, 239, 296, 306, 308
- George II, duke of Saxe-Meiningen, 308
- George, king of Saxony, 370
- Gerbet, Philippe Olympe, 129
- Gerlach, Ernst Ludwig von, 232, 241, 279
- German Empire Party, 309
- German Federation, 103-107, 161-166, 186-190, 221-235, 239-240, 273-274, 290, 295, 303
- German National Assembly, 221-235
- German parliament, 186-190
- German princes, diet of, 1863, 285, 286
- German Radical Party, 362, 363
- Germanicus, 394
- Germany, 17, 23, 25, 26, 32-34, 38, 42-45, 50-52, 58, 60, 64, 68, 76, 80, 83, 88-91, 98-108, 110-114, 124-125, 150-153, 161-166, 173-175, 181-182, 184-190, 207-210, 220-235, 238-241, 255-257, 273-283, 285-289, 292, 293, 295, 314-318, 329, 333, 334, 342, 354, 380-383, 408
- Gervinus, Georg Gottfried, 151
- Gessler, Ernst, 329
- Ghent, 78-80
- Giacopo, 270
- Gibraltar, 93, 406
- Gioberti, Vincenzo, 170, 250, 258
- Girard, Jean Baptiste, 62
- Gironde, 13, 14, 25
- Girondists, 13, 14, 16-18, 23
- Giskra, Karl, 222, 320
- Gitschin. See JITSCHIN
- Givet, 84
- Gladstone, 322
- Glais-Bizoin, Alexander, 345
- Glatz, 46
- Glumer, Adolf von, 348
- Gneisenau, August Wilhelm Anton Neithardt von, 66, 69, 70, 83, 101, 112
- Gneist, Rudolf, 311
- Gobel, bishop of Paris, 19
- Godoy, Manuel de, 17, 33, 48, 49
- Goeben, August Karl von, 296, 338, 348
- Goethe, 90, 91
- Gohier, Louis Jérôme, 31
- Goito, battle of, 193
- Golemischef-Kutusoff, Michael, 42, 57, 58, 60
- Goltz, Karl Friedrich von der, 338
- Goltz, Kolmar von der, 295, 302

- Goluchowski, count, 284, 285
 Gorczkowski, Karl von, 192
 Gordon, Charles George, 376
 Görgey, Arthur, 206
 Görres, Jakob Joseph von, 101, 103
 Gortchakoff, 342, 343, 347
 Götschen, Johann Friedrich Ludwig, 89
 Goslar, 81
 Gotha, 229
 Gottberg, general, 349
 Göttingen, 296
 Gourgaud, Gaspard, 85
 Gouvion St. Cyr, Laurent de, 38
 Govone, Giuseppe, 291
 Gramont, Antoine Agénor Alfred de, 273, 327, 331-333
 Graudenz, 46
 Grävell, Maximilian Karl Fr. Wh., 229
 Gravelotte, 339, 340
 Greece, 119-121, 126-128, 153-155
 Greenland, 388, 389, 391
 Grégoire, Henri, 19
 Gregory, patriarch of Constantinople, 120
 Gregory XVI, pope, 149, 159
 Grenoble, 77, 87
 Granville, lord, 32, 38, 44, 95
 Grévy, Jules, 379
 Grey, earl, 93
 Grillparzer, Franz, 97
 Grimm, Jacob, 89, 151
 Grimm, Wilhelm, 89, 151
 Grisons, 29
 Gröben, Charles von, 234
 Grochow, battle of, 148
 Grolman, Karl Wilhelm Georg, 112
 Grossbeeren, 62
 Grossgörschen (Lützen), 60
 Grouchy, 78, 82, 83
 Gruner, Justus, 101
 Grütli Verein, 384
 Guam, 382
 Guastalla, duchy of, 43, 72
 Gudden, Bernhard von, 369
 Gudrid, 389
 Guelph fund, 308, 372
 Guelph, House of, 104
 Guerrazzi, Francesco Domenico, 195
 Guiana, 33, 408
 Guiteau, Charles, 382
 Guizot, François Pierre Guilaume, 79, 128, 130, 177
 Günthersthal at Freiburg, 190
 Gustavus III, king of Sweden, 12, 14
 Gustavus IV, Adolphus, king of Sweden, 17, 33, 44, 48, 55
 Gyulay, Franz, 261
 HABEAS CORPUS ACT, 95
 Hageberg, 62
 Hagen, A. H. W., 279
 Hague, 65, 377
 Hague, treaty of, 22
 Halle, University of, 102
 Haller, Karl Ludwig von, 90, 91, 174
 Hambach castle, 153
 Hamburg, 39, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 105
 Hammacher, Friedrich, 309
 Hampden Club, 95
 Hanau, 64
 Hanau, princess of. See LEHMANN, GERTRUDE
 Hanno, 393
 Hanover, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 55, 76, 81, 104, 163, 186, 231, 239, 248, 295, 296, 305-308, 367
 "Hanoverian Legion," 306
 Hanoverians, 306
 Hanseatic towns, 104
 Hanseemann, David, 175, 185, 225
 Hapsburgs, 52, 226
 Hardeggs, H., 191
 Hardenberg, Karl August Theodor von, 46, 50, 54, 58, 59, 61, 63, 66, 75, 76, 100, 101, 103, 108, 112, 117, 124
 Hase, Karl August von, 358
 Hasner, Leopold von, 320
 Hasenpflug, Hans Daniel von, 151, 232, 233, 239
 Hastings, marquis, 93
 Hastings, Warren, 33
 Haugwitz, Christian Heinrich Karl, 23, 30, 42, 43, 45, 46
 Haussmann, Georges Eugène, 247
 Hawkins, Sir John, 404
 Haynau, J. J. von, 196, 206
 Hayti, 405
 Hébert, 16, 19-20
 Hecker, Friedrich, 181, 186, 187, 189, 190, 203, 230
 Heckscher, Moritz, 223
 Hefe, Karl Joseph von, 335
 Hegel, 102
 Heidelberg, 87, 186
 Heilbronn, 87
 Heilsberg, 47
 Hein, Franz, 222
 Heine, Heinrich, 153
 Heinrich, Georg, 102
 Heitersheim, 37
 Helène, queen of Italy, 383
 Heligoland, 67, 289, 408
 Helluland, 389
 Henikstein, Alfred von, 293, 297
 Hengstenberg, Ernst Wilhelm, 158, 241
 Henriette, duchess of Orléans. See ORLÉANS, duchess of
 Henriot, 21, 22
 Henry IV, king of France, 34
 Henry V, king of France. See CHAMBOARD, count of
 Henry, duke of Mecklenburg, 387
 Henry, the Navigator, 398
 Heppenheim, 181
 Herbet, Eduard, 320, 373
 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 90
 Hermes, George, 156
 Hermann, Emil, 367
 Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Karl Eberhard, 297
 Herwegh, Georg, 190
 Herzegovina, 373
 Herzog, Edward, 384
 Hesse, electorate, 25, 37, 104, 163, 186, 190, 232, 233, 239, 295, 305-307
 Hesse-Darmstadt, 42, 76, 80, 103, 152, 186, 189, 309, 312, 368, 372
 Hesse-Nassau, 367
 Heteria Philike, 119
 Hildesheim, 81
 Hindersin, Gustav Eduard von, 349
 Hobel, Max, 362
 Hochberg, counts of, 107
 Hoche, Lazare, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27
 Hochstadt, 32
 Hofer, Andreas, 52, 53
 Hoffmann, Joh. Gottfried, 102
 Hogendorp, Iyrk van, 65
 Holcengeroldseck, 107
 Hohenlinden, 33
 Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Adolf von, 279
 Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Kraft zu, 349
 Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Hermann von, prince, 372
 Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Chlodwig zu, 316, 327, 329, 355, 371, 372
 Hohenzollern, House of, 46, 330, 331
 Holabrunn, 42
 Holstein, 290, 295
 Holstein-Gottorp, 56
 "Holy alliance," 87, 88, 92, 109, 167
 Hondscote, 20
 Hotel de Ville, Paris, 378
 Houchard, general, 15, 20
 Houtman, Cornelis de, 404
 Hubner, J. A., 250
 Hudson's Bay, 390
 Hugo, Gustav, 89
 Hugo, Victor, 128, 137, 158, 215, 216, 313
 Humbert I, king of Italy, 383
 Humboldt, Alexander von, 90
 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 62, 75, 76, 102, 108, 110, 112, 125
 Huneburg, count. See VANDAMME
 "Hungarian Legion," 318
 Hungary, 42, 50, 97, 184, 197-207, 285, 291, 292, 318, 319, 325
 Huskisson, William, 125
 IBELL, KARL VON, 111
 Iberia, 394
 Ibrahim Pasha, 126

- Iceland, 388, 389, 390
 Idstedt, battle of, 210
 Illyrian kingdom, 81
 India, 28, 29, 33, 46, 93, 408
 Indians, North American, 390
 Indikopleustes, Co'smas. See COSMAS
 Inkerman, battle of, 246
 International, the, 328
 Ionian Islands, 27, 47, 93
 Ireland, 94, 321, 322, 375
 Irish Church, 322
 Iro, 373
 Isabella, queen of Spain, 169, 329
 Isandula, 376
 Isaszég, battle of, 206
 Isenburg-Büdingen, Gustav von, 296
 Isle d'Aix, 84
 Italy, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 41-44, 49, 53, 65, 68, 76, 85, 115-117, 149-150, 167, 170, 171, 180, 190-197, 247-254, 257-271, 290-292, 294, 304, 323, 325, 334, 335, 343, 382, 383
 Itzenplitz, H. von, 279
 Itzstein, Johann Adam von, 152

 JACOBIN CLUB, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17-19, 23, 32, 83
 Jaffa, 29
 Jagow, Gust. W. von, 279
 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 107, 111, 112
 Jameson, Leander Starr, 376
 Janissaries, 154
 Japan, 364
 Jassy, 119
 Jellacić, Joseph, 202-204, 206
 Jemappes, 16
 Jena, 45
 Jena, University of, 108
 Jesuits, 115, 119, 128, 129, 137, 138, 156-158, 171, 172, 240-242
 Jever, Germany, 47
 Jews, 101, 198
 Jitschin (Gitschin), 297, 299
 Joan of Arc, 38
 Johannesberg, 377
 John, archduke of Austria, 33, 162, 167, 199, 221, 223
 John VI, king of Portugal, 33, 115, 123, 124
 John, king of Saxony, 369
 Joinville, duke of, 176
 Jolly, Julius, 350, 370
 Joly de Fleury, Jean François, 5
 Jordan, Wilhelm, 222
 Joseph II, king of Belgium, 6
 Joseph II, emperor of Germany, 97, 241
 Josephine, empress of the French, 31, 40, 41, 53, 72, 84
 Joubert, general, 26, 29, 30
 Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, 20, 22, 26, 29
 Joux, 38

 Juan, bay of, 77
 Juarez, Benito, 273
 Junkers, 309
 Junot, Andoche, 49, 50
 Jura, 38

 KAISERSLAUTERN, 22
 Kalisch, 59
 Kalisch, proclamation of, 60
 Kalisch, treaty of, 61
 Kamenski, count, 46
 Kamptz, Karl C. A. H. von, 101, 110
 Kanaris, Konstantin, 121
 Kandern, 190
 Kanem, 376
 Kant, Immanuel, 90
 Kanzler, Hermann, 324
 Kapo d'Istria. See CAPODISTRIAS
 Kápolna, battle of, 206
 Kara Ali, 121
 Karlsefni, Thorfinn, 389
 Karlsruhe, 182
 Károlyi, Alois K. von, 283, 292
 Kars, fortress of, 246
 Kaschau, battle of, 206
 Kaso, 126
 Katzbach, 62
 Kaub, 67
 Kellermann, François Christophe de, general, 50
 Ketteler, Wilhelm Emanuel von, 365
 Keudell, Robert von, 330, 332
 Khartoum, 376
 Khosrew Pasha, 126
 Kiauchau, 364
 Kiel, 290
 Kimberley, 377
 Kirchhausen, Friedrich Leopold von, 102
 Kitchener, Lord Horatio Herbert, 376, 377, 378
 Klapka, Georg, 206, 207, 318
 Kleber, Jean Baptiste, general, 29, 30, 33
 Kleist, Heinrich von, 52, 63, 69, 70
 Klewitz, Wilhelm Anton von, 102, 103, 165
 Klopstock, 8
 Knights of St. John, 34, 37
 Knorr, Eduard von, 343
 Kolberg, 46
 Kolding, battle of, 209
 Kolokotroni, Theodore, 120
 Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, Franz Anton von, 167, 183
 Komorn, 206
 Königsberg, 47, 165
 Königgrätz, battle of, 300, 302
 Königstein, 62
 Könnertitz, Julius Traugott von, 187
 Körber, Ernst von, 347, 374
 Kopal, Karl von, 193, 194
 Körner, 256
 Körner, Theodor, 52, 65

 Kosel, 46
 Kosmas. See COSMAS
 Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 22
 Kossuth, Ludwig, 97, 168, 182, 184, 201-204, 206
 Kotzebue, August von, 110
 Kowno, 66
 Krasnoi, 57
 Kray, Paul, marshal, 30, 32
 Kremlin, the, 57
 Kremsier, Parliament of, 237
 Krismanic, Gideon von, 297-299
 Krudner, Juliane von, 87, 120
 Kruger, Paul, 376, 377
 Krumir, 383
 Kudlich, Hans, 203
 Kuhn von Kuhnfeld, Franz, 251, 304
 Kullmann, Eduard Franz Ludwig, 360
 Kulm, 63
 Kurshiv Pasha, 121
 Kutusoff. See GOLEMISHCHIEF
 Kuyper, Abraham, 386
 Kwang Hsu, emperor of China, 364
 Kydullen, 46

 LA BÉDOYÈRE, CHARLES A. F. H. DE, 77, 87
 Labrador, Pedro Gomez Kavelo, 75
 Lachat, E., 384
 Lacordaire, Jean Baptiste Henri, 129, 158
 Ladysmith, 377
 La Farina, Giuseppe, 268
 Lafayette, 4, 8, 10, 12-14, 73, 83, 131, 141, 142
 La Fère-Champenoise, 70
 La Ferronays, Auguste Pierre Fèrran de, 117, 122
 Laffite, Jacques, 129, 139, 140
 Lagarde, general, 87
 Lagos, 408
 La Granja, 169
 Laibach, Congress of, 88, 117-119
 Lainé, Joseph Henri Joachim, 67
 Lake Chad, 380
 Lally-Tollendal, Trophime Gérard de, 79
 La Marmora, Alfonso de, 292
 Lamartine, Alphonse de, 92, 128, 158, 179, 180
 Lamballe, princess, 15
 Lamberg, Franz Philipp von, 203, 204
 Lamennais, Hugues Félicité Robert de, 91, 129, 158, 159
 Lameth, Charles Malo François, 4
 Lamoricière, C. L. Juchauld de, 176, 214, 219
 Langenhof, 301
 Langensalza, 296
 Langres, highlands of, 67
 Languedoc, 74
 Lanjuinais, Jean Denis, 80

- Lannes, general**, 42, 52
Lanza, Giovanni, 250
Laon, 69, 83, 344
Laréveillère-Lepeaux, 25
Laroche foucauld-Liancourt, duke of, 8
La Rothière, France, 68
Las Casas, Emmanuel A. D. M. J de, 85
Lasker, Eduard, 309
Lassalle, Ferdinand, 160, 328, 361
Latour, count, 204
Lauenburg, 55, 81, 290
Laufach, 303
Lavalette, Charles Jean Marie Félix de, 302
Lavater, 28
Law, John, 5
Lebas, 21, 22
Leboeuf, Edmond, marshal, 326, 328, 336, 338
Lebrun, Barthélemy Louis Joseph, 328
Lebrun, Charles François, 31
Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste, 178-180, 190, 214
Lefebvre, marshal, 71
Leflô, 343
Leghorn, 26, 48, 76
Lehmann, Gertrude, 151
Leiningen, Friedrich Karl, prince of, 223
Leipsic, 63, 65, 163
Lelewel, Joachim, 148
Le Mans, 348
Leo XII, pope, 99, 116, 129, 149, 158, 159
Leo XIII, pope, 360, 379
Leo, Heinrich, 174
Leoben, 26
Leopardi, Giacomo, 170
Leopold, archduke of Austria, 299
Leopold, regent of Bavaria, 350, 369
Leopold I, king of the Belgians, 96, 146, 154
Leopold II, king of the Belgians, 386
Leopold, prince of Coburg. See LEOPOLD I, king of the Belgians
Leopold I, emperor of Germany, 40
Leopold II, emperor of Germany, 12, 14
Leopold, prince of Hohenzollern, 329-332, 380
Leopold II, grand duke of Tuscany, 115, 195
Le Sourd, Georges, 333
Letourneur, Charles Louis François Honoré, 25
Leu, Peter, 172
Li Hung Chang, 364
Lichnowski, Felix, 222, 224
Liebenstein, Ludwig August Friedrich, 110
Liebertwolkwitz, 63
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 361
Liege, 385
Ligny, 82
Ligurian Republic, 36, 41
Lille, 78
Liliuokalani, queen of the Sand-wich Islands, 381
Limburg-Styrum, count, 65
Lindenau, Bernhard August, 152
Lindet, 21
Lindner, 125
Lipa, 301
Lippe-Biesterfeld, Ernst zur, 372
Lisbon, 52, 403
Lissa, 304
List, Friedrich, 113, 163
Liverpool, lord, 80, 96
Livorno, 195
Lloyd shipping company, 98
Löhner, 204
Loigny, 348
Lombardy, 26, 27, 98, 253
Lombok, 387
Lomellina, 196
Loménie de Brienne, Étienne Charles de, 5, 6, 24, 68
London, 33
London conference, 166, 289
London convention, 1884, 376
London, treaty of, 127
Longwood, 85
Löning, Karl, 111
Lons-le Saulnier, 78
Lords, House of, 322
Lorencez, count, 273
Lorraine, 9, 84, 305, 337, 342
Loubet, Emile, 379
Louis, count of Aquila, 268
Louis, archduke of Austria, 168, 183
Louis I, grand duke of Baden, 110
Louis I, king of Bavaria, 91, 106, 163, 181
Louis II, king of Bavaria, 107, 293, 314, 334, 350, 351, 369
Louis XII, king of France, 34
Louis XIV, king of France, 31, 40, 405
Louis XV, king of France, 2
Louis XVI, king of France, 2, 3, 5-7, 10-14, 16, 21, 53
Louis XVII, dauphin of France, 17, 21, 23
Louis XVIII, king of France, 11, 30, 39, 69, 71-74, 76-78, 83-86, 87, 88, 110, 121, 124
Louis I, grand duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, 105
Louis III, grand duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, 372
Louis IV, grand duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, 372
Louis, prince of Parma, 33
Louis Napoleon, son of Napoleon III, 337, 376
Louis Philippe, king of the French, 77, 118, 131, 140-143, 176-180
Louise, duchess of Montpensier. See MONTPENSIER, duchess of
Louise, queen of the Belgians, 146
Louise, queen of Denmark, 208, 239
Louise, queen of Prussia, 41, 47, 53, 54, 59
Louise Marie Adelaide of Pen-thièvre, 140
Louisiana, 33, 38
Loustalot, Elisée, 11
Louvel, Louis Pierre, 110
L'Ouverture, Toussaint, 38
Louvois, 34
Lowe, Sir Hudson, 85
Löwe, Wilhelm, 222
Lübeck, 65
Lucca, 36, 41, 68, 81, 115
Lucchesini, 23
Lucerne, 172
Luden, Heinrich L., 103
Luderitz, Franz Adolf Eduard, 304
Lueger, Karl, 374
Luneville, 33, 40, 42
Lusatia, 297
Lusigny, 68
Lutz, Johann von, 359, 369
Luxembourg, 138, 146, 312, 334
Lyons, 17, 18, 23, 69, 77, 87, 159, 177
Lyons, Lord, 333
Lyttelton, Sir Neville, 378
MAASSEN, KARL GEORG, 102, 114
Macdonald, marshal, 30, 58, 62, 63, 71, 72, 77
Mack, Karl von, 42
McKinley, William, 381, 382
MacMahon, Marie Edmé Patrice Maurice de, 251, 336-338, 340, 341, 343, 378, 379
Macedonia, 153
Madagascar, 380
Madeira, 394, 398
Madrid, 33, 49-52, 65
Mafeking, 377
Mafia, 382
Magalhaes, 400, 401
Magdala, 323
Magdeburg, 64
Magellan, Straits of, 402, 408
Magersfontein, 377
Magnan, Bernard Pierre, 219
Magnano, 30
"Mahdi," the, 376
Mahmud II, Sultan, 56, 119
Mahmud Dramali, 121
Maire, 69
Maistre, Joseph de, 90, 92
Maitland, Sir Frederick Lewis, 84
Majuba Hill, 376
Malakoff, 246
Malebrancche, 3
Malesherbes, 3, 6, 16

- Malet, Claude François de, 57, 60
Mallet du Pan, 14
Malmaison, 84
Malmesbury, lord, 334
Malmö, armistice of, 209, 224
Malo-Jaroslavetz, 57
Mallon, Jules, 385
Malouet, 7
Malta, 28, 32-34, 38, 93
Mamelukes, 28
Manchester, 94
Manila, 381
Manin, Daniele, 192, 250, 259
Manin, Lodovico, 192
Mannheim, 26, 30, 67, 182
Manteuffel, Edwin von, 279, 281, 296, 303, 347-349, 371
Manteuffel, Otto von, 235
Mantua, 26, 30, 192
Manuel, Louis Pierre, 13
Manzoni, Alessandro, 91
Marat, 9, 11, 16, 17
Marco Polo. See POLO
Marengo, 32
Maret, Hugo Bernard, 68
Marfori, Carlos, 329
Maria Carolina, queen of Naples, 116
Maria Christina, queen of Spain, 1806-78, 169
Maria Christina, queen of Spain, mother of Alfonso XIII, 381
Maria Feodorovna, empress, 53
Maria II, da Gloria, queen of Portugal, 124
Maria Louisa, queen of Spain, 17
Maria Ludovica, empress, 53, 75
Maria Theresia, empress, 1, 97
Marianne Islands, 364, 381
Marie, queen of Bavaria, 286
Marie Antoinette, queen of France, 2, 11-13, 18
Marie Louise, empress of the French, 53, 60, 68, 70-72, 80, 81, 115
Marie Thérèse, duchess of Angoulême. See ANGOULÊME
Marinus of Tyre, 399
Markland, 389
Marmont, Auguste, F. L. V. de, 30, 63, 69-71, 77, 131, 139, 140
Maroto, Raphael, 169
Marquesas Islands, 176
Marrac, castle of, 49
Marsailles, 15, 17, 23, 87, 218
Marshall Islands, 364
Martignac, Jean Baptiste, S. G. de, 129, 137
Martinez de la Rosa, Francisco, 169
Marwitz, Friedrich von der, 46, 101
Marx, Karl, 160, 361
Masella, Gaetano A., 360
Masséna, André, 29, 30, 32
Massillon, 3
Massowah, 383
Matamoros, Manuel, 158
Mathy, Karl, 181, 182, 190, 222, 229, 280, 314
Maubeuge, 84
Maupas, Charlemagne Émile de, 219
Maurepas, Jean F. P. de, 3-5
Mavrogordato, Alexander, 120, 121
Maximilian, archduke of Austria. See MAXIMILIAN, emperor of Mexico
Maximilian II, king of Bavaria, 182
Maximilian, emperor of Mexico, 250, 273, 313, 314
Maximilian, prince of Thurn and Taxis, 285
Maximilian I, Joseph, king of Bavaria, 63, 80, 106
Maybach, Albert, 368
Mayence, 15, 27, 32, 37, 40, 45, 60, 64, 103, 305
Maythény, Josef von, 206
Mazarin, cardinal, 3
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 171, 180, 181, 193, 217, 257, 258, 260, 262, 263, 266
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 105, 239
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 105
Mediterranean, 388, 389, 392, 393, 397, 400, 403, 404, 410
Mehemet Ali, 126, 165, 176
Meiningen, House of, 308
Mejia, Tomas, 313
Melas, marshal, 30, 32
Melden, Ludwig von, 206
Menelik, king of Abyssinia, 383
Menotti, Ciro, 149
Menou, general, 33
Menschikoff, prince, 244-246
Mensdorff-Pouilly, Alexander, 290, 291, 293
Mercier de Lostende, H., 331
Mergentheim, 37
Mermillod, Kaspar, 384
Merseburg, 60
Messenhauser, Wenzel, 205
Messina, 39
Metternich, Clemens Wenzel von, 52, 53, 56, 58-60, 71, 75, 76, 78, 80, 88, 92, 96-98, 100, 108-113, 116, 117, 122, 130, 135, 142, 146, 149, 153, 157, 161, 162, 166-168, 172, 182-184, 207
Metternich, Richard Clement Joseph Hermann von, 293, 335
Metz, 336-338, 340, 342, 346, 371
Mexico, 123, 273, 313, 409
Meza, Christian Julius de, 289
Miaouli, Andreas Voko, 121
Michaelis, Otto, 309
Michelis, Friedrich, 359
Michelet, 1
Middelburg, 374
Mieroslawski, Louis, 213, 230
Miguel, Dom, 123, 124, 168
Milan, 26, 30, 382
Milan, battle of, 195
Milan, revolt of, 250
Miloslaw, battle of, 213
Millerand, Alexandre, 363, 379
Milner, Lord Alfred, 376, 377
Mina, Xaverio, 114
Mincio, 32
Minden, fortress of, 307
Miquel, Johannes von, 311, 356, 368, 369
Mirabeau, 4, 6-12, 24, 38, 86
Miramon, Miguel, 313
Missolonghi, siege of, 126
Missunde, battle of, 210
Mitau, 32
Mittelmaier, Karl Anton, 222
Mittermayer, Anton, 187
Mittermayer, Karl Joseph, 152
Mittnacht, Hermann von, 351, 370
Mockern, 60, 63
Modena, 26, 149, 253, 262, 264
Moga, Johann, 204, 205
Mögling, 190
Mohammedanism, 397
Mohl, Robert von, 222, 223
Moldavia, 246
Molé, Louis Matthieu, 178
Moller, Eduard von, 371
Mollinary von Monte Pastello, Anton, 301
Moltke, Helmuth von, 277, 291, 295-297, 299, 300, 303, 332, 336, 337, 340, 349
Monroe doctrine, 381, 409
Montalembert, Charles Forbes de, 129, 158, 215, 327
Montbéliard, 352
Monte Berico, battle of, 194
Montebello, 32
Monterea, battle of, 68
Montesquieu, 2, 16
Montez, Lola, 181, 182
Montgelas, Max Josef, 106
Montmédy, 340, 344
Montmirail, battle of, 68
Montholon-Sémonville, 85
Montpensier, duchess of, 167
Montpensier, duke of, 176, 330
Moor, battle of, 206
Moors in Spain, 403
Moravia, 42, 164, 297, 320
Mordini, Antonio, 268
Morea, 120
Moreau, Jean Victor, general, 26, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 63
Morny, Charles Auguste Louis Joseph de, 219
Morocco, 380
Mortara, 195
Mortefontaine, 32
Mortemart, C. L. V. de Rochecouart, 131
Mortier, Edouard A. C. J., 38, 70, 177
Moscow, 57, 65, 70
Motz, Friedrich Christian Adolf von, 114
Mounier, 7
Mount Tabor, 29, 31

- Mühler, Heinrich von, 279, 358
 Mülbe, 297
 Mülhausen, 371
 Müller, Adam, 90, 92, 174
 Müller, Johannes von, 8, 90
 Müller, Wilhelm, 124
 Münchengrätz, 299
 Munich, 32, 42
 Münster-Ledenburg, Ernst
 Friedrich Herbert, 60, 80, 104
 Murat, Joachim, 33, 42, 49, 57,
 64, 65, 68, 73, 116, 170, 256
 Murat, prince, 260
 Muraviev, general, 246
 Muravjev, Michael, 273
 Mytilene, 380

 NACHOD, battle of, 298
 Nakimoff, admiral, 244
 Nangis, battle of, 68
 Nantes, 18
 Napier, Charles, 168
 Napier, Lord Robert, 323
 Naples, 26, 29, 49, 50, 81, 116,
 256, 257
 Napoleon I, 14, 20, 24-36, 38-58,
 60-75, 77-87, 91, 109, 119, 134,
 176, 407
 Napoleon II, 58, 70, 71, 80, 83,
 143
 Napoleon III, 150, 176, 215-220,
 242-255, 259-265, 267-274,
 291, 293-295, 302-305, 311-
 314, 323-326, 329, 330, 332,
 334-337, 341
 Napoleon, prince, 250, 302
 Narvaez, Ramon Maria, 169
 Naselli, 117
 Nassau, 107, 189, 296, 305-307
 Nassau-Weilburg, prince of, 80
 Natal, 377
 National Liberal Party, 309
 Nauplia, 126
 Navarino, battle of, 127
 Navarre, 10
 Naviglio, battle of, 251
 Nebenius, Karl Friedrich, 107,
 113
 Necker, Jacques, 4-12
 Neerwinden, 17
 Negri, Theodore, 120
 Neipperg, 72
 Nelson, 28, 29, 42
 Nemours, duke of, 179
 Nesselrode, Karl Robert, 108,
 122
 Netherlands, 22, 30, 34-38, 47,
 54, 65, 67, 76, 145, 146, 386-
 387, 402-405, 407
 Neubreisach, 344
 Neubrunn, 303
 Neuenberg, principality of, 173,
 248
 Neuville, Hyde de, 128
 New Guinea, 364
 New Lanark, 94, 160
 Ney, Michel, 61-63, 71, 72, 77,
 82, 87
 Nice, 16, 26, 294

 Nicholas I, czar of Russia, 127,
 143, 146, 167, 209, 232, 236,
 243, 244, 246
 Nicholas II, czar of Russia, 377
 Nicolovius, Ludwig, 102
 Niebuhr, Barthold Georg, 89, 99,
 101, 112
 Niel, Adolphe, 251, 324, 326
 Nigra, Constantin, 326
 Nile, 398
 Nismes, 87
 Nizza, 250, 265
 Nobiling, Karl, 362
 Nokk, Wilhelm, 371
 Nola, 116
 Nollendorf, 63
 Normann-Ehrenfels, count, 121
 Norsemön, 388, 389
 North, lord, 96
 North German Confederation,
 82, 303, 306-317, 324, 328,
 342, 350
 North Sea, 53, 82, 397, 404
 Norway, 56, 61, 67
 Norwegians, 403
 Novalis, 91
 Novara, battle of, 118, 196
 Novi, 30
 Nugent, Laval, 194
 Nuits, 348
 Nunziante, Alessandro, 268

 O'CONNELL, DANIEL, 126
 Oglio, 26
 Oldenburg, 55, 105; 163, 231
 Ollech, Karl Rudolf, 277
 Ollivier, Émile, 313, 326-328,
 331, 333, 338
 Olmütz, 204, 297, 303
 Olmütz, stipulation of, 235
 Omdurman, 376
 Omer Vronis, 126
 Orange Free State, 375, 377
 Orléans, 348
 Orléans, duchess of, 179
 Orléans, duke of. See LOUIS
 PHILIPPE, king of the French
 Orléans, duke of (called *Egalité*),
 6, 10, 21, 79, 87, 140
 Orléans, duke of (son of Louis
 Philippe), 177
 Orléans, House of, 139
 Orloff, prince, 244, 245
 Orsini, Felice, 249
 Ortlöpp, Emilie, 151
 Ostrolenka, battle of, 148
 Osten-Sacken, Fabian von der, 70
 Osterach, 29
 Osterode, 46
 Ostin, Charles Emmanuel
 Leclerc d', 38
 Otto I, king of Greece, 154, 155
 Oudinot, Nicolas Charles, 54, 62,
 69, 71
 Oudinot, Nicolas Charles Victor,
 196, 217
 Overbeck, Friedrich, 91
 Oversee, battle of, 289
 Owen, Robert, 94, 160

 PAARDEBERG, 377
 Pacthod, Michel Marie, 70
 Padua, 13, 16
 Pagès, Étienne Garnier, 178
 Pagès, Louis Garnier, 179
 Pahlen, Peter, 70
 Palacky, Franz, 212
 Palatinate, 229
 Palermo, 29, 267
 Palestine, 244
 Palestro, 251
 Palfy of Erdöd, count, 192
 Palikao, Charles de, 338, 340,
 342
 Pallavicino-Trivulzio, Giorgio,
 270
 Palli, Ettore Carlo Lucchesi, 142
 Palmi, Johann Philipp, 45
 Palmella, Pedro, 115
 Palmerston, lord, 176, 248, 265,
 272
 Panama canal, 379, 390
 Pan-Slavism, 210-212
 Pan-Slavonic states, 211
 Paoli, Pasquale, 24
 Paris, 5, 6, 8-10, 13, 14, 16, 21,
 24, 25, 30, 33, 34, 37, 45, 51,
 68-70, 72, 78, 79, 83-85, 346,
 349, 352-354
 Paris, count of, 179
 Paris, treaty of, 55, 75, 83, 246,
 346, 406, 408
 Paris International Exhibition,
 314
 Parma, 26, 33, 36, 41, 81, 115,
 150, 253, 264
 Parma, duchy of, 72
 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 375
 Parsdorf, 32
 Parthenopean republic, 29
 Particularist Party, 316
 Paskevitch-Eriwanaki, Ivan
 Feodvitch, 127, 148, 206
 Paul I, czar of Russia, 29, 32, 33
 Paunsdorf, 63
 Pavia, José Manuel, 329
 Pedro I, emperor of Brazil, 123,
 168
 Pedro II, emperor of Brazil, 168
 Peel, Robert, 95, 126
 Peking, 365
 Pellew Islands, 381
 Pellico, Silvio, 91, 119, 170
 Pepe, Florestan, 117
 Pepe, Guglielmo, 116, 118
 Pepoli, Napoleone di, 262
 Perezel, Moritz, 206
 Périer, Casimir, 139
 Péronne, 349
 Persano, Carlo Pellion di, 267,
 268, 304
 Persia, 29
 Persigny, Jean Gilbert Victor
 Fialin de, 219
 Perugia, 262
 Peschiera, 194, 195
 Pestel, Eduard von, 337
 Pestel, Paul, 127
 Peta, battle of, 121

- Peter, grand duke of Oldenburg, 372
- Peter Frederick Louis, duke of Oldenburg, 55
- Peter the Great, czar of Russia, 2
- Pétion, 13-15
- Petit, Jean Martin, 72
- Peucker, Eduard von, 223
- Peyronnet, Charles Ignace de, 130, 131
- Pfalzburg, 344
- Pfizer, Paul, 164, 186
- Pfordten, L. R. Heinrich von der, 231, 293
- Pfuehl, Ernst von, 225
- Philippines, 381, 382
- Phoenicians, 393, 394
- Piacenza, 36, 41, 72
- Piadha, 121
- Piechgru, Charles, 22, 26, 27, 38, 39
- Piedmont, 33, 84, 118, 250, 257
- Pietri, Joachim, 260
- Pillars of Hercules, 388, 394
- Pillersdorf, Franz von, 184, 198, 199
- Pillnitz, Saxony, 13, 16
- Piombino, 41
- Pitt, William, the elder, 17, 31, 38, 41, 44
- Pitt, William, the younger, 92, 93
- Pitteurs-Hiegaerts, F. de, 385
- Pius VI, pope, 12, 17, 28
- Pius VII, pope, 29, 34, 40, 41, 49, 54, 59, 66, 68, 81, 85, 91, 99, 116, 156
- Pius VIII, pope, 99, 149
- Pius IX, pope, 195, 217, 256, 259, 261, 264, 269-271, 321, 324, 327, 329, 335, 360
- Plébiscite, 326, 327
- Plener, Ignaz von, 321
- Plombières, 250
- Poischwitz, armistice of, 61
- Podol, 299
- Podolia, 148
- Poland, 12, 27, 46, 53, 57, 59, 61, 64, 109, 146-149, 198, 210-213, 272-273, 358
- Polignac, duchess of, 5
- Polignac Armand de, 39
- Polignac, Jules de, 39, 86, 129, 130, 137, 139
- Polo, Marco, 399
- Pölsenberg, Ernst von, 206
- Polybius, 393
- Pomerania, 46, 60
- Pomerania, Swedish, 48, 81
- Poniatowski, Joseph, 63
- Port Arthur, 364
- Port Noyelles, 349
- Portugal, 29, 38, 47-50, 54, 62, 114, 115, 123, 168, 169, 242, 401-405
- Poscherun, 58
- Poseidonius, 398
- Posen, 149, 212, 213
- Potsdam, 42, 45, 56, 59
- Pozzo di Borgo, Carlo Andrea, 47, 66, 67, 70, 88, 108, 122, 131, 178
- Pragmatic sanction, 169, 203
- Prague, 199, 211, 212
- Prague, peace congress of, 61
- Prague, treaty of, 304, 306, 314, 328, 329
- Frankh, Sigmund von, 315
- Pressburg, 43
- Pressburg, battle of, 206
- Prester John, 398
- Pretoria, 377
- Pretoria Convention, 376
- Prieur, Pierre Louis, called Prieur de la Marne, 21
- Prim, Juan, 329-331
- Prinsloo, Marthinus, 377
- Prittitz, M. K. E. von, 185
- Probst, Rudolph, 316
- Probstheida, 63
- Progressive Party, Prussia, 290
- Prokesch-Osten, Anton von, 231
- Proudhon, P. J., 214
- Provence, 72
- Prussia, 3, 12, 14, 17, 22, 23, 25-27, 29, 32, 37-47, 50-52, 54, 56, 59-63, 75, 76, 81, 98-103, 136, 156, 162, 163, 173-175, 184-186, 188-190, 224-226, 230-232, 273-283, 290, 292-294, 296, 299, 303, 305, 307, 313, 314, 318, 333, 334, 343, 359, 366, 367
- Psara, 126
- Ptolemy, Claudius, 390
- Puchner, Anton von, 206
- Puerto Rico, 381, 405
- Pulszky, Franz, 168
- Pultusk, 46
- Pushkin, Alexander, 109
- Pytheas of Massilia, 393
- QUATREBRAS, 82
- Quinet, 2
- Quiroga, Antonio, 114, 115
- RAAN, battle of, 206
- Radetzky, Johann Joseph, 171, 190-196, 199, 227
- Radowitz, Joseph von, 184, 222
- Radziwill, Anton, 331
- Radziwill, Michael, 148
- Raglan, lord, 245
- Rainer, archduke of Austria, 97, 171
- Raleigh, Sir Walter, 404
- Ramel, Jean Pierre, 87
- Ramming von Riedkirchen, Wilhelm, 252, 298
- Ramorino, Girolamo, 148, 195
- Ranke, Leopold von, 89, 275
- Raspail, François Vincent, 214
- Rastatt, 229
- Rastatt, congress of, 27, 28, 30
- Ratisbon, 37, 43, 44
- Ratisbon, diet of, 37
- Rattazzi, Urbano, 250, 259, 261, 263, 264, 323, 324
- Ratzel, Friedrich, 411
- Raumer, Friedrich von, 89
- Raumer, Karl von, 108
- Rauschenplat, Johann E. A., 153
- Rauscher, Joseph Othmar von, 320, 335
- Raveaux, Karl, 222
- Rechberg, Johann Bernhard, 270, 273, 275, 283, 284, 288, 290
- Redshid Pasha, 126
- Referendum, 384
- Reform bill, 1866, 321
- Reform bill, 1867, 322
- Reichenbach, 61
- Reichenberg, 297
- Reichensperger, August, 241
- Reichensperger, Peter Franz, 241
- Reichstadt, duke of. See NAPOLEON II
- Reimer, Georg Andreas, 111
- Reinkens, Joseph Hubert, 359
- Reitzenstein, Siegmund von, 107
- Renan, Ernest, 255
- Repnin-Wolkonski, Nicholas, 64
- "Reptile" Fund. See GUELPH FUND
- Republican calendar, 19
- Reuss, House of, 308
- Reuter, Fritz, 153
- Rewbell, Jean François, 25
- Rowentlow, Friedrich, 210
- Rheims, 69, 344
- Rhenish confederation, 46, 47, 51-53, 55, 56, 58, 60, 64, 66
- "Rhenish Mercury," 76
- Rhenish Palatinate, 305
- Rhine frontier, 248
- Ricasoli, Bettino, 261, 271
- Richelieu, cardinal, 3, 5, 10
- Richelieu, Armand Emmanuel du Plessis de, 84, 87, 108, 109, 110
- Richter, Eugen, 363
- Ried, 63
- Rieger, Ladislaus, 212
- Riego y Nunez, Rafael del, 114, 115, 121, 123
- Rieti, battle of, 118
- Rio, treaty of, 124
- Rivarola, cardinal, 149
- Roberts, lord, 377
- Robespierre, 12, 13, 15, 22, 25, 31
- Robilant, Carlo F. N., 383
- Roche fort, Henri, 343
- Roche fort, France, 84
- Rochambeau, 4
- Rochejacquelein, 80
- Rockefeller, John, 382
- Röderer, 13
- Roger-Ducos. See Ducos
- Roggenbach, Franz von, 280
- Rohan, cardinal, 3
- Roland, Madame, 13, 14
- Rolica, Portugal, 50
- Romagna, 253, 257, 262, 382
- Roman republic, 28
- Romano, Liborio, 268
- Romans, 394

- Romanticism, 89, 91
 Rome, 3, 28, 35, 49, 53, 68, 217, 269, 270, 323, 324, 329, 335
 Romer, Friedrich, 186
 Ronge, Johannes, 157, 204
 Roon, Albrecht Theodor Emil von, 279, 281, 332, 341, 349, 367
 Roothaan, Johann Philipp van, 156
 Rosen-Gnesen, province of, 157
 Rossbach, battle of, 2
 Rossbrunn, 303
 Rossi, Pellegrino de, 217, 256
 Rostopchin, Fedor, 57, 86
 Rothschild, Jacob, 131
 Rotondo, Monte, 324
 Rotteck, Karl von, 90, 110, 152
 Rouen, 348
 Rouher, Eugène, 302, 313, 326
 Roumania, 249
 Roumanians, 319
 Roumelia, 47
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 2, 6, 12, 18-20, 90
 Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 128, 130
 Rozycki, 148
 Rückert, 256
 Rudiger, Fedor W., 207
 Rudini, Antonio, 382
 Ruge, Arnold, 222
 Rügen, island of, 67
 Rumjanzoff, Nicholas, 53
 Rump parliament, 229
 Russia, 22, 29, 33, 38-42, 44-46, 50, 53, 55, 57-63, 67, 75, 79-81, 84, 85, 87, 126, 128, 206, 224, 243-247, 314, 318, 334, 335, 343, 346, 347, 364, 380
 Ruthenians, Galician, 320
 Rybinski, Mathias, 148
 SAALFELD, 45
 Saarbrücken, 84, 337
 Saarlouis, 84
 Sack, Johann August, 100
 St. Aignan, August de, 66
 Saint-André, Jean Bon, 21
 St. Angelo, fortress of, 49
 Saint-Arnaud, Jacques Leroy de, 219, 245
 St. Cloud, 11, 31, 73, 352
 St. Dizier, 68, 69
 St. Helena, 48, 83-85, 406
 Saint-Huruge, Victor A. de la F. de, 10
 St. Jean d'Acre, 29
 St. Just, Louis Antoine Léon de, 16, 18, 20-22
 St. Petersburg, 8, 37, 56
 St. Quentin, 349
 Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy de, 159
 Salamanca, 65
 Salazar, J. Allende, 329, 330
 Salm, prince of, 55
 Salvandy, Narcisse Achille, 128
 Salzburg, 43, 103, 314
 Samoan Islands, 364, 382
 Sampson, W. T., 381
 San Domingo, 23, 38
 Sand, Karl Ludwig, 110
 Sandwich Islands, 381
 Sanfedists, 149, 258
 Santa Lucia, battle of, 193
 Santo Caserio, 379
 Santa Lucia, W. I., 408
 Santiago, Cuba, 381
 Saragossa, 52
 Sardinia, 26, 29, 49, 76, 81, 246, 249
 Savary, Anna Jean Marie René, duke of Rovigo, 48
 Savigny, Friedrich Karl von, 89
 Savigny, Karl Friedrich von, 295
 Savona, 52, 54, 67
 Savoy, 14, 16, 22, 26, 250, 260
 Saxe-Koburg, 113
 Saxony, 26, 45, 46, 50, 60, 64, 75, 81, 105, 152, 229, 239, 295, 297, 304, 307, 309, 369, 370
 Sayn-Wittgenstein, Ludwig Adolf Peter von, 59
 Sayn-Wittgenstein-Hohenstein, Wilhelm zu, 101, 110
 Scharnhorst, Gerhard David von, 56, 59
 Scharnhorst, Johann David von, 100
 Scheveningen, 65
 Schill, Ferdinand von, 46
 Schiller, 90
 Schlegel, August Wilhelm von, 91
 Schlegel, Friedrich, 91
 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel, 45, 101, 111
 Schleinitz, Alexander von, 253, 274
 Schleswig, 290
 Schleswig, battle of, 209
 Schleswig-Holstein, 207-210, 224, 233, 239, 283, 286-291, 294, 295, 304, 308, 359, 367
 Schlettstadt, 344
 Schley, Winfield Scott, 381
 Schlick, Franz, 206
 Schlosser, Fr. Chr., 89
 Schlözer, August Ludwig von, 8
 Schmalz, Theodor Anton Heinrich, 101
 Schmerling, Anton von, 223, 226, 227, 237, 238, 285, 291, 318
 Schmidt-Phiseldek, C. von, 88
 Schneider, Eugène, 343
 Schneider, Eulogius, 8
 Schön, 100
 Schönbrunn, 42, 43, 52, 53
 Schönerer, Georg, 373
 Schönfeld, 63
 Schuckmann, Friedrich von, 101
 Schulze, Johannes, 102
 Schuselka, 204
 Schütte, Anton, 205
 Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, 113
 Schwarzenberg, Felix, 204, 227, 228, 233, 235-238, 244, 254
 Schwarzenberg, Friedrich von, 335
 Schwarzenberg, Karl Philipp von, 58, 60, 62, 63, 67, 69, 82
 Schwechat, battle of, 205
 Schweidnitz, 225
 Schwerin, Maximilian von, 185, 223, 274
 Schwyz, 172
 Scott, Walter, 91
 Sebastopol, 245
 Secret societies, Russia, 127
 Sedan, 340-342
 Sedlnitzky, Leopold von, 157
 Seine, department of, 71
 Sekko, battle of, 120
 Selim III, sultan, 22, 28, 29
 Seneca, 398
 Sepulveda, 115
 Serrano, Francisco, 329
 Servia, 202, 21, 245
 Shantung, 364
 Sheil, Richard, 126
 Siberia, 57
 Sicily, 29, 49, 81, 116, 117, 266, 267, 382
 Sidi Ali, Bey of Tunis, 380
 Sidi-Ferruch, 130
 Siegl, Franz, 190
 Sièyès, Emmanuel Joseph, 6-8, 10, 13, 30, 31, 36, 74
 Silesia, 42, 46, 62, 159, 175, 294, 312
 Silveira, José Xaverio Mousinho da, 115
 Silveira Pinto da Fonseca, Manoel de, 123
 Simon, Jules, 353
 Simon, Ludwig, 222
 Simson, Martin Eduard, 228, 229, 310, 352
 Simunich, Balthasar von, 206
 Sinope, harbour of, 244
 Sismondi, Simonde de, 89
 Skalit, battle of, 298, 299
 Skrzynecki, Jan Bonczu, 148
 Slav congress in Prague, 210-211
 Slave trade, abolition of, 93
 Slavonia, 201
 Slavs, 320
 Slobosia, 48
 Slovaks, 211
 Smidt, Johann, 105
 Smith, Adam, 90
 Smith, William Sidney, 29
 Smolensk, Russia, 57
 Smorgoni, Russia, 57
 Smuts, J. C., 377
 Social Democratic Party, Germany, 328, 334, 361-363, 370
 Social Democrats, Belgium, 385, 386
 Socialist Labour Party, 361

- Soiron, Franz von, 188
 Soissons, 68
 Solferino, battle of, 252, 284
 Solms-Laubach, Frederick, 75
 Sombart, Werner, 160
 Sommacampagna, 194
 Sona, 194
 Sonderbund war, 172
 Soult, marshal, 52, 61, 66, 69, 77
 South African Republic. See TRANSVAAL
 South America, 123, 406
 South-German confederation, 304, 311
 Spain, 23, 33, 38, 41, 44, 47-54, 61, 62, 65, 66, 114, 115, 121, 168, 169, 329, 331, 380-382, 401-405
 Speckbacher, Joseph, 52
 Speier, 15
 Speransky, Michail, 109, 127
 Spiegel zum Desenberg, Ferdinand August von, 157
 Stadion, Franz, 198
 Stadion, Johann Philipp Karl Joseph, 45, 50, 52, 61, 68, 98
 Staël, Madame de, 74
 Stahl, Friedrich Julius, 174, 232, 241
 Stanley, Sir Henry M., 386
 Staps, 53
 States of the Church, 324
 Steffens, Hendrik, 8, 108
 Stavenhagen, Friedrich, 277
 Stein, Karl von, 3, 38, 46, 50, 51, 54, 57-60, 65, 66, 75, 76, 89, 100, 101, 102, 107, 112, 256
 Steinmetz, Karl Friedrich von, 298, 301, 336, 340
 Stephan, archduke, 202
 Stephan, Heinrich, 317
 Sternberg diet, 105
 Stewart, lord, 117
 Stockach, 29
 Stockhausen, August von, 235
 Stoffel, Eugène G., 329
 Stolberg, Christian von, 8, 91
 Stourdza, Alexander, 109
 Strabo, 399
 Strangford, Percy Clinton Sydney Smythe, 122
 Strassburg, 336, 337, 371
 Stratford de Redcliffe, lord, 244
 Stratimirov, Georg, 202
 Strauss, David Friedrich, 158, 172, 255
 Streschewitz, battle of, 301
 Stroganoff, Paul, 86, 120
 Strossmayer, Joseph Georg, 335-337, 342, 344, 371
 Struve, Gustav von, 181, 182, 187, 189, 224
 Stuve, Johann Karl Tertern, 151
 Styria, 26, 164
 Suchet, Louis Gabriel, 61, 66, 69
 Suckow, Albert von, 315, 329, 351
 Sudán, 376
 Suez canal, 406, 411
 Suliotes, 121
 Sumatra, 387
 Suvaroff, Alexander, 22, 29, 30
 Swabia, 26, 29, 44
 Sweden, 12, 17, 32, 39, 40, 43, 46, 54, 56, 62, 67
 Swiepwald, 301
 Switzerland, 8, 17, 28-30, 34, 37, 38, 43, 68, 81, 171-173, 180, 383-384
 Sybel, Heinrich von, 234, 313, 329
 Syntagmatikoi, 154
 Syria, 29
 Széchenyi, Stephen, 97, 168, 184
 Szécsen, Nikolaus, 284, 285
 Szell, Koloman von, 374
 TAAFFE, EDUARD, 373
 Tahiti, 176
 Talavera, 52
 Talleyrand, 3, 12, 31, 32, 37, 39, 43, 44, 48, 49, 60, 70, 71, 73, 75-78, 83, 87, 93, 124, 129
 Tallien, Jean Lambert, 25, 74
 Talma, 51
 Tangier, 406
 Tann-Ratsamhausen, Ludwig, von der, 346, 347
 Tannegui, Ch. M., 178
 Taranto, Gulf of, 33
 Tarascon, 23
 Tauroggen, treaty of, 58
 Tausenau, Karl, 204
 Tchernaya, battle of, 246
 Tegethoff, Wilhelm von, 289, 304
 Tel-el-kebir, 376
 Temesvár, 205
 Teplitz, contract of, 66, 111
 Tettenborn, Karl von, 59, 107
 Teutonic order, 37
 Tewfik Pasha, 376
 Theodore II, king of Abyssinia, 322, 323
 Théot, Catharine, 21
 Thessaly, 153
 Thibaut, Justus, 89
 Thielmann, Johann Adolf von, 60
 Thierry, Augustin, 89
 Thiers, Adolphe, 129, 131, 139, 140, 165, 177, 215, 313, 323, 343, 353, 378
 Thistlewood, Arthur, 96
 Thomas, duke of Genoa, 329
 Thouvenel, Edouard Antoine, 263
 Thugut, Franz Maria von, 22, 25, 32, 33
 Thun, Leo von, 237
 Thun-Hohenstein, Karl von, 301
 Thuringia, 113, 163, 307
 Thurn, Georg, 194
 Tilsit, 34, 47, 48, 51, 55
 Tippoo Sahib, 29, 93
 Tisch, 91
 Tobago, 408
 Tobitschau, 303
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 155
 Togoland, 364
 Tolentino, 26, 81
 Toll, Karl, 70
 Tolly, Michael Barclay de, 56, 82
 Tolstoy, Peter, count, 48
 Tonkin, 380
 Tordesillas, convention of, 406
 Torok, Ignaz von, 206
 Torres Vedras, Portugal, 52
 Toscanelli, Paolo, 396, 399
 Toulon, 18, 20, 25, 27, 28, 84
 Toulouse, 5, 17, 69, 87
 Tours, 345
 Trachenberg, 61
 Trafalgar, 42
 Transpadane republic, 26
 Transvaal, 375, 376, 377, 378
 Transylvania, 200, 292, 319
 Trautenau, 299
 Trautenau, battle of, 298
 Trebbia, 30
 Trent, 193
 Trèves, 157
 Trianon, tariff of, 54
 Trieste, 98
 Triple Alliance, 325, 326, 335, 383
 Tripolitza, fortress of, 120
 Trocadero, fort, 123
 Trochu, Louis Jules, 843, 345, 352
 Tromp, Marten Harpertzoon, 403
 Tronchet, François Denis, 16
 Troppau, 88, 117
 Troppau, congress of, 117-119
 Troyes, 5, 70
 Tsze Hsi, empress of China, 365
 Tuam, prince, 365
 Tugendbund, 51
 Tuileries, the, 31, 57, 66, 78, 378
 Turco-Egyptian war, 165
 Turcos, 337
 Turgot, 3-5
 Turin, 171
 Turkey, 12, 17, 29, 34, 47, 51, 127, 138, 154, 243, 245, 246, 380
 Tuscany, 26, 33, 253, 261, 262
 Tuscany, grand duke of, 23
 Tuscany, grand duchess of. See BONAPARTE, ELIZA
 Twesten, Karl, 279, 309
 Tyrol, 26, 50, 52, 53, 164, 193, 304
 UDINE, 194
 Uhlund, Ludwig, 91, 229, 256
 Urrich, Jean Jacques, Alexis, 344
 Ujest, Hugo von Hohenlohe-Ohringen, duke of, 311
 Ulm, 42, 44
 Ultramarines, 316, 323, 327, 330, 359, 360

- Ulundi, 376
 Union Club, 95
 United States, 96, 273
 Unruh, Hans Victor von, 225
 Unterwalden, 172
 Uri, 172
- VALAIS**, 37, 55
 Valeggio, battle of, 193
 Valençay, 49, 66
 Valence, 25, 39
 Valmy, 15
 Vandamme, Dominique René, 63
 Vannutelli, Serafino, 385
 Varennes, 12
 Varnbuler, Friedrich G. K. von, 316
 Varnhagen von Ense, Karl August von, 107
 Vasco de Gama, 401
 Vauban, 5
 Vendée, La, 3, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 32, 78, 80
 Venedey, Jacob, 222
 Veneti, the, 394
 Venetia, 36, 293-295, 303
 Venezuela, 409
 Venice, 17, 26, 192, 194, 197, 397
 Verdun, 339, 344
 Vergniaud, 14-16
 Vernet, Horace, 72
 Verona, congress of, 88, 121, 122
 Versailles, 2-4, 8, 10
 Versen, Max von, 330
 Vicari, Hermann von, 240
 Vicenza, 194
 Victor, Claude Perrin, 52
 Victor Emanuel I, king of Italy, 196, 206, 249, 250, 253, 256, 259, 261-265, 267, 269, 293, 323, 325, 334, 383
 Victor Emmanuel I, king of Sardinia, 115, 118
 Victor Emanuel II, king of Sardinia. See VICTOR EMANUEL I, king of Italy
 Victoria, queen of England, 322
 Victoria, empress of Germany, 355
 Vienna, 23, 26, 42, 183
 Vienna, congress of, 74, 79-81, 96, 408
 Vienna, treaty of, 13, 60
 Világos, battle of, 207
 Viljoen, 377
 Villafranca, treaty of, 253, 260
 Villèle, Jean Baptiste Séraphin Joseph de, 121, 124, 128
 Vimiero, Spain, 50
 Vincennes, 39
 Vincke, Georg von, 175, 185, 222, 274
 Vineland, 388, 389
 Virchow, Rudolf, 359
 Vistula, 46
 Vitrolles, Eugène F. A. d'A. de, 69
- Vittoria, 61
 Vittoria, battle of, 65
 Vivaldi, Guido de, 398
 Vogel von Falckenstein, Eduard, 303
 Vogt, Karl, 222, 229
 Voigts-Rhetz, Konstantin Bernhard, 299, 307
 Volk, Joseph, 316
 Vollmar, Georg von, 363
 Vorarlberg, 29, 53
 "Vorparlament," 186-190
- WACHAU**, 63
 Wadai, 376
 Wagener, Hermann, 279
 Wagner, Rudolph von, 315
 Wagram, 52
 Walcheren, island of, 53
 Waldeck, Leo, 225
 Waldeck-Roussau, 379
 Waldemar, prince of Lippe-Detmold, 372
 Waldersee, Alfred von, 365
 Walewska, countess, 46
 Walewski, count, 262, 263
 Wallachia, 246
 Wallis, Joseph, 98
 Wallis, Switzerland, 172
 Wangenheim, Karl August von, 106, 125
 Warsaw, 46, 47, 53, 55, 56, 81, 147, 148
 Wartburg, 108
 Wartenburg, 63
 Washington, George, 34
 Waterloo, 80, 83
 Watt, James, 93
 Wattignies, 20
 Wavre, Belgium, 82
 Weber, Karl Maria von, 91
 Weber, Wilhelm, 151
 Weidig, Friedrich Ludwig, 153
 Weihaiwei, 364
 Weissenburg, 337
 Welcker, Karl Theodor, 90, 111, 152, 186, 188, 229
 Welden, Franz Ludwig, 194
 Wellesley, Sir Arthur. See WELLINGTON
 Wellesley, Richard Colley Wellesley, marquis of, 33
 Wellington, 50, 52, 54, 61, 65, 69, 82, 83, 108, 122, 126, 127, 129
 Werder, August von, 352
 Werder, Bernhard F. W. von, 344, 348
 Wertheim, 107, 303
 Werther, Karl von, 332
 Wessenberg, Johann Philipp von, 162, 199, 204, 227
 West Indies, 405
 Westphalia, 47, 54, 63, 64, 101, 156, 307
 Wet, Christian de, 377
 "White Terror," 23, 87
 Wielopoloki, marquis of, 272
- Wilberforce, William, 93
 Wilhelmina, queen of the Netherlands, 387
 Wilhelmshafen, 240
 Wilhelmshöhe, 341
 William, prince of Baden, 348
 William I, duke of Brunswick, 150, 372
 William I, German emperor, 174, 184, 230-232, 235, 239, 252, 274-283, 285, 286, 288, 292, 293, 295, 300, 302, 304, 306, 330-334, 342, 345, 349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 362
 William II, German emperor, 354, 355, 357, 365, 369, 370
 William IV, king of England, 168
 William I, elector of Hesse, 105
 William II, elector of Hesse, 105, 150
 William, duke of Nassau, 107
 William I, king of the Netherlands, 65, 81, 145, 146
 William III, king of the Netherlands, 312, 387
 William, prince of Prussia. See WILLIAM I, German emperor
 William, I, king of Wurtemberg, 70, 106
 William II, king of Wurtemberg, 370
 Willich, 190
 Willisen, Wilhelm von, 210
 Wilson, Daniel, 379
 Wilton, Tyrol, 52
 Wimpffen, 341
 Windisch-Graetz, 199, 204-206, 212, 225, 227, 252, 373
 Windthorst, Ludwig, 358
 Winkowo, Russia, 57
 Wintzingerode, Ferdinand von, 67, 68, 70
 Wittelsbach, House of, 22
 Wittenberg, University of, 102
 Wittgenstein. See SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN
 Wittich, Ludwig von, 346
 Witzleben, Job von, 101
 Wjasma, Russia, 57
 Wolhynia, 148
 Wokeley, lord, 376
 Worms, 15
 Worth, 337, 338
 Wrangel, Friedrich von, 209, 225, 289
 Wrede, Karl Philipp von, 55, 62, 63, 106
 Wurmser, Dagobert Sigismund von, 20
 Wurtemberg, 26, 32, 37, 42, 76, 80, 81, 103, 125, 189, 190, 239
- XIONS, BATTLE of**, 213
- YORCK, HANS DAVID LUDWIG VON, 58, 60, 63, 69, 70
 Young, Arthur, 4

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Ypsilanti, Alexander, 119, 120 | Zedlitz, Joseph Christian von, 97 | "Zollverein," 103, 161-166, 240, |
| Ypsilanti, Demetrius, 120 | Zedlitz, Robert von, 361 | 280, 289, 312, 315, 356 |
| | Zichy, Ferdinand, 192 | Zug, 172 |
| ZÄHRINGEN, HOUSE OF, 107 | Ziethen, Hans Ernst Karl von, | Zumala-Carregui, Thomas, 169 |
| Zanini, Peter, 199 | 83 | Zürich, 172 |
| Zastrow, Heinrich Adolf von, | Znaim, 52 | Zürich, canton of, 384 |
| 337, 348 | Zobel, general, 193 | Zürich, treaty of, 253, 261 |

